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When Do Refugees Return Home? Evidence from Syrian Displacement in Mashreq

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This paper analyzes the factors that influenced the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq during an active period of conflict in Syria, from January 2011 to March 2018.

The analysis is based on a novel dataset that incorporates: (a) demographic data along with arrival and return dates (if applicable) for 2.16 million Syrian refugees from UNHCR’s Profile Global Registration System (ProGres) database; (b) data on conditions in host countries from vulnerability surveys conducted by UN agencies in Syria and Lebanon; and (c) conditions in Syria from a conflict-events database and nightlights data for Syria (as a proxy for access to utilities).

Main results:

- **Better security in areas of origin increases the likelihood of return.** A one standard deviation improvement in security (measured by the change in the Conflict Events Index (CEI) between the previous two quarters) increases refugee returns by 6 percent.

- **Improved access to utilities, proxied by nightlight luminosity, increases the likelihood of return.** A one standard deviation improvement in luminosity in areas of origin increases returns by 3.8 percent. This result indicates that quality of life is a factor in refugees’ decisions to return home even in the presence of ongoing conflict in the country of origin.

- **The likelihood of return increases with age.** A possible explanation is that men aged 18 to 42 are at greater risk of being conscripted by the Syrian army. Additionally, older women are more likely to be unemployed, which could increase their likelihood of return.

- **Refugees act strategically in terms of which family members return to Syria.** Men are more likely to return than women, and single refugees are more likely to return than married refugees. Additionally, adult family members (siblings, aunts and uncles) have a much higher likelihood of return than the principal applicant’s spouse. This suggests that individual family members—often single, older men—return to the country of origin first to assess the situation on the ground, while the remainder of the family remains in exile.

- **More food secure refugees are more likely to return, but the magnitude of the effect is small.** A one standard deviation increase in food security in Syria increases the likelihood of return by 0.27 percent.
• Return rates are overwhelmingly higher among refugees with the very lowest level of education. For example, relative to an uneducated adult a university degree reduces likelihood of return by 21 percent and a secondary degree by 19 percent. These results suggest that an increase in risk-adjusted payoffs from return (delivered by better security and living conditions in locations of origin) tends to increase returns. However, improvements in payoffs (e.g., food security) in host countries appear to increase returns. The authors posit that an increase in income in exile can trigger return for those with low income in the presence of mobility costs.

**Are Refugee Children Learning? Early Grade Literacy in a Refugee Camp in Kenya**

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This study assesses literacy outcomes for refugee children in lower primary schools in Kakuma refugee camp in Turkana County, Kenya. The authors also examine how the literacy outcomes for refugee children in Kakuma compare with those of Kenyan nationals outside the camps, how literacy outcomes vary by refugees’ country of origin, and what policy-relevant factors are associated with literacy outcomes.

The analysis is based on data collected in March 2018 from the Early Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA) for children in grades 1-3 in all 21 schools in Kakuma refugee camp that have lower primary classes, and from two schools in the adjacent, more recently established Kalobeyei settlement. Simple quasi-random sampling was used at the school level; the sampling strategy targeted 10 students (5 male and 5 female) in grades 1, 2, and 3 in each school, for a total of 30 students per school. All the schools follow the national curriculum of Kenya, have both Kenyan and refugee teachers, and teach using English and Kiswahili, Kenya’s official languages.

Main findings:

- **Early literacy outcomes for refugees in Kakuma were exceedingly low.** Grade 2 students in Kakuma scored below students in the national Kenya baseline on all fluency measures in both English and Kiswahili. Only 8.6 percent of grade 3 students in Kakuma met the Ministry of Education’s grade 2 benchmark for reading fluency in English and Kiswahili, and average oral reading fluency rates were some of the lowest seen in any study in lower- and middle-income countries. In comprehension skills, which are critical
predictors of later academic success, grade 3 students in Kakuma scored substantially below grade 2 students in the national Kenyan baseline (4.7 percent correct compared to 22.0 percent correct).

- **Oral reading fluency in English varied across cohorts of students from different origin countries.** Somali students tended to score higher and students from South Sudan tended to score lower. Other research suggests that refugee students’ country of origin may influence learning outcomes, possibly due to family literacy rates, ease of connection to schools and school culture, previous educational experiences in the country of origin, and length of stay in Kenya. For example, Somali refugees have been in Kenya longer, and students are more likely to have siblings or parents who were educated in English in Kenya.

- **Students’ assessed reading fluency was higher if the language of assessment was the primary language used for instruction at their school.** According to Kenyan policy, students should be exposed to English as a primary language of instruction, however teachers of refugees sometimes do not have the language skills to instruct in English or make the decision to use other languages so their students can understand the lessons.

- **Expectations of returning to their home country were associated with oral reading fluency.** One might expect that students who predicted that they would continue their education in Kenya would invest in English, however students who expected to be in Kakuma three years later had lower reading fluency in English. A possible explanation for this counterintuitive finding, is that restrictions on refugees’ rights to move freely and work in Kenya could limit the perceived usefulness of a Kenyan education. The results also showed that children who planned to be back in their country of origin ten years in the future had lower English fluency.

The authors identify several implications of relevance to policy makers and researchers:

- The lower learning outcomes in Kakuma compared to elsewhere in Kenya underscore the necessity for further research on the different learning needs of refugees, which may not be met entirely by the national education system and may require adjustments to national education systems to meet differentiated learning needs.

- A better understanding of students’ educational histories, their parents’ educational histories, and their exposure to the languages of instruction could inform policy responses and instructional practices for students from different countries of origin.

- Teachers’ in Kakuma could be trained in ‘translanguaging’ practices that enable them to capitalize on languages shared with students, such as Arabic or other home languages,
while at the same time exposing students to English and Kiswahili, which, as languages of instruction and assessment, are critical to their educational success.

- It is also important to further explore how refugee students and their families perceive the value of their education in exile, given their expectations for their futures, how this perception overlaps with the languages used in their country of origin, and how these perceptions and plans affect their investments in schooling and learning.

**Infectious disease outbreaks among forcibly displaced persons: an analysis of ProMED reports 1996–2016**

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*Conflict and Health*, Volume 14, Article Number 49 (2020)


This paper examines the relationship between forced migration and infectious disease outbreaks. The analysis is based on a review of reports published in ProMED, a digital monitoring and reporting system for infectious diseases, to identify outbreak events involving forcibly displaced populations between 1996 and 2016. The authors identified 128 outbreak events involving forcibly displaced populations in 48 countries, covering over 840,000 confirmed or suspected cases of infectious diseases. The low case counts relative to the global number of forcibly displaced people may reflect incomplete data or underreporting, despite the informal surveillance methodology that is used for ProMed.

Main findings:

- **The number of ProMED infectious disease outbreak reports concerning forcibly displaced populations increased over the study period.** Rates of outbreak events concerning forcibly displaced populations per total number of ProMED reports also increased. The mean incidence of outbreak events involving forcibly displaced populations increased from an average of 2.3 events per year during 1996 to 2002 to 5.7 during 2003 to 2009 to 11.4 events per year during 2010 to 2016.

- The study population was primarily identified as refugees (61 percent), followed by internally displaced persons (IDPs) (30 percent) and asylum seekers (9 percent).

- Outbreaks in forcibly displaced persons from ProMED included reports in refugee camps as well as refugee enclaves in cities or at borders.

- **Infectious disease outbreaks occurred in many countries and cross-border regions.** Most outbreaks were reported in Africa (52 percent), followed by Eastern
Mediterranean (17 percent) and Southeast Asia (14 percent). Kenya experienced the largest number of distinct outbreaks (13) reported to ProMED, followed by Uganda (12).

- **There are a wide range of infectious disease pathogens or syndromes that affect forcibly displaced populations.** Outbreak events due to cholera, cutaneous leishmaniasis, dengue, hepatitis E, measles and poliomyelitis were the most common disease outbreaks afflicting displaced populations. Most reported cases were due to a large-scale cholera outbreak among IDPs affected by the 2010 Haiti earthquake (more than 520,000 cases) and a large-scale epidemic typhus outbreak in Burundi in 1998 (100,000 cases). Overall, most individual cholera outbreaks (23 outbreak events) occurred in the Africa region.

- **A substantial number of outbreaks (30 percent) were related to vaccine-preventable disease cases (VPD).** More than 16,000 VPD were identified, encompassing 39 outbreaks in 20 countries over the course of the study.

- **Most outbreak events were due to acquisition of disease in the destination country.** Of 128 reports, 63 percent (80) were due to local transmission in the destination country, 20 percent (25) were due to importation (acquired in the country of origin or during transit), and 18 percent (23) were unspecified based on manual review of the report. In cases of importation, 48 percent (12) events were attributed to incomplete vaccination of the displaced population. The reasons for interrupted vaccination when available, were cited as breakdown in local health infrastructure and mistrust of local medical care. These findings are consistent with prior studies that have demonstrated low risks of imported acute infectious diseases on host country epidemiology, while crowding associated with temporary resettlement increases the risk of outbreaks among displaced residents.

These findings underscore the importance of capturing displaced populations in surveillance systems for infectious diseases to enable rapid detection and response. The authors also highlight the need for:

- Public health investment and education about effective water, sanitation, and hygiene practices.
- Efforts by local and international agencies to expand coverage of vaccination programs for refugees and IDPs.
- Enhanced cross-border surveillance with targeted screening and treatment of infectious diseases.
Intimate partner violence against women on the Colombia Ecuador border: a mixed-methods analysis of the liminal migrant experience

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Research has shown that women who experience conflict and displacement are at higher risk of intimate partner violence (IPV). This paper investigates the experiences of displaced Colombian women living in the border regions in Ecuador, and explores how their social, economic, and legal marginalization compounds their risk of IPV.

The authors use a ‘liminality’ framework, a term used to describe both the intermediate state of individuals during their migration journey as well as the legal, economic and physical insecurity of border regions.

The mixed-methods analysis draws on data from a cluster randomized controlled study of a World Food Programme (WFP) Cash, Voucher, and Food Transfer program conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The study was conducted in 2011 in seven urban areas within the provinces of Carchi and Sucumbíos in northern Ecuador. The authors focused on a sub-sample of 15 in-depth interviews and 319 longitudinal surveys for women who self-identified as Colombians. Drawing on this data, they conducted an empirical analysis to understand the factors associated with experiences of IPV.

Main findings:

- 29 percent of the Colombian women in the sample had experienced emotional IPV, and 15 percent had experienced physical and/or sexual IPV.

- Lack of legal documentation creates conditions for IPV to continue or escalate. Most of the women did not have the money, time, or literacy to obtain permanent legal status. Without legal documentation in Ecuador, they couldn’t travel freely across the border, own property, or secure regular, formal employment—creating the conditions through which IPV was able to continue or escalate.

- Previous experiences of abuse increased the risk of subsequent IPV. In the interviews, several women disclosed physical or sexual abuse either as children or in previous marriages, and many of them described near continuous IPV in their current relationships. The quantitative analysis of survey data showed that recent experiences of IPV were highly associated with previous experiences of IPV, consistent with the broader literature that shows that women previously exposed to violence are at increased risk for later victimization.
• Physical or sexual IPV is also associated with experiences of forced displacement and violence in both origin and destination countries. Both qualitative and quantitative data showed how exposure to guerrilla violence and subsequent displacement contributed to the risk of IPV. As the presence of guerrilla and paramilitary groups has spilled over into the Ecuadorian side of the border, Colombian refugees were affected by the same violence that triggered their displacement.

• Social isolation in displacement settings amplified the risk of IPV and limited the women’s ability to cope. Most of the women in the study had few or no relatives living nearby, had limited contact with family across the border, were severely restricted in their mobility by their partners (facilitated by strict gender roles), and faced difficulties developing social support networks in their new communities, which seemed to stem from real or perceived anti-Colombian sentiment. For women with family nearby, survey results showed that this provided some protection against emotional violence. No statistically significant associations were detected between physical and/or sexual violence and having family nearby, most likely due to the smaller number of women in the survey reporting physical and/or sexual IPV. These findings are in line with previous research documenting discrimination and adherence to traditional inequitable gender norms as risk factors for IPV, while social support acts as a protective factor.

• Experiences of IPV are associated with economic stress. While quantitative results showed that most men were working, qualitative data revealed that their jobs were low-paying, irregular, and insecure, and that the stress and insecurity of poverty greatly contributed to IPV. A higher value of women-owned assets was slightly protective against IPV but entering the labor force for women was a risk factor.

• Housing insecurity contributed to marital stress and IPV. Only 25 percent of the quantitative sample owned their home, and renting was a significant risk factor for physical and/or sexual IPV.

The authors conclude that protracted displacement in the border region resulted in continuous physical, social, and economic insecurity, which intensifies the conditions that facilitate IPV. The findings emphasize the necessity for policy makers to consider how the long-term marginalization of refugee women contributes to their victimization.

Conflict-related violence and mental health among self-settled Democratic Republic of Congo female refugees in Kampala, Uganda – a respondent driven sampling survey

Itziar Familiar, Pamela Nasirumbi Muniina, Chris Dolan, Moses Ogwal, David Serwadda, Herbert Kiyingi, Chantal Siya Bahinduka, Enos Sande and Wolfgang Hladik
This paper evaluates rates of PTSD and depression symptoms among female refugees from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) living in Kampala, Uganda, and how mental health issues are associated with traumatic experiences, including rape. There were an estimated 48,000 Congolese living in Kampala when the research was undertaken in 2013. Study participants were recruited using respondent-driven sampling (RDS), a peer-to-peer recruitment approach used to sample hard-to-reach populations where no sampling frame is available. 580 women were recruited who met the following eligibility criteria: Congolese nationals, 18 years or older; had been self-settled in Kampala for at least 6 months; and were documented asylum-seekers or refugees. Mental health outcomes were assessed using questionnaires previously administered in refugee settings.

Findings:

- Women were on average 33.7 years of age, 42 percent had completed between 8 and 12 years of schooling, and the majority (66 percent) were from the North Kivu province in DRC. 78 percent had been living in Uganda less than 6 years and 23 percent had been in a refugee camp before settling in Kampala. Most of the women reported being married (42 percent), unemployed (43 percent), and living with family (79 percent).

- **Most of the women met symptom criteria for PTSD, depression and suicidal ideation.** 73 percent met symptom criteria for PTSD, 57 percent for depression, and 65 percent reported thoughts of ending their life.

- **A very high proportion of women had been raped, and more than half of the women had been raped on multiple occasions.** 80 percent of women reported having been raped and over half (55 percent) reported more than one rape incident. Of those raped, most women reported being gang raped (82 percent), with 39 percent of gang-rape victims reporting more than four perpetrators. 50 percent identified the police or government soldiers as perpetrators. Although rape may have been a driver of displacement (60 percent reported being raped before displacement), more than one third (35 percent) of women reported being raped in transit, and 20 percent in the host country. Consequences of rape included genital injuries (87 percent), fistula (18 percent), and pregnancies (26 percent). 47 percent of women reported the rape incident to authorities, and 57 percent received some type of health care.

- **The women frequently experienced additional traumatic experiences.** Non-sexual traumatic incidents included experiencing a combat situation (93 percent), lack of food or water (88 percent), destruction of property (84 percent), physical abuse (84 percent),
forced separation from family (84 percent), lack of shelter (83 percent), lack of access to health care (79 percent), extortion or robbery (78 percent), and witnessing beatings or torture (74 percent).

- **Rates of PTSD were associated with experiences of rape and other traumatic events.** PTSD was associated with being raped, being raped after displacement, lacking shelter, lacking food or water, lacking access to health care, forced labor, extortion and/or robbery, experiencing the disappearance/kidnapping of a family member or friend, and witnessing the killing or murder of other people. The number of traumatic experiences reported had a dose-response relationship with PTSD; women reporting at least 11 different incidents and above 15 had higher odds of PTSD than those reporting 10 or fewer.

- **Rates of depression were associated with experiences of rape and other traumatic events.** Depression was significantly associated with several traumatic experiences including rape and experiencing the disappearance/kidnapping of a child or spouse.

These findings highlight the high frequency of sexual and other forms of violence experienced by female refugees before, during and after flight, and the high rates of adverse mental health outcomes that are associated with these traumatic experiences. The fact that 20 percent of respondents reported being raped in the country of asylum and that higher rates of PTSD were associated with being raped post-displacements points to serious gaps in the protection afforded to self-settled refugees. The authors conclude that future programs addressing the needs of self-settled refugees should include services responding to high rates of rape and associated PTSD, as well as ongoing vulnerability to rape in the country of asylum.

**Systematic Review and Meta-analysis: The Prevalence of Mental Illness in Child and Adolescent Refugees and Asylum Seekers**

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[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaac.2019.11.011](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaac.2019.11.011)

This systematic review aims to establish estimates for the prevalence of mental illness in child and adolescent refugee populations. The review identified a limited
number of high-quality studies measuring prevalence estimates of mental illness, despite the substantial number of children and adolescents displaced globally.

Eight studies met the strict inclusion criteria for the systematic review, covering 779 child and adolescent refugees and asylum seekers in five countries (Germany, Malaysia, Norway, Sweden and Turkey). Studies were only included if the diagnosis of mental illness was made based on a clinical interview and validated diagnostic assessment measure, and undertaken by a mental health professional (psychiatrist, psychologist, psychiatric nurse) or trained para-professional (psychology research assistant, trained researcher). Studies that based diagnoses solely on self-report questionnaires or symptomatology rating scales were excluded. To avoid selection bias, studies were only included if they recruited representative samples of refugee children; studies recruiting participants solely from medical clinics were excluded. When multiple articles used data from the same study, the article providing data that best met the search criteria was included.

Main findings:

- **Refugee and asylum seeker children have high rates of PTSD, anxiety, and depression.** The overall prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was 23 percent, depression 14 percent, and anxiety disorders 16 percent. Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) was 9 percent and oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) was 2 percent.

- **PTSD, depression, and anxiety disorders were all higher for those displaced less than 2 years**, compared to those displaced more than 2 years, while the prevalence of ADHD was higher among those displaced more than 2 years. This finding might be explained by the phenomena of spontaneous recovery, which can occur in some cases of PTSD and depression. ADHD, on the other hand, persists in childhood with some change in presentation as individuals become older.

- **PTSD was higher for those with insecure visa status and temporary residence**, however depression and anxiety disorders were higher for those with refugee visa status and community residence. The authors call for rigorous longitudinal research to understand the relationship between refugee experiences, different mental illnesses, visa status and resettlement experiences, and trajectories of recovery.

The authors conclude that **there are immediate and detrimental effects of pre-migration trauma, forced displacement, and the postmigration environment on the mental health of child and adolescent refugee and asylum seekers.** Refugee and asylum seeker children have substantial need for mental health services to address high rates of PTSD, depression, and anxiety, including youth- and refugee-appropriate, cross-culturally valid screening in refugee centers to streamline allocation to clinical assessment and treatment.
services. Except for ADHD, all other mental illnesses showed higher prevalence for individuals recently displaced (two years or less), indicating the need for early support when a child or adolescent refugee and asylum seeker arrives in the host/resettlement country. This support might include adequately resourced refugee centers designed to protect children from further traumatization and to ameliorate resettlement stressors that can increase the risk of poor social integration and educational disadvantage.

**Self-reliance and Social Networks: Explaining Refugees’ Reluctance to Relocate from Kakuma to Kalobeyei**

Alexander Betts, Naohiko Omata, Olivier Sterck
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The authors **investigate the reasons why refugees have been consistently reluctant to relocate from the Kakuma refugee camp in north-east Kenya to the newer Kalobeyei refugee settlement**, 3.5 km away. This reluctance is confounding since Kalobeyei offers a range of livelihood programs and integrated services provided by aid agencies to both refugees and host communities, and the Kalobeyei model has been shown to lead to better socio-economic outcomes for the settlement’s residents.

The authors employ a mixed-methods approach, including a survey of 1,976 adults living in and around Kakuma camp, semi-structured interviews and focus groups conducted between September and December 2016. Participants included Congolese, Somali, South Sudanese, Rwandan and Ethiopian refugees as well as members of the local Turkana host community.

Main findings:

- **Refugees and local hosts seem relatively well informed about Kalobeyei**: 87 percent of refugees and 71 percent of Turkanas have heard about the initiative. However, many refugees lacked detailed information about the Kalobeyei settlement.

- **Most surveyed refugees are not interested in relocating to Kalobeyei, even if land is provided**. Among those who had heard about the Kalobeyei settlement, only 7 percent of refugees expressed interest in relocating there. The proportion of refugees
who were interested in Kalobeyei rose to 16 percent if agricultural land was to be provided.

- The most common reasons for not relocating to Kalobeyei are fear of losing access to social services (education, health facilities, energy, water) and loss of current community support and networks. A large proportion of refugees rely on their social networks in the camp for socio-economic opportunities and social protection in times of need. These support mechanisms have been nurtured over years of reciprocal relationships inside the camp community and are ‘emplaced’ in the camp.

The authors conclude that social networks and access to important forms of social capital explain the decision of many refugees in Kakuma to decline the opportunity to relocate to Kalobeyei.

Supporting rebels and hosting refugees: Explaining the variation in refugee flows in civil conflicts

Oguzhan Turkoglu

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This paper examines whether a host country’s support for rebel groups affects the number of refugees that it hosts. The author argues that hosting refugees can be the continuation of a country’s support to rebel groups.

The author analyzes refugee flows from countries that experienced civil conflict between 1968 and 2011. Data on civil conflict comes from the Armed Conflict Dataset from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute (UCDP/PRIO), data on refugee flows comes from the UNHCR Population Statistics Database, and data on host country support of rebel groups comes from Non-State Actor Data (NSAD) and UCDP External Support Data.

The author controls for various push factors for refugee migration (regime type, economic development, regime transition, interstate war, genocide), pull factors (democracy, economic development, regime transition, interstate war, civil conflict, genocide, ratification of international conventions on refugees), geographical, historical, and political relations between source and host countries (distance between source and host countries, number of
source country neighbors, colonial ties, political relations characterized as rivalry or alliance, and transnational ethnic relations), and the populations of source and host countries.

Main results:

• Rebel support is positively and significantly correlated with the number of refugees that countries host, robust to different model specifications and data sources. Countries that support rebel groups host twice as many refugees as others. Supporting rebels increases the number of refugees countries host on average by 2,000.

• In the host country, GDP per capita and population have a positive and significant effect on the number of refugees hosted, the type of political regime type has no explanatory power, and civil conflict and genocide decrease the number of refugees hosted.

• In the source country, regime transition and genocide increase the number of refugees, democracies generate fewer refugees, and higher GDP per capita decreases refugee flows.

• Distance has a negative effect and the greater the number of a source country’s neighbors the smaller the number of refugees in the host country.

• Political rivalry and colonial ties do not have explanatory power. Contrary to expectations, the ethnic relations variable is not statistically significant in the first iteration of the empirical model. However, ethnic relations become significant when distance is excluded from the model.

The author argues that conflict dynamics play a significant role in explaining the variation in refugee flows across countries. Host countries’ involvement in a conflict has a significant effect on the number of refugees that they host. The author suggests that this insight may enable the international community to better anticipate refugee flows, develop faster and more effective responses, and minimize adverse impacts of population flows for both host societies and displaced people.

Refugee camps and deforestation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Colette Salemi

*Journal of Development Economics, Volume 152 (2021)*


This article examines the effect of refugee camp openings on deforestation in sub-Saharan Africa. Previous research has suggested that refugee camps lead to increased deforestation in surrounding areas due to land clearing for cultivation and demand for fuelwood.
The author employs a spatially disaggregated research design using geographic ‘tiles’ of 1.1 square kilometers. About half of the analyzed tiles were not within 20 km of any refugee camps at any point in the study period, and these tiles serve as a comparison group in the econometric analysis.

The analysis draws on a number of data sources including: (1) the African Refugee Dataset (ARD) of georeferenced locations and years of operations of planned refugee camps between 1999 and 2016; (b) Global Forest Change (GFC) data on extensive margin deforestation for the years 2000 to 2012, which captures transitions from non-zero forest cover to zero forest cover in a given year for 30 meter grid cells; and (c) NASA’s Global Forest Cover Change (GFCC) data on intensive margin deforestation, which captures gradual reductions in an areas percent forest cover at five year intervals from 2000 to 2015. The analysis is disaggregated by the type of biome, i.e., grasslands or rainforests.

Key results:

- **There are statistically significant but very small reductions to extensive margin forest losses in response to camp openings, suggesting an increase in vegetation density.** The analysis detects modest reductions in extensive margin forest loss in rainforest biomes but not grassland biomes. Each year of camp exposure is associated with a small fraction of one 30-meter grid cell within the tile not transitioning to zero forest cover. This avoided extensive margin forest loss occurs between 1–20 km from a camp. The author suggests two possible explanations for this result: (a) camps may reduce the returns to harvesting forest products, either because they impact the agricultural wage (and by extension, the opportunity costs of harvesting from forests); or (b) the security presence around camps discourages illegal logging activities.

- **There are very small declines in forest cover along the intensive margin in response to camp exposure.** On average, camp exposure leads to annual forest cover losses amounting to less than one percentage point, with slightly larger effects in rainforest tiles. In grassland tiles 1–5 km from a camp, one year of camp exposure results in a reduction of tree canopy cover by 0.13–0.15 percentage points, while in rainforest tiles 1–5 km from a camp, one year of camp exposure is associated with a reduction in tile forest cover of 0.21–0.23 percentage points. While it is possible that the activities of refugees lead to some of these modest intensive margin losses 1-5 km from a camp, losses of forest cover 15 km or further from a camp suggest that the activities of other groups may also change in response to camp openings in a manner that influences forest cover.
Overall, the results suggest that refugee camps have a very small negative impact on intensive margin forest cover within distances of 1–20 km. These results challenge the preconception that refugees cause extensive deforestation in camp areas.

Attitudes toward Migrants in a Highly-Impacted Economy: Evidence From the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan

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Most of the evidence on factors influencing attitudes toward migrants has emerged from research in developed countries (mainly Europe and the United States), which finds that: (1) in developed countries there is little evidence that attitudes towards migrants are driven by egocentric economic concerns about labor market competition. These are countries where unemployment is low, welfare states are expansive, and language and skill differences give natives a competitive advantage in the labor market; (2) concerns about the nation’s economic well-being (known as “sociotropic” concerns) in relation to the negative impact on the host country’s economy, welfare system, and public services, shape attitudes toward migrants; (3) attitudes toward migrants are substantially shaped by perceived cultural threat and concerns that migration will change the host country’s dominant culture and identity; and (4) humanitarianism may also influence attitudes.

The authors theorize that in developing countries, egocentric economic concerns about labor market competition and sociotropic concerns about the host country economy are likely to be stronger due to weaker economies, welfare systems, and public services, and more direct competition between migrants and natives in the labor market. At the same time, the authors posit that cultural concerns in developing countries are likely to be weaker (due to the increased likelihood of shared cultural and religious identities) and humanitarianism is likely to be weaker (since developing countries have a much larger refugee burden).

To address this geographical limitation, the authors conducted a large-scale representative survey of public attitudes toward migration in Jordan, one of the countries most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis. The survey was conducted in February 2018 and covered 1,500 Jordanians in regions with both high and low concentrations of Syrian refugees. The survey measured attitudes about the perceived impact of Syrian refugees on the country, hostility toward the refugee population, and support for anti-refugee policies, as well as respondent characteristics that have been identified as potential drivers.
of attitudes toward migrants in other contexts. It also asked respondents to choose between randomized profiles of refugees with different attributes, to enable an analysis of the relative importance of economic, cultural, and humanitarian considerations in shaping attitudes toward migrants.

Main findings:

- **Economic concerns do not drive Jordanians’ attitudes toward Syrian refugees.** Jordanians who have been more economically impacted by the crisis, either personally or in their communities, are no more likely to hold negative attitudes.

- **Humanitarian and cultural factors drive Jordanians attitudes towards Syrian refugees.** Jordanians who are more exposed to refugees' challenging living conditions and who are less sensitive to cultural threat demonstrate more positive attitudes toward refugees.

- **Both humanitarian vulnerability and cultural similarity outweigh egocentric and sociotropic economic threats in determining which Syrian refugees Jordanians prefer to host.**

These results undermine arguments that egocentric and sociotropic economic concerns shape attitudes towards refugees. Rather, the results indicate the potential for humanitarian concerns to sustain public support for hosting refugees over extended periods of time, even in challenging economic circumstances. The authors note that most Syrian refugees in Jordan share cultural similarities with their hosts, and in contexts where there are cultural differences, the analysis suggests that hosts may be less likely to let humanitarian motives override the perceived economic costs of hosting large numbers of refugees. This paper, therefore, reinforces the consensus on the importance of cultural factors in shaping attitudes toward migration.