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# Forced Displacement and Educational Outcomes: Evidence, Innovations, and Policy Indications

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## PART I

# Forced Displacement and Educational Outcomes: Evidence, Innovations, and Policy Indications

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### ABSTRACT

*Three salient themes emerge when reviewing the literature on forced displacement and educational outcomes. First, forced displacement impacts schooling and learning for internally displaced persons, refugees and host communities, but affects each group differently. Second, when coupled with strong government and international community response, these effects can be mitigated and present opportunities for improved education outcomes. And third, inclusive national systems (allowing integration of the forcibly displaced) provide the most sustainable, cost-effective policy response to the education challenges presented by forced displacement. This Digest also calls for strengthening data availability and the evidence base on delivering education to the displaced in conflict settings and how to implement refugee inclusive systems effectively.*

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## Introduction

At the end of 2019, a record 79.5 million people remain forcibly displaced worldwide; of these, 40 percent are children below the age of 18 years (UNHCR, 2020a). At the same time, situations of conflict and fragility – and associated displacement -- are becoming increasingly protracted and are likely to be further affected by changing climate and the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, intensifying the strain on vulnerable populations and increasing their numbers. This JDC Quarterly Digest focuses on the impacts of forced displacement on education outcomes for internally displaced populations, refugees and their host communities. It further looks at some of the policies and interventions that provide strong evidence for a shift towards national inclusive education systems and calls for strengthening the evidence base on what works to create sustainable, inclusive solutions. Gaps remain in the analysis of causal impacts, effective interventions and associated costs for scaling up, all of which are critical to an effective policy response at the national and global levels.

Most papers selected for this Digest provide strong quantitative evidence on the impact of forced displacement on education and select education interventions in forced displacement contexts. One paper provides a comparative qualitative analysis of inclusive education practices. The papers cover a wide geographical scope, albeit limited to areas where data are available or natural experiments allow for causal analysis. Three key themes emerge from this review. First, forced displacement impacts schooling and learning for internally displaced persons, refugees and host communities, but affects each group differently. Second, when coupled with strong government and international community responses, these effects can be mitigated and present opportunities for improved education outcomes. And third, inclusive national systems (allowing integration of the forcibly displaced refugees) provide the most sustainable, cost-effective response to the education challenges presented by forcible displacement.

## Impact on Schooling and Learning

Forced displacement impacts education outcomes for three main groups – internally displaced persons (IDPs) who remain within fragile or conflict-affected countries; refugees who are displaced across international borders, most frequently in neighboring countries; and host communities in which IDPs or refugees settle.

Fransen et al. (2018) observe that national primary enrollment rates of IDPs fell by close to 15 percent as a result of the 1993 conflict in Burundi. Similarly, school attendance for internally displaced boys and girls was significantly impacted in Timor-Leste in the immediate aftermath of a wave of conflict in 1999 that resulted in mass displacement and destruction of homes and schools (Justino et al., 2013).

In the case of refugee children, more than half remain out of school (UNHCR, 2020a). Beyond basic education, according to the most recent available statistics, the secondary gross enrollment rate for refugee adolescents was 31 percent compared to 76 percent globally, and the tertiary gross enrollment rate for refugees was 3 percent compared to 38 percent globally (UNHCR, 2020b). Piper et al. (2020) find that, after years of displacement in Kenya, literacy levels are far lower in the refugee camps (among refugee children from South Sudan and Sudan) than for nationals across the country, and amongst the lowest in large scale studies conducted in lower middle-income countries.

Fransen et al. (2018) find that host community children in Tanzania had lower primary completion rates than Burundian refugees in the country, who had access to UNHCR-funded schools. These were established in parallel to the Tanzanian national system and followed the Burundian curriculum and language of instruction with the goal of facilitating the return of these refugees to Burundi. As a result, there was little positive spillover to the host community children. On the other hand, where there is greater integration of the displaced into national systems, host community children benefit. Bilgili et al. (2019) find that school attendance of local Rwandan children is higher among those who reside within a 10-kilometer radius of a refugee camp for Congolese compared to children residing farther away. These children are also significantly more likely to be part of a school-based feeding program. These positive impacts are driven by the Rwandan government's community-integrated approach where refugee-targeted interventions benefit local communities and vice versa. In addition,

international aid and government funding were directed to these communities to provide additional classrooms and teaching resources, benefiting both refugees and native children alike.

While it is evident that forced displacement impacts education outcomes and delivery, the policy response for each of these groups (IDPs, refugees and host communities) should be different. Future analyses to guide policy should also be differentiated along these groups. For instance, Fransen et al. (2018) show that the access rate to education in IDP camps in Burundi was less than 50 percent compared to 90 percent in the refugee camps set up in rural Tanzania for Burundian refugees, and upon return to Burundi, refugees were more likely to have completed primary school than the IDPs who stayed behind. Considering that IDPs account for over 57 percent of forcibly displaced people (UNHCR, 2020a), it is critical that both humanitarian and development organizations remain engaged during conflict to ensure continuity of education for IDPs and retention of national capacity to deliver education services.

With regards to refugees and host countries, development organizations should provide support to ministries of education in the early stages of a crisis, complementing support from humanitarian agencies. A large majority of refugees are hosted in developing countries that are themselves stretched to deliver education. Further, they are usually concentrated in border regions or remote areas, that tend to be the most disadvantaged and not adequately supported by national systems. Early support to host country ministries of education around understanding the socioeconomic situation of IDPs and their host communities, and in needs assessment, planning and resourcing, can help them target responses effectively and mitigate the challenges of large refugee influxes. The impact of an inclusive approach as compared to establishment of parallel systems is explored further in the next section.

## Policy Lessons and Opportunities

This review finds mixed evidence on the long-term impacts of forced displacement on education, but differences emerge from varying responses to forced displacement and therein lie key policy lessons.

In Timor-Leste, Justino et al. (2013) find that the impact of conflict on school attendance of internally displaced girls, although negative in the short term, did not

affect primary school completion in the long term. In fact, girls exposed to violence had a higher likelihood of primary school completion than those not exposed to violence. This was largely driven by the rapid reconstruction of the education system in violence-affected areas supported by the international community and government, with a gender-focus on girls' outcomes. On the other hand, the impact of violence on boys' outcomes persisted over time, most likely because they tended to work more and longer hours several years after the conflict.

Fransen et al. (2018) find higher completion rates among Burundian refugees who went to Tanzania than IDPs who remained in Burundi. These differences can be explained by differences in education facilities: whereas in IDP camps they were generally non-existent or disorganized and largely funded by the Burundian government, education facilities in the refugee camps in Tanzania were organized and well-funded by the UNHCR. Conditions for IDPs tend to be worse than those for refugees – both students and teachers are more likely to be exposed to violence, there may be direct attacks on schools, households suffer income shocks that might make schooling unaffordable (both in terms of direct and opportunity costs) and there is likely a decrease in state investments in education.

In Turkey, refugee education was initially provided through temporary education centers in parallel to national systems; however, in 2014, the government introduced inclusive education policies for Syrian refugees and redirected education resources to areas with high concentration of refugees. With support from the European Commission and UNHCR, Turkey implemented remedial and accelerated learning programs, provided language support and employed Syrian teachers as voluntary advisors. Tumen (2019) reports that around 320,000 Syrian children of primary school age or 96 percent of refugee children are enrolled in schools in Turkey, exceeding the current primary school enrollment rates and even pre-war enrollment rates in Syria. Further, high school enrollment and learning outcomes of native adolescents were positively affected (Tumen, 2018a; Tumen, 2018b). Young native males with lower parental socioeconomic backgrounds were more likely to enroll in high school and PISA scores in Math, Science and Reading increased, particularly among girls and poor-performing students. The author speculates that labor market forces that emerged in the aftermath of the refugee crisis have led native adolescents, who would normally perform worse in school, to take their high school education more seriously.

Tumen (2019) also finds that native students switch from public to private schools as refugee concentration increases: 1 native child switches from public to private school for every 31.6 refugees in the public schools. Nevertheless, the author highlights that this effect size is smaller than typical estimates in the literature (Betts and Fairlie, 2003; Farre et al., 2018).

Saleh et al. (2019) find no evidence that greater exposure to Syrian refugees affected the attainment of Jordanians. The government added a second, donor-funded shift in high-Syrian areas that mitigated potential over-crowding and thus negative impacts on Jordanian school attainment. In contrast with Turkey, Jordanian labor markets did not experience a crowding-out effect as a result of the influx of low-skill refugee adolescents which may explain why native school attainment did not increase. It is unclear whether the quality of education provision in the second shift was at par with the first shift, but it is indicative that only 5 percent of students enrolled in the second shift were native Jordanians.

Some key policy lessons emerge from varying inclusive education practices analyzed across these papers:

First, comprehensive support to recovery and reconstruction of national education systems can mitigate long-term negative impacts of conflict on IDPs. Conflict and displacement can affect boys and girls differently and it is important to understand these dynamics when designing gender-responsive support. There needs to be greater support from development partners for the inclusion of IDPs within national schools in areas where they are displaced as education provision for IDPs often does not get as much attention as education for refugees.

Second, inclusive education systems can benefit both refugees and host community children. Where education support is provided in parallel to national systems, host community children can end up worse-off than refugees. Inclusive education systems should be supported through social compensation approaches that target high refugee-concentration areas. Further, the evidence on positive externalities for host communities should be disseminated more widely for improved integration and social cohesion.

Finally, where the expansion of national systems necessitates the introduction of a double-shift, greater effort should be made to deliver high quality education in the



second shift that will benefit both refugees and host communities. These investments for refugee education are all the more important since refugees demonstrate a marked shift in preferences, away from material possessions and towards investment in education and transferable human capital, which persists over generations (Becker et al. 2020).

## Inclusive Education Systems

National inclusive education systems are increasingly being recognized as a sustainable long-term solution to the refugee education challenge, presenting a marked shift away from education provision through parallel systems. Dryden-Peterson (2019) provides the following reasons for this shift: the protracted nature of conflict and displacement, emphasis on access to quality education, presence of refugees in urban areas living among nationals, need for education to facilitate social cohesion, and persistent shortfall and unpredictability in funding. While global policies and frameworks, including the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, and the Global Compact for Refugees, enshrine the legal right to education for refugees, there is a substantial gap in the actual provision of such education. This is partly driven by the ratio of refugee children to natives and the capacity of host countries to rapidly expand public education provision, as well as large variations in legal and institutional arrangements.

Crul et al. (2019) provide a qualitative comparative analysis of inclusive education policies in five countries (Sweden, Germany, Greece, Turkey, and Lebanon) that host Syrian refugees. The analysis helps us discern some key ingredients of inclusive education models that are more conducive to integration. The time spent by children from when they enter a host country to when they enroll into formal or non-formal education should be minimized. Refugee-specific education programs like accelerated, remedial or catch-up learning, language support and psychosocial support can help ease their transition into national public systems. Education provision for refugees should follow the host country curriculum so refugees can benefit from existing teaching and learning resources and have their education efforts recognized and accredited. This is especially important since most crises are protracted and return to the country of origin is not safe or viable (the Burundian refugees in Tanzania described earlier being an exception). Introduction of double-shift systems may be

necessary in some contexts but segregation of refugee children from native children is not. Integrated classes are important to promote social cohesion and peace-building. Support to secondary and technical education attainment and improved access to labor markets can also help improve completion rates in basic education and improve skills and knowledge of the forcibly displaced that are key to future solutions.

Further evidence is required on refugee education interventions to better inform effective inclusive policies. In addition, it is important to understand how these programs can be mainstreamed and scaled-up through national systems beyond donor support. For instance, accelerated learning programs (ALPs) that condense a few years of schooling into an accelerated timeframe are especially important for children whose education has been interrupted by conflict or crisis. ALPs are provided in several countries, but largely through donors including UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO, Save the Children, NRC, War Child Holland, etc. Burde et al. (2019) show that the ALP had large and positive impacts on school enrollment and learning outcomes in Afghanistan, but importantly also study the impact of integrating the ALP into national education systems by transferring implementation to village-level institutions. They find that improvements in learning outcomes and school enrollment were only marginally smaller compared to delivery by international NGOs, but considerably more cost-effective. The adoption of ALPs within national education systems requires well-coordinated support and capacity building within national, provincial, and district government authorities, which can be supported through initial start-up funding. This research also highlights the importance of robust impact evaluations including cost-benefit analyses to inform policies and implementation modalities.

Where education systems are stretched and reaching all IDP or refugee children would require a massive expansion of public systems, education technology can enhance the quality and effectiveness of teaching. However, evidence around education technology is scarce and mixed. Brown et al. (2020) find significant positive effects from a digital game-based learning program (Can't Wait to Learn, CWTL) on math competency, Arabic literacy competency and psychosocial wellbeing among children in Sudan, compared to the state-provided education program for out-of-school children. However, the CWTL program did not show positive effects for in-school children in Jordan (de Hoop et al., 2019). Menashy and Zakharia (2020) caution

against the use of technology interventions as a panacea for refugee education. Further evidence is required in this area as impact is highly dependent on many programmatic and contextual factors; yet some critical lessons emerge from this literature: education technology should be guided by a clear purpose and focus on educational objectives; content needs to be highly contextualized and aligned to local curriculums; materials should be accessible offline and with intermittent access to electricity; and national education officers and facilitators need to be well trained.

## Way Forward

While this Digest reviews high-quality robust evidence on the impacts of forced displacement on education, it is important to highlight critical gaps and the need to strengthen the evidence base on what works. Quality and timely data on education enrolment and the barriers facing the forcibly displaced is critical to assess the impact of forced displacement on IDPs, refugees and host communities. Quality and timely data is also important to support effective response policies for displaced populations, to track their progress, to improve the targeting of limited resources, and to advocate for additional resources and strengthened responsibility sharing. As countries move towards more inclusive national education systems, there is an urgent need to increase the resources (both financial and technical) dedicated to research on long-term, durable solutions. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to the adoption of education technology in many countries, and the resulting reliance on internet connectivity and availability of hardware has exacerbated learning inequalities, particularly for the forcibly displaced and their host communities. At the same time, the dramatic increase in the use of education technology should not be rolled back completely post-pandemic. Instead, this should be seen as an opportunity to learn how to use education technology more effectively in conflict settings.

## PART II

# Summaries of Select Academic Articles\*

## The impact of refugee experiences on education: evidence from Burundi

*Sonja Fransen, Carlos Vargas-Silva, and Melissa Siegel*

*Journal of Development and Migration*, Volume 8, Issue 6 (2018)

<https://doi.org/10.1186/s40176-017-0112-4>

The 1993-2005 civil war in Burundi led to the displacement of an estimated 700,000 refugees, most of whom settled in refugee camps in northwestern Tanzania. The majority of the refugees returned to Burundi after the war. This paper **examines differences in educational outcomes between returned refugees and Burundians who never left the country during the 1993-2005 civil war**. Given the low levels of educational attainment in Burundi, the authors examine differences in primary school completion rates.

The analysis is based on a nationally representative survey (covering 1,500 households in 100 communities) conducted 15 years after the signing of the peace agreement in Burundi and after the return of most refugees to the country, enabling the analysis of longer-term effects of forced displacement on educational outcomes. The analysis also draws on data from the Kagera Health and Development Survey

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\* The JDC Quarterly Digest provides summaries of published research to encourage the exchange of ideas on topics related to forced displacement. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the literature included in this review are entirely those of their authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Data Center, UNHCR, the World Bank, the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. For convenience, the Digest contains links to websites operated by third parties. The Joint Data Center and its affiliate organizations do not represent or endorse these sites or the content, services and products they may offer, and do not guarantee the accuracy or reliability of any information, data, opinions, advice or statements provided on these sites.

(KHDS) to compare the primary school completion rates of Burundian refugees with those of host communities in Tanzania.

Controlling for pre-war characteristics of refugee households, the authors find that **former refugees who returned to Burundi had better educational outcomes than their contemporaries who never left the country** (including those who were never displaced and those who were displaced internally).

Specifically:

- Returned refugees were 16 to 28 percentage points more likely to have finished primary school than their contemporaries who never left the country. However, the average primary school completion rate for returned refugees was still low (37 percent).
- An additional year spent as a refugee while of school age is associated with a 4 to 6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of finishing primary school.
- There is suggestive evidence that returnees were also better off than their hosts in the Kagera region of Tanzania (28 percent of whom finished primary school), most likely due to the better quality of education offered in schools established for refugees.

These **results are likely to reflect the better educational opportunities afforded to refugee children in Tanzania**. Children who were of primary school age during the civil war, and who were displaced to refugee camps in Tanzania, had better access to UNHCR-funded schools. An estimated 90 percent of primary school age children who arrived in Tanzania after 1993 were enrolled in school in 2000. Even though returned refugees had better educational outcomes than their contemporaries who had never left Burundi, their average primary school completion rate was still very low (37 percent), with implications for their future labor market outcomes.

In contrast, children who were internally displaced in Burundi often found themselves in camps for the internally displaced, which frequently did not have educational facilities. At least half of school-aged internally displaced children did not attend school. Children who remained in their communities of origin would have suffered the

adverse effects of conflict on schooling (for example, due to the destruction of schools, killing and exodus of teachers, recruitment of child soldiers, household income shocks, higher levels of insecurity, and decreases in government spending on education).

The authors conclude that children who stay behind when conflict erupts suffer serious gaps in their education, and they advocate for educational support programs that enable these children to catch up with those who are not affected by conflict.

## Short- and Long-Term Impact of Violence on Education: The Case of Timor Leste

*Patricia Justino, Marinella Leone, and Paola Salardi*

*The World Bank Economic Review*, Volume 28, Issue 2 (2013), Pages 320-353  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lht007>

This paper **analyzes the impact of conflict and forced displacement on educational outcomes in Timor Leste**, focusing on the last wave of violence in 1999 during the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the territory. The authors examine the short-term impact of the 1999 violence on school attendance in 2001 and its longer-term impact on primary school completion rates of the same cohorts of children when observed again in 2007. The authors compare the longer-term educational impact of the 1999 violence with the impact of other periods of high-intensity violence (1975-1979 and 1983) during the 25 years of Indonesian occupation and with the overall average educational impact of the conflict. Since most individuals in Timor Leste (approximately 65 percent) have at most only primary school education, the authors focus on primary school outcomes. Two channels of exposure to violence are considered: (a) individuals belonging to households who were displaced due to the 1999 violence; and (b) individuals belonging to households that reported homes completely destroyed due to the 1999 violence.

The analysis relies on data drawn from two nationally representative household surveys collected in 2001 and 2007. The authors also exploit data on the number of killings collected in the Human Rights Violations Database to identify districts and years that experienced high intensities of violence. The number of killings largely

corresponds to the movements of the Indonesian military operations, and also proxies for the destruction of homes and infrastructure and the displacement of people during the 1999 wave of violence.

In line with the existing literature on the effects of violent conflict on educational outcomes, the authors find that the conflict in Timor Leste led to considerable adverse impacts on educational outcomes, particularly among boys exposed to violence and forced displacement.

Specifically:

- **Overall, displacement during the 1999 wave of violence had an adverse impact on school attendance in the 2000/01 academic year.** Primary school attendance rates for children affected by displacement alone were 8.5 percentage points lower on average, with stronger effects for boys. Children affected by both displacement and destruction of homes experienced a reduction in school attendance of 13.3 percentage points on average, with girls being more severely affected. The effects were larger for younger children.
- **In the longer term, the 1999 wave of violence led to persistent negative effects on primary school attendance and completion rates among boys.** Boys exposed to the 1999 violence during their primary school years were 18.3 percentage points less likely to have completed primary school in 2007 relative to boys who were not exposed to violence. Among girls, however, there was a rapid recovery in educational outcomes. Girls exposed to the 1999 violence were 10.4 percentage points more likely to have completed primary school in 2007.
- **High intensity violence in the 1970s and 1980s also led to persistent negative effects on primary school attendance and completion rates among boys.** Boys exposed to violence were, on average, 5.6 percentage points less likely to complete primary school. Boys attending the last three years of primary school (grades four to six) during the violence were most affected. There was no significant effect found for girls.
- **Overall, boys exposed to violence in any period were, on average, 7.4 percentage points less likely to complete primary school in 2007 than those less exposed to violence.** This represents a 10 percent decrease in the

probability of primary school completion for boys. The effect is stronger among boys during the last three years of primary school. The overall effect on girls is positive (most likely driven by the 1999 effects), corresponding to an 8.5 percent increase in the likelihood of primary school completion.

On average, the wave of violence in 1999 resulted in immediate hardships for the education of boys and girls. Girls, however, recovered from the negative consequences of the 1999 violence in the medium-term. By 2007, girls affected by the conflict had a higher chance of completing primary school than girls who were not exposed to the violence. While the authors find no effect of the earlier peaks of violence on girls' primary school completion rates, they find a positive and statistically significant effect (at 10 percent) of the entire conflict on girls' primary school completion rates. The authors suggest that the post-conflict reconstruction of the education system in conflict-affected areas had positive impacts on the educational outcomes of girls exposed to violence, possibly because of a strong consideration of gender concerns in UN education programs in Timor Leste.

In contrast, boys exposed to the wave of violence in 1999 had a much lower probability of having completed primary school by 2007 relative to boys unaffected by the violence. Earlier peaks of violence as well as the entire conflict had similar negative effects on the educational outcomes of boys, particularly among boys attending the last grades of primary school. Evidence suggests that household economic needs may have resulted in boys dropping out of school, which may explain the negative impact of the conflict on boys' education. It is also possible that a small number of young boys may have dropped out of school to join armed groups.



## Are Refugee Children Learning? Early Grade Literacy in a Refugee Camp in Kenya

*Benjamin Piper, Sarah Dryden-Peterson, Vidur Chopra, Celia Reddick, and Arbogast Oyanga*

*Journal on Education in Emergencies*, Volume 5, Issue 2 (2020), Pages 71-107

<https://doi.org/10.33682/f1wr-yk6y>

This paper **examines factors associated with learning outcomes for children in Kakuma refugee camp, situated in northwestern Turkana County in Kenya**. The authors document early literacy outcomes for children in lower primary schools in the refugee camp and explore the specific characteristics of refugee children and their settings (including country of origin, language of instruction, and the children's expectations for their future) that are associated with learning outcomes. They also compare the learning outcomes of refugee children with those of Kenyan nationals outside the camps, with particular reference to host community children in Turkana County, which was ranked 45th out of 47 Kenyan counties in primary learning outcomes.

The analysis is based on a novel dataset consisting of the results of the Early Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA) for 732 children in lower primary classes (grades 1-3) representing all 21 schools in Kakuma refugee camp with lower primary classes, as well as two schools in the adjacent Kalobeyei refugee settlement. All schools follow the Kenyan curriculum, have both Kenyan and refugee teachers, and teach in English and Kiswahili. Nearly half (42 percent) of the assessed children were from South Sudan, 17 percent from Sudan, 9 percent from DRC, and 9 percent were from Somalia, with smaller proportions from other countries (e.g. Burundi and Eritrea).

Main results:

- **Learning outcomes for refugee children in Kakuma were exceedingly low, much worse than their counterparts in the rest of Kenya and even lower than those of disadvantaged host community children in Turkana County.**
- Literacy outcomes differed among refugee children, depending on: (a) their country of origin; (b) language of instruction used at their school; (c) languages spoken at home; and (d) children's expectations of a return to their country of origin. Somali

refugees scored higher and South Sudanese refugees scored lower, possibly reflecting their length of stay in Kenya and varying exposure to education in Kenya and/or to English. The results are also suggestive, but not conclusive, that **refugees' expectations for the future shape early literacy learning**. Refugee children who expected to remain in Kakuma for the following three years read less fluently in English, even though one might expect them to be more likely to invest in English language skills. Those who expected to return to their country of origin in ten years also read less fluently in English.

- The authors argue that their findings point to the **urgent need to invest heavily in improving learning outcomes among refugee children**, rather than focusing solely on their access to education. They suggest that two factors exacerbate the extremely poor learning outcomes for refugee children in Kakuma: (1) their differentiated learning needs, which may not be met entirely by the national education system; and (2) their marginalization. The findings suggest that **a better understanding of students' educational histories, their parents' educational histories, and their sources of exposure to the languages of instruction, could usefully inform policy responses** and appropriate instructional practices for students from different countries of origin. Additionally, the marginalization of refugees and host communities requires consideration of (and further research into) individual-level factors (poverty, family literacy) and school-level factors (teacher pedagogy, school environment) that contribute to learning outcomes.

## Is the Education of Local Children Influenced by Living near a Refugee Camp? Evidence from Host Communities in Rwanda

Özge Bilgili, Craig Loschmann, Sonja Fransen, and Melissa Siegel  
*International Migration*, Volume 57, Issue 4 (2019), Pages 291-309  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12541>

This **paper examines the effects of the presence of Congolese refugees in Rwanda on access to schools and educational outcomes for host community children**. The majority of the nearly 75,000 Congolese refugees in Rwanda (UNHCR, 2017) have been in protracted displacement since the mid-1990s. The Rwandan

government's policy is to integrate refugees into local schools (where possible) and strengthen facilities by building classrooms, and providing additional teachers and materials.

The analysis draws on household survey data, community surveys and focus group discussions covering host communities in the vicinity of the three largest refugee camps in Rwanda: Gihembe, Kigeme and Kiziba. The analysis relies on a comparison between host community members residing closer to (less than 10 km) and further away from (greater than 20 km) the camps.

Main findings:

- **Children living within 10 km of a refugee camp are significantly more likely to attend school**, compared with children living further away. 71 percent of all children 18 years or younger residing within 10 km of a camp regularly attend school, compared to 61 percent of the children living further than 20 km from a camp.
- **Children living within 10 km of a refugee camp that has more integration of refugee students in surrounding local schools (Gihembe and Kigeme) are significantly more likely to benefit from school feeding programs**, compared to children living further away. Only about four percent of the children within communities outside 20 km of the nearest refugee camp are provided food assistance at school compared to 23 percent of the children located within 10 km of a camp.
- **Children within 10 km of a refugee camp have better educational outcomes**—on average they have completed more years of schooling and are more likely to have completed primary school—however other factors may explain these outcomes, e.g. increased investments in public education and/or overall economic development in the country.
- **Locals residing closer to the camps have mostly positive views on the effects of refugees on local education**. Respondents particularly emphasized government's investments in education in areas surrounding the camp.

The authors conclude that **the presence of Congolese refugees has an overall positive impact on the education of children living in areas surrounding the refugee camps**. These positive effects are attributed to the integrated approach to

education pursued by the Rwandan government coupled with increased national spending on education.

## Refugees and 'Native Flight' from Public to Private Schools

*Semih Tumen*

*Economics Letters*, Volume 181 (2019), Pages 154-159

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.030>

This paper exploits the large-scale arrival of Syrian refugees into Turkey after 2012 to **estimate the impact of refugees on public-private school choice of natives in Turkey**. As of the 2017/18 academic year, there were an estimated 970,000 school-age refugee children, 63 percent of whom were enrolled in school. An estimated 320,000 refugee children were of primary school age, 96 percent of whom were enrolled in school. Almost all refugee children in education attended public schools in Turkey.

The analysis is based on province-level school enrollment data covering the period between the 2010/11 and 2015/16 academic years. The author bases his empirical strategy on the variation in the intensity of the refugee presence across years and provinces. Moreover, an instrumental variable approach is employed to address the possibility of a non-random sorting of refugees in regions with better economic opportunities.

The author finds that **Turkish children switch from public to private primary schools in response to increased Syrian-refugee concentration in their province of residence**, although the effect is weaker than estimates in the related literature on the effects of immigrant children enrolled in public schools (for example Betts and Fairlie (2003) find that for every 4 immigrant children enrolled in public secondary schools in the United States, 1 native child switches to private education). A ten percentage-point increase in refugee-to-population ratio at the province level generates, on average, a 0.12 percentage-point increase in private primary school enrollment. This roughly corresponds to one native child switching to private education

for every 31.6 refugee children enrolled in public schools. The response is slightly larger among males relative to females.

The author suggests several possible reasons for this weaker estimate of native flight: (a) Syrian refugees in Turkey generally settle together in segregated neighborhoods and their children go to public schools located around those neighborhoods, so natives have an option to switch to other public schools with fewer refugee students, especially in large cities; (b) the cost of private school tuition fees given the relatively fragile labor market conditions in Turkey and high frequency of aggregate shocks; (c) the small number of private schools, mostly located in rich urban neighborhoods; and (d) government efforts to sustain the quality and capacity of public education in response to the refugee influx, e.g. through language support to refugee children, and the deployment of Syrian teachers to regions with high refugee concentrations to act as voluntary advisers.

## How the different policies and school systems affect the inclusion of Syrian refugee children in Sweden, Germany, Greece, Lebanon and Turkey

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This article **compares how Syrian refugee children are included, or not included, in the educational systems in two Northern European countries (Sweden and Germany), one South European country (Greece) and two neighboring countries of Syria (Turkey and Lebanon)**. These five countries have very different institutional arrangements that influence the educational opportunities of refugee children, ranging from a completely parallel school system in the refugee camps in Turkey, parallel afternoon classes in Lebanon and Greece and parallel classes in Germany to full inclusion in regular school classes in Sweden as soon as possible.

The analysis is based on extensive literature reviews conducted in each country in the national language. The authors compare the following institutional arrangements with a major bearing on the education of refugee children: (1) entrance into compulsory education; (2) welcome, submersion, preparation, international or introduction classes; (3) second language instruction; (4) academic tracking; and (5) education after compulsory schooling. The authors highlight the limitations of these comparisons, which rely on secondary data sources and cannot control for the variation in background characteristics of the Syrian refugee population in each country. Another factor that influences the inclusion of Syrian refugees in national educational systems is the number of refugees that are hosted in some countries. In particular, the large numbers of refugees in Lebanon and Turkey places greater pressure on existing school facilities.

#### Key findings:

- **Entrance into compulsory education:** In the European countries, there are slight differences in the start and end age for compulsory education, which are nevertheless consequential because they can block the entry of refugee children into post compulsory education (e.g. Greece), or into the apprenticeship system (e.g. Germany). In European countries almost all refugee children in the compulsory school age were included in education after three months. However, children did not always receive quality education, because many school authorities struggled to improvise on short notice. In Turkey and Lebanon, which are also legally bound to provide education to refugee children, access to education is impeded by a myriad of factors and many refugee children do not attend school (a third of refugee children in Turkey and more than half of school-aged children in Lebanon do not attend school). Among those who do attend school in Turkey, many attend temporary education centers where they follow a Syrian curriculum.
- **Welcome, submersion, preparation, international or introduction classes:** When refugee children enter school they usually do not yet speak the national language (with the exception of Lebanon). All five countries have instituted some kind of welcome classes, but these function very differently. Segregation is a significant problem with adverse consequences for refugee children. In Turkey, for example, the

separation of refugee children in temporary centers with a curriculum taught in Arabic resulted in the children not learning Turkish, which made it almost impossible for them to transfer to regular classes. In Greece and Lebanon most refugee children were attending separate afternoon classes, often with a lower quality of education. In contrast, refugee children in Sweden are placed in temporary classes for the shortest period of time to limit segregation.

- **Second language instruction:** High quality and continuing second language instruction offered at all school levels—by properly trained teachers and using specifically developed teaching materials—is lacking in most countries. In Turkey, teachers have only begun recently to be trained to teach Turkish as a second language and there is no pedagogy in place to value the first language. On the other end of the spectrum, Sweden comes close to actualizing a language pedagogy that validates students' first language (associated with better overall educational outcomes) and providing skilled second language teachers.

- **Academic tracking:** In Germany, a stratified school system and early selection makes it difficult for refugee children arriving around the start of secondary school to pursue an academic track which prepares students for higher education. Consequently, many refugee children are tracked into vocational education. In Sweden, late selection and less selective tracking system gives more students the opportunity to progress to post-secondary or higher education. In Turkey, Lebanon and Greece, although the selection is late (age 15), most children still do not continue to upper secondary or post-secondary education. In Lebanon, for example, only 6 percent of refugee children attend post compulsory education, which is attributed to the use of parallel afternoon classes, foreign language instruction for certain subjects, and the early end of compulsory education.

- **Education after compulsory schooling:** There are extreme variations in the arrangements for post compulsory education across the five countries. Financial arrangements and the official requirements to enter post compulsory education restrict access in Lebanon, Turkey and Greece. The Swedish system is most accommodating, due to its advanced second chance system. Recently, Germany has increased effort to channel students into apprenticeship tracks, motivated by the booming German economy.

The authors conclude that **including refugee children as soon as possible in regular classes seems to provide the best chances for successful educational outcomes, whereas educating refugee children in a segregated parallel school system for extended periods often results in early school drop-outs or not attending school at all.** They note that institutional arrangements are ill prepared for immigrant children, and many countries still handle inflows of migrant children in ad hoc ways. The authors call for policy makers and institutions to address inflows of forced and voluntary migrants in a long-term and structural matter, suggesting that countries that fail to make these investments will pay a much higher price in terms of higher school drop-out rates, higher unemployment rates and broader consequences of poor educational outcomes.

## Can Communities Take Charge? The Assessment of Learning Outcomes and Social Effects of Community-Based Education: A Randomized Field Experiment in Afghanistan

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2019 Phase Two Endline Report  
Steinhardt School, New York University  
[https://research.steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/media/users/ds5910/ALSE\\_PHASE\\_II\\_ENDLINE\\_REPORT\\_06.07.pdf](https://research.steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/media/users/ds5910/ALSE_PHASE_II_ENDLINE_REPORT_06.07.pdf)

This report **presents the Phase Two results for the Assessment of Learning Outcomes and Social Effects of Community-Based Education in Afghanistan (ALSE) project.** ALSE is a multiyear, mixed-methods set of randomized controlled trials that assess strategies to improve community-based education (CBE) in Afghanistan. CBE is an education service delivery model that aims to improve access to and the quality of primary education in remote or otherwise hard-to-reach areas. ASLE focuses on the outcomes of the Community-Based Education Enhancement Program (CBEEP) implemented by two non-governmental organizations (NGOs), CARE Afghanistan and CRS Afghanistan, in 195 villages in six provinces of Afghanistan.



Outcomes from ALSE's Phase One (2014-2015) demonstrated the positive effects of CBE. CBE increased attendance among girls aged 6-11 by 16 percentage points, from 58 percent in villages without a CBE class to 74 percent in those with a class. For boys of the same age range, attendance grew by 11.7 percentage points, from 69 percent to 80 percent. The presence of a CBE class also improved children's learning outcomes by 0.28 standard deviations overall for both boys and girls. Phase One found that living in communities with CBE substantially increased people's trust in and the legitimacy of public service providers, including both the NGOs that run the CBE classes and the national government.

International NGOs set up and run most CBE classes, and their operation is highly dependent on donors' funding decisions, which affect the duration of their operations in a village. Once NGOs end their programming, the central and most challenging issue arises: how to sustain the gains achieved in education through CBE and prevent them from reverting to a situation of no access to education in rural communities?

ASLE Phase Two **tested the efficacy of a CBE sustainability model that involves village-level community institutions in managing the CBE classes inside their villages after NGOs withdraw.** The sustainability model involves village institutions (*shuras*) and district/provincial education offices taking up joint administrative responsibility for CBE classes after NGO programming ends. The model includes capacity training for village *shuras*, the facilitated handover of CBE classes to village *shuras*, and dedicated funds for teacher salaries, textbooks, and other supplies. Village *shuras* take up daily administrative responsibilities, and the district and provincial education staff provide occasional monitoring, facilitated by ALSE.

Researchers evaluated whether the sustainability model could achieve outcomes that meet a benchmark set by the exemplary NGO implementation, or whether it is inferior to a degree that is not acceptable. They also assessed the effects of the sustainability model on primary education access, learning, school quality, and villagers' confidence and trust in and the legitimacy of local and national government institutions.

Main findings:

- **The sustainability model of CBE, which involves village community institutions and local government bodies, costs almost half of what NGO administration costs.** The CBE average cost per village under the sustainability model is about 53.7 percent of what the NGO model would spend on running CBE in a village. The average cost per eligible child was estimated to be US\$80 for the sustainability model and US\$154 for NGO management of CBE.
- **Community administration of CBE under the sustainability model is as effective as under continued NGO administration in terms of promoting access to education and children's learning,** significantly outperforming what was expected, given the cost difference.
- **The sustainability model may be more beneficial for girls' education attendance.** The sustainability model provides access and learning opportunities for both boys and girls; the model performs slightly more effectively for girls than for boys in increasing access to education, although this difference is not statistically significant.
- **The confidence in village community institutions among heads of households and CBE teachers did not differ from their confidence in those institutions under NGO administration.** However, under the sustainability model, community leaders' confidence in local institutions was lower than their confidence in these institutions under NGO management. Moreover, CBE teachers' confidence that CBE classes will continue under the sustainability model was weaker than that of their peers in communities under the NGO model. Additionally, the CBE teachers under the sustainability model were less likely to remain CBE teachers than their counterparts in communities under NGO administration. The absence of mechanisms, including funds to ensure long-term access to the CBE classes, likely influenced this decline in confidence.
- **The level of villagers' trust in and the legitimacy of local and national government institutions under the sustainability model of CBE were not significantly different than the level found in areas under continued NGO administration.**

The researchers conclude that, with basic funds provided for teacher salaries and textbook supplies, it is possible to mobilize village community institutions and local education offices to sustain CBE classes in villages upon the departure of NGOs. Moreover, community-managed classes perform at a level comparable to classes under continued NGO management. The authors emphasize that the sustainability model is not a substitute for the NGO programs that initially set up the CBE classes. Rather, the sustainability model is appropriate for sustaining such efforts after they have been set up to run effectively.

The report also identifies several ways in which the sustainability model can be improved before it is scaled up. In particular:

- Village-level community institutions can provide an effective institutional infrastructure for delivering primary education. However, training is necessary to ensure these institutions' management capacity. Moreover, to ensure complete buy-in among community leaders, it may be necessary to couple the handover of administrative responsibilities to community institutions with other benefits, such as access to development funds.
- For the sustainability model to work, well-coordinated support from national, provincial, and district government authorities must be made available, along with a reliable funding mechanism.
- The sustainability model should not be viewed as a substitute for NGOs that initiated CBE classes. Instead, it must be seen as an effective model to sustain the gains those NGOs created. NGOs should plan on involving the village shuras increasingly throughout their CBE program implementation to facilitate the transfer of administrative responsibilities. Such a plan may include shura capacity-building, joint management and monitoring of CBE classes during the NGO administration, and close collaboration throughout the transition/handover process.
- CBE programs need to expand to serve multiple cohorts and grades simultaneously. Only then will CBE meet ongoing education needs, rather than serving as a temporary system. The switch from single cohort-based enrollment to multi-grade annual enrollment will require financial and programmatic modifications that should be taken into account by NGOs and the donors who support them.

## Can't Wait to Learn: A quasi-experimental mixed-methods evaluation of a digital game-based learning programme for out-of-school children in Sudan

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*American Journal of Development Effectiveness* (2020)  
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The Can't Wait to Learn (CWTL) program uses digital gaming technology to deliver educational content. In Sudan, CWTL delivers educational content aligned with the national curriculum in a non-formal classroom setting to out-of-school children, with local facilitators known as Learning Directors. This paper **examines whether CWTL led to improvements in children's learning outcomes in Sudan, compared to a state-provided education program for out-of-school children**. The authors also explore whether the CWTL program led to improvements in children's psychosocial wellbeing, and examine the factors leading to successful outcomes as well as implementation challenges.

Between December 2017 and December 2018, the authors conducted a quasi-experimental, mixed-methods evaluation of the CWTL program for Sudanese children who have never attended school. The 221 participants (of which 183 completed the program) were out-of-school children in eight villages in Sudan (four in West Kassala, and four in Sinnar). In each state, two villages (without any educational facilities) received CWTL, and two comparison villages (with educational facilities) received state provided out-of-school education. In all other respects, CWTL and comparison villages were similar in terms of distance from the capital city, distance to a main road, main income source and average income levels. Quantitative findings were corroborated and extended with qualitative data gathered from focus group discussions and key informant interviews with children, learning directors, caregivers, community leaders, and supervisory staff.

Main findings:

- **CWTL led to significantly greater improvements in mathematics competency and Arabic literacy competency, compared to state provided**

education for out-of-school children, six months after the start of the **program.**

- **The psychosocial wellbeing of children in the CWTL villages improved** after completing the program, while children in the comparison villages did not improve over time.
- The self-esteem of children in the CWTL villages did not improve, whereas children in the comparison villages did significantly improve over time. However, the authors argue that the psychometric properties of measurement instruments were not adequate and this result should be interpreted with caution.
- There were no differences in measurements of child-reported hope between the two groups.
- **Qualitative data confirmed that, beyond academic learning, respondents reported many positive improvements in children's psychosocial wellbeing.** This was attributed to the program and the influence of learning directors.
- Overall, children, parents, sheikhs, learning directors, and state and locality level supervisory staff reported positive experiences with the digital game and tablets.
- The main implementation challenges were technical problems that led to delays in playing, and loss of children's previous progress in the game, which caused frustration, disappointment and demotivation among children. There were also significant challenges with living conditions in the villages.
- Participants and stakeholders reported several perceived benefits of the CWTL program compared to out-of-school education, including reduced travel time and easier scheduling, lower cost, more engagement from children and parents, and greater efficiency.
- Some parents, Learning Directors and sheikhs requested that the existing lessons be complemented with more traditional learning materials such as blackboards, pencils and books. Perceived benefits included: enhanced effectiveness; opportunities to teach skills such as handwriting; and increased awareness and engagement of parents who would be able to follow their children's learning. Additionally, some Learning Directors expressed a preference to take a more active teaching role.

Overall, the authors conclude that **there is promise in digital game-based learning programs delivered in remote villages in Sudan that lack the basic infrastructure for standard education.**

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## Annex A: Overview of Articles

Becker, Sascha O., Grosfeld, Irena, Grosjean, Pauline, Voigtländer, Nico, and Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina (2020) **Forced Migration and Human Capital: Evidence from Post-WWII Population Transfers**, *American Economic Review* 110(5): 1430-1463. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181518

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