

# Can Aid Change Attitudes toward Refugees? Experimental Evidence from Microentrepreneurs in Urban Uganda\*

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PRELIMINARY DRAFT

## Abstract

How should aid for refugees be allocated to assist refugees and gain the support of host communities? While host populations often believe they are negatively affected by refugees, little evidence exists on the potential for aid to facilitate positive relations and mitigate tension. We conduct a randomized controlled trial to investigate two programs for Ugandan (host) microentrepreneurs: cash grants delivered with information that connects the grant with Uganda’s inclusive refugee policies and existing aid-sharing policy, and mentorship by an experienced refugee. We find that grants tagged to aid-sharing significantly increased support for inclusive policies including refugees’ right to work and hosting additional refugees. Grants and information separately, mentorship by a refugee, and mentorship by a Ugandan also increased support for inclusion but by less than the cash and information programs combined. Contact with the refugee-led organization partially drives these effects. Through the first endline, we do not find effects on business profits from any treatments but do find other positive economic effects from mentorship by a Ugandan.

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# 1 Introduction

Policy changes that are Kaldor-Hicks improvements—in which the winners could hypothetically compensate the losers to create a Pareto improvement—may be politically infeasible. Although redistribution from winners to losers could in theory generate the necessary political support, this bargaining can break down if the costs of a policy are more salient or visible to voters than the benefits. Refugees’ access to the labor market is one potential example. Without access to labor markets, refugees are likely to depend on humanitarian assistance with little long-run returns, even in protracted situations.<sup>1</sup> Although inclusion would likely benefit both refugees and hosts on net, hosts may prefer exclusion—in the absence of redistribution—due to concerns about competition.<sup>2</sup> Allowing refugees to work in exchange for sharing humanitarian assistance with the host community has the potential to make both refugees and hosts better off relative to exclusion. International policymakers are increasingly promising to include host communities in assistance, most notably in the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees, while continuing to push for inclusive hosting policies such as freedom of movement and right to work for refugees. However, the scope for aid sharing to generate political support for refugee integration is unknown.<sup>3</sup>

In this paper, we study whether directly linking assistance to host communities with inclusive refugee policies can increase citizens’ support for those policies. We conduct a randomized controlled trial in the capital city of Uganda, a country that hosts over one million refugees and shares a portion of international refugee aid with host communities. We evaluate two assistance programs for Ugandan microentrepreneurs—business support grants and business mentorship—which are implemented by a refugee-led non-profit. We randomly cross-cut the business grants program with information explaining Uganda’s aid-sharing policy and a perspective-taking exercise that has affected attitudes toward out-groups in other contexts (Kalla and Broockman 2020), allowing us

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<sup>1</sup>In 2020 alone, 2.4 billion dollars was spent to feed refugees in the countries most impacted by the world’s largest refugee crises.

<sup>2</sup>See Clemens, Huang, Graham, et al. (2018) for a thorough review of the evidence on the potential gains from refugee integration. There is also little evidence of migrants and refugees reducing wages of host citizens. See Verme and Schuettler (2019) for a review of the literature on labor market impacts in forced migration contexts. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) review global attitudes towards immigration, and Mayda (2006), Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012), R. M. Dancygier and Donnelly (2013), and Borjas (1987) debate the labor market considerations of host citizens.

<sup>3</sup>Assistance can potentially shape support at both the country and individual levels. We study the individual level in this paper, but at the country level see Tsourapas (2019) for a discussion of how conditional offers of assistance from international donors shaped policy for countries hosting Syrians and Ash and Huang (2018) for a discussion of the compact model in refugee-hosting contexts.

to isolate the effect of direct assistance tagged to aid sharing from the effect of the grant and the information in isolation. In the business mentorship arm, we randomly vary whether the mentor is a refugee or a Ugandan. We measure impacts on both political outcomes, such as support for refugees' right to work, and economic outcomes, such as business profits.

We find that providing business grants and information together substantially affects Ugandans' support for inclusive refugee hosting. Treated individuals are 15 percentage points (pp) more likely to express general support for hosting refugees, 15 pp more likely to support allowing more refugees into Uganda, and 13 pp more likely to support refugees' right to work. Mentorship, pure canvassing, and grants without the information also increase support for inclusive hosting but by significantly less. We therefore hypothesize that contact with the refugee-led organization drives part of these changes in attitudes. On the economic margin, we do not find evidence of an effect on business profits from any of the treatments. Entrepreneurs mentored by a Ugandan, however, are more likely to still be running their business and report higher measures of household well-being after our first endline.

Our findings suggest that aid-sharing can be an effective tool to create political support for inclusive refugee hosting. Refugee-focused organizations that share assistance with host communities could, for minimal additional cost, include narratives with their programming to increase awareness of aid sharing and the benefits of inclusive hosting. Furthermore, implementation through refugee-led organizations may provide a signal to host communities of the benefits of hosting refugees. Governments considering adopting inclusive hosting policies could consider aid sharing—especially if combined with awareness campaigns—as a way to foster support for these policies.

## 2 Existing Literature

Our work builds on several literatures. Our study is most closely related to three papers that ask whether assistance affects social cohesion between hosts and refugees. In a randomized controlled trial in Ecuador, Valli et al. (2018) show that social transfers—of grants, food, and vouchers—to Colombian refugees and poor members of the host community increase pro-social attitudes and behaviors of the refugees. Lehmann and Masterson (2020)'s study of Syrian refugees in Lebanon finds similar results: aid distributed to refugees can prevent or reduce anti-refugee hostility if the benefits of aid benefit the host community both indirectly through increasing spending in the local

economy and directly through aid-sharing and offering assistance to the host community. In other contexts, refugee aid has had no impact on interactions between the host community and refugees. In DR Congo, Quattrochi et al. (2021) find that economic transfers in the form of vouchers to displaced persons and vulnerable members of the host community has no effect on social cohesion measures. Our study differs from these earlier studies by making the link between the programs and displaced populations explicit and experimentally varying whether this has an effect on social cohesion.

While these are the only examples of experimental and quasi-experimental work that we are aware of, a larger body of quantitative and qualitative studies exists on the impacts of aid on social cohesion. In a wide range of contexts, this literature documents perceptions of unfairness in aid programs by excluded groups (Kreibaum 2016; López, Arredondo, and Salcedo 2011; Zhou 2019; Adato and Roopnaraine 2004; Pavanello et al. 2016a). In Colombia, for example, host communities resented “special treatment” for internally displaced people (Lopez et al. 2011), and in a review of cash-transfers in Yemen, Kenya, Uganda, among other countries, Pavanello et al. (2016b) find that jealousy and social conflict arose between beneficiaries and those excluded from the programs. To date, however, no study that we know of specifically associates assistance or benefits with the presence of refugees or displaced persons in order to improve inter-group relations. We provide a direct test of whether assistance to host communities, directly linked to the refugee presence, can ameliorate or even reverse anti-refugee sentiment.

We also contribute to the wide literature on perceptions towards refugees, internally displaced people, and immigrants. The majority of this research has focused on public opinion in the US and Europe (R. Dancygier and Laitin 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010), concluding that “immigration attitudes show little evidence of being strongly correlated with personal economic circumstances” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Instead, sociotropic concerns—such as migrants’ impacts on the national economy, demographic composition, and culture—are the main drivers of migrant exclusion. In the Global South, similar concerns about refugees’ global impact rather than “egocentric” impacts are linked to anti-refugee sentiment (Alrababa’h et al. 2019; Kreibaum 2016; Zhou 2020). Such prejudicial attitudes, however, are found to be difficult to move (Hopkins, Sides, and Citrin 2019; Paluck and Green 2009) and persistent over time (Lai et al. 2016). In light of negative perceptions of migrants and refugees,

there is a growing academic interest in programs to improve host attitudes (Adida, Lo, and Platas 2018; Alrababa’h et al. 2019; Kalla and Broockman 2020; Mousa 2019; Valli et al. 2018; among others). One emergent finding from this body of work is that information can be effective in changing attitudes towards out-groups when a message or conversation uses a “perspective-taking” technique in which an individual from the in-group is encouraged to connect their experience with that of the out-group (C. Adida, Lo, and M. Platas 2018; Broockman and Kalla 2016; Chatruc, Rozo, et al. 2021). However, few tests of this technique have been done in a lower-income countries and few have found notable effects on citizens’ policy preferences. In our study, we test the effect of a perspective-taking information intervention linked to the a more substantial intervention, cash grants, in a developing country context.

This project also contributes to the vast literature on the determinants of small business profitability in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). A key argument from Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar (2010), Bloom et al. (2013), and Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), is that managerial capital is both important for profitability and lacking in many small businesses in LMICs. However, formal skills training programs that attempt to impart this capital to micro-entrepreneurs typically find no effect on business profit (Blattman and Ralston 2015; McKenzie and Woodruff 2014). An exception is the 1-on-1 mentorship program of (Brooks, Donovan, and Johnson 2018) in Nairobi, Kenya, in which weekly sessions with a mentor increased profits of inexperienced business owners. Our study tests whether mentorship is an effective means to promote skill transfer across nationalities and increase small business profits.

### 3 Setting

**National Refugee Policy** Uganda is perhaps the leading example of a positive refugee-hosting arrangement in the Global South today. With nearly 1.4 million refugees, Uganda hosts the largest population of refugees in Africa and the third largest population globally. The government of Uganda nevertheless maintains one of the most generous refugee policies in the world. Under the 2006 Refugee Act, refugees can move freely within the country and abroad, start businesses and accept jobs, and access primary education and other public services (Uganda: The Refugee Act

2006).<sup>4</sup> International actors, led by UNHCR and World Bank have pushed forward this agenda with the ReHoPE strategy in 2016, under which 30% of the international non-food aid budgets for refugees should go to supporting host communities.<sup>5</sup> The majority of refugees live in one of the 11 rural government-designated refugee settlements where they receive monthly food assistance (either in cash or in kind) and shelter from humanitarian actors and a plot of land to farm.

**Refugee Hosting in Kampala** We conduct our study in Kampala where 78,500 registered refugees reside, though city officials estimate the unofficial number is likely significantly higher.<sup>6</sup> The refugee population in Kampala is over half Congolese, a quarter are Somali, with smaller numbers of South Sudanese. While the majority of refugees in the settlements arrived after 2016, nearly all of the refugees in Kampala are in protracted displacement situations. There are also far fewer aid actors in Kampala than in the settlement areas (Höök 2015), and therefore less resources and programming around integration of refugees in urban host communities. For these reasons, Kampala is an ideal site to examine whether aid can affect support for expansive rights for refugees.

In Kampala, refugees have primarily settled in slum areas, with certain neighborhoods known as particular ethnic enclaves, and occupy economic niches in informal and formal markets. Our main population of interest are the Congolese refugees, who despite their spatial integration, (Betts et al. 2017), reportedly lack social and economic incorporation into Ugandan society (Monteith and Lwasa 2017). Compared to other refugee groups, Congolese economic activities are more similar to that of Ugandans, and they are well-known among locals for their fabrics, tailoring, jewelry, which informs the selection of the industries from which we sample.

Due to previous restrictions on refugees, urban refugees in Kampala have been perceived as illegitimate among city officials (Bernstein 2005; Höök 2015). There are also concerns with growing xenophobia among the Ugandan host community in Kampala with residents viewing refugees as a burden and expressing resistance to hosting (Commission 2011; Höök 2015). Focus group discussions with refugees and Ugandans our research team conducted in February 2019 revealed similar

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<sup>4</sup>This was further institutionalized with the Refugee Regulations passed into 2010, and the Settlement Transformation Agenda in 2016 that integrated refugee and host community self-reliance into the country's second five-year National Development Plan (NDP2).

<sup>5</sup>Uganda is also one of the pilot countries implementing the global Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) that emerged from The New York Declaration in 2016 with an emphasis on relieving pressures on refugee-hosting communities.

<sup>6</sup>The 78,500 constitutes around 6% of Uganda's total refugee population, and 5% of the Kampala population. Numbers are retrieved from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/uga>.

trends. We found widespread misperceptions about the assistance received by refugees and negative stereotypes about the different refugee communities. During these discussions, refugees also shared instances of discrimination and expressed concerns about their long-term future in Kampala. Pervasive discrimination against refugees in Kampala has been documented in other studies as well (Commission 2011; Höök 2015; Bernstein 2005). Of the Ugandan microentrepreneurs we surveyed at baseline, 50% mention concerns about business competition or housing availability and 42% support relocating refugees currently living in Kampala to settlements.<sup>7</sup> Aid-sharing is essentially non-existent in urban areas and little is known about these policies. In our baseline survey, only 17% of those surveyed reported that assistance was shared between refugees and host communities and more than half believed refugees were not allowed to live outside of the settlements. As refugees – like other populations globally – increasingly reside in cities, social cohesion in urban areas is an important issue for policymakers.

## 4 Research Design

This section provides an overview of the sample, data collection, and treatments. For further details on the sample and randomization, please see Table 3 and Appendix A1.

### 4.1 Timeline

The data collection started with a listing exercise in October 2019. We selected the sample from the listing data and conducted the baseline survey between mid-November 2019 and mid-December 2019. We launched the interventions in January of 2020 and suspended operations in mid-March 2020, with the interventions only partially complete, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. We conducted a midline survey over the phone in October 2020. We resumed and completed (modified) intervention delivery between March and May 2021. The first endline survey was done between late May and the middle of June 2021. The time between treatment and endline therefore varies significantly within each survey wave, between 2 weeks and 16 months at endline; we are working on analyzing this dimension of heterogeneity within the treatment effects.

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<sup>7</sup>Other baseline statistics from our sample can be found in Table 3 and Table 4.

## 4.2 Sample Construction

We listed 3,414 micro-entrepreneurs in market areas where refugees operate businesses (Kisenyi, Central, etc.) from which we selected our main sample (inexperienced Ugandan business owners) and the mentors (experienced refugee and Ugandan business owners). The main sample was chosen consisting of 1,406 Ugandan businesses. These were randomly assigned to five treatments (cash and information, cash, information, a refugee mentor, a Ugandan mentor) or control, stratified by gender, sector, and mentor eligibility, and within each of these cells, median profits and median attitudes towards hosting.<sup>8</sup>

Our sample consists of young Ugandan micro-entrepreneurs with less than five years of experience who are either salon owners or tailors. We select these industries for a number of reasons. First, a significant number of refugees and Ugandans own businesses in these sectors, including both men and women with a range of experience levels. Second, both industries benefit from a skillset that could be learned and expanded in mentorship. In addition to general management skills (accounting, advertising, etc.) and connections with supplier networks studied by Brooks, Donovan, and Johnson (2018) in a wide range of industries, tailors and hair stylists can exchange new styles and techniques, an aspect that was mentioned frequently during piloting. Third, owners are willing to leave their businesses periodically to participate in mentorship.<sup>9</sup> Finally, both industries require a stable place of business which facilitates higher rates for follow-up.

Mentors were selected non-randomly from the listing in order to have balance on refugee and Ugandan mentee characteristics (profit, years of experience, gender) and match business owners in the same industry. We also survey the refugee mentors to gather data on their integration, livelihoods, and descriptive data on the impacts of mentorship.

## 4.3 Interventions

Our interventions consist of two main sets of treatments. The first is a grant delivered with information and the second is a mentorship program with refugees and Ugandan business mentors. In the grant and information treatment, we combine a large in-kind grant (500,000 UGX) for the business owner with a mixed information treatment about the refugee aid-sharing policy. The

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<sup>8</sup>This produces 28 strata, ranging in size from 13 to 100 observations.

<sup>9</sup>In piloting, owners of restaurants and small shops, for example, were significantly more worried about a negative effect on revenue from temporary closure.

Table 1: Assignment and Actual Treatment Status

	Grant + Canvassing	Grant	Canvassing	Refugee Mentorship	Ugandan Mentorship	Control
Assigned	280	237	287	169	168	265
Treated	230	184	257	133	135	NA

interventions are intended to both 1) assist micro-entrepreneurs in business development and 2) generate support for inclusive refugee-hosting policies. The interventions are randomly assigned at the individual level.

An in-kind grant for the business was chosen for their demonstrated long-run impact in other contexts with higher returns to in-kind grants when the research team accompanies the owner to purchase capital (Fafchamps et al. 2014). We combine the in-kind grant with an information treatment to increase the salience and benefits of the assistance accompanying refugee-hosting. In order to isolate the effects of both the cash grant and the information treatments affecting attitudes towards refugees, we implement two additional treatment arms. To these groups, we provide either a cash grant that is not connected to the refugee presence or an information treatment not accompanied by cash.

In our second set of interventions, we match Ugandans in our sample of business owners with refugee mentors in the same industry who have more experience. The design is motivated by the contact hypothesis, in which close collaborative relationships with outgroups can promote inclusion (Gordon W. Allport 1979; Gordon Willard Allport, Clark, and Pettigrew 1954), and by the results of a similar mentorship program that demonstrated large effects on profits (Brooks, Donovan, and Johnson 2018). In order to benchmark the effects on profits, we implement the same mentorship program with Ugandan mentors instead of refugees. Altogether, we have a 2x2 cross-cutting design with canvassing and cash treatments and a separate mentorship treatment with refugee and Ugandan mentors, yielding five distinct treatment arms and a control. The scripts are available in Appendix A2.

Interventions were implemented in-person to about 30% of the sample beginning in January 2020. Due to disruptions related to COVID-19, we suspended interventions and recommenced all treatments remotely in February 2021.

**Treatment 1: Grant and Canvassing** This treatment tests whether aid-sharing programs that have a direct benefit for individuals coupled with positive messages about refugees and refugee hosting can generate support for inclusive refugee hosting policies. The intervention begins with a YARID staff member providing about Uganda’s national aid-sharing policy and YARID’s work. The facilitator then takes the participant through an empathetic listening exercise that is designed to “encourage perspective-taking and activate inclusionary values while reducing counter-arguing and the perceived threat to the self from the interaction” (Kalla and Broockman 2020, p. 4). We modeled our empathetic listening exercise on others that have documented success in reducing prejudice towards migrants and refugees in the various contexts (Kalla and Broockman 2020; C. L. Adida, Lo, and M. R. Platas 2018; Chatruc, Rozo, et al. 2021). In a structured conversation, the YARID staff member asks the Ugandan respondent to connect with an experience of marginalization and invites a discussion around their potential concerns with refugees.<sup>10</sup>

Once the YARID staff member concludes the perspective-taking exercise, the intervention continues with the offer of an in-kind grant worth 500,000 Ugandan Shillings (136 USD), or roughly 3.5 times average monthly profit in our sample. The business owner must spend at minimum 300,000 UGX out of the 500,000 UGX value on in-kind business-purpose purchases such as inventory or machinery in addition to rent payments for the business location. Our decision to require a minimum in-kind component is motivated by evidence that returns to in-kind purchases are higher than returns to cash for micro-entrepreneurs (Fafchamps et al. 2014).<sup>11</sup>

All respondents were contacted over the phone following the COVID-19 suspension to review the canvassing script and dispense the cash grant if it was not provided before the suspension. The full 500,000 UGX was disbursed via mobile money, and the requirement to spend at least 300,000 with the enumerator was removed. The respondent was encouraged to invest the money in their business if it was still operating, but this was not enforced.

**Treatment 2: Grant** The grant only treatment allows us to isolate possible effects of wealth driving changes in attitudes towards refugees. This intervention offers a business grant identical to that from Treatment 1 without any association with refugees. The same procedures are followed, however, no information about the existing aid-sharing policy is given and no perspective-taking

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<sup>10</sup>The scripts for all treatments are included in the Appendix.

<sup>11</sup>Grants between \$100 and \$200 USD were found to increase profits between 5% per year in Sri Lanka (De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2012) and 20% per month in Mexico (McKenzie and Woodruff 2008).

exercise is conducted.

Following the COVID-19 suspension, the same procedure is followed as in the Grant and Canvassing intervention with 500,000 UGX disbursed via mobile money without any requirements.

Of the first 143 purchases made before COVID-19 in the grant and the grant and canvassing groups, 27 (18%) bought small tools like scissors, razors, needles and thread, for their salon or for their tailor shop, and 71 (50%) bought assets including chairs, professional grade hair dryers, and sewing machines. Additionally, 57 out of 92 salon owners (62%) bought nondurable goods like hair products and cleaning supplies and 23 out of 51 tailors bought fabric (45%). On average 420,000 UGX (\$110) was spent on the items and almost no beneficiaries spent more than the 500,000 UGX grant. While 25% spent exactly the minimum and received 200,000 (\$54) in cash, 48% spent the entirety of the grant including 8% who used some of their own money to purchase a more expensive item. Out of the 143, 53 (37%) reported they were using the remaining money for business rent and the majority did not disclose what they would spend it on.

Of the 137 purchases made during the remote interventions resumed in 2021 that we collected data on, 17 out of the 35 tailors bought large tools (49%) and 9 out of 35 bought fabric (26%).<sup>12</sup> Out of the 102 salon owners, 83 (81%) bought large tools and 13 (13%) bought small tools. These purchasing patterns perhaps demonstrate an increase in spending on more durable items compared to inventory and nondurable goods due to the reduced consumer demand for services during Ugandan's economic lockdown.

**Treatment 3: Canvassing** This treatment arm was designed to test whether a “light touch” in which simply greater information about refugee experiences and refugees’ presence contributing to an improvement of community welfare can produce changes host community attitudes towards refugee hosting. The canvassing portion of the intervention is identical to the Grant and Canvassing treatment, with the exception of the YARID staff member informing the respondent that they will receive a cash grant as part of the aid shared with host communities. Canvassing conversations lasted on average 19 minutes with a standard deviation of 85 minutes, and in 63% of the information conversations, facilitators reported a positive view of refugees during the call.

After the COVID-19 suspension, the same script was administered over the phone to every person in the information treatment group, whether they had been visited before the suspension

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<sup>12</sup>Due to an error, data on purchases was not collected for all participants after we resumed interventions in 2021

or not. Calls lasted on average longer than the information visits in-person, averaging 32 minutes with a standard deviation of 97 minutes. The facilitators reported 86% of respondents during the conversations had positive views of refugees.

**Treatment 4: Refugee mentorship** This treatment tests whether contact and professional collaboration with a refugee can shift attitudes towards refugees and refugee-hosting. In this intervention, inexperienced Ugandan business owners are matched with refugees of Congolese origin.<sup>13</sup> We chose to recruit mentors of Congolese origin as Congolese sellers have an especially strong reputation in salons and tailor shops. The Congolese “bitenge” fabric, clothing styles, and hair styles are highly-regarded by Kampala consumers<sup>14</sup>. We hypothesized the high concentration and reputational advantage of refugees was desirable for this study to increase the chances for skill transfer and collaboration to emerge from refugee-Ugandan pairs in mentorship.<sup>15</sup>

During the mentorship intervention, a YARID staff accompanies the mentee to the mentor’s business, and is present for the conversations to assist with translation, prompt the initial conversation, and take notes. The full intervention consists of 6 meets with an average frequency of once a week (with attrition expected). Following the resumption of interventions after the COVID-19 suspension, four mentorship meetings were facilitated by YARID staff with all pairs that could be found using three-way calling (regardless of previous treatment status). To compensate participants for their time away from their work and as an incentive, both the mentor and the mentee are compensated.<sup>16</sup>

During meetings conducted before the suspension, the most common topics of discussion are about customers (70% of all meetings), skills (62% of all meetings), equipment and tools (31%), location (30%), and suppliers (26%). Following the COVID-19 suspension, topics discussed remained similar, with the majority of discussions topics remaining customers (67% of all meetings), skills (51% of all meetings), equipment and tools (29%), location (30%), and suppliers (28%). However,

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<sup>13</sup>Participants are not informed before agreeing to mentorship that their mentor is a refugee, and instead they are told that the business owner is in the same industry and of the same gender and may or may not be of the owner’s same nationality.

<sup>14</sup>Anecdotally, Bitenge is assumed by many customers to be imported from the DRC, though others noted it is increasingly imported from China and marketed as DRC-origin.

<sup>15</sup>Other studies have found that refugees and immigrants can have medium to long-term positive structural impacts on the host economy (Sequeira, Nunn, and Qian 2020; Peters 2017). Murard and Sakalli (2018) find that history of migration-related gains in the textile industry from Murard.

<sup>16</sup>Mentees are compensated 10,000 UGX (\$2.75) for their time for the first meeting, 5,000 UGX for the second and third meeting, and nothing for the fourth. The compensation structure was designed to incentivize the initial meetings, with demand for the subsequent meetings driven by the mentee.

Table 2: Number of Mentorship Meetings by Year

	Number of Meetings							Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	
2020	95	29	129	28	2	6	48	337
2021	107	9	7	27	187	NA	NA	337

following the lockdown and resumption of interventions, the content of these topics changed. For example, the mentorship pairs discussed how their businesses had been affected by COVID-19, and mutually expressed interests in learning new skills to expand their business such as salons also expanding to doing make-up or tailors learning to make wedding gowns and how to attract the costumers they had lost due to the COVID-19 shutdown. Many Ugandans expressed their appreciation for a new friendship and to connect with a refugee of a different nationality.

While the structure of mentorship meetings between refugees and Ugandans was designed to be a skills-transfer, conversations were reported to be equal in participation. YARID facilitators reported that in about half (45%) of conversations, the mentor and mentee had equal control and further, in about a third of the meetings (34%) most of the conversation between the mentee and mentor had to be translated. Prior to the suspension, the conversations on average last 43 minutes with a standard deviation of 21 minutes. Following the resumption of the interventions, calls between mentors and mentees lasted on average 23.11 minutes with a standard deviation of 9.08.

**Treatment 5: Ugandan mentorship** The Ugandan mentor treatment allows us to test whether there are complementarities between mentor-mentee pairs from different nationalities. It is structured identically to the Refugee mentorship intervention, with assignment instead to a Ugandan mentor. Mentor selection in the refugee and Ugandan pool was designed to balance relevant mentor characteristics other than nationality, such as business experience and profit, across treatment arms (see the Appendix for details).

Ugandan mentor Ugandan mentee meetings are largely similar to the refugee mentor refugee mentee meetings regarding topics of conversation, length of meeting, and participation. Topics have been relatively stable across the number of meetings and mostly consistent across mentor nationality, with refugee-Ugandan mentorship pairs are slightly more likely to talk in the conversation with 60% of the pairs being more active than the facilitator in the conversation, compared

to 53% of refugee pairs, though this difference is not statistically significant. In contrast to the refugee-Ugandan pairs, 20% of the Ugandan mentorship pairs had half or more of their conversation translated, which is a statistically significant difference. Similar to the Refugee Mentorship group, in about half of the mentorship meetings the mentor and mentee had equal control.

**Control Group** This group receives no intervention and was not contacted by YARID.

### 4.3.1 COVID-19 Interruption Details

The interventions were launched in late January of 2020 and suspended on March 20, 2020 due to COVID-19. At the time of the suspension, YARID had visited:

- 82% of the canvassing only treatment arm
- 75% of the grant and grant and canvassing arms for the first meeting to explain the program
- 33% for the second meeting to disburse the grant
- 83% of the mentorship treatment arms. 70% of the mentorship pairs met at least once, with 23% of those having met all six times

## 4.4 Empirical strategy

This section briefly describes our strategy for measuring outcomes and identifying treatment effects. Additional details are available in our pre-analysis plan hosted at the AEA RCT Registry.

### 4.4.1 Estimating equations

We estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) effects using the following ANCOVA specification:

$$y_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^5 \beta_j T_{ji} + \gamma y_{i0} + \delta M_{i0} + \eta X_i + \theta_t + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (1)$$

where  $y_{it}$  is an outcome for individual  $i$  measured at time  $t$ , with  $t = 0$  corresponding to baseline (pre-treatment) values;  $M_{i0}$  is an indicator for a missing value of  $y_{i0}$ ;  $T_{ji}$  are treatment assignment dummies for treatment groups  $j = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ ;  $X_i$  is a vector of baseline controls chosen through the double lasso methodology (Chernozhukov et al. 2018);  $\theta_t$  is a survey round fixed effect;  $\alpha_i$

is a randomization strata fixed effect; and  $\epsilon_{it}$  is an error term. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. We run separate lassos for each dependent variable using the Stata package *pdslasso* (Ahrens, Hansen, and Schaffer 2019) and include all possible controls from the baseline in each. Our treatment effects of interest are given by the coefficient vector  $\beta_j$ , and represent the average difference in outcome  $y$  between each treatment group and the control group, across individuals and post-treatment survey rounds, conditional on pre-treatment outcome levels and the set of baseline controls selected by double lasso. See McKenzie 2012 for details on the ANCOVA specification in the analysis of experiments.

#### 4.4.2 Measurement and Multiple Hypothesis Testing

We transform Likert scale measures and other categorical variables into binary measures, resolving neutral answers toward the smaller group. We winsorize monetary measures at the first and 99th percentiles and transform using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) for regressions and USD for summary statistics.

In addition to analyzing outcomes individually, we group outcomes into domains representing classes of related hypotheses. For each domain, we compute a summary index following the methodology of Anderson 2008. Each summary index represents a weighted average of standardized components within a domain.<sup>17</sup> For our four primary hypotheses, we report Westfall-Young stepdown adjusted p-values to control for the family-wise error rate. This procedure estimates the probability of making one or more type I errors and adjusts for correlation across outcomes. Within each domain, we report sharpened q-values to control for the false discovery rate. This procedure estimates the share of rejected null hypotheses that are false rejections. For completeness, we report all pre-specified domains and indices in Appendix A3

## 5 Results

To preview our results, we find a positive effect of all five treatment groups on our main outcome, a pre-specified index of policy preferences, that is statically significant at the 10% level. The cash and information combined treatment (T1), however, has a larger effect than the other four treatments,

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<sup>17</sup>In the Anderson summary index, a component’s weight is equal to the sum of its row entries in the inverted covariance matrix of outcomes in its domain.

which are statistically different from zero but not from each other. The T1 group was more likely to know about Uganda’s aid-sharing policy and more likely to report receiving assistance associated with the refugee presence, which is consistent with our main hypothesis that saliently linking the policies to assistance increases political support. The effects from other treatments appear to be driven by multiple factors; we hypothesize that exposure to the refugee-led organization implementing popular programs is one underlying driver and plan on collecting additional data to explore this hypothesis further. We find no evidence of an effect of cash grants on business profit or other economic outcomes, suggesting that policy preferences towards refugees can move independently of economic outcomes.

## 5.1 Support for inclusive refugee hosting policies

Our primary outcomes are support for inclusive policies. Table 4 shows the intent-to-treat effect on respondents’ support for hosting overall, the right to work, freedom of movement, hosting more refugees, and the pre-specified index that combines these measures. Column 1 shows the cash with information treatment (T1) increased general support for hosting during COVID-19 by 15 percentage points (p- and q-values less than 0.01), relative to a mean of 72% in the control group at the endline. Column 2 shows that support for hosting after COVID-19 is lower both in levels (65% in the control group at endline) and the T1 treatment effect (8.7 percentage points), but still statistically different from the control group with a p-value less than 0.01 and q-value of 0.013.

The next four columns assess support for specific policies for refugees already in Uganda. The information script covered these policies, explaining that the right to work, for instance, was critical for refugees’ self-reliance and allowed more of the international donations to be shared with Ugandans. Columns 3 and 4 show T1 significantly increased support for the right to work, both during and after COVID-19. Columns 5 and 6 show no significant effects on support for freedom of movement; these questions, however, were framed negatively in order to test respondents’ attentiveness to individual questions.<sup>18</sup> We view this null result as evidence that respondents in the treatment group were reacting to each question instead of reporting broad agreement to please the enumerator or finish the survey faster.

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<sup>18</sup>The exact phrasing for the question in Column 5 was “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: During coronavirus, Uganda should relocate all refugees to live in the settlements, including those currently living in Kampala.” You can answer Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neutral, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree, or It depends on the nationality.

Finally, column 9 shows the pre-specified index that combines the eight individual outcomes, with higher values indicating more support for inclusive policies. T1 increased the summary index by 0.35 standard deviations relative to the control group (standardized to mean 0 within each survey round), which is significantly different from the control group at the 0.01 level and from all other treatment groups at the 0.05 level.

Table 4 also shows that both components of the the program - the cash (T2) and the information (T3) - significantly affected respondents' policy preferences when implemented separately. The effect sizes are lower than for the combined program (statistically significantly lower for 2 of the 8 outcomes for T2 and 5 of the 8 outcomes for T3) but positive and significantly different from the control group for at least half of the domain's survey questions and the summary index overall. The effect of T3 is consistent with our hypothesis and other studies utilizing perspective-taking exercises that show short, strategic conversations with enumerators can shift policy preferences. We explore multiple explanations for the effect of the cash alone in the results below.

Mentorship also increased support for inclusive policies. We hypothesized that mentorship by a refugee (T4) would shift attitudes through interpersonal contact and, if the mentee perceived the program to be beneficial, by increasing the direct personal benefits to the mentee from refugee-hosting. We find evidence consistent with this hypothesis: support for refugees' right to work, hosting more refugees, and the summary index are positive and significant at the 10% level for T4. However, the effects are also positive and significant for T5, mentorship by a Ugandan mentor (p-value < 0.05 but not statistically different from T4). This suggests the interpersonal contact with the mentor is unlikely to be the main channel influencing the shift in policy preferences.<sup>19</sup>

## 5.2 Knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes about refugees

Table 5 describes other outcomes that we expect, in most cases, to correlate with policy preferences and are important for social cohesion on their own. The first column reports whether respondents answered "yes" to the question "Are any of the international donations to refugees in Uganda shared with Ugandans?". The information script in T1 and T3 explained that approximately 30% of refugee aid is allocated to Ugandans; respondents in T1 are 10.9 percentage points more likely

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<sup>19</sup>Mousa (2019) finds inter-group contact affected behaviors within the intervention but not in settings outside the intervention that would build broader social cohesion. This further suggests that the effects on policy preferences may not have been driven by inter-personal contact in our setting.

to remember this aid-sharing policy (p-value < 0.01, q-value < 0.05), relative to an endline control mean of 38%. However, T2 – cash without accompanying information – is also more likely to affect beliefs that assistance is shared. We discuss this result in the Discussion section below.

Columns 2 through 5 of Table 5 report treatment effects on respondents’ beliefs about the economic effects of refugees. Columns 2 and 3 show that T1, T2, and T3 has positive effects on beliefs that refugees positively affect the overall economy and respondents’ personal economic situations. The pre-specified index for this domain (shown in Table A3.5) is also strongly significant for these three treatments. Mentorship appears to have little effect on beliefs. Columns 6, 7, and 8 measure whether the treatments affect views of refugees’ economic outcomes and show no signs of effects.

Table 6 presents results on social attitudes toward refugees. We find significant effects from T1, T2, and T3 on the social distance index, a combination of four questions on whether the respondent is OK with having a refugee as a spouse, relative, friend, and neighbor, although only the effect on T1 survives a q-value less than 0.1. Our intervention that were designed to move beliefs about the economic effects of refugees also affected social attitudes, suggesting that social attitudes and economic beliefs likely do not move independently from one another.

We also propose a simple dictator game at the end of the survey, offering an additional 3,000 UGX at baseline and endline and 1,500 UGX at midline for the respondent to split between themselves, a program that helps refugees in Kampala, and a program that helps Ugandans in need.<sup>20</sup> This was included in order to have an incentivized measure of behavior in addition to the survey responses.<sup>21</sup> We find that respondents in T1 and T2 donate a higher proportion to refugees than the control group, while also donating more to the Ugandan charity (column 7). As in most dictator games, respondents often divided the pot evenly; in our version, the cash treatments affected the probability they included themselves in the allocation.<sup>22</sup> Column 8 shows that T1 and T2 significantly affected the pre-specified index of social attitudes toward refugees, in addition to the effects on political preferences, knowledge, and economic beliefs discussed above. We find no evidence that mentorship by a refugee or a Ugandan affected social attitudes.

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<sup>20</sup>The base compensation for survey participation is 7,000 UGX ( $\approx$  2 USD) and 3,000 UGX, respectively.

<sup>21</sup>We are currently exploring options for other behavioral outcomes as well.

<sup>22</sup>Table A3.11 shows no treatment effects on the probability of donating more or equal amounts to refugees.

### 5.3 Economic outcomes in the firm and household

We hypothesized that both cash and mentorship would improve business outcomes. Table 7 shows impacts on firm profit reported over the previous 30 days. We find that no treatment significantly affected profits – point estimates are generally negative and imprecise. Business owners assigned to a Ugandan mentor are, however, more likely to have kept their businesses from closing down (coeff = 4.2 pp, p-val<0.01). They are also more likely to have taken out loans for their business (0.2 more loans per business, p-val=0.09), and worked significantly longer hours (40% longer, p-val<0.01) at their business over the prior week. The q-values on these estimates are typically high, however, and so should be interpreted as suggestive.

Table 8 displays treatment impacts on business practices. We analyze three indices representing business practice scores in three categories of management, which we modify from McKenzie and Woodruff 2017—marketing, buying and stock control, and costing and record keeping—as well as a single composite index of all three practices. We find suggestive evidence that both types of mentorship as well as cash improved business practices by 0.17–0.21 standard deviations, with p-values around 0.09. This is driven by positive effects in all three components – marketing, buying and stock control, and costing and record keeping – though individual coefficients and statistical significance vary. We also analyze an index composed of 5 measures of self-reported change in business practices: whether the owner changed suppliers, services offered, advertising, management such as accounting, and labor or machines. Estimated impacts on this index are inconsistently signed and not statistically significant. Together, this suggests that mentorship and cash change how owners manage their businesses, but in subtle ways that they do not report as change when asked directly.

Table 9 shows effects on various measures of household well-being, including income, savings, and qualitative measures of financial security. The only statistically significant impact at the 10% level on the composite index of well-being is on those who were assigned a Ugandan mentor: this treatment increases the well-being index by 0.134 standard deviations (p-val = 0.08). No individual component shows a statistically significant change. We find modest but insignificant improvements in the well-being index in the cash and cash + information groups (coeffs = 0.039 and 0.086, p-val = 0.57 and 0.22 respectively). Businesses assigned to a refugee mentor display no change in the well-being index.

## 5.4 Discussion and Additional Results

We interpret these results as strong evidence in favor of our main hypothesis. T1, combining the cash grant with information that the grant is made possible by inclusive refugee-hosting policy, had large, significant effects on policy preferences in favor of continuing inclusive hosting policies. We hypothesized the grant would make the information on aid-sharing more salient and credible, as respondents personally and tangibly believed they benefited from the policy. Respondents in this group were more likely to remember the aid-sharing policy and, as shown in Table 10, column 4, also more likely to report that they received assistance associated with refugees in an open-ended question about assistance in the last year. They are more likely to say refugees have positive effects on the economy and them personally and back up their responses with more donations to refugees. Although we do not measure any effects of the grant on economic outcomes, the program was in high demand from participants, and we are confident respondents at least perceived some personal benefit. Overall, the grant with information program suggests Ugandans' policy preferences toward refugees respond most when the benefits are clear and tangible.

The effects on the other treatment arms likely have multiple explanations. Effects in the cash only arm (T2) are most similar to the effects in cash with information (T1): in addition to effects on policy preferences, they are similarly more knowledgeable about aid-sharing, more likely to believe refugees have positive economic impacts, donate larger amounts while including refugees, and express less social distance from refugees than the control group. Furthermore, Table 10, column 4, also shows that the T2 group is also more likely to report they received specific assistance associated with refugees. This suggests that some in this group learned that the grant was associated with refugees. It's possible that YARID field officers deviated from the script and mentioned that the organization was founded and is led by refugees instead of describing YARID only as a "community-based" organization as planned. It's also likely that respondents across treatment groups and control discussed the project, though if they discussed the grants' association with refugees, we view this as further evidence for our main hypothesis that the information was highly salient and impactful for recipients. Finally, respondents likely connected the survey, the questions on the surveys about refugees, and the program they received; even if the link was not explicitly outlined, some respondents likely deduced a connection.

An alternative explanation is that respondents are less accepting of refugees because they believe

refugees receive unfair levels of assistance. Once they also receive benefits from a non-profit, whether the benefit is explicitly tied to refugees or not, they are less resentful and more open to inclusion. We find suggestive evidence when looking at heterogeneity in the effects on policy support by baseline levels of acceptance in Table A3. The effects in T2 especially, and to a lesser extent in T1, T3, and T4, are driven by those who were less supportive at baseline. Column 9, for instance, says that the effect of T2 is entirely driven by those who did not believe refugees deserved sympathy and support at baseline.

While experimenter demand effects may also be present in our study, we do not believe the effects are driven by this bias. Respondents in T1 and T2 who received cash knew the transfer was a one-time program and independent of their views on refugees. We also run a within-survey priming experiment on the five outcomes listed in Table A2. We randomize whether to ask these questions right before or after asking about assistance received in the last year to see whether recall of assistance changes responses.<sup>23</sup> We find no effects of priming. The survey firm was also separate from YARID, although some respondents likely drew a connection. We also believe there was some degree of discussion and spillovers about these programs, as discussed above. In this case, the other groups that did not receive cash would be equally incentivized to misreport their true preferences in hopes of receiving cash for favorable answers. This would attenuate a treatment effect. Similarly, in the presence of information diffusion about the program, our results could be driven by the control group growing resentful for not receiving any assistance and reducing support, instead of increasing support in the treatment arms. Column 1 in Table 4 shows the control group means for general hosting support were stable during the course of the study, which suggests this does not drive the main effects here.

For other threats to our main hypothesis, we do have differential attrition at this point in the data collection, as shown in Table A1, with more follow-up surveys from cash only (T2), those mentored by Ugandans (T5), and cash with information (T1) to a lesser extent. We are working on Lee bounds to address the severity of the potential effect but do not believe this would overturn our strong main results.

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<sup>23</sup>These questions on assistance were at the end of the survey to avoid priming the majority of the survey responses.

## 6 Policy Implications and Next Steps

We believe our study provides some of the clearest empirical evidence to date on how assistance can positively affect attitudes toward refugees. When Ugandans know they are receiving assistance because of Uganda’s inclusive hosting policies, they are more likely to support both inclusion and hosting more refugees in the future. On a program level, this provides evidence for non-profits that deliver livelihoods interventions in refugee-hosting settings on how to potentially leverage the assistance for additional gains in social cohesion. Many already include host community members in programming, but few to our knowledge explicitly connect the assistance to the refugee presence. The costs to facilitate this connection – adapting the non-judgemental, perspective-taking exercise to the context, training field officers, and allocating additional time to deliver the short scripts – are likely minimal relative to a program overall. For funders, we believe our results suggest that supporting refugee-led organizations and their programming may have wider positive effects on host community attitudes towards refugees. At the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, signatories to the Grand Bargain agreed to allocate 25% of humanitarian funds to local organizations by 2020 but fell short of this goal (Cornish 2021). More broadly, if these results apply in other contexts, the model of aid-sharing with awareness campaigns could be adopted to facilitate policy changes by host governments that currently exclude refugees from the labor market.

We have multiple next steps planned and funded for this project. With the data collected through mid-June 2021, we are exploring additional results including heterogeneity by mentor characteristics, effects of the assistance on gender roles within the household, the implications of differential attrition, and the effects of the COVID-19 shock in the middle of our study. We are also continuing to analyze baseline and midline data from our sample of refugee microentrepreneurs, including mentors who participated in the interventions and those with minimal experience at baseline who are comparable to our treatment sample. Data collection for the first endline for refugees was delayed due to a COVID-19 lockdown, and we are currently adapting the survey instrument for phone implementation. We also have multiple survey rounds funded for our full sample, including the experimental sample of Ugandans, comparable refugees with little experience, and mentors. In these surveys, we plan to assess the medium-term effects of all treatments on both political and economic outcomes. The economic gains may not be immediately realized, and the attitude outcomes could attenuate over time – and possibly even reverse if recipients expect

future transfers (despite YARID's clear communication that this was a one-time program) and are frustrated if expectations are not met. We plan three additional phone surveys – including one of the treatment groups facilitated by our implementing partner, YARID, to test some of the hypotheses around respondents' knowledge of YARID that have emerged from the first round of endline analysis – and one additional in-person survey, ideally in November of 2021 if the COVID-19 situation allows. We are also exploring additional behavioral measures to supplement the survey responses and donations. We expect to have these additions completed by January of 2022.

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## 7 Main Tables

Table 3: Baseline Summary Statistics

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Sample	Ugandan Mentors	Refugee Mentors
	mean	mean	mean
Age	27.48	34.41	34.96
Education Years	10.72	9.87	10.80
Female	0.68	0.65	0.65
Tailor	0.45	0.63	0.63
Experience	2.38	9.26	9.62
Profit	137044.93	159071.01	177869.05
Any Employees	0.22	0.22	0.20
Know Intl Donations Shared w Ugandans	0.19	0.16	.
Support Hosting	0.72	0.68	.
More Refugees	0.52	0.48	.
Freedom of Movement	0.58	0.51	.
Right to Work	0.60	0.60	.
Observations	1406	170	169

Table 4: Support for Inclusive Refugee Hosting

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Support Hosting Current	Support Hosting Post-COVID	Right to Work Current	Right to Work Post-COVID	Freedom of Movement Current	Freedom of Movement Post-COVID	More Refugees Current	More Refugees Post-COVID	Policy Preferences Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.153*** (0.029) [0.001]	0.087*** (0.030) [0.013]	0.131*** (0.029) [0.001]	0.082*** (0.028) [0.013]	0.017 (0.036) [0.271]	0.061 (0.038) [0.105]	0.151*** (0.032) [0.001]	0.112*** (0.032) [0.003]	0.350*** (0.067)
Cash (T2)	0.095*** (0.032) [0.013]	0.105*** (0.030) [0.003]	0.089*** (0.030) [0.013]	0.058** (0.028) [0.056]	-0.053 (0.037) [0.117]	0.011 (0.041) [0.311]	0.121*** (0.033) [0.003]	0.081** (0.034) [0.033]	0.218*** (0.071)
Information (T3)	0.066** (0.031) [0.049]	0.080*** (0.029) [0.017]	0.068** (0.030) [0.039]	0.031 (0.029) [0.194]	-0.021 (0.036) [0.256]	0.042 (0.037) [0.184]	0.093*** (0.033) [0.016]	0.035 (0.032) [0.194]	0.193*** (0.069)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.055 (0.035) [0.106]	0.034 (0.033) [0.198]	0.066* (0.034) [0.062]	0.039 (0.033) [0.177]	-0.064 (0.042) [0.113]	0.040 (0.043) [0.221]	0.071* (0.037) [0.064]	0.010 (0.036) [0.311]	0.127* (0.076)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.091*** (0.033) [0.017]	0.079** (0.033) [0.030]	0.055 (0.035) [0.106]	0.022 (0.032) [0.243]	-0.069 (0.043) [0.105]	0.023 (0.044) [0.270]	0.080** (0.035) [0.038]	0.064* (0.035) [0.077]	0.177** (0.076)
Observations	2,139	2,142	2,138	2,139	2,130	1,089	2,137	2,138	2,150
Domain for q-values	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>P-values</i>									
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.037	0.512	0.108	0.353	0.052	0.203	0.318	0.328	0.033
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.001	0.803	0.014	0.046	0.276	0.581	0.052	0.012	0.010
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.300	0.172	0.770	0.619	0.909	0.691	0.803	0.150	0.506
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.004	0.284	0.051	0.191	0.135	0.751	0.086	0.027	0.009
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.565	0.177	0.755	0.646	0.603	0.848	0.520	0.232	0.648
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.028	0.004	0.057	0.352	0.358	0.789	0.007	0.102	0.019
<i>Control Means</i>									
Baseline	0.738	0.738	0.601	0.601	0.588	0.588	0.512	0.512	
Midline	0.720	0.841	0.794	0.866	0.487	0.782	0.763	0.763	
Endline	0.716	0.645	0.678	0.710	0.536	.	0.486	0.596	

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses. FDR sharpened q-values in brackets. The full questions for the dependent variables listed in the Appendix A3, along with the full set of questions in each domain that determines the within-domain q-values. The results are from the Intent-to-Treat ANCOVA specification using the double-lasso method to select baseline controls and data collected at midline and endline. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

Table 5: Knowledge and beliefs about Refugees' Economic Effects and Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Know Intl Donations Shared w Ugandans	Pos Effect on Economy Overall	Pos Effect on You Personally	Pos Effect on Your Business	Have Skills	Have Money	Receive More Aid Than Needed	Can Support Themselves
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.109*** (0.036) [0.046]	0.148*** (0.040) [0.004]	0.122*** (0.039) [0.016]	0.077 (0.064) [0.267]	0.135** (0.055) [0.050]	0.041 (0.053) [1.000]	-0.062 (0.056) [1.000]	-0.064 (0.051) [0.371]
Cash (T2)	0.089** (0.037) [0.079]	0.068* (0.040) [0.171]	0.112*** (0.040) [0.026]	0.127* (0.065) [0.115]	0.009 (0.056) [0.619]	-0.066 (0.056) [1.000]	-0.053 (0.057) [1.000]	-0.126** (0.052) [0.079]
Information (T3)	0.033 (0.035) [0.359]	0.113*** (0.039) [0.023]	0.091** (0.039) [0.052]	0.088 (0.064) [0.263]	0.065 (0.054) [0.267]	-0.036 (0.054) [1.000]	-0.063 (0.056) [1.000]	-0.042 (0.051) [0.497]
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	-0.081** (0.041) [0.172]	0.047 (0.046) [0.360]	-0.024 (0.045) [0.523]	0.055 (0.078) [0.514]	0.006 (0.064) [0.619]	-0.043 (0.061) [1.000]	-0.078 (0.066) [1.000]	-0.066 (0.060) [0.371]
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.029 (0.042) [0.414]	0.031 (0.046) [0.514]	0.074* (0.043) [0.171]	0.066 (0.075) [0.429]	0.021 (0.061) [0.619]	-0.057 (0.062) [1.000]	0.045 (0.062) [1.000]	-0.088 (0.059) [0.371]
Observations	2,160	1,936	2,025	487	890	884	857	917
Domain for q-values	3	4	4	4	4	51	51	52
<i>P-values</i>								
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.610	0.039	0.795	0.405	0.022	0.043	0.864	0.221
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.035	0.330	0.391	0.844	0.184	0.138	0.993	0.663
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.016	0.748	0.029	0.891	0.823	0.832	0.076	0.738
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.000	0.039	0.009	0.869	0.113	0.268	0.342	0.551
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.001	0.227	0.015	0.766	0.692	0.948	0.234	0.416
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.002	0.054	0.003	0.409	0.758	0.808	0.280	0.156
<i>Control Means</i>								
Baseline	0.176	0.510	0.416	0.621	0.506	0.580	0.500	0.468
Midline	0.364	0.453	0.461	.	.	.	.	.
Endline	0.377	0.396	0.423	0.675	0.429	0.596	0.534	0.440

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses. FDR sharpened q-values in brackets. The full questions for the dependent variables listed in the Appendix A3, along with the full set of questions in each domain that determines the within-domain q-values. The results are from the Intent-to-Treat ANCOVA specification using the double-lasso method to select baseline controls and data collected at midline and endline. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

Table 6: Social Attitudes toward Refugees

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pos Effect Culture	Social Distance Index	Deserve Sympathy	Feel Safe in Areas w Foreigners	No Tension with Foreigners	Prop. Donated Refugees	Prop. Donated Ugandans	Social Attitudes Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.024 (0.037) [0.839]	0.291*** (0.091) [0.054]	0.038 (0.053) [0.827]	-0.049 (0.049) [0.649]	0.121** (0.056) [0.198]	0.042** (0.018) [0.198]	0.032* (0.019) [0.254]	0.140** (0.071)
Cash (T2)	-0.020 (0.037) [0.947]	0.180* (0.095) [0.214]	0.107** (0.052) [0.198]	-0.089* (0.050) [0.215]	0.071 (0.058) [0.539]	0.039** (0.018) [0.198]	0.034* (0.019) [0.215]	0.116* (0.069)
Information (T3)	0.033 (0.035) [0.649]	0.204** (0.093) [0.198]	0.034 (0.052) [0.839]	-0.055 (0.048) [0.588]	0.023 (0.056) [1.000]	-0.006 (0.018) [1.000]	0.015 (0.019) [0.739]	0.009 (0.068)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.035 (0.042) [0.732]	0.013 (0.115) [1.000]	0.061 (0.062) [0.649]	-0.123** (0.059) [0.198]	0.139** (0.062) [0.198]	-0.013 (0.022) [0.867]	-0.004 (0.024) [1.000]	-0.005 (0.081)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.069* (0.038) [0.215]	0.101 (0.104) [0.649]	0.053 (0.059) [0.700]	0.009 (0.053) [1.000]	0.024 (0.062) [1.000]	-0.002 (0.021) [1.000]	0.005 (0.022) [1.000]	0.067 (0.074)
Observations	1,793	1,041	953	916	739	2,160	2,160	2,160
Domain for q-values	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
<i>P-values</i>								
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.255	0.232	0.174	0.431	0.377	0.870	0.917	0.720
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.788	0.336	0.936	0.899	0.072	0.003	0.333	0.042
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.432	0.464	0.903	0.029	0.079	0.617	0.686	0.355
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.273	0.118	0.620	0.219	0.174	0.004	0.333	0.169
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.164	0.349	0.537	0.130	0.214	0.030	0.331	0.283
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.196	0.142	0.331	0.084	0.183	0.054	0.336	0.325
<i>Control Means</i>								
Baseline	0.700	0.017	0.441	0.690	0.843	0.210	0.326	
Midline	0.694	.	.	.	.	0.327	0.387	
Endline	0.656	-0.000	0.530	0.741	0.606	0.257	0.310	

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses. FDR sharpened q-values in brackets. The full questions for the dependent variables listed in the Appendix A3, along with the full set of questions in each domain that determines the within-domain q-values. The results are from the Intent-to-Treat ANCOVA specification using the double-lasso method to select baseline controls and data collected at midline and endline. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

Table 7: Business Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Profit	Business Survival	Business Loans	Working Hours (Inv Hyp Sin)	Business Networks	Marketing
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	-0.135 (0.185) [1.000]	0.016 (0.018) [1.000]	0.110 (0.105) [1.000]	0.021 (0.100) [1.000]	0.180 (0.144) [1.000]	0.027 (0.042) [1.000]
Cash (T2)	-0.096 (0.190) [1.000]	0.007 (0.019) [1.000]	0.252** (0.128) [1.000]	0.032 (0.100) [1.000]	0.217 (0.146) [1.000]	0.021 (0.040) [1.000]
Information (T3)	0.012 (0.182) [1.000]	-0.025 (0.020) [1.000]	-0.020 (0.096) [1.000]	-0.091 (0.098) [1.000]	0.127 (0.146) [1.000]	0.044 (0.042) [1.000]
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.071 (0.206) [1.000]	0.009 (0.022) [1.000]	-0.081 (0.109) [1.000]	0.156 (0.110) [1.000]	0.187 (0.169) [1.000]	-0.013 (0.046) [1.000]
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.152 (0.219) [1.000]	0.046** (0.018) [0.680]	0.227* (0.134) [1.000]	0.339*** (0.090) [0.007]	0.071 (0.168) [1.000]	0.068 (0.048) [1.000]
Observations	2,107	2,160	1,023	2,156	916	916
Domain for q-values	2	10	9	9	9	9
<i>P-values</i>						
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.837	0.574	0.323	0.909	0.783	0.884
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.407	0.026	0.246	0.240	0.710	0.689
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.321	0.061	0.039	0.051	0.518	0.113
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.771	0.003	0.052	0.000	0.909	0.578
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.723	0.001	0.033	0.000	0.811	0.411
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.848	0.002	0.058	0.000	0.614	0.453
<i>Control Means</i>						
Baseline	40.892	.	0.386	81.768	1.777	0.066
Midline	17.816	0.914	.	67.020	.	.
Endline	28.280	0.945	0.620	63.885	1.914	0.160

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses. FDR sharpened q-values in brackets. The full questions for the dependent variables listed in the Appendix A3, along with the full set of questions in each domain that determines the within-domain q-values. The results are from the Intent-to-Treat ANCOVA specification using the double-lasso method to select baseline controls and data collected at midline and endline. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

Table 8: Business Practices

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Marketing Index	Stock Index	Record-keeping Index	Business Practices Index	Change Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.180*	0.147	0.006	0.171	-0.009
	(0.106)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.115)
Cash (T2)	0.170	0.179	0.044	0.186*	0.152
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.112)
Information (T3)	0.010	0.088	-0.056	0.036	-0.076
	(0.109)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.111)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.142	0.145	0.173	0.211*	-0.192
	(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.130)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.126	0.170	0.157	0.199*	0.003
	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.114)	(0.129)
Observations	916	916	916	916	916
Domain for q-values	91	92	93		95
<i>P-values</i>					
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.929	0.758	0.715		0.176
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.127	0.556	0.540		0.563
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.899	0.843	0.902		0.178
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.581	0.924	0.233		0.116
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.524	0.826	0.156		0.060
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.437	0.459	0.231		0.115
<i>Control Means</i>					
Baseline					
Midline					
Endline					

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses. FDR sharpened q-values in brackets. The full questions for the dependent variables listed in the Appendix A3, along with the full set of questions in each domain that determines the within-domain q-values. The results are from the Intent-to-Treat ANCOVA specification using the double-lasso method to select baseline controls and data collected at midline and endline. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

Table 9: Household Well-being

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Total Household Income (IHS)	Household Saving	Relative Economic Situation	Have Food	Fine w Household Expenses	No Need to Sell Assets	Can Afford Child Education	Household Well-Being Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q						
Cash & Information (T1)	-0.140 (0.290) [1.000]	0.190 (0.225) [1.000]	-0.041 (0.053) [1.000]	0.033 (0.021) [1.000]	0.014 (0.028) [1.000]	0.035 (0.040) [1.000]	-0.019 (0.054) [1.000]	0.086 (0.070)
Cash (T2)	-0.741** (0.333)	0.191 (0.227)	0.020 (0.055)	0.009 (0.021)	0.025 (0.028)	0.024 (0.042)	0.004 (0.055)	0.039 (0.069)
Information (T3)	-0.230 (0.308) [1.000]	-0.226 (0.225) [1.000]	-0.040 (0.052) [1.000]	0.029 (0.021) [1.000]	-0.017 (0.028) [1.000]	0.068* (0.040) [1.000]	0.008 (0.054) [1.000]	-0.103 (0.074)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.036 (0.363) [1.000]	-0.123 (0.253) [1.000]	-0.063 (0.061) [1.000]	-0.008 (0.026) [1.000]	-0.003 (0.034) [1.000]	0.067 (0.045) [1.000]	0.043 (0.059) [1.000]	-0.000 (0.082)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.492 (0.338) [1.000]	0.329 (0.254) [1.000]	0.027 (0.060) [1.000]	0.018 (0.024) [1.000]	0.010 (0.032) [1.000]	0.054 (0.046) [1.000]	0.067 (0.058) [1.000]	0.134* (0.076)
Observations	727	979	916	2,147	2,149	1,041	827	2,160
Domain for q-values	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
<i>P-values</i>								
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.073	0.996	0.255	0.220	0.704	0.795	0.680	0.457
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.770	0.042	0.975	0.862	0.261	0.371	0.609	0.006
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.186	0.074	0.160	0.333	0.731	0.773	0.687	0.097
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.269	0.070	0.453	0.437	0.637	0.762	0.637	0.015
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.227	0.055	0.361	0.454	0.511	0.689	0.677	0.015
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.155	0.108	0.508	0.505	0.673	0.413	0.757	0.032
<i>Control Means</i>								
Baseline	87.046	23.857	0.438	0.958	0.921	0.911	0.583	
Midline	.	.	.	0.883	0.773	.	.	
Endline	72.738	37.504	0.407	0.918	0.831	0.787	0.646	

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses. FDR sharpened q-values in brackets. The full questions for the dependent variables listed in the Appendix A3, along with the full set of questions in each domain that determines the within-domain q-values. The results are from the Intent-to-Treat ANCOVA specification using the double-lasso method to select baseline controls and data collected at midline and endline. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

Table 10: Recall of Treatments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Reported Any Support	Associated Support w YARID	Associated Support w Data Firm	Associated Support w Refugees
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.206*** (0.033) [0.001]	0.134*** (0.017) [0.001]	0.042** (0.018) [0.031]	0.079*** (0.017) [0.001]
Cash (T2)	0.192*** (0.033) [0.001]	0.078*** (0.015) [0.001]	0.075*** (0.021) [0.001]	0.039*** (0.015) [0.017]
Information (T3)	0.011 (0.028) [0.644]	0.001 (0.006) [0.807]	0.022 (0.017) [0.307]	0.010 (0.013) [0.521]
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.013 (0.033) [0.644]	0.007 (0.008) [0.521]	0.029 (0.021) [0.261]	-0.007 (0.015) [0.644]
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.036 (0.032) [0.366]	0.000 (0.009) [0.807]	0.022 (0.020) [0.366]	0.012 (0.015) [0.521]
Observations	2,160	2,160	2,160	2,160
Domain for q-values	19	19	19	19
<i>P-values</i>				
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.706	0.014	0.159	0.040
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.000	0.000	0.272	0.000
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.520	0.507	0.774	0.292
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.000	0.000	0.137	0.000
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.000	0.000	0.085	0.098
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.077
<i>Control Means</i>				
Baseline	.	.	.	.
Midline	0.485	0.000	0.086	0.051
Endline	0.060	0.005	0.000	0.000

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses. FDR sharpened q-values in brackets. The full questions for the dependent variables listed in the Appendix A3, along with the full set of questions in each domain that determines the within-domain q-values. The results are from the Intent-to-Treat ANCOVA specification using the double-lasso method to select baseline controls and data collected at midline and endline. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

Table 11: Policy Preferences, Beliefs, and Attitudes toward Other Out-Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Immigrants: Accept More	Immigrants: Allow To Stay	Immigrants: Effect on Economy	Immigrants: Effect on You	Immigrants: Effect on Culture	Importance of Own Tribe	Other Tribes: Effect on Your Business	Other Tribes: Social Distance	Satisfied w Local Politician	Satisfied w MP
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.120** (0.048) [0.059]	0.145*** (0.049) [0.059]	0.064 (0.053) [0.464]	0.117** (0.054) [0.298]	-0.052 (0.053) [1.000]	0.016 (0.041) [1.000]	0.052 (0.042) [0.459]	0.195** (0.096) [0.261]	0.081* (0.044) [0.093]	0.053 (0.040) [0.152]
Cash (T2)	0.118** (0.049) [0.059]	0.115** (0.049) [0.059]	0.095* (0.052) [0.298]	0.056 (0.055) [0.565]	-0.002 (0.054) [1.000]	0.024 (0.040) [1.000]	0.077* (0.042) [0.459]	0.054 (0.101) [1.000]	0.074* (0.044) [0.124]	0.004 (0.040) [0.398]
Information (T3)	0.068 (0.049) [0.150]	0.070 (0.046) [0.150]	0.103** (0.052) [0.298]	-0.002 (0.055) [0.946]	-0.047 (0.055) [1.000]	0.013 (0.041) [1.000]	0.039 (0.043) [0.546]	0.077 (0.106) [1.000]	0.101** (0.042) [0.059]	-0.015 (0.038) [0.362]
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.016 (0.059) [0.388]	-0.010 (0.054) [0.398]	-0.029 (0.064) [0.849]	-0.090 (0.063) [0.365]	0.002 (0.061) [1.000]	0.075* (0.043) [0.684]	0.066 (0.051) [0.459]	-0.018 (0.124) [1.000]	0.004 (0.054) [0.398]	0.016 (0.044) [0.362]
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.102* (0.054) [0.093]	0.106* (0.056) [0.093]	0.004 (0.059) [0.946]	0.015 (0.060) [0.946]	-0.073 (0.060) [1.000]	0.003 (0.047) [1.000]	0.037 (0.048) [0.546]	0.011 (0.127) [1.000]	0.119*** (0.045) [0.059]	0.105** (0.043) [0.059]
Observations	916	916	844	853	776	916	879	916	849	1,847
Domain for q-values	11	11	12	12	13	20	15	16	11	11
<u>P-values</u>										
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.957	0.574	0.538	0.258	0.355	0.853	0.504	0.128	0.863	0.222
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.256	0.128	0.448	0.027	0.931	0.941	0.740	0.206	0.602	0.083
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.153	0.055	0.608	0.113	0.264	0.126	0.572	0.832	0.028	0.051
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.343	0.067	0.137	0.015	0.685	0.530	0.849	0.273	0.255	0.039
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.315	0.136	0.073	0.158	0.576	0.387	0.715	0.873	0.153	0.029
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.100	0.055	0.060	0.267	0.660	0.423	0.423	0.918	0.027	0.050
<u>Control Means</u>										
Baseline	0.727	0.391	0.654	0.394	0.642	0.887	0.781	0.070	0.798	0.475
Midline	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.500
Endline	0.642	0.265	0.629	0.519	0.708	0.833	0.800	0.000	0.776	0.524

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses. FDR sharpened q-values in brackets. The full questions for the dependent variables listed in the Appendix A3, along with the full set of questions in each domain that determines the within-domain q-values. The results are from the Intent-to-Treat ANCOVA specification using the double-lasso method to select baseline controls and data collected at midline and endline. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

## A1 Appendix: Sample Selection, Data Collection, and Randomization

### A1.1 Sampling Frame and Listing Survey

In the initial round of data collection in October and November of 2019, we surveyed all tailors and hair salons within 10 kilometers of the Kampala city center. We surveyed either the owner of the business or a manager who retains most of the profits since, as the residual claimant on profits, their attitudes are the most relevant for our theory of change.<sup>24</sup> In this census, we recorded the owners' years managing the business in Kampala, nationality, and contact information. For all non-Ugandans, all owners with five or fewer years of experience, and a 20% random sample of Ugandans with more than five years of experience, we collected further variables of interest including age, gender, languages spoken, profits, capital, and number of employees.<sup>25</sup>

### A1.2 Sample Construction and Baseline Survey

The second survey was conducted in December 2019 and January 2020 among a sample from the listing data. The sample includes inexperienced Ugandans for the main experiment (denoted as the “main sample”), potential refugee and Ugandan mentors, and inexperienced refugees for comparison. To be included in the main sample, the owners must be Ugandan, have five or fewer years of experience in their sector, be forty years old or younger, and speak Luganda, English, or Swahili. Their business must have fewer than five employees, profits under 282 USD (one million Ugandan Schillings (UGX)), and capital under 2,820 USD (ten million UGX). Given their relatively low numbers, all non-Ugandans, excluding a few male tailors explained in the next section, were included. The baseline survey captured the same business outcomes as Ugandans and outcomes on assimilation instead of attitudes towards hosting. Finally, potential Ugandan mentors were selected to match the characteristics of the experienced non-Ugandans; their baseline survey was identical to the instrument for the main sample.

### A1.3 Randomization

Treatments, including assignment as a mentor where applicable, are randomly assigned within strata. Strata are defined by gender, sector, and mentor eligibility, and within each of these cells, median profits and median attitudes towards hosting.<sup>26</sup> For instance, female salon owners who are eligible to be mentors because they have 3-5 years of experience are randomly assigned within their profit-attitude stratum to one of the five treatments, control, or as a mentor. Treatment probabilities within gender-sector-mentor eligibility strata are determined by the number of available refugee mentors in the gender-sector cell and the distribution of their experience. The probability of receiving a Ugandan mentor is set equal to the probability of receiving a refugee mentor, and the probability of being a mentor is determined by number of refugee mentors in the gender-sector cell between three and five years experience. The remaining probabilities are distributed equally within each strata to canvassing, canvassing with cash, cash only, and control.

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<sup>24</sup>A few businesses pay the owner a flat fee to operate, and then retain the residual earnings. The managers of these firms in the sample and interventions are included because they are the residual claimant on profits. They are included in references to “owners” throughout the paper.)

<sup>25</sup>The simple random sample was selected by a random number generator on the spot.

<sup>26</sup>For stratification, the seven main questions on attitudes towards refugee policy are used to construct an index based on the first principle component.

## A2 Appendix: Scripts

### Grant & Information Treatment - Visit 1

#### **Intro:**

Hi, may I speak with [RESPONDENT\_NAME]? I'm here to offer an opportunity to participate in a pilot program that offers grants to small businesses in Kampala.

#### **Consent:**

I'm [FO\_NAME], a staff member from YARID, or Young African Refugees Integral Development. We are a refugee-led, community-based NGO in Kampala that works in the areas of education for refugees and Ugandans, small business support, and women's empowerment. We are not associated with the government of Uganda or any microfinance organization. I've come to talk to you today because we're starting a new project organized by Harvard University in the USA to help small businesses. You have been randomly selected to be part of this pilot program. The program is a grant for your business worth 500,000 UGX. Participation in this program will take about 15 minutes today and one hour at a later date that we will schedule together. The goal of the program is to improve businesses and income globally. There are no risks to your participation. If this is ok, I would like to describe the program to you and at the end I will ask if you want to participate. Is that ok?

#### **Description of the Program [Information Sharing]:**

As part of our program I'd like to tell you a little bit about our organization's mission and why we are starting this small business grant program in areas of Kampala that host refugees. If you have any questions, please stop me, and I am happy to discuss.

Our program works in areas that host refugees. Refugees are people who do not feel safe in their home countries. They or their families have often been targeted by violent groups, and they are looking for a place where they can feel safe. Refugees come to Uganda from the Congo, South Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and other countries, and the reason is that they believe they are safer in Uganda than the country where they were born. Many have had family members killed by violent groups, and they were often forced to abandon their belongings, their land, and sometimes their family.

#### **Empathetic Listening (Based on Kalla-Broockman Model):**

##### *Step 1: Uncover Honest Opinion*

What do you think of refugees in Kampala? What are some reasons that you would think of them favorably? How about unfavorably?

##### *Step 2: Connect Around Experiences with Refugees*

Have you had any experiences with refugees? How did that feel? Do you know any refugees?

<b><u>No, Don't Know Someone</u></b>	<b><u>Yes, They Know Someone</u></b>
-What kind of role do you see refugees playing in your community?	-Who are you closest to? How are they doing? -What is their story? -What do you think that was like for them? Tell me more?

#### **\*\*Share personal refugee story \*\*\***

I am here working with YARID today because I...

*Step 3: Connect Around Compassion Experiences*

I think having these conversations is important because it gives us a chance to think about how we want to treat everyone in our community, including refugees, because we've all faced tough times and needed others...

<p><b><u>Your Compassion Story</u></b> I remember when....</p>	<p><b><u>Business Owners' Compassion Story</u></b> Was there a time when someone showed you compassion and you really needed it?</p> <p>Maybe a friend or parent? What was the situation How old were you? How did that feel? Why?</p>
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*Step 4: Address Concerns*

Thank you so much for having this conversation with me... Earlier you mentioned \_\_\_\_\_ as a concern? What are your fears? What is on your mind now? What are you picturing might happen? Do you have a personal connection to that concern?

*Step 5: Make Your Case*

I think it's important to support refugees and host refugees because I want everyone in our community, including refugees, our families, as well as our friends and neighbours to be treated with compassion and not feel excluded or suffer discrimination.

When refugees come to Uganda, Uganda is a very generous host. Uganda lets refugees work, for example. They can apply for jobs and support themselves if they are hired by a business, and their work contributes to the Ugandan economy. Uganda also gives refugees freedom to move. There are many settlements and camps in Uganda where refugees can live, but if they have other opportunities outside of the settlement, they are free to live where they want to in Uganda. Some countries, even ones close to Uganda like Kenya and Ethiopia, are not as welcoming to refugees. In these countries, refugees cannot work legally. They must support themselves in the black market and hope they are not caught by authorities. In Kenya and Ethiopia, refugees also cannot live outside of the camps. They are not free to move to places where they might find a job or have family. Uganda is much more generous by allowing refugees to work and the freedom of movement to live outside of camps.

Because of this generous policy, many refugees in Uganda can support themselves. Since refugees can work, some of the aid money coming from international donors like Great Britain can be shared with Ugandans. This aid money shared between refugees and Ugandans can help with health, education, small businesses, and poverty. In countries like Kenya where refugees cannot work, more aid money needs to be spent on food and basic needs for refugees, and so it cannot be shared with the host country. In Uganda, since refugees can get jobs and live outside of camps, aid money and programs can be shared with Ugandans like you. Does that make sense? In Uganda, 30% of aid money for refugees goes to supporting Ugandans.

This aid has been used to support schools and hospitals in areas where there are many refugees, including Kampala. The schools and hospitals are built for both Ugandans and refugees to use. International donors pay for these buildings and services because Uganda is a generous host to many refugees. For instance, Kisenyi Hospital was supported by donors to appreciate Ugandans' generous

hosting of refugees. The World Bank also gave Uganda \$500 million recently to support the Ministry of Education. In other countries, this money only goes to **refugees** who need the money since they can't work.

My organization, YARID, is another example where aid money is shared between refugees and Ugandans. YARID was founded by refugees from the Congo in XXX with the goal of helping people in Kampala – refugees from any country and Ugandans alike. YARID runs training programs on English, computer literacy, and small business practices for people in need. It is based in Kampala and has helped more than XXX thousand people since its founding.

The program I'm visiting you about today is run by YARID and is part of the aid sharing between refugees and Ugandans.

**Description of the Program [Grant]:**

As part of this project you will be placed in a program that gives cash grants to micro-entrepreneurs. The grant is worth 500,000 UGX total. At least 300,000 UGX must be used for purchasing equipment for your business. This money can be used to purchase anything related to your business, such as machinery or inventory. The 300,000 UGX cannot be used for personal expenses such as rent, medical fees, or school fees. Whatever money remains from the 500,000 UGX will be given to you as cash. This grant is intended for business use, but we understand if there is an urgent need in your household. Therefore there are no rules for this remaining cash – you can spend it on anything you want.

You will have some time to think about what you want to buy, and we will set up an appointment for a later date. I will return to visit your business on that date and accompany you to make the purchase. Remember, at least 300,000 out of the 500,000 UGX must be spent on purchases for your business, which we will make together at a supplier. This is to ensure that enough money is used on capital or inventory. After you've made your purchases of at least 300,000, we will give you whatever money remains from the 500,000 as cash. So, for example, if you spend 300,000 on inventory for your business, we will give you 200,000 in cash. If you spend 200,000 on inventory and 200,000 on tools, we will give you 100,000 in cash. The total will always be 500,000 and you must spend at least 300,000 on your business. Do you have any questions right now about the program?

You will not need to do anything for us. We have already determined that you are eligible for the grant. You will never have to pay back the grant to us or to anyone else. Your participation is voluntary, and you can withdraw from the program at any time. Do you agree to participate?

**Actions:**

The grant program is completely separate from your opinion about refugees. Today, we will exchange contact information, but we will not be doing any transactions today. You will have up to 1-2 weeks to decide what you want to buy and set up an appointment. Make sure to take enough time to consider what you want, shop around, and compare prices. You can also use some of your own money if you'd like to buy something that costs more than 500,000 UGX.

Appendix Table A1: Attrition

	(1)
	Surveyed
	b/se
Cash & Information	0.053* (0.031)
Cash	0.085*** (0.031)
Information	0.041 (0.031)
Mentored by Refugee	0.034 (0.035)
Mentored by Ugandan	0.091*** (0.034)
Midline Mean	0.796
Endline Mean	0.740
<i>Observations</i>	2,812

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses. The results are from an OLS specification of all baseline respondents in the experimental sample controlling for strata and wave fixed effects.

Appendix Table A2: Within-Survey Priming Experiment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Primed Outcomes Index	Have Money	Receive More Aid Than Needed	Can Support Themselves	Deserve Sympathy	Have Skills
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Primed on Aid Received	-0.001 (0.061)	0.019 (0.033)	-0.026 (0.034)	0.006 (0.032)	0.018 (0.031)	0.009 (0.033)
<i>Observations</i>	1,004	884	857	917	953	890

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses. The full questions for the dependent variables listed in the Appendix A3. The results are from the Intent-to-Treat ANCOVA specification using the double-lasso method to select baseline controls and data collected at endline. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

## A3 Pre-specified Outcomes and Domains

In this section, we report the intent-to-treat results for all outcomes and domains as listed in the pre-analysis plan to provide more details on the variables, the construction of the q-values, and eliminate selective reporting. We also include variables and domains, denoted by an \*, that are not in the pre-analysis plan. We are working on the remaining elements of the pre-analysis plan (i.e. Lee bounds for attrition, some tests for heterogeneity, and the treatment-on-the-treated results).

### A3.1 Domain 1: Support for inclusive refugee hosting

- Overall, during coronavirus, I am in favor of Uganda hosting and assisting refugees. (*Questions not exactly the same: no Covid info in baseline and endline.*)
- After coronavirus, I am in favor of Uganda hosting and assisting refugees. (*Questions not exactly the same: no Covid info in baseline.*)
- In July refugees from Congo were allowed to come to Uganda. They were tested for coronavirus, quarantined, and settled into camps. I am in favor of allowing refugees who test negative to move to Uganda right now.
- After coronavirus ends, Uganda should accept more refugees. (*Questions not exactly the same: no Covid info in baseline.*)
- During coronavirus, Uganda should relocate all refugees to live in the settlements, including those currently living in Kampala. (*Questions not exactly the same: no Covid info in baseline and endline.*)
- For those who answered “agree” or “strongly agree”: Should the relocation be permanent or only during coronavirus?
- Uganda should continue allowing refugees who already live in Uganda to work outside the settlements, according to any lockdown rules, during coronavirus. (*Questions not exactly the same: no Covid info in baseline and endline.*)
- After coronavirus ends, Uganda should continue allowing refugees to work outside the settlements. (*Questions not exactly the same: no Covid info in baseline.*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Support Hosting Current b/se/q	Support Hosting Post-COVID b/se/q	More Refugees Current b/se/q	More Refugees Post-COVID b/se/q	Freedom of Movement Current b/se/q	Freedom of Movement Post-COVID b/se/q	Right to Work Current b/se/q	Right to Work Post-COVID b/se/q	Policy Preferences Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.153*** (0.029) [0.001]	0.087*** (0.030) [0.013]	0.151*** (0.032) [0.001]	0.112*** (0.032) [0.003]	0.017 (0.036) [0.271]	0.061 (0.038) [0.105]	0.131*** (0.029) [0.001]	0.082*** (0.028) [0.013]	0.350*** (0.067)
Cash (T2)	0.095*** (0.032) [0.013]	0.105*** (0.030) [0.003]	0.121*** (0.033) [0.003]	0.081** (0.034) [0.033]	-0.053 (0.037) [0.117]	0.011 (0.041) [0.311]	0.089*** (0.030) [0.013]	0.058** (0.028) [0.056]	0.218*** (0.071)
Information (T3)	0.066** (0.031) [0.049]	0.080*** (0.029) [0.017]	0.093*** (0.033) [0.016]	0.035 (0.032) [0.194]	-0.021 (0.036) [0.256]	0.042 (0.037) [0.184]	0.068** (0.030) [0.039]	0.031 (0.029) [0.194]	0.193*** (0.069)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.055 (0.035) [0.106]	0.034 (0.033) [0.198]	0.071* (0.037) [0.064]	0.010 (0.036) [0.311]	-0.064 (0.042) [0.113]	0.040 (0.043) [0.221]	0.066* (0.034) [0.062]	0.039 (0.033) [0.177]	0.127* (0.076)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.091*** (0.033) [0.017]	0.079** (0.033) [0.030]	0.080** (0.035) [0.038]	0.064* (0.035) [0.077]	-0.069 (0.043) [0.105]	0.023 (0.044) [0.270]	0.055 (0.035) [0.106]	0.022 (0.032) [0.243]	0.177** (0.076)
Observations	2,139	2,142	2,137	2,138	2,130	1,089	2,138	2,139	2,150
Domain for q-values	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>P-values</i>									
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.037	0.512	0.318	0.328	0.052	0.203	0.108	0.353	0.033
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.001	0.803	0.052	0.012	0.276	0.581	0.014	0.046	0.010
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.300	0.172	0.803	0.150	0.909	0.691	0.770	0.619	0.506
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.004	0.284	0.086	0.027	0.135	0.751	0.051	0.191	0.009
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.565	0.177	0.520	0.232	0.603	0.848	0.755	0.646	0.648
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.028	0.004	0.007	0.102	0.358	0.789	0.057	0.352	0.019
<i>Control Means</i>									
Baseline	0.738	0.738	0.512	0.512	0.588	0.588	0.601	0.601	
Midline	0.720	0.841	0.763	0.763	0.487	0.782	0.794	0.866	
Endline	0.716	0.645	0.486	0.596	0.536	.	0.678	0.710	

### A3.2 Domain 1.11: Support for inclusive refugee hosting (Additional Measures)\*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Provide Land in Settlements	Provide Indef Stay	Provide Citizen- Ship	Complete Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.159*** (0.048) [0.015]	0.086*** (0.030) [0.028]	0.123*** (0.046) [0.029]	0.365*** (0.068)
Cash (T2)	0.133*** (0.050) [0.029]	0.010 (0.033) [0.813]	0.081* (0.049) [0.138]	0.197*** (0.074)
Information (T3)	0.113** (0.049) [0.043]	0.020 (0.032) [0.687]	0.056 (0.048) [0.315]	0.187*** (0.070)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.001 (0.057) [0.813]	-0.022 (0.039) [0.687]	-0.008 (0.055) [0.813]	0.102 (0.078)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.136** (0.055) [0.032]	-0.020 (0.040) [0.687]	0.061 (0.055) [0.315]	0.174** (0.081)
Observations	1,041	1,041	1,041	2,150
Domain for q-values	111	111	111	111
<i>P-values</i>				
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.590	0.010	0.364	0.011
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.322	0.017	0.135	0.004
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.023	0.973	0.246	0.372
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.054	0.004	0.161	0.002
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.074	0.596	0.444	0.591
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.009	0.754	0.343	0.039
<i>Control Means</i>				
Baseline	0.551	0.835	0.538	
Midline	.	.	.	
Endline	0.514	0.874	0.596	

### A3.3 Domain 2: Business profits

- What were the profits of your business during the last 30 days?

	(1)	(2)
	Profit	Profit
	b/se/q	(Standardized)
	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	-0.135 (0.185) [1.000]	-0.048 (0.076)
Cash (T2)	-0.096 (0.190) [1.000]	-0.038 (0.079)
Information (T3)	0.012 (0.182) [1.000]	0.005 (0.075)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.071 (0.206) [1.000]	0.026 (0.085)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.152 (0.219) [1.000]	-0.064 (0.091)
Observations	2,107	2,107
Domain for q-values	2	2
<i>P-values</i>		
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.837	0.900
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.407	0.467
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.321	0.331
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.771	0.811
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.723	0.735
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.848	0.856
<i>Control Means</i>		
Baseline	40.892	
Midline	17.816	
Endline	28.280	

### A3.4 Domain 3: Knowledge of refugees and hosting policy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Live Outside Settlements b/se/q	Allowed Outside Settlements b/se/q	Know Intl Donations Shared w Ugandans b/se/q	Knowledge Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.078 (0.051) [0.239]	0.127** (0.050) [0.079]	0.109*** (0.036) [0.046]	0.268*** (0.075)
Cash (T2)	0.030 (0.052) [0.436]	0.077 (0.050) [0.239]	0.089** (0.037) [0.079]	0.182** (0.076)
Information (T3)	-0.011 (0.049) [0.625]	0.091* (0.049) [0.182]	0.033 (0.035) [0.359]	0.074 (0.070)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	-0.058 (0.059) [0.359]	-0.019 (0.058) [0.592]	-0.081** (0.041) [0.172]	-0.175** (0.084)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.056 (0.058) [0.359]	0.079 (0.056) [0.243]	0.029 (0.042) [0.414]	0.081 (0.085)
Observations	1,041	1,041	2,160	2,160
Domain for q-values	3	3	3	3
<i>P-values</i>				
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.342	0.317	0.610	0.255
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.064	0.461	0.035	0.006
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.972	0.105	0.016	0.005
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.073	0.137	0.000	0.000
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.391	0.227	0.001	0.000
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.533	0.141	0.002	0.001
<i>Control Means</i>				
Baseline	0.354	0.451	0.176	
Midline	.	.	0.364	
Endline	0.481	0.432	0.377	

- How many refugees in Uganda live outside of camps or settlements: all, most, some, few, or none? (“Some” or “few” will be considered correct answers)
- Are refugees allowed to live outside of the camps or settlements? (“yes” is correct)
- Are any of the international donations to refugees in Uganda shared with Ugandans? (“yes” is correct)

### A3.5 Domain 4: Beliefs about economic effects of refugees

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Pos Effect on Your Business b/se/q	Pos Effect on Economy Overall b/se/q	Pos Effect on You Personally b/se/q	Have Skills b/se/q	Economic Beliefs Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.077 (0.064) [0.267]	0.148*** (0.040) [0.004]	0.122*** (0.039) [0.016]	0.135** (0.055) [0.050]	0.366*** (0.077)
Cash (T2)	0.127* (0.065) [0.115]	0.068* (0.040) [0.171]	0.112*** (0.040) [0.026]	0.009 (0.056) [0.619]	0.246*** (0.077)
Information (T3)	0.088 (0.064) [0.263]	0.113*** (0.039) [0.023]	0.091** (0.039) [0.052]	0.065 (0.054) [0.267]	0.300*** (0.073)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.055 (0.078) [0.514]	0.047 (0.046) [0.360]	-0.024 (0.045) [0.523]	0.006 (0.064) [0.619]	0.096 (0.089)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.066 (0.075) [0.429]	0.031 (0.046) [0.514]	0.074* (0.043) [0.171]	0.021 (0.061) [0.619]	0.145* (0.086)
Observations	487	1,936	2,025	890	2,103
Domain for q-values	4	4	4	4	4
<i>P-values</i>					
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.405	0.039	0.795	0.022	0.120
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.844	0.330	0.391	0.184	0.365
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.891	0.748	0.029	0.823	0.606
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.869	0.039	0.009	0.113	0.013
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.766	0.227	0.015	0.692	0.070
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.409	0.054	0.003	0.758	0.000
<i>Control Means</i>					
Baseline	0.621	0.510	0.416	0.506	
Midline	.	0.453	0.461	.	
Endline	0.675	0.396	0.423	0.429	

- How do the [sector] businesses managed by people from other countries affect your business overall? Do they help you a lot, help you a little, hurt you a little, hurt you a lot, or have no effect on you? (*Compared to the similar question on Ugandans from your tribe.*)
- Taking everything into consideration, would you say the overall economic effect of refugees on Uganda has been positive, negative, or neutral?
- How about the overall economic effect of refugees on you personally?
- How many refugees have skills and contribute to the economy?

### A3.6 Domain 4a: Beliefs about economic effects of Congolese refugees

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Overall Economy	Schools & Healthcare	Prices Rent	Prices Other Goods	Economic Beliefs Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.105*	0.145***	-0.066	-0.083	0.118
	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.112)
	[0.321]	[0.050]	[0.393]	[0.344]	
Cash (T2)	0.127**	0.053	-0.093*	-0.046	0.021
	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.112)
	[0.321]	[0.462]	[0.321]	[0.665]	
Information (T3)	0.100*	0.058	-0.020	-0.050	0.096
	(0.056)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.111)
	[0.321]	[0.393]	[0.675]	[0.596]	
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.026	0.037	-0.046	0.003	0.013
	(0.066)	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.132)
	[0.675]	[0.675]	[0.675]	[0.848]	
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.034	0.017	-0.107**	-0.076	-0.188
	(0.062)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.119)
	[0.675]	[0.675]	[0.321]	[0.393]	
Observations	794	777	838	848	887
Domain for q-values	41	41	41	41	41
<i>P-values</i>					
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.685	0.068	0.586	0.465	0.396
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.923	0.079	0.335	0.492	0.848
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.914	0.735	0.302	0.219	0.132
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.383	0.133	0.410	0.656	0.085
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.279	0.874	0.265	0.675	0.105
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.144	0.699	0.155	0.618	0.188
<i>Control Means</i>					
Baseline	0.475	0.198	0.298	0.485	
Midline	.	.	.	.	
Endline	0.545	0.174	0.322	0.453	

- Taking everything into consideration, would you say the overall economic effect of Congolese on Uganda has been positive, negative, or neutral?
- How have access and quality of schools and health facilities been affected by Congolese in Kampala?
- How have rents been affected by Congolese in Kampala?
- How have prices of goods you buy, other than rents, been affected by Congolese in Kampala?

### A3.7 Domain 4b: Beliefs about economic effects of Somali refugees

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Overall Economy	Schools & Healthcare	Prices Rent	Prices Other Goods	Economic Beliefs Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.132** (0.060) [0.154]	0.066 (0.055) [0.301]	0.014 (0.042) [0.721]	-0.114** (0.052) [0.154]	0.076 (0.110)
Cash (T2)	0.125** (0.061) [0.174]	-0.092* (0.052) [0.202]	-0.001 (0.042) [0.801]	-0.139** (0.055) [0.123]	-0.089 (0.104)
Information (T3)	0.098 (0.059) [0.202]	-0.050 (0.051) [0.339]	0.016 (0.041) [0.721]	-0.058 (0.053) [0.307]	0.017 (0.107)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	-0.034 (0.073) [0.721]	-0.091 (0.058) [0.214]	-0.031 (0.046) [0.565]	-0.105* (0.064) [0.202]	-0.273** (0.124)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.017 (0.067) [0.721]	-0.092* (0.052) [0.202]	-0.013 (0.044) [0.721]	-0.150** (0.058) [0.123]	-0.254** (0.107)
Observations	723	730	817	828	884
Domain for q-values	42	42	42	42	42
<i>P-values</i>					
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.894	0.003	0.732	0.627	0.109
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.545	0.028	0.952	0.268	0.579
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.830	0.986	0.707	0.491	0.869
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.044	0.016	0.835	0.483	0.005
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.055	0.798	0.765	0.327	0.032
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.055	0.326	0.883	0.048	0.025
<i>Control Means</i>					
Baseline	0.413	0.195	0.200	0.391	
Midline	.	.	.	.	
Endline	0.413	0.268	0.152	0.411	

- Taking everything into consideration, would you say the overall economic effect of Somalis on Uganda has been positive, negative, or neutral?
- How have access and quality of schools and health facilities been affected by Somalis in Kampala?
- How have rents been affected by Somalis in Kampala?
- How have prices of goods you buy, other than rents, been affected by Somalis in Kampala?

### A3.8 Domain 5a: Beliefs that refugees receive too much aid

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Have Money b/se/q	Receive More Aid Than Needed b/se/q	Economic Perceptions Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.041 (0.053) [1.000]	-0.062 (0.056) [1.000]	-0.004 (0.104)
Cash (T2)	-0.066 (0.056) [1.000]	-0.053 (0.057) [1.000]	-0.146 (0.107)
Information (T3)	-0.036 (0.054) [1.000]	-0.063 (0.056) [1.000]	-0.091 (0.106)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	-0.043 (0.061) [1.000]	-0.078 (0.066) [1.000]	-0.121 (0.118)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.057 (0.062) [1.000]	0.045 (0.062) [1.000]	0.015 (0.121)
Observations	884	857	952
Domain for q-values	51	51	51
<i>P-values</i>			
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.043	0.864	0.169
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.138	0.993	0.401
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.832	0.076	0.280
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.268	0.342	0.530
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.948	0.234	0.587
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.808	0.280	0.538
<i>Control Means</i>			
Baseline	0.580	0.500	
Midline	.	.	
Endline	0.596	0.534	

- How many refugees have a lot of money? All, most, some, few, or none?
- How many refugees get more assistance than they need?

### A3.9 Domain 5b: Beliefs that refugees can support themselves

	(1) Can Support Themselves b/se/q	(2) Economic Perceptions Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	-0.064 (0.051) [0.371]	-0.056 (0.052)
Cash (T2)	-0.126** (0.052) [0.079]	-0.128** (0.052)
Information (T3)	-0.042 (0.051) [0.497]	-0.045 (0.051)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	-0.066 (0.060) [0.371]	-0.066 (0.060)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.088 (0.059) [0.371]	-0.078 (0.059)
Observations	917	917
Domain for q-values	52	52
<i>P-values</i>		
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.221	0.157
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.663	0.827
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.738	0.855
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.551	0.527
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.416	0.423
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.156	0.161
<i>Control Means</i>		
Baseline	0.468	
Midline	.	
Endline	0.440	

- How many refugees are able to support themselves financially without assistance?

### A3.10 Domain 6: Social attitudes about refugees

- What effect have refugees had on culture in Uganda?
- I would be comfortable marrying a refugee. (*Social distance index constructed based on these four questions.*)
- I would be comfortable having a refugee marry a member of my family.
- I would be comfortable having a refugee as a close, personal friend.
- I would be comfortable having a refugee as a neighbor.
- How many refugees deserve sympathy and support?
- Our research team has an extra UGX available. We can give it to you or share it between you and two charity organizations in Uganda. The first charity helps poor Ugandans living in Kampala. The second charity helps refugees living in Kampala. We are going to let you decide how to split the money. How much of the UGX should we give to the charity supporting poor Ugandans in Kampala? (*Questions not exactly the same: 3000 total in baseline, 1500 total in midline, and 3000 total in endline. Proportion calculated. Not included in index calculation.*)
- How much of the remaining UGX should we give to the charity supporting refugees in Kampala? (*Questions not exactly the same: 3000 total in baseline, 1500 total in midline, and 3000 total in endline. Proportion calculated.*)
- How safe do you feel walking around areas in Kampala where people from other countries live? You can say very safe, somewhat safe, neutral, somewhat unsafe, very unsafe, or that it depends on the nationality. (*Compared to the similar question on walking around most areas in Kampala.*)
- Is there tension between Ugandans and people from other nationalities?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pos Effect Culture	Social Distance Index	Deserve Sympathy	Prop. Donated Refugees	Prop. Donated Ugandans	Feel Safe in Areas w Foreigners	No Tension with Foreigners	Social Attitudes Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.024 (0.037) [0.839]	0.291*** (0.091) [0.054]	0.038 (0.053) [0.827]	0.042** (0.018) [0.198]	0.032* (0.019) [0.254]	-0.049 (0.049) [0.649]	0.121** (0.056) [0.198]	0.140** (0.071)
Cash (T2)	-0.020 (0.037) [0.947]	0.180* (0.095) [0.214]	0.107** (0.052) [0.198]	0.039** (0.018) [0.198]	0.034* (0.019) [0.215]	-0.089* (0.050) [0.215]	0.071 (0.058) [0.539]	0.116* (0.069)
Information (T3)	0.033 (0.035) [0.649]	0.204** (0.093) [0.198]	0.034 (0.052) [0.839]	-0.006 (0.018) [1.000]	0.015 (0.019) [0.739]	-0.055 (0.048) [0.588]	0.023 (0.056) [1.000]	0.009 (0.068)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.035 (0.042) [0.732]	0.013 (0.115) [1.000]	0.061 (0.062) [0.649]	-0.013 (0.022) [0.867]	-0.004 (0.024) [1.000]	-0.123** (0.059) [0.198]	0.139** (0.062) [0.198]	-0.005 (0.081)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.069* (0.038) [0.215]	0.101 (0.104) [0.649]	0.053 (0.059) [0.700]	-0.002 (0.021) [1.000]	0.005 (0.022) [1.000]	0.009 (0.053) [1.000]	0.024 (0.062) [1.000]	0.067 (0.074)
Observations	1,793	1,041	953	2,160	2,160	916	739	2,160
Domain for q-values	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
<i>P-values</i>								
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.255	0.232	0.174	0.870	0.917	0.431	0.377	0.720
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.788	0.336	0.936	0.003	0.333	0.899	0.072	0.042
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.432	0.464	0.903	0.617	0.686	0.029	0.079	0.355
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.273	0.118	0.620	0.004	0.333	0.219	0.174	0.169
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.164	0.349	0.537	0.030	0.331	0.130	0.214	0.283
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.196	0.142	0.331	0.054	0.336	0.084	0.183	0.325
<i>Control Means</i>								
Baseline	0.700	0.017	0.441	0.210	0.326	0.690	0.843	
Midline	0.694	.	.	0.327	0.387	.	.	
Endline	0.656	-0.000	0.530	0.257	0.310	0.741	0.606	

### A3.11 Domain 6alt: Alternative Measures of Donations\*

	(1) Donation Refugees > Ugandans b/se/q	(2) Donation Refugees ≥ Ugandans b/se/q	(3) Donation Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	-0.009 (0.021) [1.000]	0.024 (0.029) [1.000]	0.021 (0.073)
Cash (T2)	0.005 (0.022) [1.000]	-0.012 (0.030) [1.000]	0.005 (0.076)
Information (T3)	-0.010 (0.020) [1.000]	-0.033 (0.030) [1.000]	-0.067 (0.073)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.006 (0.025) [1.000]	0.019 (0.033) [1.000]	0.027 (0.089)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.006 (0.024) [1.000]	-0.008 (0.033) [1.000]	-0.029 (0.084)
Observations	2,160	2,160	2,160
Domain for q-values	63	63	63
<i>P-values</i>			
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.527	0.226	0.831
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.950	0.047	0.221
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.650	0.430	0.545
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.923	0.296	0.727
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.860	0.481	0.681
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.941	0.605	0.802
<i>Control Means</i>			
Baseline	0.045	0.764	
Midline	0.111	0.758	
Endline	0.060	0.842	

### A3.12 Domain 6a: Social attitudes about Congolese refugees

	(1) Social Distance Index b/se/q	(2) Pos Effect Culture b/se/q	(3) Pos Effect Dress Code b/se/q	(4) Pos Effect Behaviors b/se/q	(5) Social Attitudes Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.277*** (0.102) [0.145]	0.037 (0.054) [1.000]	0.023 (0.056) [1.000]	0.069 (0.051) [1.000]	0.281*** (0.103)
Cash (T2)	0.152 (0.103) [1.000]	0.067 (0.053) [1.000]	0.012 (0.055) [1.000]	0.028 (0.049) [1.000]	0.208** (0.099)
Information (T3)	0.136 (0.103) [1.000]	0.055 (0.052) [1.000]	0.005 (0.054) [1.000]	0.048 (0.048) [1.000]	0.180* (0.102)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	-0.103 (0.131) [1.000]	0.032 (0.061) [1.000]	0.004 (0.066) [1.000]	0.002 (0.057) [1.000]	-0.067 (0.130)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.094 (0.120) [1.000]	0.088 (0.061) [1.000]	0.041 (0.060) [1.000]	0.025 (0.057) [1.000]	0.069 (0.108)
Observations	916	757	839	806	916
Domain for q-values	61	61	61	61	61
<i>P-values</i>					
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.194	0.589	0.853	0.430	0.454
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.139	0.740	0.748	0.673	0.297
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.949	0.401	0.576	0.714	0.291
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.003	0.903	0.973	0.819	0.046
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.052	0.860	0.924	0.888	0.128
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.081	0.598	0.964	0.877	0.082
<i>Control Means</i>					
Baseline	0.032	0.803	0.498	0.760	
Midline	.	.	.	.	
Endline	-0.000	0.250	0.462	0.241	

- I would be comfortable marrying a Congolese. (*Social distance index constructed based on these four questions.*)
- I would be comfortable having a Congolese marry a member of my family.
- I would be comfortable having a Congolese as a close, personal friend.
- I would be comfortable having a Congolese as a neighbor.
- What effect have Congolese had on culture in Uganda?
- Please tell us how the dress code has been affected by Congolese in Kampala. You can answer positive, negative, or no effect.
- How have acceptable behaviors (such as how people talk to each other) been affected by Congolese in Kampala?

### A3.13 Domain 6b: Social attitudes about Somali refugees

	(1) Social Distance Index b/se/q	(2) Pos Effect Culture b/se/q	(3) Pos Effect Dress Code b/se/q	(4) Pos Effect Behaviors b/se/q	(5) Social Attitudes Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.303*** (0.103) [0.071]	0.084 (0.055) [0.548]	-0.033 (0.058) [1.000]	0.019 (0.049) [1.000]	0.269** (0.111)
Cash (T2)	0.063 (0.105) [1.000]	0.112** (0.053) [0.283]	-0.029 (0.056) [1.000]	-0.006 (0.047) [1.000]	0.099 (0.108)
Information (T3)	0.125 (0.102) [0.714]	0.090* (0.054) [0.548]	-0.060 (0.054) [0.714]	0.018 (0.049) [1.000]	0.185* (0.106)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.054 (0.124) [1.000]	0.097 (0.062) [0.548]	-0.081 (0.064) [0.714]	-0.011 (0.057) [1.000]	-0.003 (0.125)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.032 (0.114) [1.000]	0.132** (0.058) [0.279]	-0.024 (0.062) [1.000]	-0.051 (0.052) [0.813]	-0.012 (0.119)
Observations	916	692	828	764	916
Domain for q-values	62	62	62	62	62
<i>P-values</i>					
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.020	0.586	0.946	0.606	0.123
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.073	0.909	0.606	0.988	0.439
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.496	0.570	0.378	0.482	0.939
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.023	0.916	0.871	0.652	0.090
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.560	0.884	0.770	0.600	0.297
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.625	0.159	0.689	0.751	0.311
<i>Control Means</i>					
Baseline	0.057	0.731	0.396	0.695	
Midline	.	.	.	.	
Endline	0.000	0.701	0.418	0.213	

- *Social distance index constructed based on these four questions.*
  - I would be comfortable marrying a Somalis.
  - I would be comfortable having a Somalis marry a member of my family.
  - I would be comfortable having a Somalis as a close, personal friend.
  - I would be comfortable having a Somalis as a neighbor.
- What effect have Somalis had on culture in Uganda?
- Please tell us how the dress code has been affected by Somalis in Kampala. You can answer positive, negative, or no effect.
- How have acceptable behaviors (such as how people talk to each other) been affected by Somalis in Kampala?

### **A3.14 Domain 7: Contact with refugees by choice**

- How many of your business collaborators are from another country?
- Would you be open to collaborating with business owners from another country?
- In the last 30 days, have you bought supplies (such as materials for your business), tools, or machines from someone from another country?
- Have you ever had an apprentice or person from outside your household at your business who was learning skills but not paid who was from another country?
- Are any of your employees from a different country than you?
- In the past 30 days, how many people from another country have you contacted for any social reason, such as having a long conversation?
- Number of people from another country listed in the networks module.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Foreign Business Collaborators	Open to Collab w Foreigners	Foreign Suppliers	Foreign Apprentices	Foreign Employees	Foreign Contacts	Foreign Networks	Contact Refugees by Choice Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.127 (0.139) [1.000]	-0.002 (0.017) [1.000]	0.008 (0.039) [1.000]	0.014 (0.039) [1.000]	0.007 (0.020) [1.000]	0.276 (0.287) [1.000]	0.008 (0.047) [1.000]	0.042 (0.080)
Cash (T2)	0.037 (0.138) [1.000]	-0.001 (0.018) [1.000]	0.010 (0.039) [1.000]	-0.024 (0.038) [1.000]	-0.010 (0.019) [1.000]	0.098 (0.262) [1.000]	-0.013 (0.045) [1.000]	0.028 (0.078)
Information (T3)	0.349* (0.180) [1.000]	-0.003 (0.017) [1.000]	-0.032 (0.037) [1.000]	-0.012 (0.039) [1.000]	0.024 (0.022) [1.000]	0.088 (0.251) [1.000]	-0.016 (0.045) [1.000]	0.153* (0.088)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.200 (0.366) [1.000]	0.008 (0.016) [1.000]	0.008 (0.047) [1.000]	-0.077* (0.041) [1.000]	0.002 (0.022) [1.000]	-0.135 (0.306) [1.000]	0.046 (0.063) [1.000]	0.162 (0.223)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.083 (0.277) [1.000]	0.005 (0.017) [1.000]	0.042 (0.047) [1.000]	-0.052 (0.042) [1.000]	-0.005 (0.021) [1.000]	0.188 (0.309) [1.000]	-0.065 (0.046) [1.000]	0.065 (0.169)
Observations	2,022	886	1,041	916	915	1,035	916	2,160
Domain for q-values	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
<i>P-values</i>								
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.535	0.930	0.961	0.302	0.399	0.606	0.654	0.866
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.238	0.932	0.275	0.495	0.432	0.536	0.618	0.210
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.802	0.893	0.520	0.549	0.770	0.332	0.053	0.742
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.553	0.955	0.540	0.192	0.637	0.778	0.238	0.622
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.387	0.902	0.391	0.356	0.493	0.803	0.216	0.542
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.360	0.962	0.557	0.323	0.660	0.894	0.310	0.420
<i>Control Means</i>								
Baseline	0.154	0.956	0.118	0.079	0.010	0.625	0.024	
Midline	0.722	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Endline	0.600	0.975	0.180	0.179	0.031	1.328	0.154	

### A3.15 Domain 8: Contact with refugees by circumstance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Foreigners in Neighborhood b/se/q	Foreign Businesses in Area b/se/q	Foreign Customers b/se/q	Contact Refugees by Circumst. Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.057 (0.049) [1.000]	-0.009 (0.031) [1.000]	0.042 (0.039) [1.000]	0.109 (0.103)
Cash (T2)	0.030 (0.050) [1.000]	-0.041 (0.029) [1.000]	0.036 (0.039) [1.000]	0.055 (0.100)
Information (T3)	0.067 (0.050) [1.000]	-0.002 (0.032) [1.000]	0.048 (0.038) [1.000]	0.122 (0.098)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.025 (0.059) [1.000]	0.003 (0.037) [1.000]	0.001 (0.043) [1.000]	0.125 (0.120)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.121** (0.056) [0.890]	-0.026 (0.034) [1.000]	-0.030 (0.039) [1.000]	0.063 (0.108)
Observations	965	766	1,020	1,034
Domain for q-values	8	8	8	8
<i>P-values</i>				
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.585	0.224	0.878	0.615
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.846	0.794	0.879	0.899
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.118	0.442	0.483	0.628
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.493	0.516	0.308	0.949
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.334	0.400	0.242	0.879
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.244	0.440	0.341	0.749
<i>Control Means</i>				
Baseline	0.577	0.069	0.161	
Midline	.	.	.	
Endline	0.552	0.076	0.164	

- How many people from other countries live in your neighborhood? Many, some, few, or none?
- How many businesses in your sector in this area are managed by people from another country?
- How many of your customers are from another country?

### A3.16 Domain 9: Business practices

- If you were to sell all the business-related equipment you own right now (such as chairs, machines and tools), how much do you think you could make? (*Business capital is the sum of the value of the equipment and the value of the inventory.*)
- If you were to sell all the inventory you own right now (e.g. fabric, thread, soap), how much do you think you could make?
- Over the past 7 days, how many hours did you work at this business?
- In the past year, how many times did you take out a loan for your business? (*Omitted from index calculation due to ambiguous interpretation*)
- How much total business-related debt do you currently have? (*Omitted from index calculation due to ambiguous interpretation*)
- Number of contacts listed in the networks module.
- Over the past year, how often did you spend money advertising your business? Every day, every week, every month, a couple times, or never?
- How often did you keep written books/accounting records? Always, frequently, sometimes, occasionally, or never?
- How often did you sell goods or provide services to customers on credit? For all sales, most sales, some sales, a few sales, or never?
- How often did you buy materials, tools, or machines for your business on credit? For all sales, most sales, some sales, a few sales, or never?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Business Capital	Working Hours (Inv Hyp Sin)	Business Loans	Business Debt	Business Networks	Marketing	Record Keeping	Sell on Credit	Buy on Credit	Business Practices Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	-0.060 (0.123) [1.000]	0.021 (0.100) [1.000]	0.110 (0.105) [1.000]	-0.107 (0.261) [1.000]	0.180 (0.144) [1.000]	0.027 (0.042) [1.000]	0.018 (0.053) [1.000]	0.054 (0.054) [1.000]	0.014 (0.034) [1.000]	0.022 (0.069)
Cash (T2)	0.168 (0.120) [1.000]	0.032 (0.100) [1.000]	0.252** (0.128) [1.000]	0.122 (0.273) [1.000]	0.217 (0.146) [1.000]	0.021 (0.040) [1.000]	0.020 (0.054) [1.000]	0.044 (0.055) [1.000]	0.074** (0.036) [1.000]	0.014 (0.074)
Information (T3)	-0.010 (0.129) [1.000]	-0.091 (0.098) [1.000]	-0.020 (0.096) [1.000]	-0.233 (0.267) [1.000]	0.127 (0.146) [1.000]	0.044 (0.042) [1.000]	-0.009 (0.054) [1.000]	0.037 (0.052) [1.000]	0.054 (0.034) [1.000]	-0.064 (0.071)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	-0.225 (0.168) [1.000]	0.156 (0.110) [1.000]	-0.081 (0.109) [1.000]	-0.062 (0.307) [1.000]	0.187 (0.169) [1.000]	-0.013 (0.046) [1.000]	0.097 (0.064) [1.000]	0.033 (0.064) [1.000]	0.059 (0.041) [1.000]	0.084 (0.084)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.091 (0.124) [1.000]	0.339*** (0.090) [0.007]	0.227* (0.134) [1.000]	0.369 (0.301) [1.000]	0.071 (0.168) [1.000]	0.068 (0.048) [1.000]	0.057 (0.060) [1.000]	0.021 (0.060) [1.000]	0.062 (0.040) [1.000]	0.231*** (0.065)
Observations	997	2,156	1,023	1,040	916	916	916	916	916	2,160
Domain for q-values	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
<i>P-values</i>										
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.031	0.909	0.323	0.386	0.783	0.884	0.964	0.860	0.099	0.908
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.664	0.240	0.246	0.622	0.710	0.689	0.604	0.745	0.248	0.208
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.043	0.051	0.039	0.190	0.518	0.113	0.546	0.855	0.955	0.049
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.052	0.000	0.052	0.278	0.909	0.578	0.505	0.987	0.508	0.000
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.062	0.000	0.033	0.195	0.811	0.411	0.361	0.985	0.963	0.000
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.102	0.000	0.058	0.318	0.614	0.453	0.448	0.935	0.236	0.000
<i>Control Means</i>										
Baseline	524.721	81.768	0.386	27.437	1.777	0.066	0.407	0.260	0.047	
Midline	.	67.020	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Endline	670.882	63.885	0.620	67.486	1.914	0.160	0.512	0.444	0.105	

### A3.17 Domain 9a: Marketing\*

	(1) Check Competitor Prices b/se/q	(2) Check Competitor Products b/se/q	(3) Consult Customers on Products b/se/q	(4) Ask Customer Who Left b/se/q	(5) Ask Suppliers abt Products b/se/q	(6) Give Special Offers b/se/q	(7) Spend Money Advertising b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.019 (0.052) [1.000]	-0.008 (0.048) [1.000]	0.013 (0.041) [1.000]	0.088* (0.051) [0.825]	-0.016 (0.043) [1.000]	0.026 (0.048) [1.000]	0.095* (0.051) [0.825]
Cash (T2)	0.066 (0.051) [1.000]	0.057 (0.047) [1.000]	0.003 (0.043) [1.000]	0.099* (0.051) [0.825]	-0.012 (0.044) [1.000]	0.050 (0.046) [1.000]	0.032 (0.049) [1.000]
Information (T3)	0.014 (0.051) [1.000]	-0.042 (0.047) [1.000]	-0.073* (0.043) [0.825]	0.007 (0.051) [1.000]	-0.013 (0.042) [1.000]	0.030 (0.045) [1.000]	0.046 (0.050) [1.000]
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.078 (0.058) [1.000]	0.098* (0.052) [0.825]	0.042 (0.048) [1.000]	0.112* (0.059) [0.825]	0.021 (0.050) [1.000]	-0.002 (0.056) [1.000]	-0.043 (0.056) [1.000]
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.094* (0.055) [0.825]	0.014 (0.054) [1.000]	-0.036 (0.050) [1.000]	0.043 (0.058) [1.000]	0.004 (0.049) [1.000]	0.080 (0.051) [0.825]	0.028 (0.055) [1.000]
Observations	916	916	916	916	916	916	916
Domain for q-values	91	91	91	91	91	91	91
<i>P-values</i>							
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.345	0.171	0.814	0.827	0.925	0.604	0.205
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.919	0.488	0.043	0.105	0.931	0.930	0.326
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.785	0.136	0.141	0.273	0.749	0.145	0.230
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.464	0.062	0.126	0.267	0.943	0.636	0.176
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.466	0.044	0.097	0.186	0.894	0.501	0.423
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.340	0.071	0.154	0.131	0.960	0.478	0.545
<i>Control Means</i>							
Baseline	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Midline	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Endline	0.654	0.741	0.821	0.593	0.809	0.716	0.296

### A3.18 Domain 9b: Stock Practices\*

	(1) Negotiate Price w Supplier b/se/q	(2) Compare btw Suppliers b/se/q	(3) Use Up Stock b/se/q	(4) Stock Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.039 (0.043) [1.000]	-0.003 (0.041) [1.000]	0.077 (0.050) [1.000]	0.147 (0.103)
Cash (T2)	0.046 (0.045) [1.000]	0.001 (0.042) [1.000]	0.102** (0.051) [0.722]	0.179 (0.109)
Information (T3)	-0.033 (0.045) [1.000]	0.001 (0.041) [1.000]	0.094* (0.049) [0.722]	0.088 (0.103)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.041 (0.049) [1.000]	0.037 (0.045) [1.000]	0.059 (0.057) [1.000]	0.145 (0.120)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.061 (0.046) [1.000]	0.031 (0.044) [1.000]	0.049 (0.056) [1.000]	0.170 (0.114)
Observations	916	916	916	916
Domain for q-values	92	92	92	92
<i>P-values</i>				
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.874	0.918	0.596	0.758
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.089	0.921	0.716	0.556
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.677	0.906	0.874	0.843
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.265	0.855	0.861	0.924
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.166	0.794	0.732	0.826
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.229	0.872	0.263	0.459
<i>Control Means</i>				
Baseline	.	.	.	.
Midline	.	.	.	.
Endline	0.772	0.833	0.648	

### A3.19 Domain 9c: Record-Keeping\*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Record Purchase & Sale	Have Written Budget	Keep Accounting Records	Record-keeping Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.005 (0.051) [1.000]	0.030 (0.053) [1.000]	-0.032 (0.049) [1.000]	0.006 (0.106)
Cash (T2)	0.006 (0.053) [1.000]	-0.019 (0.054) [1.000]	0.061 (0.049) [1.000]	0.044 (0.108)
Information (T3)	-0.064 (0.051) [1.000]	-0.007 (0.053) [1.000]	-0.019 (0.049) [1.000]	-0.056 (0.103)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.078 (0.059) [1.000]	0.039 (0.063) [1.000]	0.056 (0.057) [1.000]	0.173 (0.125)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.058 (0.058) [1.000]	0.026 (0.061) [1.000]	0.061 (0.055) [1.000]	0.157 (0.117)
Observations	916	916	916	916
Domain for q-values	93	93	93	93
<i>P-values</i>				
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.976	0.348	0.052	0.715
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.154	0.461	0.784	0.540
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.754	0.846	0.940	0.902
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.095	0.819	0.152	0.233
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.048	0.772	0.311	0.156
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.095	0.890	0.355	0.231
<i>Control Means</i>				
Baseline	.	.	.	
Midline	.	.	.	
Endline	0.636	0.519	0.691	

### A3.20 Domain 9d: Changes in Business Practices\*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Change Suppliers	Change Services	Change Ads	Change Business Management	Change Business Size	Change Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.030 (0.054) [0.956]	0.105* (0.054) [0.315]	0.034 (0.046) [0.899]	-0.138*** (0.052) [0.230]	-0.047 (0.053) [0.866]	-0.009 (0.115)
Cash (T2)	0.068 (0.054) [0.627]	0.114** (0.055) [0.283]	0.017 (0.046) [1.000]	-0.035 (0.052) [0.899]	0.048 (0.054) [0.866]	0.152 (0.112)
Information (T3)	-0.014 (0.053) [1.000]	0.014 (0.053) [1.000]	0.063 (0.045) [0.489]	-0.125** (0.051) [0.230]	-0.090* (0.051) [0.315]	-0.076 (0.111)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	-0.040 (0.064) [0.899]	0.019 (0.062) [1.000]	-0.036 (0.051) [0.899]	-0.113* (0.061) [0.315]	-0.072 (0.060) [0.627]	-0.192 (0.130)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.005 (0.060) [1.000]	0.024 (0.061) [1.000]	0.119** (0.056) [0.283]	-0.038 (0.059) [0.899]	-0.083 (0.059) [0.489]	0.003 (0.129)
Observations	916	916	916	916	916	916
Domain for q-values	95	95	95	95	95	95
<i>P-values</i>						
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.482	0.865	0.730	0.051	0.070	0.176
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.404	0.079	0.528	0.808	0.386	0.563
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.509	0.950	0.007	0.260	0.852	0.178
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.437	0.191	0.083	0.183	0.075	0.116
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.312	0.242	0.041	0.236	0.037	0.060
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.461	0.259	0.057	0.100	0.046	0.115
<i>Control Means</i>						
Baseline	.	.	.	.	.	.
Midline	.	.	.	.	.	.
Endline	0.457	0.451	0.235	0.617	0.444	

### A3.21 Domain 10: Household well-being

- What were the profits of your business during the last 30 days? (*Total household income is the sum of the following four questions.*)
- What were the profits of [any other household-owned] businesses (excluding this one) during the last 30 days?
- How much wage income did you earn in the last 30 days?
- How much wage income did [other members of your household] earn in the last 30 days?
- Business survival, measured using an indicator for whether the main business is operating at the time of the survey
- How much money was your household able to save in the past 30 days?
- Compared to the average Ugandan in your neighborhood, how would you describe the economic situation of your household? Much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse?
- Over the past 30 days, how often have you or anyone in your household gone without enough food to eat? (*Questions not exactly the same: over the past 30 days in baseline and endline and over the past week in midline.*)
- Over the past 30 days, how often have you or anyone in your household struggled to afford basic household expenses (such as medicine, rent, school fees)? (*Questions not exactly the same: over the past 30 days in baseline and endline and over the past week in midline.*)
- In the past 30 days, have you or anyone in your household had to sell assets (jewelry, furniture, clothing, tools, machines, land) in order to afford basic household expenses?
- In the past 30 days, has your household had to stop education for a child due to lack of finances?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Total Household Income (IHS)	Business Survival	Saving	Relative Economic Situation	Have Food	Fine w Household Expenses	No Need to Sell Assets	Can Afford Child Education	Household Well-Being Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	-0.140 (0.290) [1.000]	0.016 (0.018) [1.000]	0.190 (0.225) [1.000]	-0.041 (0.053) [1.000]	0.033 (0.021) [1.000]	0.014 (0.028) [1.000]	0.035 (0.040) [1.000]	-0.019 (0.054) [1.000]	0.086 (0.070)
Cash (T2)	-0.741** (0.333) [1.000]	0.007 (0.019) [1.000]	0.191 (0.227) [1.000]	0.020 (0.055) [1.000]	0.009 (0.021) [1.000]	0.025 (0.028) [1.000]	0.024 (0.042) [1.000]	0.004 (0.055) [1.000]	0.039 (0.069)
Information (T3)	-0.230 (0.308) [1.000]	-0.025 (0.020) [1.000]	-0.226 (0.225) [1.000]	-0.040 (0.052) [1.000]	0.029 (0.021) [1.000]	-0.017 (0.028) [1.000]	0.068* (0.040) [1.000]	0.008 (0.054) [1.000]	-0.103 (0.074)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.036 (0.363) [1.000]	0.009 (0.022) [1.000]	-0.123 (0.253) [1.000]	-0.063 (0.061) [1.000]	-0.008 (0.026) [1.000]	-0.003 (0.034) [1.000]	0.067 (0.045) [1.000]	0.043 (0.059) [1.000]	-0.000 (0.082)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.492 (0.338) [1.000]	0.046** (0.018) [0.680]	0.329 (0.254) [1.000]	0.027 (0.060) [1.000]	0.018 (0.024) [1.000]	0.010 (0.032) [1.000]	0.054 (0.046) [1.000]	0.067 (0.058) [1.000]	0.134* (0.076)
Observations	727	2,160	979	916	2,147	2,149	1,041	827	2,160
Domain for q-values	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
<i>P-values</i>									
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.073	0.574	0.996	0.255	0.220	0.704	0.795	0.680	0.457
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.770	0.026	0.042	0.975	0.862	0.261	0.371	0.609	0.006
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.186	0.061	0.074	0.160	0.333	0.731	0.773	0.687	0.097
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.269	0.003	0.070	0.453	0.437	0.637	0.762	0.637	0.015
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.227	0.001	0.055	0.361	0.454	0.511	0.689	0.677	0.015
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.155	0.002	0.108	0.508	0.505	0.673	0.413	0.757	0.032
<i>Control Means</i>									
Baseline	87.046	.	23.857	0.438	0.958	0.921	0.911	0.583	
Midline	.	0.914	.	.	0.883	0.773	.	.	
Endline	72.738	0.945	37.504	0.407	0.918	0.831	0.787	0.646	

### A3.22 Domain 11: Policy preferences and representation

- Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Uganda should accept more foreigners besides refugees.
- For foreigners, besides refugees, which option do you think Uganda should follow? (analyzed as 4 binary variables)
- How satisfied are you with the LC1 for this area?
- How satisfied are you with the MP for this area?

	(1) Immigrants: Accept More b/se/q	(2) Immigrants: Allow To Stay b/se/q	(3) Satisfied w Local Politician b/se/q	(4) Satisfied w MP b/se/q	(5) General Policy Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.120** (0.048) [0.059]	0.145*** (0.049) [0.059]	0.081* (0.044) [0.093]	0.053 (0.040) [0.152]	0.366*** (0.105)
Cash (T2)	0.118** (0.049) [0.059]	0.115** (0.049) [0.059]	0.074* (0.044) [0.124]	0.004 (0.040) [0.398]	0.341*** (0.108)
Information (T3)	0.068 (0.049) [0.150]	0.070 (0.046) [0.150]	0.101** (0.042) [0.059]	-0.015 (0.038) [0.362]	0.249** (0.104)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.016 (0.059) [0.388]	-0.010 (0.054) [0.398]	0.004 (0.054) [0.398]	0.016 (0.044) [0.362]	0.019 (0.127)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.102* (0.054) [0.093]	0.106* (0.056) [0.093]	0.119*** (0.045) [0.059]	0.105** (0.043) [0.059]	0.360*** (0.115)
Observations	916	916	849	1,847	916
Domain for q-values	11	11	11	11	11
<i>P-values</i>					
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.957	0.574	0.863	0.222	0.812
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.256	0.128	0.602	0.083	0.262
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.153	0.055	0.028	0.051	0.011
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.343	0.067	0.255	0.039	0.050
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.315	0.136	0.153	0.029	0.047
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.100	0.055	0.027	0.050	0.001
<i>Control Means</i>					
Baseline	0.727	0.391	0.798	0.475	
Midline	.	.	.	0.500	
Endline	0.642	0.265	0.776	0.524	

### A3.23 Domain 12: Beliefs about economic effects of non-refugee immigrants

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Immigrants: Effect on Economy b/se/q	Immigrants: Effect on You b/se/q	Foreigners: Economic Beliefs Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.064 (0.053) [0.464]	0.117** (0.054) [0.298]	0.197* (0.106)
Cash (T2)	0.095* (0.052) [0.298]	0.056 (0.055) [0.565]	0.163 (0.106)
Information (T3)	0.103** (0.052) [0.298]	-0.002 (0.055) [0.946]	0.101 (0.107)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	-0.029 (0.064) [0.849]	-0.090 (0.063) [0.365]	-0.200 (0.132)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.004 (0.059) [0.946]	0.015 (0.060) [0.946]	-0.022 (0.115)
Observations	844	853	878
Domain for q-values	12	12	12
<i>P-values</i>			
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.538	0.258	0.729
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.448	0.027	0.353
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.608	0.113	0.182
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.137	0.015	0.017
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.073	0.158	0.032
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.060	0.267	0.058
<i>Control Means</i>			
Baseline	0.654	0.394	
Midline	.	.	
Endline	0.629	0.519	

- Taking everything into consideration, would you say the overall economic effect of foreigners other than refugees on Uganda has been positive, negative, or neutral?
- How about the overall economic effect of foreigners other than refugees on you personally?

### A3.24 Domain 13: Social attitudes about other non-refugee immigrants

	(1)	(2)
	Immigrants: Effect on Culture b/se/q	Foreigners: Social Attitudes Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	-0.052 (0.053) [1.000]	-0.054 (0.053)
Cash (T2)	-0.002 (0.054) [1.000]	0.000 (0.053)
Information (T3)	-0.047 (0.055) [1.000]	-0.045 (0.055)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.002 (0.061) [1.000]	0.003 (0.061)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.073 (0.060) [1.000]	-0.074 (0.061)
Observations	776	776
Domain for q-values	13	13
<i>P-values</i>		
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.355	0.318
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.931	0.867
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.264	0.245
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.685	0.648
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.576	0.553
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.660	0.648
<i>Control Means</i>		
Baseline	0.642	
Midline	.	
Endline	0.708	

- What effect have foreigners besides refugees had on culture in Uganda?

### **A3.25 Domain 14: Contact with Ugandans from another tribe**

- How many of your customers are Ugandans from a different tribe?
- How many businesses in your sector in this area are managed by Ugandans from another tribe?
- How many of your business collaborators are Ugandans from a different tribe?
- Would you be open to collaborating with Ugandans from other tribes?
- Have you ever had an apprentice or person from outside your household at your business who was learning skills but not paid who was from another tribe?
- Are any of your employees from a different tribe than you?
- In the past 30 days, how many people from a different tribe have you contacted for any social reason, such as having a long conversation?
- Number of people from another tribe listed in the networks module.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Customers from Other Tribes	Business from Other Tribes	Business Collab from Other Tribes	Open to Collab w Other Tribes	Apprentices from Other Tribes	Employees from Other Tribes	Contacts from Other Tribes	Networks from Other Tribes	Other Tribes: Contact Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.043 (0.053) [1.000]	-0.024 (0.052) [1.000]	1.165 (0.742) [1.000]	0.018* (0.011) [1.000]	-0.018 (0.055) [1.000]	0.039 (0.041) [1.000]	0.276 (0.287) [1.000]	0.141 (0.107) [1.000]	0.156* (0.087) [1.000]
Cash (T2)	0.026 (0.054) [1.000]	-0.087* (0.051) [1.000]	-0.109 (0.409) [1.000]	0.014 (0.009) [1.000]	0.065 (0.056) [1.000]	-0.046 (0.042) [1.000]	0.098 (0.262) [1.000]	-0.052 (0.101) [1.000]	0.065 (0.083) [1.000]
Information (T3)	0.008 (0.051) [1.000]	-0.012 (0.051) [1.000]	0.719 (0.516) [1.000]	0.007 (0.014) [1.000]	-0.002 (0.053) [1.000]	0.039 (0.041) [1.000]	0.088 (0.251) [1.000]	0.066 (0.108) [1.000]	0.049 (0.109) [1.000]
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.037 (0.062) [1.000]	-0.071 (0.061) [1.000]	-0.295 (0.522) [1.000]	0.010 (0.014) [1.000]	0.003 (0.062) [1.000]	-0.000 (0.047) [1.000]	-0.135 (0.306) [1.000]	0.013 (0.126) [1.000]	-0.023 (0.101) [1.000]
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.019 (0.059) [1.000]	-0.015 (0.058) [1.000]	0.226 (0.522) [1.000]	0.012 (0.014) [1.000]	-0.105* (0.060) [1.000]	-0.009 (0.044) [1.000]	0.188 (0.309) [1.000]	0.003 (0.112) [1.000]	0.013 (0.104) [1.000]
Observations	879	829	1,006	885	916	915	1,035	916	1,041
Domain for q-values	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14
<i>P-values</i>									
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.739	0.193	0.060	0.193	0.132	0.048	0.606	0.051	0.185
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.467	0.819	0.556	0.185	0.755	0.991	0.536	0.475	0.252
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.774	0.368	0.268	0.928	0.097	0.867	0.332	0.940	0.720
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.960	0.482	0.102	0.401	0.092	0.244	0.778	0.384	0.201
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.961	0.372	0.190	0.783	0.048	0.279	0.803	0.722	0.716
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.973	0.354	0.309	0.264	0.096	0.426	0.894	0.856	0.804
<i>Control Means</i>									
Baseline	0.392	0.335	1.608	0.992	0.367	0.147	0.625	0.735	
Midline	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
Endline	0.353	0.365	2.808	0.981	0.475	0.222	1.328	0.827	

**A3.26 Domain 15: Beliefs about economic effects of Ugandans from another tribe**

	(1)	(2)
	Other Tribes: Effect on Your Business	Other Tribes: Economic Beliefs Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.052 (0.042) [0.459]	0.050 (0.042)
Cash (T2)	0.077* (0.042) [0.459]	0.076* (0.042)
Information (T3)	0.039 (0.043) [0.546]	0.045 (0.043)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.066 (0.051) [0.459]	0.067 (0.051)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.037 (0.048) [0.546]	0.037 (0.048)
Observations	879	879
Domain for q-values	15	15
<i>P-values</i>		
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.504	0.508
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.740	0.893
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.572	0.568
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.849	0.897
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.715	0.791
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.423	0.450
<i>Control Means</i>		
Baseline	0.781	
Midline	.	
Endline	0.800	

- How do the businesses managed by Ugandans from a different tribe affect your business overall? Do they help you a lot, help you a little, hurt you a little, hurt you a lot, or have no effect on you? (*Compared to the similar question on Ugandans from your tribe.*)

### A3.27 Domain 16: Social attitudes about Ugandans from another tribe

	(1)	(2)
	Other Tribes: Social Distance	Other Tribes: Social Attitudes Index
	b/se/q	b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.195** (0.096) [0.261]	0.195** (0.096)
Cash (T2)	0.054 (0.101) [1.000]	0.054 (0.101)
Information (T3)	0.077 (0.106) [1.000]	0.077 (0.106)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	-0.018 (0.124) [1.000]	-0.018 (0.124)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.011 (0.127) [1.000]	0.011 (0.127)
Observations	916	916
Domain for q-values	16	16
<i>P-values</i>		
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.128	0.128
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.206	0.206
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.832	0.832
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.273	0.273
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.873	0.873
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.918	0.918
<i>Control Means</i>		
Baseline	0.070	
Midline	.	
Endline	0.000	

*Social distance index constructed based on these four questions:*

- I would be comfortable marrying a Ugandan from another tribe.
- I would be comfortable having a Ugandan from another tribe marry a member of my family.
- I would be comfortable having a Ugandan from another tribe as a close, personal friend.
- I would be comfortable having a Ugandan from another tribe as a neighbor.

### A3.28 Domain 17: Gender roles

	(1) Share Profits w Spouse b/se/q	(2) Women Can Decide Expenditure b/se/q	(3) Gender Role Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	-0.067 (0.071) [1.000]	-0.048 (0.065) [1.000]	-0.143 (0.156)
Cash (T2)	0.085 (0.068) [1.000]	-0.033 (0.066) [1.000]	0.103 (0.149)
Information (T3)	-0.000 (0.066) [1.000]	0.037 (0.060) [1.000]	0.075 (0.140)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	-0.123* (0.073) [0.694]	-0.189** (0.077) [0.167]	-0.485*** (0.173)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.056 (0.070) [1.000]	-0.013 (0.071) [1.000]	-0.117 (0.165)
Observations	537	537	537
Domain for q-values	17	17	17
<i>P-values</i>			
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.028	0.822	0.134
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.308	0.165	0.159
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.361	0.032	0.054
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.052	0.043	0.010
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.035	0.021	0.005
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.070	0.041	0.012
<i>Control Means</i>			
Baseline	0.194	0.667	
Midline	.	.	
Endline	0.517	0.701	

- Do you share all of your profits from this business with your spouse?
- Who decides how the household's money is spent?

### A3.29 Domain 18: COVID-19 household shock

- In total, about how much income did your family earn during the 4 months of the lockdown (April - July)? Do not count money that you borrowed.
- During the lockdown, how often did you or anyone in your household go without enough food to eat? Always, often, sometimes, or never?
- During the lockdown, how often did you or anyone in your household struggle to afford basic household expenses other than food (such as medicine, rent, school fees)?
- During the lockdown, did you or anyone in your household have to sell assets (jewelry, furniture, clothing, tools, machines, land) in order to afford basic household expenses?
- How much did you borrow during the lockdown to pay for basic necessities like food, housing, and medicine?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	COVID: Income b/se/q	COVID: Have Food b/se/q	COVID: Fine w Household Expenses b/se/q	COVID: No Need to Sell Assets b/se/q	COVID: Borrowing b/se/q	COVID Shock Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	-0.192 (0.221) [1.000]	0.011 (0.043) [1.000]	-0.036 (0.044) [1.000]	-0.009 (0.044) [1.000]	-0.217 (0.263) [1.000]	-0.007 (0.096) [1.000]
Cash (T2)	-0.217 (0.224) [1.000]	-0.040 (0.045) [1.000]	-0.063 (0.046) [1.000]	-0.009 (0.045) [1.000]	0.233 (0.279) [1.000]	-0.115 (0.098) [1.000]
Information (T3)	0.244 (0.242) [1.000]	-0.065 (0.044) [1.000]	-0.126*** (0.045) [0.161]	-0.072 (0.044) [1.000]	-0.110 (0.261) [1.000]	-0.042 (0.100) [1.000]
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	-0.170 (0.273) [1.000]	0.003 (0.050) [1.000]	0.006 (0.050) [1.000]	0.065 (0.048) [1.000]	-0.061 (0.293) [1.000]	0.051 (0.114) [1.000]
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	-0.088 (0.263) [1.000]	0.044 (0.047) [1.000]	-0.059 (0.050) [1.000]	-0.042 (0.050) [1.000]	0.186 (0.303) [1.000]	-0.054 (0.112) [1.000]
Observations	1,068	1,112	1,113	1,119	1,117	1,119
Domain for q-values	18	18	18	18	18	18
<i>P-values</i>						
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.912	0.248	0.551	0.995	0.104	0.262
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.067	0.065	0.046	0.145	0.674	0.714
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.787	0.427	0.226	0.037	0.446	0.388
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.329	0.135	0.116	0.064	0.441	0.650
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.258	0.110	0.085	0.032	0.527	0.543
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.384	0.170	0.039	0.060	0.685	0.629
<i>Control Means</i>						
Baseline	.	.	.	.	.	.
Midline	165.949	0.741	0.726	0.722	596.041	.
Endline	.	.	.	.	.	.

### A3.30 Domain 19: Government or NGO Support\*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Reported Any Support b/se/q	Associated Support w YARID b/se/q	Associated Support w Data Firm b/se/q	Associated Support w Refugees b/se/q	Attribution Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.206*** (0.033) [0.001]	0.134*** (0.017) [0.001]	0.042** (0.018) [0.031]	0.079*** (0.017) [0.001]	0.508*** (0.081)
Cash (T2)	0.192*** (0.033) [0.001]	0.078*** (0.015) [0.001]	0.075*** (0.021) [0.001]	0.039*** (0.015) [0.017]	0.481*** (0.080)
Information (T3)	0.011 (0.028) [0.644]	0.001 (0.006) [0.807]	0.022 (0.017) [0.307]	0.010 (0.013) [0.521]	0.066 (0.069)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.013 (0.033) [0.644]	0.007 (0.008) [0.521]	0.029 (0.021) [0.261]	-0.007 (0.015) [0.644]	0.067 (0.083)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.036 (0.032) [0.366]	0.000 (0.009) [0.807]	0.022 (0.020) [0.366]	0.012 (0.015) [0.521]	0.109 (0.080)
Observations	2,160	2,160	2,160	2,160	2,160
Domain for q-values	19	19	19	19	19
<i>P-values</i>					
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.706	0.014	0.159	0.040	0.775
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.000	0.000	0.272	0.000	0.000
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.520	0.507	0.774	0.292	0.654
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.000	0.000	0.137	0.000	0.000
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.000	0.000	0.085	0.098	0.000
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.077	0.000
<i>Control Means</i>					
Baseline	.	.	.	.	.
Midline	0.485	0.000	0.086	0.051	
Endline	0.060	0.005	0.000	0.000	

- Over the past year, has your household received any assistance from an NGO or international organization? If so, what are the names of the organizations running those programs?
- Enumerator: Did they mention YARID in their answer?
- Enumerator: Did they mention this study, research, or survey firm in their answer?
- What was the purpose of those programs?
- Enumerator: Did they mention refugees in their answer?

### A3.31 Domain 20: Importance of Tribe\*

	(1)	(2)
	Importance of Own Tribe b/se/q	Own Tribe Index b/se/q
Cash & Information (T1)	0.016 (0.041) [1.000]	0.043 (0.111)
Cash (T2)	0.024 (0.040) [1.000]	0.063 (0.108)
Information (T3)	0.013 (0.041) [1.000]	0.036 (0.108)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.075* (0.043) [0.684]	0.200* (0.115)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.003 (0.047) [1.000]	0.007 (0.126)
Observations	916	916
Domain for q-values	20	20
<i>P-values</i>		
Cash & Info (T1) = Cash (T2)	0.853	0.853
Cash & Info (T1) = Info (T3)	0.941	0.941
R-Mentee (T4) = U-Mentee (T5)	0.126	0.126
T1 = T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.530	0.530
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5	0.387	0.387
T2 = T3 = T4 = T5 = 0	0.423	0.423
<i>Control Means</i>		
Baseline	0.887	
Midline	.	
Endline	0.833	

Appendix Table A3: Heterogeneity in Support for Inclusive Policies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Female Owner	Business Profit	Support Hosting	Economic Beliefs	Social Attitudes	Contact Refugees by Choice	Contact Refugees by Circumst.	Knowledge abt Intl Donation	Deserve Sympathy	Mentor Profit
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Cash & Information (T1)	0.267** (0.131)	0.457*** (0.118)	0.496*** (0.114)	0.468*** (0.111)	0.469*** (0.106)	0.232* (0.139)	0.339*** (0.080)	0.336*** (0.077)	0.436*** (0.100)	0.333*** (0.070)
Cash & Info (T1) * X	0.088 (0.156)	-0.199 (0.145)	-0.302** (0.142)	-0.253* (0.141)	-0.278** (0.140)	0.146 (0.160)	-0.013 (0.165)	-0.021 (0.182)	-0.257* (0.137)	0.000 (.)
Cash (T2)	0.147 (0.132)	0.351*** (0.119)	0.348*** (0.115)	0.316*** (0.116)	0.338*** (0.106)	0.357*** (0.134)	0.217*** (0.083)	0.223*** (0.083)	0.327*** (0.100)	0.202*** (0.074)
Cash (T2) * X	0.072 (0.159)	-0.241 (0.151)	-0.277* (0.148)	-0.214 (0.150)	-0.278* (0.147)	-0.215 (0.162)	-0.062 (0.178)	-0.124 (0.179)	-0.303** (0.143)	0.000 (.)
Information (T3)	0.027 (0.136)	0.270** (0.119)	0.286** (0.116)	0.298*** (0.111)	0.272** (0.109)	0.076 (0.147)	0.205** (0.084)	0.183** (0.080)	0.358*** (0.097)	0.187*** (0.071)
Information (T3) * X	0.231 (0.159)	-0.133 (0.148)	-0.184 (0.143)	-0.201 (0.145)	-0.191 (0.142)	0.149 (0.169)	-0.065 (0.168)	0.019 (0.183)	-0.419*** (0.141)	0.000 (.)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.075 (0.142)	0.239* (0.130)	0.272** (0.121)	0.280** (0.124)	0.219* (0.114)	0.133 (0.149)	0.143 (0.089)	0.136 (0.088)	0.253** (0.101)	0.159* (0.096)
Mentored by Refugee (T4) * X	0.080 (0.172)	-0.170 (0.162)	-0.259 (0.159)	-0.273* (0.160)	-0.146 (0.157)	0.013 (0.175)	-0.021 (0.187)	-0.013 (0.191)	-0.275* (0.154)	-0.121 (0.155)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.098 (0.129)	0.363*** (0.131)	0.270** (0.125)	0.276** (0.128)	0.221* (0.123)	0.218 (0.148)	0.150* (0.091)	0.149* (0.090)	0.187* (0.110)	0.115 (0.099)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5) * X	0.068 (0.165)	-0.342** (0.164)	-0.221 (0.159)	-0.231 (0.161)	-0.151 (0.154)	-0.089 (0.177)	0.031 (0.180)	0.006 (0.189)	-0.095 (0.151)	
Heterogeneity Dimension X	0.000 (.)	0.196 (0.135)	0.213 (0.138)	0.273** (0.115)	0.326*** (0.111)	0.123 (0.127)	0.077 (0.132)	0.044 (0.143)	0.345*** (0.107)	0.075 (0.109)
Observations	2,150	2,150	2,150	2,150	2,150	2,150	2,150	2,150	2,150	2,150

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable for each column is the policy preferences index defined in Table 4. Each column title lists the dimension of heterogeneity (X) that is analyzed in the regression. The results are from an Intent-to-Treat OLS specification that controls for strata, survey wave, survey date, an indicator for phone survey, baseline education, and age at baseline. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

Appendix Table A4: Heterogeneity in Business Profits

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Female Owner	Business Practices	Business Network Size	Mentor Profit	Mentor Experience	Dist. to Mentor
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Cash & Information (T1)	0.142 (0.152)	-0.045 (0.105)	0.057 (0.110)	-0.063 (0.078)	-0.062 (0.078)	-0.063 (0.078)
Cash & Info (T1) * X	-0.278 (0.178)	-0.034 (0.156)	-0.234 (0.157)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Cash (T2)	0.227 (0.160)	0.006 (0.114)	0.003 (0.127)	-0.030 (0.081)	-0.030 (0.081)	-0.030 (0.081)
Cash (T2) * X	-0.356* (0.185)	-0.068 (0.163)	-0.058 (0.166)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Information (T3)	0.169 (0.148)	0.012 (0.110)	0.035 (0.113)	-0.014 (0.076)	-0.015 (0.076)	-0.015 (0.076)
Information (T3) * X	-0.249 (0.172)	-0.052 (0.154)	-0.087 (0.154)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Mentored by Refugee (T4)	0.164 (0.175)	-0.001 (0.120)	0.140 (0.123)	-0.025 (0.108)	0.055 (0.103)	0.011 (0.128)
Mentored by Refugee (T4) * X	-0.200 (0.200)	0.025 (0.168)	-0.226 (0.170)	0.021 (0.195)	-0.029 (0.194)	-0.104 (0.204)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5)	0.163 (0.172)	-0.247* (0.126)	-0.067 (0.145)	-0.158 (0.121)	-0.107 (0.118)	-0.171 (0.112)
Mentored by Ugandan (T5) * X	-0.419** (0.206)	0.244 (0.187)	-0.111 (0.189)			
Heterogeneity Dimension X	0.000 (.)	0.014 (0.113)	0.067 (0.113)	0.054 (0.148)	-0.056 (0.152)	0.105 (0.151)
Observations	2,107	2,107	2,107	2,107	2,107	2,107

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable for each column is business profits corresponding with Table 7. Each column title lists the dimension of heterogeneity (X) that is analyzed in the regression. The results are from an Intent-to-Treat OLS specification that controls for strata, survey wave, survey date, an indicator for phone survey, baseline education, and age at baseline. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

## A4 Westfall-Young stepdown adjusted p-values

The tables below show the Westfall-Young stepdown adjusted p-values for the four primary hypotheses, which are

- Grants with canvassing (T1) will increase support for inclusive hosting.
- Refugee mentorship (T4) will increase support for inclusive hosting.
- Grants with canvassing (T1) will increase business profits.
- Refugee mentorship (T4) will increase business profits.

Domain 1 contains information on support for inclusive hosting, and domain 2 contains information on business profits. Anderson summary indices are used here as dependent variables for each domain. Bootstrap is performed 10,000 times.

**Table 1: ITT Specification**

	(1) Policy Preferences Index	(2) Profits (Standardized)
R-Mentee	0.102 (0.081) [0.421]	0.026 (0.630) [0.919]
Cash & Info	0.365 (0.071) [0.000]	-0.048 (0.583) [0.747]
N	2,150	2,107

Standard errors in parentheses. WY p-values in brackets.