



# Forced Displacement Literature Review

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# Syrian refugee women's negotiation of higher education opportunities in Jordan and Lebanon

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This paper **examines how gender norms shape young Syrian refugee women's engagement in higher education in Lebanon and Jordan, and highlights ways in which displacement has contributed to shifting gender norms.**

Jordan hosts more than 665,000 Syrian refugees (around 9 percent of the population), while Lebanon hosts more than 855,000 registered Syrian refugees (one fifth of the population). In Jordan, 80 percent of refugees are poor, and 60 percent of refugee households are in extreme poverty; in Lebanon, 90 percent of refugee households are in extreme poverty. While most Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon are above the age of secondary education, only a small fraction (8 percent in Jordan and 6 percent in Lebanon) are enrolled in higher education due to several factors including financial hardship, lack of documentation, lack of residence permits (Lebanon), and lack of capacity in higher education institutions.

Prior to the Syrian war, women in Syria accounted for more than half of all university enrolments and graduated at higher rates than men. However, women only accounted for 15 percent of the labor force in Syria before the war.

The author has drawn on data from a broader research project investigating Syrian youths' perspectives and experiences of higher education opportunities for refugees in the Middle East and North Africa region. Data was collected through semi-structured focus group interviews.

Main findings:

- **The ways in which Syrian refugees construct and negotiate their gender identities are shaped by traditional Arab culture and Sunni Islam.** For Syrian women, cultural narratives position them as biological reproducers, cultural transmitters, metaphors and gatekeepers of the nation. Syrian men are positioned as protectors and providers for the family and wider national collectivity.

- **Displacement has changed the way that many Syrian families view gender relations.** In some cases, displacement has created opportunities for women's participation in the public sphere (through increased access to travel, education, and employment opportunities). In other instances, it has intensified restrictions on women's movements, behaviors, and choices.
- **Displacement has affected Syrian women's access to higher education.** In some cases, there is greater cultural acceptance of Syrian women pursuing higher education due to severe financial hardship, inability of Syrian men to provide for their families, and the pervasiveness of female-headed households in displacement settings.
- **Participation in higher education does not necessarily challenge entrenched gender relations in the home.** Women typically continue to have cultural responsibility for all domestic work and childcare.
- **Increased access to higher education does not necessarily translate into increased participation in the public sphere for Syrian women.** Employment for women (other than high status professional employment) continues to be viewed as an act of necessity or financial desperation, which compromises the honor of female refugees and undermines the masculinity of their male relatives.

The author concludes that for many Syrian refugees, **displacement has brought about social transformation and changed the way that families view gender relations. However, increased access to higher education has not necessarily challenged gender relations in the home or expanded women's access to the public sphere.**

## **Experiences of armed conflicts and forced migration among women from countries in the Middle East, Balkans, and Africa: a systematic review of qualitative studies**

Linda Jolof, Patricia Rocca, Monir Mazaheri, Leah Okenwa Emegwa, and Tommy Carlsson  
*Conflict and Health*, Volume 16 (2022), Article number 46  
<https://conflictandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13031-022-00481-x>

This paper **provides a systematic review of literature on women's experiences of armed conflicts and forced migration, focusing on women in or from countries in the Middle East, Balkans, or Africa.** The literature indicates that refugee women's exposure to conflict, violence and displacement leads to significant health and mental health consequences.

The review covers empirical studies in English with qualitative findings, published in scientific journals between 1980 and September 2021. Of the 3,800 records screened, 26 were included in the systematic review. Most studies relied on interviews, including a total of 494 participants, and were judged as having trivial methodological limitations.

The thematic synthesis resulted in three themes illustrating women's lived experiences:

- **Changed living conditions involving exposure to considerable discrimination, violence, death, and a need to survive while taking care of their family.** The interviewed women had experienced insecurity and been exposed to various forms of violence, including witnessing violence, or being subjected to violence themselves. They found themselves unable to access resources to meet their basic needs, leading to stress and feelings of sadness and powerlessness. Forced migration was an act of last resort in response to threatening circumstances. Despite these hardships, there were some reports of positive effects of displacement including empowerment, greater independence, and a capacity to challenge traditional gender roles.
- **Health-related consequences when confronted by a complex and demanding situation.** Displacement entailed significant psychological distress, fears, and uncertainties, in particular for women in camp settings. Women were exposed to intensified violence including sexual violence in both public and private settings, leading to fear, panic, insecurity, grief, and physical consequences. Women were particularly vulnerable when pregnant, giving birth, or breast-feeding. Women had difficulties accessing adequate healthcare and social support.
- **Resources and strategies that enhance resilience.** Women used a range of interpersonal and intrapersonal resources and strategies to enhance their strength and resilience when faced with challenging circumstances. Social support and family life were important before, during and after forced migration. Women relied on "internal resources" and strategies including religion and faith, education and work, humor/optimism, ingenuity to avoid male violence, resistance, and taking control of their lives. Negative coping strategies included becoming violent towards their children, developing self-harming behaviors, succumbing to passivity and resignation, hiding their emotions, and vigilance.

The authors conclude that **displaced women face significant challenges related to changed living conditions and are exposed to health-related consequences.** Women are consistently targets of severe structural and personal violence, while lacking access to basic healthcare services. Despite facing considerable hardships and trauma, these women

display remarkable resilience and endurance by finding strength through social support and internal resources. Synthesized qualitative research illustrates that **women value social support, including peer support, which is a promising intervention that needs to be evaluated in future experimental studies.**

## **Heterogeneous Effects of Forced Migration on the Female Labor Market: The Venezuelan Exodus in Colombia**

Julian Pedrazzi and Leonardo Peñaloza-Pacheco

*Journal of Development Studies*, Volume 59, Issue 3 (2022), Pages 324-341

<https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2022.2139609>

This paper **examines the impact of large-scale Venezuelan migration on the female labor market in Colombia.** More than 1.5 million Venezuelans migrated to Colombia in the period 2016–2019 due to the economic and social crises in Venezuela.

The analysis is based on data from the Colombian household survey for the period 2013–2019. The authors exploit the variation in the concentration of Venezuelans across Colombian departments over time. They consider the non-random settlement of Venezuelans across Colombian departments by modeling (using an instrumental variables approach) the share of people living in each state of Venezuela in 2011 (before the Venezuelan exodus) and the distance between those states and the departments of Colombia.

Main findings:

- **The arrival of Venezuelan migrants negatively affected the labor force participation of native women.** An increase in the share of Venezuelan immigrants of one percentage point caused an average reduction in labor force participation close to 0.7 percent relative to 2013.
- **Venezuelan migration negatively affected the employment rate of native women.** An increase in the share of Venezuelan immigrants of one percentage point, caused an average reduction in the employment rate of 0.8 percent relative to 2013.
- **Inflows of Venezuelan migrants reduced the average weekly working time of native women.** An increase in the share of Venezuelan immigrants of one percentage point, decreased the average weekly working time by 0.4 hours.

- **These results hold only for low- and medium-skilled native women.** There were no significant effects on the labor force participation, employment and working time of high-skilled native women.
- **For high skilled native women with at least one dependent child of 5 years of age or younger, Venezuelan migration had a positive impact on the labor market participation, employment, and average weekly working time of high-skilled native women.** A one percentage point increase in the share of Venezuelan immigrants increased the labor force participation of high-skilled women with dependent children close to 0.5 percent, increased their employment rate by 1 percent, and increased their average weekly working hours by 1.4 hours, relative to 2013.
- **Venezuelan migration increased the probability of hiring live-in domestic workers in the households of high-skilled Colombian women with children.** There was also a drop in the hourly wage of female domestic service workers which supports the hypothesis that immigration reduced the cost of childcare. Additionally, there is evidence of a negative effect of Venezuelan migration on the hours spent on childcare by high-skilled native women with at least one child, which are substituted by more hours in the labor market.

The authors conclude that **the sudden influx of Venezuelan migrants reduced the labor force participation of less-skilled native women but positively affected the labor force participation for high-skilled native women with children.** The authors find evidence that Venezuelan migrants reduced the cost of childcare, making it more affordable for high skilled native women to hire domestic workers, spend less time on childcare, and instead earn an income in the labor market.

## Refugee-Host Proximity and Market Creation in Uganda

Marco d'Errico, Rama Dasi Mariani, Rebecca Pietrelli, and Furio Camillo Rosati

*Journal of Development Studies*, Volume 58, Issue 2 (2022), Pages 213-233

<https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2021.1961749>

This paper **analyses how proximity to refugees affects the welfare and economic activity of host communities in Uganda.** Uganda hosts more than 1.4 million refugees, living across 31 settlements in 13 districts. Despite their freedom of movement, most refugees remain in official settlements to access assistance from national and international agencies.

The analysis relies on data from a 2017/8 survey carried by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Northern and Southwestern Uganda. The sample consists of 3,799 households, including both refugees (2,170 households) and hosts in the proximity of the refugee settlements (1,632 households). The survey captured geo-referenced information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the households, food security, shocks, assistance, perceived resilience capacity, coping strategies and aspirations, access to basic services, employment, and agricultural and livestock production. The authors use the distance between host and refugee households as a proxy for the potential economic interaction among them. On average, host households have at least one refugee household at 1.7 kilometers, with a range from immediate proximity to about 11 kilometers. More than 70 percent of host households' heads never moved from their current residence and about 95 percent did not move within the two years preceding the survey.

Main results:

- **Proximity to refugees increased hosts' consumption of food, while non-food expenditure was not affected.** On average, the reduction of the distance to refugee households by about one kilometer led to about a 5 percent increase in food expenditures.
- Transfers from government and international agencies do not appear to depend on the proximity between hosts and refugees and, therefore, are not associated with the observed increase in expenditure.
- **Proximity to refugee households increased a host household's total labor income, mainly due to an increase in wage income.** On average, the reduction of the distance to refugee households by about one kilometer generated an increase in host households' wage income of about 6 percent.
- **The observed increase in consumption appears to be due mainly to the increase in wage income.** Proximity to refugees did not appear to have affected host households' self-employment income both in agricultural and non-agricultural activities. Also, the value of sales of crops and livestock products was not affected by the distance between refugee and host households.
- **The observed increase in household income appears to have been generated by an increase in waged employment coupled with a reduction in casual employment.** Host households in proximity of refugees were more likely to work as employees and less likely to be involved in casual work. On average, a reduction of one kilometer in the distance to refugees decreased the probability of casual work by about 1 percent and increased the probability of wage employment by 1 percent.

- **Wage employment increased mainly in agricultural and non-agricultural private sectors.** The effect on public employment was not significant, indicating that the increase in wage employment was not due to demand from camp activities.
- **Additional wage employment may be generated by small enterprises run by refugee households** and proximity increased the probability of being employed in them. Proximity did not affect the probability that hosts ran a non-agricultural enterprise, but it was positively correlated with the probability that refugees had an enterprise.
- **The effects of market creation were very localized.** Effects on food expenditures dissipated beyond six kilometers and effects on wage income dissipated beyond four kilometers.

Overall, results indicate that **one of the channels through which the refugee presence increases hosts' welfare is the direct interaction between the two communities.** This increase is in both the level and the characteristics of the economic activity conducted by the hosts. **However, the effects tend to be very localized.**

## Refugees, trade, and FDI

Dany Bahar, Christopher Parsons, and Pierre-Louis Vézina

*Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, Volume 38, Issue 3 (2022), Pages 487–513

<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grac022>

This article **discusses trade and investment links forged by refugees between their countries of resettlement and countries of origin**, drawing on findings from the literature on migrants and refugees.

Main points:

- There are many historical examples of refugees spreading new knowledge and technology, with positive economic dividends for host societies.
- Rather than cutting links with their home countries, evidence indicates that refugees maintain strong links with their home countries, with positive potential impacts on trade.
- A growing body of evidence suggests that **refugees can contribute to the development of their home nations.** The literature suggests that migration has a positive impact on trade, and that migrants' ability to stimulate trade is a function of their knowledge of foreign markets coupled with their ability to integrate into their host-country communities. Refugees might even exert more influence on trade and investment when

compared to migrants more broadly, because they often constitute new populations in their host countries and have greater incentives to invest in human capital.

- **Effects on trade and investment might be larger in developing countries of origin,** characterized by weak institutions, in which contract enforcement is more costly and trusted networks more valuable. On the other hand, trade and investment in conflict-affected countries may be constrained due to political upheaval or an absence of the rule of law.
- **Refugees' remittances play a potentially important developmental role.** Refugees send significant remittances home. Some evidence even suggests that refugees remit more frequently than other types of migrants. The exact role that refugee remittances play in facilitating FDI and trade flows remains largely unstudied.
- **Policies in both countries of origin and countries of asylum can foster refugees' economic impact on trade and FDI.** Examples include: (1) establishing regulations and policies that differentiate between refugees and migrants, providing refugees with full access to local labor markets; (2) reducing the costs of remittance flows; (3) leveraging refugee diasporas; and (4) providing suitable incentives for refugees to return home in post-conflict situations.

The authors conclude that **refugee represent enormous potential to contribute to development and post-conflict reconstruction of their home countries.** They note that, “refugees and their associated diasporas represent serious opportunities—if accompanied by the right policies—to realize important economic gains that in the medium to long run might be expected to exceed any short-run costs of ‘accommodating’ them.”

## **Do applications respond to changes in asylum policies in European countries?**

Simone Bertoli, Herbert Brücker, and Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga

*Regional Science and Urban Economics*, Volume 93 (2022), Article number 103771

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2022.103771>

This paper **analyzes whether the distribution of asylum applications across European countries responds to policy changes.**

The authors model the uncertainties faced by asylum seekers including: (a) the probability of obtaining refugee protection; (2) the expected time required to process an asylum application; and (3) the risk of repatriation for asylum seekers whose applications are

rejected. The analysis is based on EUROSTAT data on asylum applications to European countries between 2009 and 2017.

**The proportion of asylum applications that are successful (recognition rate) largely reflects conditions in origin countries** at a particular time. **The expected processing time and the risk of repatriation largely reflects policies in destination countries**, including the resources that are allocated to processing pending asylum applications, the extent to which processing of applications from various countries of origin are prioritized (implicitly or explicitly), and the resources allocated to the enforcement of immigration legislation.

Descriptive statistics:

- The number of first-time applications from an origin country to a destination country in a given month ranged from five to 37,000 (from Syrians in Germany in February 2016), with an average of 155 applications across all origin-destination country pairs.
- **Asylum applications from a given origin country typically face broadly similar recognition rates across destinations.** The average recognition rate for first-time applications was 28 percent. Across countries of origin, recognition rates ranged from 2 percent for Macedonian asylum seekers to 78 percent for Eritrean asylum seekers. Across destination countries, recognition rates ranged from 2 percent in Latvia to 69 percent in Malta.
- **Average time to process an asylum application was 9.5 months.** Across origin countries, this ranged from less than 7 months for Syrians, Eritreans, and Serbians to more than 14 months for applicants from the Democratic Republic of Congo. By destination, average processing times ranged from just over 1 month in Portugal to more than 18 months in Ireland.

Main results:

- The share of applications received by a destination country from a specific origin country does not affect the recognition rate for applications from that origin country.
- **Processing times have a heterogeneous impact on asylum applications depending on the recognition rate and on the repatriation risk.** A higher processing time reduces the share of asylum applications received from countries with a high recognition rate, thus reducing the average recognition rate. For countries with low recognition rates, processing times have a negative and significant effect on applications only when the

repatriation risk is high. When the repatriation risk is low, however, the effect of the processing time becomes positive.

- **German policies to speed up the processing of asylum application increased the attractiveness of Germany as a destination for asylum seekers from countries that are heavily affected by violent conflicts and persecution and who can easily substantiate their asylum claims.** A reduction in the average processing time in Germany (from 15.7 to 9.4 months), together with an increase in average processing time in other European countries (from 6.7 to 8.9 months), explains 13.5 percent of the increase in asylum applications lodged in Germany, and a 7.9 percent decrease in asylum applications in other European countries. For Syrian refugees, the observed variations in processing times increased applications in Germany by 16 percent and decreased applications in Sweden by 35 percent between 2014 and 2015.
- **The inclusion of origin countries in lists of safe countries significantly reduced asylum applications in Europe and contributed to faster processing times.** When a country is added to the lists of safe countries of origin (making citizens of that country subject to quick and direct denial of asylum), asylum applications are reduced around 11 months after the policy is implemented despite a decrease in processing times and a temporary increase in recognition rates.

The authors conclude that **recognition rates, processing times and risk of repatriation do influence the number of asylum applications received by European countries and their composition by country of origin.** Asylum seekers do respond to differentials in recognition rates and processing times, and so asylum policies decided unilaterally in one country affect other destination countries. The authors **advocate for coordination of policies across European countries to avoid a race to the bottom in refugee protection standards.**

## **Dynamic Effects of Co-Ethnic Networks on Immigrants' Economic Success**

Michele Battisti, Giovanni Peri, and Agnese Romiti

*The Economic Journal*, Volume 132, Issue 641 (2022), Pages 58–88

<https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueab036>

This paper **estimates the causal effect of co-ethnic networks on the economic success of immigrants in Germany.**

The analysis draws on longitudinal data of immigrants in Germany from the IAB-SOEP Migration Sample, a yearly survey of immigrants in Germany beginning in 2013, for individuals who are linked to IEB (Integrierten Erwerbsbiografien), the German social security archive that includes information on immigrants' labor market history after arrival in Germany.

To address the likely endogeneity of immigrants' decisions about where to settle (i.e. immigrants choosing locations based on characteristics that are likely to improve their economic success, and/or because of the presence of co-ethnic networks), the authors: (a) control for a range of location and individual characteristics, including those characteristics affecting immigrants' initial location choices; and (b) exploit the quasi-experimental variation in initial location for refugees subject to dispersal policies that distribute refugees across locations independently of most of their characteristics.

Main findings:

- **Immigrants arriving in districts with larger co-ethnic networks are significantly more likely to find employment within three years of arrival; this advantage fades over time and disappears within four to six years.** An increase of one standard deviation (SD) in the initial co-ethnic network leads to an increase in employment of 9.3 percentage points in the first year after migration. This positive effect dissipates within three years of migration.
- **There is a significant positive correlation between initial network size and the likelihood that the first job in Germany was found through personal contacts.** A one SD increase in the co-ethnic network size at arrival corresponds to a 9.2 percentage point greater likelihood of having found a first job through personal contacts.
- **The initial network size negatively affects the likelihood of being in school/training during the first six years following arrival.** Immigrants first arriving in districts with co-ethnic networks that are one SD larger are 3.1 percentage points less likely to be in school/training in their first three years after migration. This negative effect slightly declines (2.4 percentage points) but persists until six years after arrival.
- **Large co-ethnic network locations reduce time in school/college education rather than time invested in vocational training.** The negative effect of the network size at arrival on school/formal education is long lasting; a one-SD increase in network size upon arrival translates into a one-percentage-point reduction in the probability of

attending school and college, even in the long run. The effects on vocational training are smaller, and shorter lived.

- **Larger initial networks tend to be associated with lower current language proficiency**, especially for speaking, which is consistent with the idea that co-ethnic networks might reduce opportunities to speak German. The negative effects of network size on language proficiency are attenuated for people who have a better initial knowledge of German and are more severe for individuals that have lower pre-migration proficiency.
- **Effects are stronger for immigrants with lower levels of education.** For lower-educated immigrants, a one SD increase in the network size increases the probability of finding a job through personal contacts by 10 percentage points. For immigrants with tertiary education, the size of the initial network does not seem to affect economic outcomes. The relationship between network size and human capital investment is also stronger (more negative) for individuals with low and medium levels of education.
- **For refugees and ethnic Germans subject to dispersal policies, effects on employment and human capital investments are similar and sometimes a bit larger.** For a one SD increase in the network size, the probability of being employed increases by around 13 percentage points in the first three years of migration. The effect remains positive and significant in the medium term (4–6 years after migration), slightly decreasing to 11 percentage points. There is weak evidence that part of the positive effect may be persistent in the long run for this sample, equal to around six percentage points of employment. This group also exhibit a larger decline in human capital investment in the first three years, corresponding to a 4.3 percentage points reduction in the probability of investing in human capital. After six years this difference has disappeared.

The results show that immigrants initially located in districts with larger co-ethnic networks are more likely to be employed soon after arrival. However, they are also less likely to invest in human capital, especially in the form of schooling and college education. Consequently, the employment advantage fades after four years, as migrants located in places with smaller co-ethnic networks catch up due to greater human capital investments. **These effects appear stronger for lower-skilled immigrants, as well as for refugees and ethnic Germans.** This appears to suggest that refugees experience a particularly strong network effect both increasing their employment and decreasing their schooling/training in the three years after arrival. The authors conclude that **the benefits of a dense co-ethnic network are short lived, in terms of employment, and an unintended consequence of**

encouraging settlement in co-ethnic enclaves may be that new immigrants have fewer incentives to obtain more education and training in the long run.

## Social integration of Syrian refugees and their intention to stay in Germany

Cyrine Hannafi and Mohamed Ali Marouani

*Journal of Population Economics*, Volume 36 (2023), Pages 581–607

<https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-022-00913-1>

This paper **analyzes the determinants of social and economic integration of Syrian refugees and the impact of social and integration on refugees' decision to remain in Germany**. Germany hosted almost 600,000 Syrian refugees between 2014 and 2016. Social integration occurs when: (a) a migrant has values and norms from their country of origin; and (b) through exchanges and interactions with the host community. Assimilation occurs when the migrant abandons values and norms from their country of origin. Separation occurs when interactions are limited to the migrant's own community.

The analysis draws on the 2016 IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey which collected information about refugees' living conditions, educational status, vocational training, current occupational situations, language skills, family situations, biographies before displacement, social participation, link to their country of origin, and participation in integration programs. The authors focus on a subsample of 2,179 Syrian refugees in the working age population who have received an asylum status.

Social integration is proxied by an index composed of three variables, mixing subjective and objective measures of social integration: (1) the level of feeling like an outsider; (2) the number of German acquaintances; and (3) the possibility of using the internet, watching TV, or reading newspapers or books in German.

Main findings:

- **Economic integration has an impact on social integration for low- and medium-educated refugees only.** Overall, the impact of economic integration on social integration is not significant. However, there are positive impacts of economic integration on social integration for low-educated and medium-educated refugees.

- **Educational attainment, having a child in Germany, number of acquaintances from other countries, language proficiency, and residence in refugee accommodation have a positive impact on social integration, while negative reciprocity and age have a negative effect.** Refugees who have completed secondary education are more socially integrated than those who have completed only primary education, and refugees who have been educated abroad are also more likely to be socially integrated. Having a child in Germany increases social integration. The number of acquaintances from other countries increases social integration. Both English and German speaking proficiency have positive impacts on social integration. Additionally, residence in refugee accommodation has a positive effect on social integration. However, negative reciprocity (based on an index constructed using answers that respond to the degree of agreement about the statements such as: “If someone insults me, I will insult him.”) and age have negative effects on social integration.
- **Being male, number of acquaintances from other countries, work experience and German proficiency have a positive effect on the chance of finding work, while being female, time since arrival, having at least one child in Germany, and ethnic enclaves have a negative effect.** Males have a higher chance of working compared to females. The number of acquaintances from other countries has a positive impact on the probability of finding a job. Work experience matters for the probability of finding a job. German speaking proficiency is also beneficial for finding a job. However, the probability of finding a job decreases with time since arrival. People from Syria who have at least one child in Germany are less likely to work. Ethnic enclaves (measured by the number of Syrian acquaintances) decrease the probability of working. Educational attainment does not seem to significantly affect economic integration.
- **Social integration affects the intention to stay in Germany, whereas economic integration does not.** The employment status of refugees has an indirect impact on the intention to stay, through social integration, and for low- and medium-educated refugees only.
- **Being single, higher levels of education, English proficiency, the number of daughters in Germany, and the number of acquaintances from other countries have a negative effect on the intention to stay.** Being single decreases the intention to stay permanently in Germany. Higher educational attainment reduces intention to stay. Proficiency in English decreases the intention to stay in Germany. The number of daughters in Germany decreases the intention to stay, but there is no significant effect of the number of sons. The number of acquaintances from other countries decreases the

intention to stay. Refugees who came in 2016 have a stronger intention to stay compared to those who came in 2015.

The authors conclude that, overall, economic integration may not be critical for the successful integration of refugees. This may reflect refugees' different motives for migration and/or their traumatic experiences, which may make them more sensitive to the social integration dimension. However, **for low- and medium-educated refugees, employment facilitates social integration and consequently has an indirect impact on the incentives to stay**. For refugees with higher levels of education, economic integration does not have an impact on decisions to stay, and therefore more focus needs to be placed on social integration if the objective is to keep this category of refugees in the host country.