



Monthly Update of Forced Displacement Literature Review

June 2021

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Deconstructing borders: Mobility strategies of South Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda

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Uganda currently hosts more than 880,000 South Sudanese refugees, mostly in its northern districts. Refugees are permitted to work and move freely, and consequently there is interaction with surrounding host communities. Refugees are also free to settle independently in urban areas or town centers, but given that settlement registration is a prerequisite for support, most South Sudanese remain in the rural settlements.

This paper **explores the mobility of South Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda**. The analysis is based on fieldwork undertaken by the author in 2018 and 2019 in Adjumani district, which hosts more than 200,000 refugees across 13 refugee settlements. The author interviewed refugees in Boroli settlement (home to 15,000 refugees, all new arrivals since 2013) and Alere settlement (home to around 6,700 refugees, including both new and old caseloads) as well as Adjumani town (home to many South Sudanese refugees that self-settled). Alongside the more recent arrivals, some old caseload refugees are settled in town and have registered themselves again as refugees during the recent influx. From town it is approximately 50 km to the Elegu-Nimule post on Uganda's border with South Sudan.

Key findings:

- **Decisions to flee South Sudan are a function of multiple factors** including: whether a person has a source of income in South Sudan, which may make them less likely to seek asylum in Uganda; whether a person is enrolled in education in South Sudan or Uganda; whether a person has children, who they may wish to relocate to a safer location in Uganda; the location of family members; personal preferences such as whether to stay in a rural area or town; and previous experiences of displacement.
- The border delineating South Sudan and Uganda cuts through ethnic communities. Communities in northern Uganda and South Sudan share a long history of cross-border activities, dating back to pre-colonial times. For many South Sudanese it is not the first time living in asylum in Uganda, and so they can fall back on pre-existing social ties with co-nationals as well as host community members, based on shared ethnicity, trade or earlier experiences of displacement. There is also a large group of South Sudanese that

grew up in the Adjumani settlements or town and so there is a high degree of de facto integration.

- **Refugee settlements are places of arrival, onward movement, temporary visits and voluntary return and figure as nodes in larger national, regional and international networks.** There is a continuous flow of people between the settlements, rural villages and town centers in Uganda and South Sudan; and, to a lesser extent, third countries in Africa or elsewhere. The movements are both a continuation of pre-conflict movements as well as a response to new challenges caused by displacement.
- **Refugees travel between the rural settlements and urban areas, and also cross the border into South Sudan for short visits or extended stays.** South Sudanese refugees in Uganda engage in two different forms of mobility: (1) many refugees are attracted by the living conditions and socio-economic opportunities available in towns near the refugee settlements, but commute to the refugee settlements at least once a month to maintain their registration and collect assistance on distribution days; and (2) there is also a relatively high degree of cross-border mobility between the northern Ugandan settlements and South Sudan, driven by diverse push and pull factors (e.g. better education, employment, marriage opportunities), with refugees crossing the border for short visits as well as extended stays.
- Although neighboring town centers are sites of attraction, mobility also happens in the opposite direction. Life in a settlement, where food and a plot of land is provided, can be less costly and demanding than life in town.
- **Mobility happens in the form of many daily movements, including a lot of interactions with surrounding host community members** who are coming and going, for example to sell their agricultural produce. For example, on days when aid is distributed in the settlements, Ugandans (as well as self-settled South Sudanese) from town come to the settlements to sell their products such as clothing, cooking utensils and cell phones.
- **A common strategy employed by (mostly) male South Sudanese is to leave their wife and children safely in Uganda and to remain in or return to South Sudan in search of work.** This was also a common practice during the protracted civil war in Sudan (prior to South Sudan becoming an independent state), when refugees in Uganda described southern Sudan as an “extension of their socio-economic network, made possible by its accessibility”.
- **The border is also crossed to maintain social relationships and activities.** Respondents mentioned trips to South Sudan to visit relatives (to take care of a parent, or attend funerals or celebrations), to seek treatment in formal health facilities or from

traditional healers, and to enroll in secondary or university education in Juba or elsewhere. The other way around, those who are employed or are students in South Sudan spend holidays in the secure environment of the northern Ugandan settlements and towns, surrounded by family members. A less common reason to cross the border into South Sudan is to enact customs (marriage, customary conflict resolution). There is often a gendered pattern in the division of tasks, with men searching for employment and women settling in Uganda to take care of children or elderly family members.

- For the majority of the South Sudanese in Adjumani, displacement remains the dominant form of mobility, with only exceptional movements during occasions of decease, illness or celebration.
- **In terms of durable solutions, return and local integration are not mutually exclusive possibilities.** There are several possibilities along a spectrum from local integration to return, including the continued presence of family members in the host country. Patterns of a 'split-return' can vary according to a number of characteristics of a household, such as its size and gender composition, as well as the circumstances of return.

The author argues that for South Sudanese refugees, **mobility and crossing borders can be empowering** and gives them agency. While displacement to Uganda has been a life-rupturing event, refugees now engage in forms of mobility that are life sustaining, including for education, work or social events. **Turning their households (and wider families) into transnational networks, with members at complementary locations, they are able to avoid risks, diversify livelihood activities and continue social customs.** These findings raise questions about the relevance of mutually exclusive notions of 'refugees' versus 'migrants' and 'home' versus 'host'. The author also argues that freedom of movement results in a win-win situation, whereby refugees are less dependent and contributing to local markets and communities. However, the author also highlights that to engage in this kind of cross-border mobility and to stay in often insecure regions in South Sudan while being separated from family members is not without risks to personal safety and security.

Gender-Based Violence and Violence Against Children: Prevention and Response Services in Uganda's Refugee-Hosting Districts

The Republic of Uganda and the World Bank (2020)

<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/34494>

Uganda hosts 1.4 million refugees, 81 percent of whom are women and children who are at high risk of gender-based violence (GBV) and violence against children (VAC), including sexual exploitation and abuse, rape, forced and child marriage, and intimate partner violence. Host communities face similar challenges.

This report documents the outcomes of a rapid assessment in 11 of the 12 refugee-hosting districts in Uganda to: (1) **identify key risk factors for GBV and VAC and to examine the intersections between them**, with an emphasis on host communities; (2) **map existing GBV and VAC prevention and response services in both refugee and host communities**, including the effectiveness of existing referral pathways; and (3) **provide recommendations to align and link the GBV and VAC prevention and response services provided in refugee settlements and host communities**.

Main findings:

- **GBV and VAC are prevalent in both refugee and host communities.** Data were collected before the COVID-19 pandemic, but subsequent data show an increase in GBV and VAC, exacerbated by confinement measures, particularly for adolescent girls and women who are at increased risk of intimate partner violence.
- **The most common factors contributing to violence against women and children in host and refugee communities include poverty, substance abuse, discriminatory gender roles, and widespread acceptance of violence, which are reinforced by social norms.** Disability, substance abuse, financial stress, the physical environment (e.g. location, porous border, and environmental degradation), and discriminatory social and gender norms are identified as key risk factors for violence against women and children in host communities. Economic hardship and substance abuse are the most commonly mentioned factors in the study's qualitative findings. Additionally, domestic violence, violence in schools, and a lack of child-friendly and accessible services to report and respond to VAC increase children's risk of victimization.
- **Women and children in situations of forced displacement face specific vulnerabilities associated with poverty, food insecurity, aid dependency, and trauma that can exacerbate the risk of experiencing violence and constrain their ability to seek help and access services.** Socioeconomic status and ethnicity influences case reporting, and survivors who have access to resources or livelihoods are more likely to report GBV than refugees without resources or livelihoods. Reporting is also limited among the more conservative refugee communities (e.g. Somalis and

Eritreans). Poverty and a lack of safeguards drive children into the hands of abusers and perpetrate harmful practices, such as early marriage.

- **GBV and VAC share similar risk factors that tend to be mutually reinforcing.** For example, children in households where women experience intimate partner violence are at higher risk of VAC. There is a high rate of acceptance of physical violence as a way to 'discipline' women and children.
- **Many survivors of GBV and VAC who live in host communities face various barriers to accessing essential services** (such as health, psychosocial support, justice, and safety) due to gaps in the existing referral systems, poor case tracking, weak institutional capacity, and weak coordination of services in refugee-hosting districts.
- **GBV and VAC services provided by humanitarian organizations can establish parallel structures for the provision of services**, which are not necessarily aligned with or integrated into local and national protection systems. This hampers the standardization of procedures, protocols, and interventions among service providers, and undermines local capacity to address GBV and VAC in a sustainable and integrated manner.
- **The few prevention programs that are being implemented in refugee and host communities are low-scale, fragmented, and dispersed.** Evidence-based approaches to reduce the key risks of violence identified in this assessment, such as economic and social empowerment of women and adolescent girls, have not been systematically undertaken over time.
- **Despite their common risk factors, programming for GBV and VAC continue to operate in silos, each with its own funding streams and actors.**

The authors offer the following recommendations to strengthen protection against GBV and VAC:

- **Integrate GBV risk mitigation and prevention into the development response to forced displacement.** Measures could include grievance redress mechanisms, guidance, and tools to train local project stakeholders on GBV and VAC risk assessment and mitigation.
- **Strengthen and enhance multi-sectoral services, including district- and local-level structures.** Bolster the case management capacity of GBV and child protection actors through: systematic training and mentoring; improving facilities and logistical resources;

and strengthening coordination and referral mechanisms, including local leaders and refugee welfare committees.

- **Scale-up evidence-based community violence prevention approaches to address GBV and VAC risk factors aligned to District and community structures.** Focus prevention efforts on: changing social norms that perpetuate GBV and VAC; supporting economic empowerment of women and adolescent girls; and preventing VAC at school, including school clubs, gender-differentiated sanitary facilities, and peer-to-peer learning.
- **Break conceptual ‘silent spaces’ across GBV and child protection programming** by, for example, training service providers to address multiple forms of violence and expanding existing programs to address common risks factors.
- **Bridge the humanitarian-development divide between GBV and child protection programming.** In line with the 2017 Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) for Uganda, reduce the gap between humanitarian and development responses to GBV- and VAC-related risks by aligning violence prevention and response interventions with national systems.

How Are Forcibly Displaced People Affected by the COVID-19 Pandemic Outbreak? Evidence From Brazil

Patrícia Nabuco Martuscelli

American Behavioral Scientist (2021)

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This article **examines how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected forcibly displaced people in Brazil, by considering their intersectional multiple identities.** Intersectionality refers to the multiple, overlapping social identities of an individual (such as gender, social class, sexual orientation, nationality, ethnicity etc.) that affects their vulnerability.

Brazil has 43,000 recognized refugees from more than 80 countries, including Syria, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Colombia, Palestine, Pakistan, Mali, Iraq, Angola, Afghanistan, and others. In 2019, Brazil recognized nearly 38,000 Venezuelans as refugees.

While Brazil's asylum law is generally recognized as progressive, refugees and asylum seekers face impediments to accessing their rights in Brazil. Brazil has no federal integration policy, no national program to teach Portuguese, nor culturally and linguistic adapted services for refugees and asylum seekers. These populations also face challenges accessing banking services and some public systems that require a Brazilian identification number that only Brazilians have. Refugees also struggle to access the labor market.

The analysis is based on 29 semi-structured phenomenological interviews (i.e. interviews that consider the 'living experience' of people) with refugees in the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in March and April 2020. Interviewees were mainly male and young; they came from DRC, Syria, Venezuela, Mali, Cameroon, Guinea, and Guyana.

Refugees reflected on their experiences during the first two weeks of the pandemic, when state governors adopted public health measures including quarantine, social distancing, and the closure of nonessential businesses and schools. An intersectionality approach aimed to understand how refugees experienced the COVID-19 pandemic by considering how their many identities (class, race, nationality) put them in a more vulnerable position. Refugees have specific vulnerabilities arising from their identities as non-nationals (without a vote), forcibly displaced, minorities, non-Portuguese native speakers, and perceived as different because of their race, nationality, religion or cultural traditions.

The results indicate that refugees face three challenges connected to the pandemic:

- **The same challenges faced by Brazilians related to the nature of their employment (vulnerable, employed, freelancing, self-employed).** *Vulnerable refugees* and Brazilians working in the informal sector with no social protection were prevented from working; they depended on donations and feared not having money to pay bills. *Employed refugees* and Brazilians had social protection in Brazil but were worried about the future of the Brazilian economy and losing their job in the economic crisis precipitated by the pandemic. Some *freelancing refugees* and Brazilians could rely on savings but were worried about the length of the pandemic; but many freelancers had no savings and were worried about how to pay bills. *Self-employed refugees* and Brazilians were severely affected; some continued to operate businesses, but were worried about the duration of the pandemic because sales were slow, and they needed to pay bills. Additional anxieties common to refugees and Brazilians included: anxiety about paying rent and bills, affordability of hygiene products, closure of schools and consequently children consuming more meals at home. The closure of schools appeared more in the

narratives of female refugees, indicating the gendered expectations of women as caregivers.

- **Challenges aggravated by the pandemic due to refugees' identity as non-nationals.** Refugees lack social network that could help them during the crisis. Refugees had a hard time accessing linguistically and culturally adapted information on COVID-19. They also feared discrimination and xenophobia when accessing the health care system.
- **New challenges due to their social identity as forcibly displaced non-nationals including the closure of migration services and borders and the feeling of “living the pandemic twice”.** The closure of borders, migration services, organizations providing services to this population, agencies that send money abroad, and international phone companies seriously affected the lives of refugees. Refugees “lived the pandemic twice”: they experienced the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak (including governmental responses) in Brazil and worried about their health and wellbeing, while at the same time they worried about their families living through the pandemic in their countries of origin.

Overall, **the interviewed refugees perceived that they were abandoned or neglected in the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, which increased their feeling of uncertainty, hopelessness, and fear.** The interviews indicated the importance of understanding how the pandemic affected refugees considering their multiple intersectional identities, which involve the same challenges faced by Brazilians, challenges aggravated by the pandemic and new challenges created by the pandemic.

Integration of Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants in Brazil

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<http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35358>

Brazil is hosting over 260,000 Venezuelans as of the second quarter of 2020. The majority of Venezuelan refugees and migrants enter and settle in the northern localities of Roraima (50 percent) and Amazonas (19 percent) bordering Venezuela. Brazil's legal framework provides for universal access to education, healthcare and social protection irrespective of documentation status and prohibits any kind of discrimination at work.

This paper **examines the extent to which Venezuelan refugees and migrants are integrated into the education sector, formal labor market and social protection sector in Brazil and how different economic and social factors accelerate or hinder the process of integration.** Integration is measured as a ratio between the outcomes for Venezuelans compared to those for Brazilians, specifically:

- Integration in the education sector is measured as the relative probability of Venezuelans, aged 4-17, being enrolled in school compared to their Brazilian counterparts.
- Integration in the formal labor market is measured as the relative probability of Venezuelans, aged 15-64, being employed in the formal labor market compared to their Brazilian counterparts.
- Integration in the social protection sector is measured as the relative probability of Venezuelans registering in the Unified Registry of Social Programs (Cadastro Unico), a database that collects details about low-income families in Brazil, compared to their Brazilian counterparts, and the relative probability of registered Venezuelans being beneficiaries of the Bolsa Familia (PBF), the flagship conditional cash transfer program for the poor, compared to their Brazilian counterparts.

The analysis is based on: (a) education data from the 2019 and 2020 School Census; (b) labor market data from the 2019 Annual Report on Social Information (RAIS); (c) social assistance data from the Cadastro Unico; and (d) population data from the National Migration Registry System (SISMIGRA) and International Traffic System (STI-MAR) for Venezuelans and from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics Foundation's (IBGE) population estimation counts for Brazilians.

These data provide the following descriptive statistics and insights into the factors that promote or hinder integration of Venezuelans:

- **Demotion to a lower grade and shortages of Spanish speaking teachers are major obstacles for Venezuelans to access education.** Only about 3 percent of teachers in Roraima and Amazonas schools with Venezuelan children are proficient in Spanish, which might be a major deterrent for Venezuelan children, who understand little or no Portuguese. A higher proportion of Venezuelans (68 percent) are attending classes that are below the grades consistent with their age compared to the Brazilian cohort (53 percent).
- **Venezuelans work longer hours and in more contact-based jobs than Brazilians even though they are on average better educated, and they are more likely to be occupationally downgraded.** 86 percent of Venezuelans work in jobs for which they

are overqualified, compared to 72 percent of Brazilians, suggesting that occupational downgrading is more prevalent among Venezuelans.

- **Venezuelans who register in the Cadastro Unico are poorer but more educated than their Brazilian counterparts.** Average income of registered Venezuelans is R\$85, while that of Brazilians is R\$307. 72 percent of registered Venezuelans live in extreme poverty with an income less than R\$89, while 48 percent of registered Brazilians have an income less than R\$89. Registered Venezuelans are also more educated with 27 percent having some tertiary education compared to 3 percent of registered Brazilians having tertiary education. 20 percent of Brazilians in Cadastro Unico have high school degrees compared to 42 percent of Venezuelans.

Empirical results:

- **Venezuelans are less likely to be enrolled in school.** Venezuelan children are 0.47 times as likely to be enrolled in school compared to Brazilian children. However, the extent of integration varies across states. In Roraima, which hosts the highest number of Venezuelans, Venezuelans are 0.25 times as likely to enroll in school compared to Brazilian children. Overall, integration in the education sector appears to be higher in provinces that have fewer Venezuelan residents. **Congestion, language barriers and mismatch of age and grade attainment are the main impediments for Venezuelan refugees and migrants children to integrate in schools.**
- **Venezuelans are less likely to be employed in the formal sector.** Venezuelans are 0.36 times as likely to be employed in the formal sector compared to their Brazilian counterparts. The level of integration varies across states. For example, in Roraima, which has the highest concentration of Venezuelan formal workers, Venezuelans are 0.08 times as likely as Brazilians to be a formal worker. Integration is higher in states that have greater job opportunities like Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais. It also seems to be harder for women to access formal sector jobs, suggesting women face additional constraints entering the formal labor market. **Occupational downgrading is the main barrier for working age Venezuelan refugees and migrants to access the formal labor market.**
- **Venezuelans are less likely to be registered in the Cadastro Unico.** Venezuelans are 0.7 times as likely to be registered in the Cadastro Unico compared to their Brazilian counterparts, which suggests that many Venezuelan refugees and migrants may not be aware of their rights to assistance. Venezuelans who register for access to social protection programs are also poorer than their Brazilian counterparts.

- **Overall, integration seems to be higher where the population of Venezuelan migrants and refugees is lower.** Concentration in certain localities like Roraima seem to be creating an overcrowding effect that constrains integration.

Based on their findings, the authors recommend several policy actions, including:

- Facilitate the process of credential and skill verification and validation, which could reduce downgrading in both schools and the formal labor market.
- Building on existing government and UNHCR relocation programs, expand voluntary relocation to areas within Brazil that have more job opportunities.
- Provide language training to help children to enroll in school at the grade commensurate with their age and also to promote employability of Venezuelan adults.
- Develop labor intermediation services focusing on language training, Venezuelan community outreach and specialized counselors, who can identify employers looking for particular skills or jobs where Portuguese proficiency is less important.
- Increase capacity of schools by introducing different shifts to reduce overcrowding.
- Strengthen labor market activation programs to include job intermediation and skills and language training to help overcome search barriers and matching friction.
- Continue provision of information assistance for identity documents and enrollment in education, health and social assistance services and benefits and inform Venezuelan refugees and migrants of their rights.

Refugees who mean business: Economic activities in and around the Rohingya settlements in Bangladesh

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Journal of Refugee Studies (2020)

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As of May 2021, there were 867,000 Rohingya refugees from Myanmar living in refugee settlements in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh (UNHCR, 2021). Only about 50,000 Rohingya refugees from earlier (pre-August 2017) caseloads have been granted refugee status, allowing them to leave the camps for employment or to buy goods and services. The vast majority of Rohingya refugees, however, are not officially recognized as refugees, prohibited from leaving the camps without permission, prohibited from working or owning property, and without access to land for farming. In mid-2018, when data was collected for this paper, the

camps did not have fencing around them that would prevent refugees from coming and going.

This paper **evaluates economic activities in and around the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh**. Specifically, the authors explore the following questions: (1) what types of business activities exist within and around the refugee camps; (2) whether and how Bangladeshis and Rohingya engage in economic interactions inside and outside of the camps; and (3) how different businesses operate and perform.

The analysis is based on data from a survey conducted in April and May 2018 of 326 enterprises in the two upazilas (sub-districts) where the camps are located: Ukhia upazila, which hosts the large Kutupalong refugee settlement, and Teknaf upazila, which hosts the Nayapara refugee settlement. Representative samples of enterprises were interviewed in three zones: inside camp limits; in the immediate camp vicinity; and elsewhere in the upazilas ('away from camps').

Main findings:

- **The Rohingya settlements are sites of substantial economic activity and feature a number of businesses operating in and around them** (even in the more recently established blocks), consistent with previous studies of economic life in refugee camps. Refugees have access to a diverse array of businesses inside the camps, including trade, services, and manufacturing enterprises, among others.
- **Both Rohingya and Bangladeshis are engaged in business activities inside the camp**. Bangladeshis run 32 percent of the businesses sampled inside the camps.
- **Some Rohingya who have official refugee status and are legally allowed to work, run businesses outside of the camp**. Rohingya-run businesses account for 10 percent of the sample in the vicinity of the camp, and only 1 percent (a single respondent) away from the camp. All but one of the Rohingya doing business outside the camp limits had arrived prior to the recent migration waves.
- **Business owners across the two nationalities had similar age profiles, but they differed in gender, education, and language**. Only five of the respondents were women, all of them Rohingya. Bangladeshi owners were on average more educated than Rohingya ones, with a higher proportion having completed primary school (57 percent), while the most common category for Rohingya was 'no formal schooling' (39 percent), with a further 27 percent having only partial primary schooling.

- **A disproportionately small share of Rohingya business owners (35 percent) had migrated since the start of the recent violence in Myanmar** (since August 2017). However, most businesses had been established since that wave (61 percent). This suggests that a number of previously established migrants responded to the influx of new people by starting businesses.
- **The vast majority of sampled businesses were traders.** Of the 336 sampled businesses, about half were in wholesale and retail trade, 13 percent were in accommodation and food services, 10 percent were in manufacturing, 10 percent were in transport services, and 8 percent were involved in financial and communications activities.
- **Within the camps, the types of enterprises being run by Rohingya or Bangladeshis tend to differ.** Rohingyas are more likely to run wholesale and retail trade businesses, manufacturing businesses, and accommodation and food services. Bangladeshis are more likely to run transportation businesses, possibly because they can more easily afford the higher capital requirement to purchase or rent a vehicle.
- **About 8 percent of the Bangladeshis running businesses in or around the camps reported having relocated into the area post-August 2017,** which suggests that they were attracted by the business opportunities created by large refugee inflows.
- **Business start-up costs varied significantly across locations and differed depending on the nationality of the respondent.** Rohingya owners started businesses with an average of US\$501 as start-up capital, compared to more than five times that amount for Bangladeshis (US\$2,593). The sectors with the highest start-up costs were financial and communications services and transportation services, both of which have low Rohingya participation. Similar proportions of Rohingya and Bangladeshi owners relied on loans to start their business (about half). However, while Bangladeshis sometimes also relied on formal loans from banks or microcredit institutions (16 percent), only a single Rohingya respondent had taken a formal loan.
- **Businesses inside the camp operate on a smaller scale than those in the vicinity or away from the camp,** in terms of numbers of hired workers, monthly gross sales and monthly profits.
- **There is evidence of frequent business-to-business and business-to-customer interactions between business owners, suppliers, workers, and clients from both Rohingya and Bangladeshi communities.** Goods and services offered by camp businesses attract the patronage of some residents outside the camp (12 percent of customers of businesses inside the camp came from outside the camps). The camp economy does not offer many of the goods needed as inputs or merchandize; only 9

percent of all sampled enterprises purchased inputs inside of the camp. The vast majority (94 percent) of Rohingya business owners source inputs in secondary markets outside of the camp, highlighting the business-to-business interactions between the two communities. Inside the camp, 76 percent of hired workers are Rohingya, while the remaining 34 percent are Bangladeshi.

- **Lending plays an important role in sustaining economic activity—approximately half of transactions are on credit.** 46 percent of sampled businesses purchase inputs on credit and 52 percent of sampled businesses accepted payments on credit.
- **Rohingya workers are systemically paid less than Bangladeshi workers,** regardless of the nationality of the business owner or business type. Further analysis is required to determine whether these differences reflect skill levels, segmented labor markets, discrimination, or other factors.
- **Rohingya-run businesses perform poorly compared to Bangladeshi-run businesses.** Nationality of the business owner is strongly correlated with business revenue, productivity, and profits, even after controlling for a variety of characteristics including business scale and type.
- **Start-up capital, scale, location, and education are key factors explaining the lower performance of Rohingya businesses.** About a third of the explained difference between Rohingya and Bangladeshi business performance can be traced back to levels of start-up capital. Scale (number of workers) also explains some of the difference, as do location and education.

The authors note several limitations of their analysis including the small sample size, compromises made in the sampling strategy, and the dynamic nature of the refugee population in Cox's Bazar. They emphasize that **while their study highlights a budding business environment and deep economic interactions between hosts and refugees, it is likely that the overwhelming majority of migrants remains without gainful employment.** Additionally, the end of 2019 saw a tightening of the policies regarding Rohingya participation in local economic life, both inside and outside of the camps.

Welfare Impact of Hosting Refugees in Ethiopia

Ashenafi Belayneh Ayenew

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<http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35408>

This paper examines the impact of refugee inflows on the welfare of host households in Ethiopia. The author examines the impact on consumption expenditure per capita and wealth of host households, and investigates three potential mechanisms for these effects, namely: (a) the labor market; (b) societal cooperation; and (c) prices. The author focuses on the period from the end of 2009 until the end of 2014, when the number of refugees hosted in Ethiopia increased from 125,910 to 660,987 people.

The author uses a difference-in-difference methodology that exploits large spatial differences in the intensity of the refugee inflows in villages over time, and an instrumental variable approach to address the possibility that refugees choose their settlement location based on the relative conditions in each location. The analysis is based on refugee data from UNHCR as well as household data from the Ethiopian Socioeconomic Survey (ESS) conducted by the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA) and the World Bank.

Main findings:

- **Refugee inflows negatively affected host consumption expenditure per capita, increasing the probability that host households fall into consumption poverty.** A one percent increase in refugee intensity increases the probability of falling into consumption poverty by about 18 percentage points. The consumption effect occurs in rural areas with no effect in urban areas.
- **Refugee inflows negatively affected food consumption expenditure but not non-food consumption expenditure.** Decomposing household consumption expenditure per capita into food, education, and other non-food components, reveals that refugee inflows negatively affect food consumption expenditure, while other components of household expenditure remained unchanged.
- **Refugee inflows had no statistically significant effect on household wealth.** There are no differences in the effects on wealth and wealth poverty results between urban and rural areas. The finding that refugee inflows affect consumption expenditure and consumption poverty but don't appear to affect wealth or wealth poverty might be because the wealth metrics are less sensitive to short-term shocks.
- **Consumption effects were driven by the displacement of individual hosts from salaried employment and increases in the prices of agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilizer).** No evidence is found for other potential mechanisms investigated by the author including changes in self-employment in non-farm businesses, societal cooperation as measured by participation in customary labor-sharing arrangements, and prices of food items.

In his conclusion, the author identifies **several development interventions that could potentially offset the welfare loss of hosting refugees** such as: (a) cash transfer programs that include participation in temporary (casual) labor as one of the targeting parameters; (b) investments in skills and entrepreneurship training to assist rural hosts to engage more in self-employment in non-farm businesses or take up salaried permanent employment; and (c) provision of subsidized agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilizer) to refugee-hosting farm households.

The labor market reintegration of returned refugees in Afghanistan

Craig Loschmann and Katrin Marchand

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<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-019-00315-w>

This paper **investigates the labor market outcomes of returned refugees in Afghanistan**. The authors examine the factors influencing the labor market outcomes of returned refugees compared to non-migrants, and in particular, whether the returnees' migration and return experience influences their labor market outcomes. The authors focus on the likelihood of that an individual is engaged in one of three labor market activities: self-employment in business; agriculture which incorporates subsistence farming and/or animal herding; and wage employment.

The analysis relies on cross-sectional data from an original household survey collected in five provinces of Afghanistan in 2011 covering 1,841 individuals, of which 461 are returned refugees from Iran or Pakistan. The sample is restricted to returnees who originally migrated because of political or security concerns or because of an environmental disaster, and who stated their return was motivated by improvements to the political and security situation of the country or personal reasons (e.g. missed their country, culture, or family). By excluding voluntary migrants and those returnees motivated by employment opportunities, the estimates are less affected by selection bias than would otherwise be the case. The authors control for ethnicity (Pashtun, Tajik, other) of the returnee as well as the district type (urban, semirural, or rural) and province of return.

Descriptive statistics:

- Returnees are about 6 percentage points more likely to be self-employed in business, while non-migrants are around 5 percentage points more likely to be wage employed. There is no statistical difference in the likelihood of not working or being engaged in an agricultural activity between the two groups.
- Nearly all returned refugees are the household head, compared with around half of non-migrants. On average, returnees are eight years older than non-migrants. Returnees are more likely to be married and have more children compared to non-migrants.
- Around 15 percent of returnees have a secondary or higher level of education compared to 11 percent of non-migrants.
- There is no discernable difference in the socioeconomic status of returnees and non-migrants in terms of land ownership.
- Returnees are 12 percentage points more likely to have social capital in the form of a local social network (involvement in a community organization other than a religious group).
- A quarter of returnees were employed prior to seeking asylum abroad and just over two-thirds fled to Pakistan, while the rest fled to Iran. The average time abroad is around 12 years, and only 6 percent sent remittances during that period.
- Around half of the returnees repatriated between the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992 and the ouster of the Taliban regime in 2001, and around half repatriated in the period from 2002 to 2011; on average they had returned 10 years prior to the survey. Nearly three-quarters of returnees cited improvements in the political and/or security situation as the main reason for return, while the rest reported personal reasons (i.e. wanting to be closer to family and friends).
- The average savings brought back upon return was US\$246, and 28 percent received financial assistance on return from either an international organization or government. Only 19 percent of returnees intend to migrate in the future.

Main results of the empirical analysis:

- **Returned refugees are less likely to be engaged in wage employment compared to non-migrants.** Returned refugees are less than half (0.42 times) as likely to be engaged in wage employment compared to non-migrants.
- **Educational attainment affects labor market outcomes of non-migrants but is not statistically important for the labor market outcomes of returned refugees.** Non-migrants with a higher level of educational attainment (at least secondary education) are less likely to be engaged in agricultural work and more likely to be involved in wage

labor—suggesting that non-migrants with low levels of education have few options other than subsistence agricultural labor, whereas higher levels of education open up opportunities for wage employment. For returned refugees, however, there is no significant relationship between educational attainment and the likelihood of wage employment.

- **Differences in labor market outcomes arise from dissimilarities in socioeconomic status.** Both non-migrants and returned refugees belonging to households that own land have a higher likelihood of being engaged in an agricultural activity relative to not working.
- **The strength of social networks affects employment status for both non-migrants and returned refugees.** Being involved in a community organization improved the engagement of both non-migrants and returned refugees in all labor market activities.
- **Several factors are found to be of particular consequence for current employment status of returned refugees including employment prior to migration, time abroad, amount of savings brought back upon return, return assistance, and intentions to re-migrate.** Being employed prior to migrating increases the likelihood of being wage employed upon return. The more years spent abroad, the greater the likelihood of being wage employed, suggesting skill acquisition while abroad. Returnees who sought asylum in Iran are more likely to be involved in farming or herding upon return compared to those who sought asylum in Pakistan. The amount of savings brought back upon return is positively associated with becoming self-employed in agriculture or herding. Receiving assistance upon return or having intentions to ‘re-migrate’ is negatively associated with becoming self-employed in agriculture or herding. The authors suggest that labor-intensive activities such as farming or herding animals may necessitate high upfront investment in productive assets like land and livestock not covered by the support received and which makes future movement less desirable.

The authors conclude that, in a context where wage employment is limited, self-employment may be the only, if not best viable income-generating activity. Providing support to returned refugees for this specific purpose, whether for a business venture or agricultural endeavor, has the potential to facilitate reintegration and improve individual welfare, while also contributing to local development.

The world's most neglected displacement crises in 2020

Norwegian Refugee Council (2021)

<https://www.nrc.no/resources/reports/the-worlds-most-neglected-displacement-crises-in-2020/>

This report **identifies the world's most neglected displacement crises in 2020**, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).

NRC considered 40 displacement crises resulting in more than 200,000 displaced people, and ranked them according to the following three criteria:

- **Lack of political will:** The analysis considered: whether United Nations Security Council resolutions were adopted in 2020; the number and importance of international and government envoys to the conflict; whether the international community engaged in any activities to help establish peace; and whether international summits, donor conferences or high-level meetings were organized. The actions taken were analyzed in relation to the size of the displacement crisis.
- **Lack of media attention:** Media attention towards the different displacement crises was measured using figures from the media monitoring company Meltwater. When comparing media attention, the number of people displaced by each crisis was included in the calculations.
- **Lack of international aid:** The amount of money raised for each crisis in 2020 was assessed as a percentage of the amount needed, indicating the level of economic support.

Key messages:

- Although humanitarian assistance should be based on needs alone, some crises receive more attention and support than others.
- **Crises in Africa dominated the neglected displacement crises list for 2020**, with Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) topping the list followed by Cameroon, Burundi, Venezuela, Honduras, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Central African Republic and Mali.
- **DRC is the world's most neglected displacement crisis** according to NRC annual list, due to overwhelming needs and an acute lack of funding, as well as media and diplomatic inattention. More than five million people are currently internally displaced within DRC, and an additional million have fled the country, mostly to neighboring countries. DRC is home to the largest number of food insecure people in the world—27 million, including over 3 million children. One in three Congolese does not have enough food to feed themselves. Less than

33 percent of the money required to meet the needs of the Congolese people was received, making it one of the world's most underfunded crises.

- **Cameroon, which ranks second on the 2020 list, topped the list in 2018 and 2019.** Cameroon is affected by three crises and has witnessed a spike in displacement in recent years, but little international pressure has been placed on conflict parties to stop attacking civilians.
- **For the first time this century, the global humanitarian appeals to support aid operations were less than 50 percent funded last year.** In some of the neglected crises only a third of what was needed was received, even for lifesaving relief. This year, the United Nations aid appeal for DRC was only 12 percent funded by end-May (UNOCHA, 2021).