# Table of Contents

Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2023 ................................................................. 2  
Why do states give refugees the right to work? ................................................................. 4  
Understanding the Dynamics of Refugee Impact on Employment: Evidence from Northern Uganda .......................................................................................................................... 5  
Labour market and redistributive consequences of the Syrian refugees in Turkey ....... 7  
Refugees and the education of host populations: Evidence from the Syrian inflow to Jordan ........................................................................................................................................... 8  
Cash transfers amid shocks: A large, one-time, unconditional cash transfer to refugees in Uganda has multidimensional benefits after 19 months ........................................... 9  
Refugee settlements are highly exposed to extreme weather conditions ............... 11  
Assessment of the environmental impacts of conflict-driven Internally Displaced Persons: A sentinel-2 satellite based analysis of land use/cover changes in the Kas locality, Darfur, Sudan ........................................................................................................... 12  
Role of personal network attributes in adoption of clean stoves among Congolese refugees in Rwanda .......................................................................................................................... 13  
Prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder and associated factors among displaced people in Africa: a systematic review and meta-analysis ............................................. 14
Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2023

UNHCR (2024)

The 2024 Global Trends report presents the most recent official statistics on refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), stateless people, and returned refugees for the year 2023. The data included in the report is sourced from governments, non-governmental organizations, and UNHCR.

Main messages:

- **By the end of 2023, the global number of forcibly displaced people reached 117.3 million**, 8 percent higher than the previous year. This includes 43.4 million refugees, 6.9 million asylum-seekers, and 68.3 million IDPs. The global figure corresponds to more than 1 in every 69 people in the world. Based on operational data, it is estimated that by the end of April 2024, the global number of forcibly displaced people likely surpassed 120 million.

- **In 2023, a total of 27.2 million people were forced to flee**, with one in four seeking refuge in another country. Conflict in Sudan led to the displacement of more than 7.2 million people, including 6 million IDPs and 1.2 million refugees. Escalating violence in Myanmar led to the displacement of 1.3 million people, while UNRWA estimates that up to 1.7 million people were displaced by conflict in the Gaza Strip. Additionally, 3.8 million people were internally displaced in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with 1.8 million IDPs estimated to have returned during the same period.

- **Children account for 40 percent of all forcibly displaced people** but make up 30 percent of the world’s population.

- **At the end of 2023, approximately 75 percent of forcibly displaced people were living in countries with high-to-extreme exposure to climate-related hazards.** Nearly half were living in countries where they also remained exposed to conflict.

- **The global refugee population increased by 7 percent to reach 43.4 million at the end of 2023.** This increase reflects new displacement, primarily from Sudan, as well as revised population figures in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, and Germany. The global figure includes 31.6 million refugees and people in a refugee-like situations, 5.8 million other people in need of international protection under UNHCR’s mandate (predominantly from Venezuela), and 6 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA’s mandate.

- **73 percent of refugees under UNHCR’s mandate originate from just five countries.** The largest numbers of refugees were from Afghanistan (6.4 million), Syria (6.4 million), Venezuela (6.1 million), Ukraine (6.0 million), and Sudan (1.5 million).

- **Most refugees are in low- and middle-income countries, mainly in countries neighboring their own.** Low- and middle-income countries hosted 75 percent of the world’s refugees and other people in need of international protection, while the Least Developed Countries provided asylum to 21 percent of the total. 69 percent of refugees and other people in need of international protection were hosted in neighboring countries at the end of 2023.
• **The burden of hosting refugees is not equally distributed across countries.** Globally, the Islamic Republic of Iran (3.8 million), Türkiye (3.3 million), Colombia (2.9 million), Germany (2.6 million) and Pakistan (2 million) hosted the largest refugee populations, including other people in need of international protection. Relative to their national populations, the island of Aruba and Lebanon hosted the largest number of refugees and other people in need of international protection, followed by Montenegro, Curaçao and Jordan.

• **66 percent of refugees were in protracted situations.** At the end of 2023, an estimated 24.9 million refugees and other people in need of international protection were in 58 protracted situations, in 37 host countries.

• **The global number of IDPs increased by 10 percent to 68.3 million people at the end of 2023,** accounting for 58 percent of all forcibly displaced people. The largest numbers of IDPs were in Sudan (9.1 million), Syria (7.2 million), Colombia (6.9 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (6.7 million), and Yemen (4.5 million). Additionally, there were 7.7 million IDPs who remained displaced due to disasters at the end of 2023.

• **There were 6.9 million asylum-seekers with pending claims at the end of 2023.** The total number of new individual asylum applications registered was 3.6 million, a 40 percent increase on the previous year, with over half received in just five countries: the United States, Germany, Egypt, Spain, and Canada. Most of these applications were made by nationals of Venezuela, Colombia, Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan.

• **By the end of 2023, there were 4.4 million stateless people reported by UNHCR.** About 1.3 million stateless people worldwide are also displaced, mostly Rohingya IDPs and refugees. 32,200 stateless people had their nationality confirmed or acquired citizenship during the year. Stateless people, including those displaced, are not included in the global number of forcibly displaced people.

• **Nearly 1.1 million refugees returned to their countries of origin in 2023.** Four out of five of those returning were Ukrainian or South Sudanese. There were 158,700 refugees resettled to third countries in 2023, 35 percent more than in 2022. A further 30,800 refugees acquired the citizenship of their host country during the year.

• **5.1 million IDPs returned to their place of origin in 2023.** Nearly 62 percent of all IDP returns were in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1.8 million) and Ukraine (1.3 million).
This article investigates why some low- and middle-income countries give refugees the right to work, while others do not. The authors disaggregate the right to work for refugees into the *de jure* right (rights in law) and the *de facto* right (rights in practice). They argue that the central government determines the *de jure* right to work, while local governments determine the *de facto* right to work.

The mixed-methods research includes an empirical analysis of the correlates of *de jure* and *de facto* refugee rights to work, based on an original dataset covering more than 100 countries hosting more than 1,000 refugees in 2017, including 73 low- and middle-income countries. They consider several explanatory variables including: (1) adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol; (2) GDP per capita; (3) a stable employment rate; (4) the size of the refugee population; (5) amount of official development assistance (ODA) per capita; (6) ethnicity of the refugee population; (7) a decentralization index; and (8) ethnic fractionalization within countries.

The authors also conducted a comparative study of three refugee-hosting countries in East Africa—Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda—that exhibit variation in *de jure* and *de facto* rights to work. Uganda has the *de jure* and *de facto* right to work, Ethiopia has the *de jure* right to work but not the *de facto* right to work, while Kenya has the *de facto* right to work in part of the country but not the *de jure* right to work.

Main findings:

- The comparative analysis suggests that pay-offs from the international level matter. When financial incentives are provided by the international community to the central government, there is a commitment to the *de jure* right to work. When financial incentives accrue directly (or via the central government) at the local level, then the *de facto* right to work can be found.

- The most important variable predicting *de jure* right to work is whether a country has adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol. Countries that have adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol are 43 percentage points more likely to have legislation that includes an explicit right to work for refugees under similar conditions to nationals. Countries with British legal origins are 32 percentage points less likely to offer a *de jure* right to work to refugees. Overall, about half of the explained variation in refugee rights to work is explained by norm-based factors. There is weak evidence that ODA is associated with *de jure* rights to work, but the importance of this factor is low. Decentralization is positively associated with refugee *de jure* right to work, explaining 8 percent of the variation in the outcome.

- Decentralization is the most important factor explaining refugees' *de facto* right to work. Decentralization explains 10.5 percent of the variation in the dependent variable.
Having adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol is also an important predictor of refugee de facto right to work; countries that have adopted the international obligations are 69 percentage points more likely to allow refugees to work in practice.

- **Adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol and decentralization also explain refugees’ right to freedom of movement.** Countries that have adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol are about 35 percentage points more likely to grant de jure and de facto freedom to choose place of residency for refugees. Decentralized countries are more likely to let refugees chose their place of residency, especially in practice. Countries with British legal origins are less likely to grant freedom of residency rights to refugees in their law, but legal origins do not seem to matter in practice.

Overall, countries that have adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol are much more likely to grant rights to refugees, both in law and in practice. This result highlights the power of international commitments and the need to pursue international efforts to support the institutionalization of international norms. Additionally, decentralization is an important predictor of refugee rights, especially de facto rights. The authors conclude that in many refugee-hosting countries, the de jure right to work is predominantly shaped at the national and international levels, while the de facto right to work relies more upon political buy-in at the local level.

**Understanding the Dynamics of Refugee Impact on Employment: Evidence from Northern Uganda**

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*International Migration Review* (2024)

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This paper explores the impact of refugees on local employment opportunities in Northern Uganda. Uganda hosts more than 1.5 million refugees, with around 1 million from South Sudan.

Research was conducted in 2019 in the Adjumani district, in the West Nile region of Northern Uganda. Information was collected from semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with host community members, government officials, and refugee agencies. A total of 50 interviews and 4 focus group discussions with 5-8 participants each were conducted with host community members.

Main findings:

- **The arrival of refugees led to new employment and self-employment opportunities.** The presence of refugees attracted local and international relief organizations and government refugee programs, creating job opportunities that employed a significant number of hosts, usually skilled workers from urban areas. Additionally, population growth due to the arrival of refugees led to more employment and self-employment in the
construction and hospitality sectors. Many host community members also worked as agriculture laborers for refugee households.

- There were concerns among the host community that the cost of living was increasing, which they associated with the inflow of refugees.

- **Participants perceived a general increase in wages for skilled and unskilled jobs.** However, construction workers reported high competition for jobs, reduced wages, and long working hours due to refugees. The uniqueness of the construction sector was attributed to the large number of semi-skilled host youths seeking work in the sector.

- **Despite having the right to work and operate businesses in Uganda, refugees in rural areas, especially the Dinka who are pastoralists, did not seek employment in agriculture.** They were more likely to engage in livestock rearing than compete for limited jobs in the farming sector. Only a small group of refugees, mainly the Kuku and Madi tribes who were farmers South Sudan, sought employment in the agricultural sector. Refugees with urban backgrounds preferred to live in urban areas, where they compete with hosts for employment or self-employment opportunities within the settlement and nearby towns.

- **Policies that were perceived to favor refugees caused discontent among hosts who believed they deserved equal opportunities.** For example, under the REHOPE program, development agencies earmark 70 percent of their assistance and jobs for refugees and 30 percent for hosts. Discontent was greater when refugees perceived hosts as being wealthier. Additionally, many hosts felt left out in favor of refugees and, to some extent, Ugandans from other places.

The presence of refugees can generate new job opportunities, especially in the humanitarian sector, for skilled host community members. Refugees’ presence mainly increased competition with unskilled locals in sectors that align with refugees’ livelihood backgrounds. The competition for jobs varies across sectors, with sectors more closely related to refugees’ previous livelihoods experiencing the highest competition. Refugees are more likely to seek employment in sectors they were involved in while in their country of origin. The authors conclude that, **understanding the dynamics of refugee impact on employment requires considering refugees’ diverse backgrounds and the local policies that shape their participation in the labor market.**
Labour market and redistributive consequences of the Syrian refugees in Turkey

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This paper *examines the impact of Syrian refugees on the labor market outcomes of Turkish nationals and how these effects are distributed across workers and regions.* Prior to 2016, Syrian refugees did not have work permits and predominantly worked in the informal labor market, particularly in low-wage, labor-intensive sectors such as construction and agriculture. Even after work permits became available, they were limited in practice.

The authors of the study developed a model to analyze the redistributive effects of the arrival of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The model considers the self-selection of individuals of different skill levels into their preferred regions based on their comparative advantage and mobility costs. It also considers the decision of firms with different productivity levels to register their business and hire formal or informal workers.

Data for the analysis is drawn from: (1) the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC), which includes data on workers’ educational attainment, employment status, and the distribution of employment across firms of different sizes; (2) the Address Based Population Registration System (ABPRS), which provides statistics on internal migration at the regional level; and (3) the total number of refugees across regions in Turkey collected by the Directorate General of Migration Management.

Main findings:

- **The influx of Syrian refugees led to an increase in informality in the regions most affected by the refugee shock**, such as Southeast Anatolia and Mediterranean, as well as in other regions due to the migration of native workers in response to refugee arrivals. Istanbul, despite receiving a substantial number of refugees, did not experience an increase in informality.

- **Wages of low-skill workers declined substantially in the most affected regions.** Low skilled workers in Southeast Anatolia were strongly affected, with a wage loss of around 16 percent. Low-skill wages fell in almost all other regions, but the magnitudes were smaller, leading to an average negative effect of around 4 percent.

- **The share of informal firms increased in almost all regions, particularly in Southeast Anatolia and Mediterranean, but not in Istanbul.** Informal firms disproportionately benefited from the refugee labor supply shock, leading to higher entry into the informal sector, as well as an expansion of low-productivity formal firms that hire informal workers. This led to a reduction in aggregate productivity of 1 percent in the country overall.

- **Profits and tax revenues per worker increased in the most affected regions**, as the decline in low-skill wages translated into higher profits per capita. Since part of the
increase in economic activity occurred in the formal sector, tax revenues per capita also increased modestly.

- **Redistributing tax revenues in per capita terms can substantially reduce low-skill workers’ losses in most affected regions**, although the extent of this reduction varies across regions. Redistributing profits in per capita terms can completely restore both low- and high-skill workers’ losses, leading to an increase in per capita income for both types of workers relative to the baseline before the refugee crisis.

The arrival of Syrian refugees in Turkey had significant redistributive impacts on the labor market. Regions with the largest influx of refugees experienced a substantial increase in informal employment and a decrease in wages among low-skill workers. However, the most affected regions also saw an increase in tax revenues and profits per worker among native workers. The authors conclude that **policies that redistribute the economic benefits from the arrival of refugees could alleviate the negative consequences for those workers directly affected by this shock**, with positive effects on social cohesion.

**Refugees and the education of host populations: Evidence from the Syrian inflow to Jordan**

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This paper *examines the effect of Syrian refugees on the educational outcomes of Jordanian students*. The focus is on the period after the mass arrival of Syrian refugees in Jordan, which began in early 2013. The government of Jordan allowed most school-age Syrians to attend public schools, resulting in Syrian students comprising approximately 7 percent of the total population in Jordanian public schools.

The authors use a difference-in-differences approach that compares students who attended school with a high prevalence of Syrians to students from the same school who finished just before Syrians arrived. Data on educational outcomes of Jordanian students are obtained from the 2016 wave of the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey (JLMPS 2016), and data on Syrian students in public schools is drawn from the Education Management Information System (EMIS) administrative data for the 2016 school year. The authors also compare the evolution of school supply outcomes across schools or localities before and after the Syrian arrival, drawing on administrative data from EMIS from 2009 to 2019.

**Main findings:**

- **There is no evidence that Syrians affected the educational outcomes of Jordanians.** There is no impact of Syrian refugees on grade completion at various levels, final exam scores, grade repetition, and entry to secondary and tertiary education.

- **The government’s policy of establishing second shifts in existing public schools and opening new schools in camps mitigated potential overcrowding.**
Jordanian government responded to the Syrian inflow by enrolling Syrians in evening shifts, and to a lesser extent, by opening new schools in camps. This policy appears to have mitigated the exposure of Jordanian students to Syrians and left the student–teacher ratio and the classroom density among Jordanian students largely unaffected.

The results demonstrate that the educational outcomes of Jordanian students in public schools were not significantly affected by exposure to the mass arrival of Syrian refugees. The Jordanian government was able to insulate Jordanian students from high levels of exposure to Syrians, mainly by adding evening shifts to public schools to accommodate Syrian students. The results suggest that peer effects were largely irrelevant due to the segregation of Syrian students in evening shifts. The authors conclude that the Jordanian response has effectively absorbed a large number of Syrians, but the quality of schooling for the displaced remains an open, critical question.

**Cash transfers amid shocks: A large, one-time, unconditional cash transfer to refugees in Uganda has multidimensional benefits after 19 months**

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Prankur Gupta, Daniel Stein, Kyla Longman, Heather Lanthorn, Rico Bergmann, Emmanuel Nshakira-Rukundo, Noel Rutto, Christine Kahura, Winfred Kananu, Gabrielle Posner, K.J. Zhao, and Penny Davis

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The article examines the effects of a substantial, one-off, unconditional cash transfer to refugee families in Uganda. Uganda hosts over 1.5 million refugees and asylum seekers.

The authors examine the effects of a US$1,000 cash transfer by the international NGO GiveDirectly to refugees in Kiryandongo settlement in Uganda distributed over two years until all households were reached. The authors compared early recipients (treatment group) with those awaiting the transfer (control group) at the study’s conclusion. The analysis draws on data collected from a sample of 1,090 households. The authors complemented quantitative findings with a longitudinal panel of semi-structured qualitative interviews.

Main findings:

- **The transfer boosted household consumption.** Households that received the transfer experienced an 11 percent increase in household monthly consumption, equivalent to and additional US$92 per month. This rise was primarily due to households opting for more expensive but preferred items like animal products and vegetables, which are not included in the WFP food rations.

- **The cash transfer increased asset values and improved housing conditions.** Recipients' asset holdings increased by an average of US$3,937, compared to the control mean of US$6,495, primarily driven by an increase in the value of house and land
holdings. The funds were often invested in constructing new homes or upgrading existing ones, leading to better housing quality, as evidenced by an increase in the number of rooms and improvements in the construction of walls, floors, and roofs.

- **The transfer boosted business ownership and revenue.** Recipients were 8.2 percentage points more likely to own a business, a 37 percent increase from the control mean. Additionally, recipients generated US$41 more per month in business revenue compared to the control mean of US$63, mainly from small shops in the treatment group. Qualitative research suggests that business formation might have been higher without COVID-19 disruptions, as many households had plans to start businesses thwarted by lockdowns. The ability to invest the transfer effectively varied; some managed to establish successful businesses and create lasting income streams, while others remained dependent on humanitarian aid post-transfer.

- **The transfer increased self-reliance.** Transfer recipients experienced a 0.16 standard deviation increase in a self-reliance index, primarily due to decreased household debt.

- **The transfer significantly increased psychological well-being.** The cash transfer improved psychological wellbeing, with recipients showing a 0.28 standard deviation improvement in a wellbeing index, with consistent gains across mental health metrics such as depression, stress, happiness, and life satisfaction.

- There were positive but insignificant effects on agricultural production and revenue, food security, household dependency ratio, migration, employment, and female empowerment.

The authors conclude that large one-off cash transfers for refugees in situations of protracted displacement enabled them to make meaningful progress towards self-reliance through investments and asset accumulation. However, the magnitude and mixed nature of the results suggest that transfers alone are insufficient to deliver lasting self-reliance to those in protracted displacement, especially in the context of multiple shocks.
Refugee settlements are highly exposed to extreme weather conditions

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https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2206189120

This article examines the exposure of refugee settlements to extreme weather conditions. Refugee settlements are often located in isolated and remote areas, with unfavorable land quality and harsh climates.

The analysis compares camp locations to national trends for slow- and rapid-onset events, incorporating descriptive statistics, signal-to-noise analyses, and trend analyses. Drawing on climate and weather data, as well as UNHCR data on the geographic locations of refugee settlements, the authors examine the exposure of the 20 largest refugee camps worldwide to extreme weather conditions from the 1980s to 2020. These 20 largest formal camps represent over 4.5 million of the estimated 6.6 million refugees living in camps in 2021.

Main findings:

- **Most refugee settlements are highly exposed to slow-onset events such as extreme temperatures and low rainfall.** Refugee settlements in several countries, including Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda, experience higher than average temperatures. In Jordan and Pakistan, refugee settlements face lower temperatures compared to the national averages. Additionally, settlements in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda have lower levels of rainfall compared to the national averages.

- **Findings for rapid-onset events, such as heatwaves, coldwaves, and extreme rainfall, are less conclusive compared to country trends.** However, there is relatively high exposure to extreme rainfall in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. The lack of conclusive evidence on rapid-onset events reflects the nature of rapid-onset events, which tend to be localized and lead to within-country variability.

Refugee settlements are often situated in areas with unfavorable climate conditions, including extreme temperatures and precipitation. This exposes refugee populations to harsh weather, exacerbating their vulnerability and marginalization. To address this, climate adaptation and sustainable development policies should prioritize the inclusion of displaced populations, ensuring equitable and sustainable development in refugee-hosting countries.
Assessment of the environmental impacts of conflict-driven Internally Displaced Persons: A sentinel-2 satellite based analysis of land use/cover changes in the Kas locality, Darfur, Sudan

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https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0304034

This study examines the effects of settlements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) on vegetation cover in the Kas locality of Darfur, Sudan. The Kas locality is in the South Darfur state, around 86 kilometers northwest of the state capital, Nyala. The estimated population of IDPs in the Kas locality increased from between 35,000 to 40,000 in 2004 to more than 77,000 by 2020.

The study used high-resolution Sentinel-2 satellite images for the years 2016 and 2022 from the United States Geological Survey (USGS). Rainfall and temperature data were sourced from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The images were classified into five Land Use and Land Cover (LULC) classes: vegetation cover, bareland, built-up, agricultural land, and sand. The authors examined land-use changes within 10 km of IDP settlements and between 10 km and 15 km of the settlements.

Main findings:

- In 2016, agricultural land covered more than half (56 percent) of the study area, while bareland accounted for 35 percent. Vegetation cover and built-up areas had the least coverage, at 3 percent and 1 percent respectively. In 2022, the dominant land cover type was agricultural land, accounting for 65 percent of the study area. Bareland accounted for 28 percent, while built-up areas had the least coverage at 1 percent.

- **Between 2016 and 2022, there was a decrease in the area under vegetation cover, bareland, and sand, while agricultural land and built-up areas increased.** The mean annual decline in vegetation cover was estimated at 6 percent, resulting in a loss of 1.7 km² of vegetation cover per year. Agricultural land gained 16.4 km² (3 percent) per year.

- **There was a substantial 43 percent decrease in vegetation cover and a 43 percent decline in bareland within 10 km of the settlements from 2016 to 2022.** In the 10-15 km zone, there was a 35 percent decrease in vegetation cover and an 18 percent decline in bareland during the same period. Additionally, built-up areas increased by 103% in the 10-15 km band around the settlement, indicating rapid urbanization or infrastructure development. Agricultural land increased by 17 percent within 0-10 km and 18 percent within 10-15 km around the settlements. Sand coverage decreased by 38 percent within 0-10 km and 51 percent within 10-15 km around the settlements.

The authors conclude that the loss of vegetation cover in the Kas locality of Darfur is primarily caused by the presence of IDP settlements. The increase in IDPs has led to an expansion of agricultural activities to meet their food demands, resulting in the conversion of vegetated areas to agricultural land. While climatic variations also play a role in the changes
in land use and land cover, their impact is minor compared to the direct impacts of IDPs on the environment.

**Role of personal network attributes in adoption of clean stoves among Congolese refugees in Rwanda**

Praveen Kumar, Naira Kalra, and Anita Shankar

*World Development*, Volume 177 (2024), Article 106539

[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106539](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106539)

This article examines the effect of personal network attributes on the adoption of clean cookstove technology by Congolese women living in a Rwandan refugee camp. This study was conducted in the Kigeme refugee camp located in the Nyamagabe district of the southern province, about 150 km from Kigali. The camp is home to nearly 19,000 Congolese refugees.

The research was conducted as part of a randomized controlled trial (RCT) where women were offered the opportunity to receive a free clean tier 4+ cookstove along with a subscription for pellets that could be paid for by a cash for fuel program. Initially, between 2016 and 2018, the clean cookstoves were offered on a first-come first serve basis to “early adopters” who paid out of pocket. Subsequently, from 2018, clean cookstoves were financially subsidized and offered to households based on random allocation.

Network size, number of peers living inside the camp (camp homogeneity) and number of peers having already adopted a clean cookstove (clean cookstove homogeneity) were examined at baseline and at six-months follow-up. The baseline social network data were collected in September 2018 from women aged 18–45 and included socio-demographic data and information on adoption of clean cooking technology. The endline survey was conducted in March/April 2019. Out of 935 households that participated in both the baseline and endline surveys, 503 households were in the intervention group, and 432 households were in the waitlisted control group.

**Main findings:**

- Early adopters of clean cookstoves in the refugee camp were more likely to have peers who also had a clean cookstove (clean cookstove homogeneity) and were less likely to have peers living inside the camp (camp homogeneity). Additionally, early adopters were more likely to have higher levels of education.

- **Clean cookstove homogeneity was significantly associated with clean cookstove adoption.** Respondents who adopted tier 4+ stoves reported a higher increase in peers having tier 4+ stoves from baseline to follow-up compared to those who did not adopt tier 4+ stoves. A unit positive increase in the number of peers having tier 4+ stoves from baseline to follow-up was associated with 1.2 times increase in the odds of adopting tier 4+ stoves at follow-up, even after adjusting for demographic predictors and randomization status. There was no significant difference for network size and camp homogeneity across the two outcome groups of stove adoption.
There was a significant difference in the employment status of the respondents at follow-up between the two outcome groups. However, other demographic predictors such as age, education, employment status of the partner, and employment status of the respondents at the baseline did not show a significant difference.

The authors conclude that personal network attributes played a significant role in clean cookstove adoption in a humanitarian setting. They suggest that power of social networks is an untapped influence on technology adoption and should be more effectively integrated in future research and programs.

**Prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder and associated factors among displaced people in Africa: a systematic review and meta-analysis**

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*Frontiers in Psychiatry*, Volume 15 (2024)
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This systematic review summarizes the most recent data and evidence on the prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder and the effect of associated factors on adult displaced people in Africa. Posttraumatic stress disorder is marked by increased stress and anxiety following exposure to a traumatic or stressful event.

Publications were identified from PubMed/Medline, EMBASE, the Cochrane Library, Scopus databases, and other grey searches of Google Scholar and World Health Organization (WHO) reports. Articles published online in English from January 2000 to April 2023 were considered. The quality of research was assessed using the Joanna Briggs Institute (JBI) for cross-sectional study quality assessment. Ten studies of satisfactory quality met the inclusion criteria, covering a total of 5,287 study participants. Among the 10 studies, three were from Ethiopia, two from Nigeria, two from Uganda, and one each from Kenya, Somalia, and Zambia.

Main results:

- **The pooled prevalence of PTSD among displaced people in Africa was 56 percent.**
- A higher pooled prevalence of PTSD was found among studies conducted in Uganda (60 percent) and Nigeria (60 percent), compared to Ethiopia (48 percent).
- The pooled prevalence of PTSD among internally displaced people and refugees was 56 percent and 54 percent, respectively.
Demographic characteristics such as being female, single, and unemployed, as well as depression, were identified as risk factors for PTSD among displaced people.

The systematic review and meta-analysis revealed a high prevalence of PTSD among displaced people in Africa. The study also identified demographic characteristics such as being female, single, and unemployed, as well as depression, as risk factors for PTSD among displaced individuals.