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1 The compilation of monthly literature reviews can be accessed in a pdf version or on our online database.

2 The JDC Literature Review provides summaries of recently published research to encourage the exchange of ideas on topics related to forced displacement. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the literature included in this review are entirely those of their authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Data Center, UNHCR, the World Bank, the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. For convenience, the literature review contains links to websites operated by third parties. The Joint Data Center and its affiliate organizations do not represent or endorse these sites or the content, services and products they may offer, and do not guarantee the accuracy or reliability of any information, data, opinions, advice or statements provided on these sites.

The report includes the following key statistics on internal displacement due to conflict and violence:

1. An estimated 45.7 million people were internally displaced as a result of conflict and violence at the end of 2019, the highest figure ever recorded. Five countries—Syria (6.5 million), Colombia (5.6 million), DRC (5.5 million), Yemen (3.6 million), Afghanistan (3 million)—account for more than half of the global total.

2. 8.5 million new displacements due to conflict and violence were recorded in 50 countries in 2019. The majority occurred in low and middle-income countries including large-scale internal displacement in Syria (1.8 million), DRC (1.7 million) and Ethiopia (1.1 million).

3. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) recorded the largest number of new displacements due to conflict (4.6 million). Escalating violence and deteriorating security in the Sahel region, particularly in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, caused many new displacements. In DRC, armed conflict and inter-communal violence resulted in nearly 1.7 million new displacements, mainly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu. In Ethiopia, more than a million people were displaced by conflict and violence. Ongoing conflict in Somalia and South Sudan also displaced hundreds of thousands of people. An estimated 19.2 million people in SSA were internally displaced due to conflict and violence at the end of 2019, the highest figure ever recorded for the region.

4. 2.6 million new displacements were recorded in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Protracted conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya led to an increase in displacement in the MENA region during 2019. Around 12.5 million people were internally displaced as a result of conflict and violence across the MENA region at the end of 2019.
This year’s report assesses efforts to prevent and respond to internal displacement in 2019, and identifies three critical success factors:

1. **Improved evidence.** Improvements in the quantity and quality of data available enabled better reporting and analysis, which in turn informed more effective responses and risk mitigation measures.

2. **Strengthened capacity.** Humanitarian and development actors demonstrated better coordination and increased investment.

3. **Political commitment.** New national initiatives showed greater levels of political commitment: Niger and Somalia improved their policy frameworks on internal displacement; Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines incorporated displacement in their development plans and in reporting on the Sustainable Development Goals, or when updating risk management strategies in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction; and Equatorial Guinea, Somalia and South Sudan ratified the Kampala Convention in 2019. At a global level, the UN Secretary General established the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement.

The authors of the report also identify the following lessons learned: (1) the recognition of internal displacement is a vital first step toward addressing it; (2) policies and programs may integrate internal displacement or be dedicated to it, but they should always align with national priorities; (3) regional and global initiatives act as catalysts for national commitment and local action; (4) effective local initiatives require more predictable and sustained funding; (5) existing tools can be used to provide planners and policymakers with evidence that goes beyond numbers; (6) improved collaboration is making data more available and accessible; and (7) accounting for displacement and reporting on progress is a vital tool in generating and sustaining political commitment.

**Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019**

UNHCR, 2020

[https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019/](https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019/)

The report presents data compiled by UNHCR on forced displacement in 2019 due to persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or events seriously disturbing public order. This year’s report includes analysis of displacement trends over the past decade.

Key findings include:
1. The number of forcibly displaced people reached a record high of 79.5 million at the end of 2019, including 45.7 million IDPs, 26.0 million refugees (20.4 million refugees under UNHCR’s mandate and 5.6 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA’s mandate), 4.2 million asylum-seekers, and 3.6 million Venezuelans displaced abroad. One percent of the world’s population is now forcibly displaced.

2. 11 million people were newly displaced (or newly registered) in 2019, comprising 8.6 million IDPs, 0.4 million refugees and 2.0 million asylum seekers.

3. Asylum-seekers submitted two million new individual applications in 2019, with the largest numbers of new individual applications reported in the United States, Peru, Germany, France and Spain.

4. 5.6 million displaced people returned to their areas or countries of origin during 2019, including 5.3 million IDPs and 317,200 refugees. The highest numbers of IDP returns were reported in DRC (2.1 million) and Ethiopia (1.3 million). The highest numbers of refugee returns were reported in South Sudan (99,800), Syria (95,000) and the Central African Republic (46,500).

5. Only 107,800 refugees were admitted for resettlement during the year with or without UNHCR assistance, the majority to Canada, the United States and Australia.

6. 55,000 refugees were reported as having been naturalized in 2019, the majority in Canada and the Netherlands.

7. A small number of countries have produced the majority of forcibly displaced at the end of 2019. The largest forcibly displaced populations at the end of 2019 (including refugees, IDPs, asylum seekers, and Venezuelans displaced abroad) originated from: Syria (approximately 13 million people); Colombia (8.2 million); DRC (5.9 million); Afghanistan (5.5 million); Venezuela (4.5 million); South Sudan (3.9 million); Yemen (3.7 million); and Somalia (3.6 million).

8. 73 percent of refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad lived in countries neighboring their countries of origin. Developing countries hosted 85 percent of refugees under UNHCR’s mandate and Venezuelans displaced abroad, while Least Developed Countries hosted 27 percent of the total. Countries hosting the largest numbers of refugees under UNHCR’s mandate and asylum-seekers were: Turkey (3.9 million), Colombia (1.8 million), Germany (almost 1.5 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), Uganda (1.4 million), the United States (1.2 million), and Sudan (1.1 million). The countries hosting the largest proportions of refugees under UNHCR’s mandate and displaced Venezuelans abroad relative to the national population were Aruba (156 per 1,000 host country inhabitants), Lebanon (134), Curacao (99), and Jordan (69).
9. 77 percent of refugees were in protracted refugee situations at the end of 2019 (i.e. 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given host country).

10. There were 4.2 million stateless persons recorded at end-2019, but the true global figure is estimated to be significantly higher.

11. Approximately half of refugees were women or girls. In 16 of 20 UNHCR operations where demographic data was available at the end of 2019, just over half of all IDPs were women and girls.

12. Based on a combination of different data sources and statistical models, 38-43 percent of forcibly displaced people are estimated to be children, although the proportion varies substantially across settings. 153,300 unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) were identified among the refugee population at the end of 2019 and UASC lodged around 25,000 new asylum applications—these figures are likely to be significantly underestimated due to incomplete data.

13. Available data on IDPs indicates that the ratio of urban versus non-urban internally displaced populations was 2:1 at the end of 2019. Where UNHCR was involved in situations of internal displacement in 2019, two out of three IDPs were in urban or semi-urban areas.

Prevalence of COVID-19 symptoms, risk factors, and health behaviors in host and refugee communities in Cox’s Bazar: a representative panel study

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Bulletin of the World Health Organization, May 2020

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This article is a preprint and has not yet been peer-reviewed.

This paper examines the prevalence of COVID-19 symptoms and associated risk factors in Rohingya refugee camps and host communities in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh.

The analysis draws on a phone-based survey conducted in April 2020 with a sample of 899 households. The sample was drawn from the longitudinal Cox’s Bazar Panel Survey (CBPS), representative of Rohingya refugees and the host population. Data from the 2019 CBPS baseline survey shows that refugee households have significantly lower levels of
income and assets. Housing conditions that favor community transmission of the virus (e.g. shared toilets and shared water sources) are more often observed in camps.

Key findings:

1. **Refugees report COVID-19 symptoms almost twice as frequently as members of the host community.** 25 percent of camp residents and 13 percent of host community members reported at least one of the three most common symptoms of COVID-19 (fever, dry cough and fatigue). Differences in self-reported non-COVID-19 symptoms are not statistically significant. It is possible that refugees experience higher rates of other common illnesses with overlapping symptoms or that some refugees over report adverse life events and health outcomes.

2. **Residents of refugee and host communities are equally vulnerable to COVID-19 symptoms after adjusting for basic socio-demographic characteristics and pre-COVID-19 living conditions** (e.g. toilet sharing, employment, and household assets).

3. **Return migration is the strongest predictor of COVID-19 symptoms.** Respondents in communities where at least one migrant returned in the previous two weeks are more likely to report at least one symptom of COVID-19.

4. **Gender is the second strongest predictor of COVID-19 symptoms,** with women being significantly more likely to report at least one symptom—possibly explained by gendered differences in willingness to report ill health.

5. **Respondents who report having been unable to buy essential food items in the week prior to the survey are also more likely to report at least one symptom of COVID-19,** indicating that food insecurity is a strong predictor of COVID-19 symptoms.

6. Lifetime trauma and depression severity are not significantly correlated with COVID-19 symptoms.

7. **For those who experienced at least one symptom of any health conditions, pharmacies were the first stop for advice and treatment** (70 percent and 42 percent in host communities and camps respectively). Among refugees, health information providers in camps are the second most common healthcare provider (35.8 percent visited one to treat their symptoms).

8. **Trusted sources of advice on COVID-19 prevention vary greatly across refugees and hosts, but information provided by friends and acquaintances is important for both groups.** Among refugees, NGOs are also trusted sources, followed by informational campaigns on the street and local leaders (e.g. block...
majhees). Among hosts, newspapers, radio, and TV are the most trusted sources of information, as well as social media.

9. Most respondents understand how COVID-19 is transmitted and practice good respiratory hygiene. However, attendance at social and religious events is widespread—especially in the refugee population—and is strongly correlated with COVID-19 symptoms. Between 77 percent (camps) and 52 percent (host community) had attended a communal prayer in the previous week. Another 47 percent (camps) 34 percent (host community) had attended a non-religious social gathering.

The following main conclusions emerge from this research: (1) COVID-19 symptoms are highly prevalent in Cox’s Bazar, especially in refugee camps; (2) widespread attendance at religious and social events undermine efforts to contain the spread of the disease; (3) pharmacists (as front-line health workers) pharmacists should receive training, PPE, and other supportive interventions; and (4) religious leaders could provide a mechanism to disseminate public health information and offer alternatives to prayer gatherings that have been widely adopted in other parts of the Muslim world.

**COVID-19 and the Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: The Challenges and Recommendations**

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This short article describes the current challenges facing Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and suggests possible prevention measures to avoid COVID-19 outbreaks in these vulnerable areas.

The authors identify the following challenges: (a) the difficulty of implementing social distancing measures in the refugee camps due to overcrowding (population density per square kilometer in the camps is 40 times higher than the average density in Bangladesh); (b) lack of internet and telecommunication services in the camps, which makes it difficult for refugees to access public health information; (c) limited access to clean water, and inadequate hygiene; (d) insufficient COVID-19 testing facilities and intensive care facilities; (e) absence of skilled medical professionals; (f) prevalence of pre-existing diseases among
refugees, making them more vulnerable to COVID-19; and (g) the approaching cyclone and monsoon season.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Bangladesh has disseminated public health information in the camps, intensified hygiene promotion, offered training for health care workers and community leaders, and permitted refugees to use testing services, isolation, and hospital facilities of the Cox’s Bazaar district. The authors argue that government, NGOs, and international health organizations will need to undertake further initiatives to contain the spread of COVID-19. Specifically, they suggest:

1. Installation of electronic billboards to provide information on COVID-19 and public health guidelines;
2. Installation of wireless or wired connectivity to facilitate communication between refugees and health workers;
3. Distribution of sufficient supplies of masks and soap;
4. Establishment of a dedicated testing facility and intensive care unit beds for refugees;
5. Additional health workers or volunteers to disseminate health information;
6. Expansion of facilities to maintain hygiene standards including additional hand pumps and toilets;
7. Recruitment of additional health professionals and installation of digital health service points for receiving advice from doctors through video or teleconferencing; and
8. Ensuring easy access to humanitarian services throughout the pandemic.

Refugee camps and COVID-19: Can we prevent a humanitarian crisis?

Hanne Dahl Vonen, Merete Lan Olsen, Sara Soraya Eriksen, Signe Smith Jervelund and Terje Andreas Eikemo
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In this brief article, the authors argue that refugee camps pose a serious threat to the health of their residents, especially during a pandemic. For example, the Moria refugee camp on the Greek island of Lesbos, currently Europe’s largest refugee camp, suffers from overcrowding (accommodating 20,000 refugees in transit facilities built for 3,000), insufficient amenities, poor sanitary conditions, and inadequate health services. In these conditions, it is impossible to adhere to WHO’s public health recommendations regarding social distancing,
hand hygiene, and self-isolation. Moreover, the refugee population has a high prevalence of existing conditions, a risk factor for acute COVID-19 disease. The authors call for:

1. More permanent infrastructure capable of meeting the needs of refugees arriving in camps, with greater attention to hygiene and access to essential health care, including mental health services;
2. Inclusion of migrants and refugees living in camps in the broader public health measures applied to citizens; and
3. Public-health information that is accessible and understandable to the refugee population.

Jobs Interventions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

Kirsten Schuettler and Laura Caron

This literature review summarizes: (a) evidence on the impact of forced displacement on economic outcomes for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); and (b) existing knowledge on jobs interventions for refugees and IDPs. The authors include both quantitative experimental and quasi-experimental studies (largely focused on refugees in high-income countries), as well as qualitative studies and ‘gray’ literature, particularly as a way to understand if and how research in high-income countries is relevant for low- and middle-income countries.

Key points relating to the specific challenges for the labor market integration of refugees and IDPs include:

1. **Studies in high-income host countries consistently show that labor market outcomes (employment, wages) for refugees lag behind locals and economic migrants.** Many studies in Europe and the United States show that refugees can close the employment gap over time, and might even perform better than economic migrants after six to ten years. However, results of quantitative studies in Norway and Denmark suggest the opposite—after five to ten years, social insurance dependency begins rising and employment rates begin declining.

2. **Descriptive statistics from representative, cross-sectional surveys in low- and middle-income countries point to large wage and employment gaps between**
refugees and hosts, consistent with the patterns found in high-income settings.

3. Evidence on IDPs also shows a negative association between forced displacement, employment rates and wages.

4. Poorer labor market outcomes (at least in the short- to medium-term) are a consequence of specific obstacles that refugees and IDPs face compared to local workers and economic migrants, linked to selection effects, impacts of the displacement experience and conditions at destination. The authors provide an excellent summary of these constraints in their Table 1. Obstacles include: loss of assets; lack of skills and language proficiency; psychological health and economic behavior; legal situation and discrimination; and lack of social networks, information on the labor market and labor demand.

5. Several studies in low- and middle-income countries show a negative association between forced displacement and the level of household assets. Negative effects of physical asset loss increase if households are separated from family members during displacement or experience the death of their primary income earner.

6. Forced migrants often lack the skills or qualifications required in the new labor market. Long periods of economic inactivity or unemployment diminish human capital, discourage workers, and make it more difficult to find employment. Additionally, forced migrants may not speak the language of the host community and consequently may have difficulties finding employment or earning high wages.

7. A nascent literature shows how violence and forced displacement have an impact on psychological health and economic behavior, which in turn impacts labor market outcomes. Refugees and IDPs are more likely than the host population to suffer from poor mental health. Poor mental health might prevent refugees and IDPs from working and successfully participating in jobs interventions. Experiences of violence and forced displacement might also lead to a negative outlook on life and lower hope and aspirations, which can have a negative impact on economic activities undertaken and create a vicious cycle. Additionally, experiences of conflict have an impact on risk-aversion, which in turn impacts the level of economic risks that people are ready to take. On the other hand, refugees and IDPs might also have a high determination to rebuild their lives, but evidence is missing.

8. The time horizon of forced migrants will influence their willingness to make host-country specific investments. Forced migrants might also take the portability of an asset into consideration when thinking about an investment.
9. **A complex set of laws and regulations influences labor market access of refugees.** Even if host countries grant refugees the right to work, refugees may also face de facto limitations on their ability to access employment due to: (a) protection issues; (b) restrictions on freedom of movement; (c) restrictions on ownership of property; (d) restrictions on opening a business; and (e) restrictions on opening a bank account, and accessing other financial services like insurance and loans. Forced migrants also struggle with lack of information on their rights and face discrimination.

10. **Social networks are important to integrate into the labor market and can help forced migrants overcome information asymmetries.** Social networks with host communities can, however, be difficult to establish for forced migrants. Contacts with certain groups of co-nationals or other refugees can be helpful for better labor market outcomes. However, others have suggested mixed or negative employment effects of contacts with co-nationals or other refugees, which might suggest that relying exclusively on these networks might hamper long-term integration with hosts. Forced migrants often face a lack of demand in the labor market at destination, as they usually do not choose their first destination based on available labor market opportunities, and tend to move together in large groups, suddenly increasing labor supply.

**Overall, the literature shows that refugees and IDPs struggle more than other groups to integrate the labor market,** and reveals the specific constraints that they face. How important these obstacles are in practice depends on the individual characteristics of those forcibly displaced as well as their country of origin and destination.

**Existing literature on jobs interventions for refugees and IDPs is scarce in terms of experimental or quasi-experimental evaluations.** The authors provide a useful summary of the available evidence by type of interventions in their Table 2. The emerging literature indicates the following:

1. **Repeated cash transfers, vouchers, and in-kind transfers:** Emerging literature suggests that: (a) transfer programs reduce poverty and help cover basic needs, improving mental health and sometimes allowing households to save; (b) impacts on basic needs appear to be similar for cash, voucher or in-kind transfer programs but cash might have additional benefits; (c) repeated transfers do not seem to have a positive impact on adult employment rates and might allow refugees and IDPs to search for higher-quality jobs, but existing evidence is focused on Syrian refugees; (d) cash transfers may help low-income displaced people to afford education, which
improves future labor market outcomes; (e) cash transfers might decrease negative coping strategies like child labor; and (f) transfers may indirectly increase social networks and decrease discrimination, which could help refugees and IDPs find jobs.

2. **One-off transfers and complementary interventions**: One-off transfers aim to directly help refugees and IDPs overcome the loss of assets to become self-employed or start a business. One-off cash or asset transfers can increase income from self-employment, but uncertainty about length of stay and restrictive legal frameworks for refugees might lower impacts. Using micro-finance or other forms of loans instead of grants faces additional challenges in the context of forced displacement. Combined approaches such as graduation-type programs (i.e. cash grants in combination with business or entrepreneurship training, intensive coaching and financial inclusion) provide better prospects for vulnerable populations like refugees and IDPs.

3. **Vocational, business and other skills training and recognition of skills**: The literature suggests that: (a) training programs could help address the lack of skills that refugees and IDPs might face in destination labor markets, but the track record of “skills only” interventions is not promising; (b) training programs in displacement contexts have the additional challenge of tailoring training to skills that are appropriate and marketable in view of the legal framework and location of forced migrants; (c) training programs need to take constraints to participation into account and focus on those that need to change occupation after displacement; (d) positive results have been found for skills like coding and IT skills but the potential for scaling up needs to be proven; (e) combining skills training with other interventions could lead to better results but must demonstrate cost-effectiveness; and (f) assessment and recognition of skills and qualifications could be helpful, notably in more formalized labor markets and for those middle- or high-skilled, but more evidence is needed.

4. **Language training**: Language training, combined with other measures, may be helpful for employment, as evidence from high-income countries shows. Language classes should be linked to work opportunities and not delay labor market entry.

5. **Mental healthcare and psychosocial support**: Mental healthcare and other psychosocial support have important positive impacts on the mental health of refugees and IDPs. More evidence is needed to understand which type of psychosocial support works best in which context and how to best implement it in low-resource settings in a cost-efficient way and in environments with a lack of professional counselors and psychotherapists. Evidence on which type of support
can facilitate labor force participation and how it can be best integrated into broader jobs interventions is scant.

6. **Changing the legal framework for refugees**: Legal frameworks are especially important in determining refugee and IDP relationships with the labor market, and any kind of program aimed at these populations must take legal obstacles into account. Evidence from OECD countries shows that the length of waiting periods before entry into the labor market is associated with employment gaps that take many years to fill, due to scarring effects, deterioration of human capital and lower motivation. Faster certainty about prospects of stay and permanent residency status can have a positive impact on labor market outcomes. Allocating asylum seekers and refugees taking labor market opportunities into account or allowing them to move freely improves their economic outcomes.

7. **Anti-discrimination laws and communication about rights of the forcibly displaced for employers and refugees themselves**: Such policies and interventions aim to address discrimination against refugees and IDPs, but there is a lack of rigorous evaluations.

8. **Job search assistance or matching programs and coaching**: Job search assistance or matching program are associated with positive effects on employment in high-income countries, but the available evidence on low- and middle-income countries seems less promising. Matching services cannot replace private networks and refugees and IDPs might benefit from support to build up such networks. Case management, intensive coaching and individualized assistance can have positive impacts on labor market outcomes but tend to be more costly. Interventions aiming to overcome spatial mismatches seem promising and need to be further evaluated.

9. **Wage subsidies**: Wage subsidies for employers of refugees and IDPs show promising results, but evidence is limited to high-income countries. Other monetary benefits for employers need to be adapted to the firms’ profiles.

10. **Cash for work, labor-intensive public works and other subsidized public sector employment**: Public works programs can have important positive short-term impacts in displacement contexts, even in very fragile and poor environments, but the medium- to longer-term impacts appear to be less promising.

11. **Value chains and other market-based livelihood interventions**: An increasing number of interventions for refugees and IDPs aim to improve access to markets. Interventions aiming to develop or strengthen links along value chains and provide information on markets, often combined with other measures, seem promising, but rigorous evaluations are needed.
As refugees and IDPs usually face multiple barriers to enter the labor market, the evidence for integrated interventions that tackle several constraints at once seems promising. Such interventions range from the combination of training with cash injections or work experience to full-fledged graduation-type of approaches. More evidence is needed to understand which program elements are most effective. Future evaluations should not only include more low- and middle-income countries and interventions for IDPs, but also longer-term impacts.

**Estimating Poverty among Refugee Populations: A Cross-Survey Imputation Exercise for Chad**

Theresa Beltramo, Hai-Anh H. Dang, Ibrahima Sarr, and Paolo Verme
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https://glabor.org/platform/discussion-papers/
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http://www.ecineq.org/milano/workingp.htm

Household consumption surveys do not typically cover refugee populations, and consequently poverty estimates for refugees are rare. This paper examines the performance of cross-survey imputation methods to estimate poverty for a sample of refugees in Chad, by combining non-income refugee data from UNHCR’s Profile Global Registration System (ProGres) database (or other household datasets) with existing sets of non-nationally representative refugee consumption data. The authors also estimate the accuracy of the current humanitarian targeting strategy and compared it with the targeting strategy based on imputed consumption in the light of international evidence.

The analysis is based on data collected by humanitarian organizations, including: (a) ProGres registration data containing socioeconomic variables (such as household size, marital status, gender, age, country of origin, and region of residence) but not consumption and expenditure data; (b) census-like ‘targeting’ data collected for the purposes of categorizing refugees into wealth groups for cash, food, and livelihood assistance, containing demographic data (household size, gender, age, country of origin, and region of residence), data on asset and animal ownership, and information on coping strategies, but not consumption and expenditure data; and (c) ‘Post-Distribution Monitoring’ data collected
by World Food Programme (WFP) from a sample of refugees to provide insights into how refugees use food assistance and containing data on consumption and expenditure.

Key findings:
1. **The limited set of variables available in ProGres registration data predict household consumption (welfare) reasonably well.** This result is robust to different poverty lines, sets of regressors, and other econometric modeling assumptions.
2. Adding variables related to asset and animal ownership provides predictions that are very close to the ones with only the variables available in the ProGres dataset.
3. The current targeting strategy in Chad, which is used jointly by the National Commission on the Welcoming and Resettlement of Refugees (CNARR), UNHCR, and WFP, is accurate in predicting household welfare. However, this targeting strategy could be further improved by reducing the inclusion and exclusion errors.

The authors conclude that if these results are replicated in other contexts, poverty predictions for refugees could be expanded at scale, with good prospects for the improvement of targeted programs.

**How does poverty differ among refugees? Taking a gender lens to the data on Syrian refugees in Jordan**

Lucia Hanmer, Eliana Rubiano, Julieth Santamaria, and Diana J Arango
*Middle East Development Journal* (2020)
[https://doi.org/10.1080/17938120.2020.1753995](https://doi.org/10.1080/17938120.2020.1753995)

This paper quantifies differences between male- and female-headed households' incidence of poverty and identifies some of the demographic characteristics that are linked to greater poverty risk. The analysis is based on microdata on Syrian individuals and households who arrived and registered in Jordan between 2011 and 2014 drawn from two UNHCR datasets: the Profile Global Registration System (ProGres) database and the Jordanian Home-Visits (JD-HV) dataset. ProGres includes demographic information on each household’s Principal Applicant (PA) and all the other individuals registered under the PA, including the relationship to the PA, age, sex, and marital status. The JD-HV dataset is a non-randomized sample of ProGres containing socio-economic data, including household expenditure, which is used to calculate poverty.
One third of Syrian refugee households in Jordan have a female PA. **There are stark differences between the characteristics of male and female PA households in terms of marital status, household type and education:**

1. 90 percent of female PAs have an absent spouse or no spouse, compared to 25 percent of male PAs.
2. 91 percent of female PAs live in non-nuclear households (single person, single caregiver, couple without children, unaccompanied children, sibling household, extended family household, polygamous household), compared to 34 percent of male PAs.
3. Most female PAs are single caregivers (48 percent) and single persons (20 percent), while most male PAs are in a couple with children (66 percent).
4. Female PAs are less educated on average. 29 percent of female PAs have less than six years of education (compared to 17 percent of male PAs), and only 15 percent of them have more than 12 years of education (compared to 19 percent of male PAs).

Additionally, **there are several gender gaps that influence the poverty risk faced by households:**

1. A higher proportion of adult males live in households with a male PA and the opposite is true for households with a female PA. Having a larger number of adult males is linked to lower risk of household poverty for both male and female PAs, since male labor force participation is less constrained than female labor force participation.
2. Some categories of households are especially vulnerable if the PA is female. Single-caregiver households with female PAs have more children on average but less access to employment than male PA single caregiver households. Compared with unaccompanied children with a male PA, unaccompanied children with a female PA have little access to irregular and daily work compared to other household types.

Key results from the empirical analysis:

1. **Overall, there is no difference between the poverty rates of male and female PA households before humanitarian assistance.** Over half of refugee households (53 percent) registered with UNHCR are poor before humanitarian assistance.
2. **Disaggregation by marital status reveals considerable poverty gaps between female PA and male PA households before humanitarian assistance.** For example, before humanitarian assistance, 57 percent of female PAs who are married but living without their spouse are poor compared to 30 percent of comparable male PAs.
3. Disaggregation by household status reveals considerable poverty gaps between female PA and male PA households before humanitarian assistance for several household types. For example, poverty rates are considerably higher for female single caregivers than for male single caregivers, 60 percent versus 45 percent. 61 percent of female PAs who are unaccompanied children are poor compared to 41 percent of male PAs in this category.

4. Humanitarian assistance reduces overall poverty from 53 percent to 11 percent, but the rate of reduction varies between male and female PAs according to their marital status and household type. Poverty gaps in favor of male PA households remain for PAs who are married but living without their spouse, single or engaged, widowers/widows, or divorced or separated. Female PA households have significantly higher rates of poverty than male PA households in all household types except for couples with children.

5. Households formed following forced displacement (e.g. sibling households, unaccompanied children, and single caregivers) are extremely vulnerable, especially if the PA is a woman or girl. Poverty gaps between male and female PAs for these vulnerable households persist after humanitarian assistance is received.

6. Households with female PAs that have similar characteristics as households with male PAs are inherently more vulnerable to poverty than those with male PAs, attributed to differences in their household composition. The presence of more able-bodied working age males in the household as well as more family members, for example, help female PA households exit poverty.

In their conclusion, the authors note that although assistance lifted considerable numbers of Syrian refugee households out of poverty in 2013/14, the gender poverty gap widened. The gap is statistically explained by the initial endowments or features that characterize female PA households compared to male PA households such as the presence of children under five, presence of elderly people, differences in education and household size.

Two and a half million Syrian refugees, tasks and capital intensity

Yusuf Emre Akgunduz and Huzeyfe Torun
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This paper examines the impact of the sudden inflow of 2.5 million Syrian refugees into Turkey on the tasks performed by Turkish workers and the intensity of capital employed by Turkish firms. Most Syrian refugees take low-skilled, manual jobs in the informal sector due to limited access to work permits, language and cultural barriers, and low educational attainment. Despite the unexpected nature of the refugee inflow, refugees’ choice of location may be influenced by the labor market opportunities in hosting regions. To handle this endogeneity, the authors identify the causal effects of Syrian refugees by using the distance between the hosting cities in Turkey and hometowns in Syria in an instrumental variables approach. The analysis is based on data from the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey, as well as administrative data for all firms in the country containing balance sheets reported for tax purposes.

**Key findings:**

1. **The refugee inflow pushed Turkish employees from manual-intensive jobs towards more complex jobs that involve abstract tasks.**

2. **There are heterogeneous effects by age and education.** Young and highly educated natives move towards higher complexity jobs. Lower educated employees show no significant change in their tasks and also drive the negative effect on native employment—their inability to adjust to tasks that are complementary to Syrian labor inputs may explain why their employment outcomes are negative affected.

3. **On average capital intensity (the ratio of fixed assets to sales) and investment rates (annual percentage change in fixed assets) decline in refugee-hosting regions.** This decline is concentrated among small manufacturing firms, which other studies have shown drive employment growth.

The authors conclude that low-skilled labor provided by Syrian refugees is a complement to Turkish workers’ abstract tasks and a substitute for Turkish workers’ manual tasks and capital use by Turkish firms. The adjustment to the large-scale refugee shock is rapid, varied for different skill and age groups and affects both labor tasks and capital inputs.

**Blessing or burden? Impacts of refugees on businesses and the informal economy**

Onur Altindag, Ozan Bakis and Sandra V. Rozo


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The authors examine the impact of the sudden arrival of more than three million Syrian refugees on the behavior of firms in Turkey. This case is useful to investigate causal effects because: (a) the timing and scale of the refugee inflow were exogenous to economic conditions in Turkey; and (b) refugees clustered in regions with a higher share of Arabic speakers, leading to substantial geographic variation in exposure to refugee inflows. The vast majority of Syrian refugees work in the informal labor market, mostly in low-wage jobs in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and service industries.

The analysis is based on data from multiple sources covering the period 2006 to 2015, including annual censuses of firms, labor force surveys, business registrations and trade statistics, and official population and migration figures. The authors also draw on findings from face-to-face interviews with business owners and refugees. The authors employ an instrumented difference-in-differences approach that exploits province-year variation in refugee inflows, accounting for the endogeneity between firm outcomes and refugee inflows using ‘predicted inflows’ as an instrumental variable (interaction of the annual number of individuals who left Syria and the historical distribution of Arabic-speaking populations in Turkey in 1965).

Key findings:

1. No significant effect of refugee inflows on production figures reported by firms (reported sales and gross output for accounting purposes), but strong evidence of a positive effect of refugee inflows on production proxies such as oil and electricity consumption, which correct for firms’ underreporting and account for informal economic activity. A one-percentage-point increase in the share of refugees to total population boosted firms’ electricity and oil consumption by 4.3 percent. These effects are stronger for smaller firms and those in construction and hospitality.

2. Refugee inflows had a positive impact on firm creation, especially those with foreign ownership. A one-percentage point increase in the share of refugees to total population led to a 1.5 percentage point increase in the number of firms and a 6.3 percentage point increase in the number of firms with foreign partnership. A significant proportion of new firms were established by Syrians partnering with Turkish citizens to overcome barriers to market entry.

3. Refugees are replacing native workers in the informal labor market, thereby increasing the competition for low-wage jobs and potentially reducing labor costs for firms. Among native male workers (who account for 75 percent of the employed labor force in the sample), a one-percentage-point increase in refugees in
the overall population decreases the likelihood of overall employment by 0.3 percentage points, driven by the loss of employment in the informal labor market. Those who stay employed experience a 0.4 percent marginal increase in their wages and work longer hours.

4. **No evidence of significant effects of refugee inflows on firm exit, or on Turkish exports/imports.**

Overall, the findings suggest that larger refugee inflows have a positive impact on local businesses and firm creation, which are largely concentrated in the informal economy, while reducing employment of native workers in the informal labor market. The authors suggest several mechanisms for these results including:

1. The likelihood of permanently leaving their original location might have induced refugees to bring most of their accumulated wealth to the host country and to invest it.
2. Fixed costs associated with initial resettlement, such as housing and establishing a new business, might contribute to the positive shock, especially in the construction sector.
3. Aid provided to refugee settlement locations by the Turkish government, international governments, and NGOs is mainly supplied by local firms, which might contribute to increased firm output.
4. Reduced labor costs due to the informal hiring of refugees might contribute to the local production boom in refugee hosting areas.

**Migration in Libya: A Spatial Network Analysis**

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[https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33194](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33194)

Libya is both a transit hub for legal and illegal migration as well as a destination country for international migrants, including refugees. This paper provides an empirical assessment of migration patterns to, within, and from Libya during 2017 and 2018.

The analysis exploits data from IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) for the period January 2016 to April 2018. DTM data is collected through a network of key informants at Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs), including information on the frequency and volume of
migrants (including international migrants, refugees and IDPs) residing in, arriving at, and leaving from a specific FMP. For those already present at the FMP, it records the nationality, planned destination, and length of stay. The authors employ spatial statistical methods to analyze location choices and identify patterns in migration movements, enabling the identification hotspots and clusters and major gateways for international migrants passing through Libya. Social network analysis was used to map the network of migration movements, determine the level of migratory pressure in different provinces, and identify the formation of network hubs.

Key findings:

1. The vast majority (97 percent) of migrants are males. In 2017, females and children were 3 percent and 5 percent of the migrant population, respectively.

2. The five top nationalities registered at flow monitoring points in 2017 and 2018 were Egyptian, Nigerien, Nigerian, Sudanese and Chadian. The five preferred arrival destinations registered at flow monitoring points in 2017 and 2018 were Libya, Italy, France, Germany and Egypt. Some African countries appear as origins and destinations (e.g. Egypt, Chad, Mali, Niger).

3. Migration in Libya can be characterized as forced migration because conflict intensity is the main determinant of decisions to relocate from one province to another. The probability of observing a migration flow toward a province with fewer conflicts is 18 percent higher with respect to a situation in which migrants move at random.

4. There are increasing numbers of hotspots and clusters of migrants. From 2017 to 2018, the number of migrant hotspots increased, and the area around Tripoli continues to represent a cluster of provinces attracting migrants.

5. There is a dense network of connections across provinces. For each province, there is not a unique migration route from or to any other province, suggesting that individual-level characteristics play an important role in choice of migration route.

6. Between 2017 and 2018 there were changes in internal migration routes between provinces. This might reflect a reduction in the total number of migrants in the provinces, as well as a reorganization along migration paths, with migrants more evenly distributed over all paths.

7. Migrants from the same country of origin, moving in the same direction, sorted themselves into contiguous routes following similar paths.

8. West African countries are the origin for most migrants. Outside Africa, Asia, specifically Bangladesh, plays a major role.
9. **Europe is the preferred destination for migrants.** The second-most-preferred destination in 2017 is Western Asia (Kuwait, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey), but this almost disappears in 2018. For receiving countries, most migrants originated in West Africa, but East Africa played an increasing role, with a significant increase in the number of migrants reaching Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. There was also an increase in the number of Asian migrants reaching France and Germany.

10. **The network of international migrants’ movements between Libyan provinces became less dense in 2018.** Two changes are apparent: (a) the number of origin countries decreased; and (b) migrants from a given origin country are found in fewer Libyan provinces in 2018 than in 2017. This suggests a consolidation in the set of origin countries and in the routes that migrants followed.

11. At the same time, the number of destination countries decreased, and each destination country had fewer connections. In particular, some of the African countries reported as preferred destinations in 2017 disappeared from the list in 2018 (Chad, Mali, and Nigeria). The fact that these are all conflict-affected countries suggests that migrants who initially hoped that they would be able to return have instead migrated to Europe. This would explain the drastic reduction in the number of connections between Libyan provinces.

12. Three international migrant passages can be identified running across the country: (1) an eastern route (from Alkufra to Tobruk); (2) a central route (from Murzuq to Tripoli); and (3) a western route (from Ghat province to Zwara and Aljfara provinces).

13. The location and number of refugees and IDPs across Libyan provinces did not change much between 2017 and 2018.

The authors conclude that migration flows are complex phenomena that must be analyzed using multiple complementary methodologies to be correctly described and understood.

**Migration restrictions and long-term regional development: evidence from large-scale expulsions of Germans after World War II**

Michael Wyrwich


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This article examines the long-term effect of temporary but restrictive migration barriers on regional development in the wake of a refugee crisis by exploiting the
large-scale expulsions of Germans after World War II (WW2). Approximately 8 million expellees arrived in West Germany in the late 1940s. Migration restrictions prohibited expelled Germans from settling in the French occupation zone, but there weren’t any similar restrictions on settlement in the American, British or Soviet occupation zones. Migration restrictions were abolished in 1949 when the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was founded, following which expellees could move freely across all West German regions.

The analysis is based on German census data from 1925 and 1939 (pre-treatment) and 1946, 1950, 1961, and 1970 (to analyze the treatment effect). Information from 1976 onward is drawn from reports of the German Federal Statistical Office. The data shows that:

1. There was a common trend of population growth and population density before 1939. Regions in the French occupation zone experienced lower population growth and population density until 1950.
2. In December 1949, the unemployment rate in areas of the French occupation zone was much lower than in the other zones. Housing conditions (and war-related damage) were relatively similar across zones, and rental prices were lower in the French occupation zone. Lower cost of living and lower unemployment should have provided incentives to move to areas of the former French occupation zone once the resettlement restriction was removed.

Using a difference-in-difference approach, the author shows that resettlement restrictions had persistent spatial effects. The results are robust to controlling for several regional characteristics such as wartime destruction, industry structure and natural conditions and when comparing only regions with similar pre-war conditions based on propensity score matching. In particular:

1. Regions that were subject to migration restrictions in the first few years after WW2 have significantly lower levels of population growth and population density until today. Additionally, the level of urbanization is significantly lower in regions of the former French occupation zone well into 2010, the last year of the observation period.
2. There appears to be no convergence of population growth over time. There was a slight catch-up in population levels in areas of the former French occupation zone in the first years after removing the barrier, which appears to be driven by public resettlement schemes. It is likely that these schemes attracted expellees who were not yet well integrated economically and socially.
3. There is some evidence suggesting a detrimental effect of the migration restriction on local income growth in war-devastated regions of the former
French occupation zone. Population growth in the other occupation zones is associated with higher income growth, while population growth in the former French occupation zone is to a lower degree related to growth in income levels.

4. There was a lower potential for urban population growth and agglomeration economies in war-devastated cities of the former French occupation zone in the first pre-war years. In the 1950s there was large-scale migration of expellees from rural areas into cities which suggests delayed spatial sorting, which had not been possible in the years immediately following WW2 due to wartime destruction. Cities in the former French occupation zone may have attracted fewer expellees because there were fewer expellees in the surrounding rural areas due to the earlier migration restrictions, and these cities were further from rural counties of the other occupation zones.

The author concludes that the impact of population shocks on the spatial distribution of population depends on the capacity of affected regions to unfold agglomeration economies. The analysis also indicates that refugees sort into places where they perceive themselves to be more productive after movement restrictions are removed, in particular a spatial sorting into cities.

Does Aid Reduce Anti-refugee Violence? Evidence from Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

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Lebanon, a country with a population of 4.5 million, has received more than a million refugees since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. The majority of Syrian refugees live in individual accommodation in Lebanese towns. Existing theory and policy debates predict that aid to refugees exacerbates anti-refugee violence by increasing hosts’ resentment toward refugees. This paper presents quasi-experimental evidence that cash transfers to refugees do not increase, and may in fact reduce, anti-refugee violence.

The analysis is based on survey data from 1,358 Syrian refugee households living between 450-550 meters altitude. Since only refugees living in locations at or above 500 meters altitude were eligible for cash transfers (UNHCR targeted refugees residing in colder climates during winter months), the authors employ a regression discontinuity design,
comparing refugees in eligible ‘poor’ households slightly above 500 meters altitude (treatment group) to otherwise eligible ‘poor’ households living in communities slightly below 500 meters altitude (control group). To measure hostility towards refugees, researchers asked whether Lebanese in the community had been physically aggressive or verbally abusive to household members in the past six months.

Key findings:

1. There were no systematic differences found between treated and control communities in terms of geography (latitude/longitude), demography (number of Lebanese and refugees), climate (temperature and precipitation), economy, and religious sect.

2. 5.2 percent of respondents report verbal assault, and 1.3 percent report physical assault, by Lebanese community members. Respondents believe that economic consequences of the refugee influx for host communities are the primary drivers of violence, with higher unemployment and inflation accounting for 56 percent of the hostility experienced by refugees. 17 percent of respondents believe that receiving humanitarian aid was one of the reasons for anti-refugee violence.

3. The number of refugees in a community is negatively correlated with the daily wage rate of agricultural labor. A one percent increase in the size of the refugee population is associated with a 0.05 percent decrease in local wages. Additionally, a refugee’s labor supply (hours worked) is a statistically significant predictor of violence in our data.

4. Cash transfers to refugees did not increase anti-refugee violence, and may have reduced it.

5. Survey data provides evidence of possible mechanisms including that aid allows recipients to: (a) indirectly compensate locals through higher demand for local goods and services; (b) directly benefit locals by offering help and sharing aid; and (c) reduce contact with potential aggressors.

The authors note that in survey areas, local economies adjusted well to refugees receiving cash transfers with large positive effects on food consumption of recipients and no effects on local prices. In other contexts, widespread programming could cause inflation (if market supply is unable to accommodate large shifts in demand) and may thereby increase resentment/hostility toward refugees.