Stanford ETH zürich

ipl immigration policy lab

Working Paper Series

Working Paper No. 25-01 • April 2025

Support for Refugee Integration in a Major Refugee-Hosting Country: Evidence from Kenya

Mae MacDonald and Adam Lichtenheld

Support for Refugee Integration in a Major Refugee-Hosting Country: Evidence from Kenya

Mae MacDonald* Adam Lichtenheld†

April 16, 2025

Abstract

What drives public support or opposition to refugee integration in low- and middle-income countries? States have increasingly adopted policies promoting the integration of refugees into local communities and labor markets, even as they simultaneously tighten entry restrictions for asylum-seekers. We examine public attitudes towards an incoming refugee integration policy in Kenya, leveraging a unique window after the policy has been passed but before implementation. Using a nationally representative survey and two embedded experiments, we examine whether support varies by policy dimension and refugee nationality. We find widespread support for refugee integration—including work rights, free movement, and shared services—driven largely by humanitarian concerns and perceived economic benefits such as increased business activity and tax revenues. Citizens who share ethnic kinship with refugees or have close personal contact are especially supportive. Concerns center on economic competition and insecurity, and opposition is strongest toward Somali refugees, often associated with Islamic extremism.

*Department of Political Science and Immigration Policy Lab, Stanford University. Email: maemac@stanford.edu

†Immigration Policy Lab, Stanford University. E-mail: alich@stanford.edu.

*We are grateful to Jeremy Weinstein, Jens Hainmueller, Sigrid Weber, Hans Leuders, Paige Hill, and Jocelyn Perry for thoughtful feedback, as well as participants in multiple Immigration Policy Lab workshops, the UNHCR–World Bank Joint Data Center 3rd Research Conference on Forced Displacement, and our 2024 International Studies Association (ISA) panel. For valuable conversations in the early stages of this research, we thank Allan Mukuki and Marie Iradukunda (Strathmore Law School), Philip Ogonda (Refugee Consortium of Kenya), and colleagues at the Refugee-Led Research Hub, along with the many individuals who generously shared their perspectives during exploratory fieldwork. We thank Michael Mwarange, Maggie Ireri, Riccardo Ochieng, Mary Achieng, and the team at TIFA Research for outstanding work implementing the survey. This project was supported by funding from the Stanford King Center on Global Development and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

1 Introduction

Since the 1990s, governments around the world have increasingly adopted policies that allow individuals who have obtained refugee status to integrate into the communities and labor markets of their asylum countries (De Haas, Natter and Vezzoli, 2018; Blair, Grossman and Weinstein, 2022). Longstanding refugee-hosting countries such as Colombia, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, and Uganda have recently implemented measures that grant refugees greater rights to work, move freely, and access public services. This trend stands in stark contrast to policies on refugee admission, where many states have tightened their borders and restricted entry for asylum seekers (Appleby, 2024; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan, 2017; Hirsch, 2024).

Refugee integration has the potential to generate large welfare gains in low- and middle-income countries, which host three-quarters of the world's refugees. In these contexts, most refugees are in "protracted situations" where they have been living temporarily in an asylum country for at least five years (UNHCR, 2024*b*). Many reside in refugee camps and/or lack the right to work and move in the host country (UNHCR, 2024*b*). Integration policies fundamentally alter these conditions, enabling refugees to build more permanent, self-sufficient livelihoods.

We lack knowledge about whether the public supports or opposes integration, and if it is likely to backlash against specific integration dimensions—work, movement, or shared services—or the integration of unpopular refugee groups. Although a substantial body of research has explored public attitudes toward refugees, it has primarily focused on high-income countries and the admission of new asylum seekers (Alrababa'h et al., 2021; Weber et al., 2024).* Support for refugee integration may differ substantially from support for admission policies that allow refugees to enter but significantly restrict their rights to work and move (Margalit and Solodoch, 2022). Unpacking public support for refugee integration is also critical for understanding the conditions under which different integration policies are politically feasible.

To help fill this gap, this paper examines public attitudes toward an incoming integration policy in Kenya, a recent example of this trend. We present a theoretical framework regarding drivers of attitudes towards integration, based on variation on the integration policy dimension, the nationality of the refugee group, and the characteristics of the respondent—including ethnic kinship, close contact, economic concerns, and experience of forced displacement. We field a phone survey with 3,326 citizens, including a nationally representative sample of 2,432 respondents and an oversample of 894 individuals living in the sub-counties surrounding the country's two refugee camps. Our design includes two survey experiments that vary the dimension of integration and the nationality of the refugee group, along with open-ended qualitative questions. Importantly, we conducted the survey after Kenya's new refugee integration law was passed but before its implementation, offering a more realistic, behavioral measure of public opinion than a survey about a hypothetical policy shift.

We find strong support among the Kenyan population for refugee integration. Nearly three-

*This research broadly finds that citizens prefer to admit refugees who are vulnerable, culturally similar, and economically productive (Weber et al., 2024). Egocentric economic concerns have limited effects on attitudes (Weber et al., 2024; Verme and Schuettler, 2021). See Alrababa'h et al. (2021) and Allen, Ruiz and Silva (2022) for rare studies examining attitudes in low- and middle-income settings.

quarters of respondents support granting refugees work rights and access to public services, and three in five support freedom of movement. Support for integration is four times higher than support for the status quo encampment policy. The two major drivers of support are humanitarian concerns for refugees, and the perception that integration will generate economic benefits such as new businesses, jobs, increased tax revenue, and greater demand for goods and services.

Support for refugee integration is highest among citizens with direct social or ethnic ties to refugees, including Somali Kenyans and those with refugees as close personal contacts. Notably, individuals living near refugee camps—who are most likely to be affected by integration—also express greater support, likely due to frequent interaction and shared ethnic backgrounds. The two major concerns expressed about integration relate to economic competition and security, including fears of job loss and potential conflict over scarce resources. Support for Somali refugees specifically is markedly lower than for other refugee groups, largely due to perceived associations with Islamic extremism.

This paper makes three primary contributions. First, we provide evidence of widespread public support for refugee integration in a large refugee-hosting country prior to implementation of a new integration policy. This suggests that in Kenya, integration may have been enabled by favorable public opinion. We identify key points of potential opposition, particularly the extension of movement rights to unpopular groups and concerns about economic and security impacts. These findings are especially relevant as international donors increasingly promote integration and "self-reliance" as solutions to protracted displacement (Miliband, 2019). They also prompt new questions about what barriers—beyond public opinion—prevent the adoption of such policies, pointing toward elite-level attitudes and incentives.

Second, we offer the first nationally representative study of refugee attitudes in a major African host country. Our findings contribute to the small but growing literature that compares public opinion on refugees across low-, middle-, and high-income settings (Weber et al., 2024; Verme and Schuettler, 2021). Sub-Saharan Africa hosts over one in five of the world's refugees but remains understudied.* Unlike in high-income countries, we find that Kenyans are more likely to view refugee employment as economically beneficial, and that exposure to refugees is positively—rather than negatively—associated with support (Weber et al., 2024; Rudolph and Wagner, 2022; Getmansky, Sınmazdemir and Zeitzoff, 2018; though see Steinmayr, 2016). Humanitarian concerns, shared ethnic identity, and the recognition that displacement is a common experience in the region also play a role in determining attitudes, highlighting distinct drivers of support in low- and middle-income contexts compared to those in high-income countries.

Finally, we highlight the importance of perceived security threats in shaping public opinion on refugee policy. Although empirical research increasingly questions whether refugees actually increase the risk of conflict and violence (e.g., Zhou and Shaver, 2021), our findings show that perceived threats remain influential. Concerns about terrorism and social unrest—especially regarding Somali refugees—are key obstacles to support for refugee integration in Kenya.

*Figure calculated using UNHCR Population Statistics Database. Includes refugees, asylum seekers, and others in need of international protection.

The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by reviewing the rise of refugee integration policies in low- and middle-income countries and provide background on Kenya's integration policy. We then present our theoretical framework and hypotheses, describe our research design, and report both experimental and observational findings. We conclude by discussing the main takeaways of this paper and ideas for further research.

2 Local Integration as a Solution to Protracted Refugee Situations

UNHCR and other international actors have increasingly encouraged asylum countries in Africa and beyond to pursue the "local integration" of refugees into host communities (UNHCR, 2019; Hovil, 2014; Crisp, 2004; Oliver and Boyle, 2019). This shift comes in response to two intersecting trends: rising numbers of displaced people and declining humanitarian assistance. Over the past two decades, the global refugee population has nearly tripled, from 15.4 million in 2010 to 43.7 million in 2024 (UNHCR, 2024*b*). This increase is not only due to new displacements but also because many refugees in protracted situations have been unable to leave their asylum countries, as conflicts in their origin country persist and resettlement opportunities remain limited.[*] At the same time, resources to support long-term humanitarian responses have become increasingly constrained. In 2023, less than half of UNHCR's funding needs were met (UNHCR, 2024*a*), and this is likely to decline rapidly in 2025 due to U.S. and European aid cuts. These pressures are most acute in sub-Saharan Africa, which hosts more refugees in protracted situations, maintains more refugee camps, and receives more UNHCR aid than any other region (see Fig. A1).[*]

A central pillar of the international community's approach to addressing these challenges is the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), an international agreement affirmed in the UN General Assembly in 2018 following the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in 2016. The agreement places strong emphasis on self-reliance and durable solutions for refugees (Miliband, 2019).[*] Local integration policies aligned with the GCR and CRRF promote self-reliance by allowing refugees to move out of refugee camps, gain access to labor markets, receive public services such as healthcare and education, and obtain naturalization. In doing so, these policies aim to reduce long-term dependence on external aid. As shown in Fig. 1, low-income countries have made the most significant strides in refugee integration policies, expanding rights to employment, movement, and citizenship.

2.1 Refugee Integration in Kenya

Kenya has long been one of Africa's major refugee-hosting countries and currently hosts over 800,000 refugees (Thomas and Mara, 2024; Jaji, 2022; Teferra, 2022; Halakhe and Omondi,

[*]Between 2023 and 2024, 1.1 million refugees returned to their home countries and 159,000 were resettled elsewhere (UNHCR, 2024b).

[*]Ten of the 15 largestprotracted refugee situations are in sub-Saharan Africa, including South Sudan, Sudan, DRC, Somalia, CAR, Eritrea, Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, and Mali.

[*]Some scholars have criticized these initiatives for shifting the burden of refugee hosting onto low- and middle-income countries (Hovil and Maple, 2022).

Figure 1: Global Liberalization of Refugee Integration Policies



Note: Integration Score calculated using the mean of the employment strand ("Employment"), a 0-1 scaled version of the free movement measure ("Move"), and the citizenship and participation strand ("Participation") from the Dataset of World Refugee and Asylum Policies (Blair, Grossman and Weinstein, 2022). Uses World Bank historical classifications of each country using income levels for that year.

2024). The largest refugee populations are from Somalia and South Sudan, residing primarily in the Dadaab and Kakuma camps, respectively (UNHCR, 2024*c*). While Kenya initially welcomed refugees during the post-colonial period, its policies became more restrictive following the mass arrival of Somali refugees in the 1990s (Jaji, 2022; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond, 2005).

The 2006 Refugees Act curtailed refugees' rights to work and move freely, and restrictions tightened further after a series of terrorist attacks by the Islamic extremist group Al-Shabaab, based in Somalia. In 2014, the government mandated that all refugees reside in designated camps (Amnesty International, 2014). Although refugees are legally permitted to work, they must obtain work permits, which are very rarely issued (Ginn et al., 2022; Betts, Omata and Sterck, 2020; Venui and Iragi, 2023; World Bank and UNHCR, 2019). Refugees in camps cannot leave without a "movement pass," granted for limited purposes such as healthcare, education, or business (Campbell, Crisp and Kiragu, 2011; Betts, Omata and Sterck, 2018). Since 2018, urban refugee IDs have only been issued under exceptional circumstances, effectively preventing most refugees from relocating to cities like Nairobi.

In recent years, however, the Kenyan government has adopted a more open approach to refugee integration. Following the launch of the GCR, the World Bank pledged financial support for reforms expanding refugee rights in Kenya (Nasubo and Muon, 2024; Halakhe and Omondi, 2024; Miliband, 2019; Leghtas and Kitenge, 2022; Miller and Graham, 2021). In 2021, Parliament passed a new Refugee Act that includes three dimensions to improve the

ability of refugees to integrate (Nasubo and Muon, 2024).

First, the Act promotes economic inclusion by allowing refugees to start businesses, work in the formal sector, and access professional certification and financial services such as banking and mobile money. Second, it expands freedom of movement, permitting refugees to move within "designated areas" and granting East African Community (EAC) nationals—including Somalis and South Sudanese—the ability to obtain EAC citizenship and move and work freely. Third, the Act supports the shared use of services by refugees and host communities, including both donor-funded and government-provided services. Following from the Act, the "Shirika Plan" aims to transform refugee camps into "integrated settlements" where refugees and host citizens live and access services together.

The World Bank and other donors have committed nearly $200 million to support the Shirika Plan and have made a $1.2 billion loan contingent on the Act's full implementation and other reforms (Nyamori, 2024; Nasubo and Muon, 2024). The Act took effect in 2022, though implementation of the Shirika Plan did not begin until March 2025.* The passage of the Act received little attention and was largely unknown to the public at the time of our study.*

3 Public Attitudes Towards Local Integration: Theory and Hypotheses

What drives public support or opposition to refugee integration? We hypothesize that support depends on three main factors: (1) the specific dimension of the integration policy, (2) the nationality of the refugee group, and (3) the characteristics of the respondent and their relationship to refugees.

3.1 Integration Policy Dimension

Refugee integration can encompass a range of policy measures that may have different implications for both refugees and host citizens. While citizens may support hosting refugees in principle, they may still oppose certain policies that facilitate integration. For example, studies in Europe and Colombia find that people favor policies that offer refugees protection but also limit their access to public services (Jeannet, Heidland and Ruhs, 2021; Allen et al., 2024; Allen, Ruiz and Silva, 2022). The three key dimensions of Kenya's 2021 Refugee Act—work rights, movement rights, and shared services—have distinct consequences, which may shape public support.

Expanding work rights for refugees may intensify job competition with citizens, though previous research suggests this is only likely for low-skilled, low-wage, informal, and agriculture

*Regulations were released in 2024, and the government officially launched the Shirika Plan in March 2025. Although priorities within the Refugee Act and Shirika Plan have since shifted, we focus here on the policy's core elements as envisioned in 2023. Note that the Act also includes provisions that are more restrictive in areas unrelated to integration, and some—including refugee leaders—have criticized the top-down nature of its development (Nyamori, 2024; Opanda, 2025).

*In our survey, fewer than 2 percent of respondents were aware of the new law or able to accurately describe its provisions.

workers (Ceritoglu et al., 2017; Verme and Schuettler, 2021; Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; Lebow, 2022; Aksu, Erzan and Kırdar, 2022; Sakamoto, Ullah and Tani, 2024). However, economic inclusion can also stimulate local economies by creating new businesses, increasing trade with countries of origin, and boosting demand for goods and services (Groeger, León-Ciliotta and Stillman, 2024; Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; Maystadt and Duranton, 2019; Verme and Schuettler, 2021). In Kenya, for example, both Dadaab and Kakuma camps have thriving markets that have helped spur local economic development, and many Kenyans live near the camps to take advantage of the economic opportunities it provides (Sanghi, Onder and Vemuru, 2016; Alix-Garcia et al., 2018; Betts, Omata and Sterck, 2018; Nasubo and Muon, 2024; Teferra, 2022).

Regarding freedom of movement, previous research suggests that the presence of refugees can lead to higher prices for food and housing (Verme and Schuettler, 2021), the spread of disease (Dagnelie, Mayda and Maystadt, 2023), environmental degradation (Black, 2018; Jacobsen, 2001), and higher levels of crime, violence, and risk of terrorism (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Fisk, 2018, 2019; Jacobsen, 2001).[*] Research has found that opposition to refugees is driven by perceived threats to culture, and policies that allow refugees to move and settle in new areas may amplify these concerns (Alrababa'h et al., 2021; Adida, Lo and Platas, 2019; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016, 2023; Lazarev and Sharma, 2017; Getmansky, Sınmazdemir and Zeitzoff, 2018).

In contrast, the shared services dimension is more likely to produce direct benefits for host citizens. In low- and middle-income contexts, UNHCR and other organizations often fund services that both refugees and locals can access, potentially improving service quality and generating jobs (Zhou, Grossman and Ge, 2023; Alix-Garcia et al., 2018). In Kenya, the 2021 Refugee Act facilitates Kenyan access to donor-funded services, particularly in Turkana, one of the country's poorest regions, where host residents are often poorer than refugees (World Bank and UNHCR, 2021).[*]

Of the three policy dimensions, shared services is most likely to directly benefit Kenyans, while work and movement rights—although associated with potential positive consequences—may lead to negative outcomes for hosts. We therefore hypothesize that citizens will prefer the shared services dimension, either because of potential benefits to themselves or to their co-nationals.

H1: Citizens are more likely to support refugee integration policies that provide direct benefits to hosts (e.g., shared services) than dimensions that could pose a potential threat (e.g., work rights or freedom of movement).

3.2 Refugee Nationality

Existing research consistently finds that public support for refugees varies depending on the refugee group's characteristics (Adida, Lo and Platas, 2019; Bansak, Hainmueller and

[*]Though other research suggests that the security risks refugees pose are overstated (Zhou and Shaver, 2021; Masterson and Yasenov, 2019).

[*]However, the long-term goal of integration is to reduce reliance on donor support and incorporate refugees into national service systems.

Hangartner, 2016, 2023). Attitudes are shaped by three major considerations: economic concerns, cultural proximity, and humanitarian need (Weber et al., 2024). Refugee groups differ in how they are perceived along these lines, with some nationalities considered as having a more negative effect on the economy and culture of the asylum country, or as having a lesser humanitarian need.

In Kenya, we expect citizens to be less supportive of integrating Somali refugees compared to other refugee groups. Somalis are often viewed as linked to Al-Shabaab and terrorism, and face higher levels of discrimination and targeting by the police (Abdelaaty, 2021; Nasubo and Muon, 2024; Shahow, 2021; Simpson and Lapar, 2013; Jaji, 2013; Omata, 2021; Jaji, 2022; Freeman, 2019). Tensions between Kenya and Somalia, including concerns about pan-Somalism, may also contribute to lower levels of support (Murunga, 2009).[*]

H2: Citizens will be less likely to support integrating a refugee group that is perceived as having a negative impact on the country.

3.3 Respondent Characteristics

Drawing on prior research, we propose that four types of respondent characteristics shape attitudes toward refugee integration: (1) ethnic kinship with a refugee group, (2) contact with or exposure to refugees, (3) concern about the economy and individual economic vulnerability, and (4) experience with forced displacement.

3.3.1 Ethnic Kinship

Numerous studies find that cultural similarity, more than economic concerns, drives attitudes toward immigrants (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2012; Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; Adida, Laitin and Valfort, 2016; Holland, Peters and Zhou, 2024; Valentino et al., 2019). These findings hold with respect to refugees, with citizens being more willing to provide asylum to those who share their ethnicity, religion, political values, or culture (Alrababa'h et al., 2021; Adida, Lo and Platas, 2019; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016, 2023; Lazarev and Sharma, 2017; Getmansky, Sınmazdemir and Zeitzoff, 2018).

Unlike in high-income countries, ethnic kinship across borders is particularly common in sub-Saharan Africa (Young, 1976).[*] In cases where refugees travel across borders to countries where there are already existing ethnic kin, such kinship can lead to improved welfare outcomes for refugees (Blair, Grossman and Weinstein, 2022; Monsutti, 2005; Gale, 2006; Porter et al., 2008; Teferra, 2022; Fisk, 2019). In Kenya, the only refugee group this applies to is Somali refugees, who share ethnic kinship with 7% of citizens who are ethnically Somali.

[*]For example, the government has previously threatened to close Dadaab camp due to disputes over Jubaland and a maritime border ruling (Shahow, 2021).

[*]According to the Transborder Ethnic Kin dataset, 46 of the 160 politically relevant ethnic groups living in at least two countries globally are in Africa (Vogt et al., 2015).

This has fostered strong business and remittance networks, with high levels of social cohesion between ethnic kin (Campbell, 2006; Betts et al., 2023, 2024; Abdelaaty, 2021; Lindley, 2011).

We hypothesize that citizens who share ethnic kinship with refugees (Somali Kenyans) will be more willing to support refugee integration, particularly for their refugee kin. We hypothesize that they will also be more willing to support more controversial aspects of refugee integration policies, such as providing work rights or allowing free movement.

H3a: Citizens who are ethnic kin with a refugee group are more likely to support refugee integration, particularly for their refugee kin.

H3b: Citizens who are ethnic kin with a refugee group are more likely to support movement and work rights for refugees than citizens who are not ethnic kin with a refugee group.

3.3.2 Proximity and Contact

Some research suggests that proximity to refugees can provoke hostility. For example, brief exposure has been linked to increased support for anti-refugee parties in Europe (Hangartner et al., 2019; Rudolph and Wagner, 2022), and Turkish citizens exposed to Syrian refugees reported more negative attitudes (Getmansky, Sınmazdemir and Zeitzoff, 2018). In Africa, Zhou (2024) find that proximity correlates with restrictive attitudes toward citizenship, while Betts et al. (2023) find no negative effect. However, consistent with intergroup contact theory, several studies show that meaningful interaction with refugees can improve attitudes towards them (Allport, 1954; Ghosn, Braithwaite and Chu, 2019; Alrababa'h et al., 2021; Campo et al., 2023; Allen, Ruiz and Silva, 2022).

In Kenya, citizens living near refugee camps will be most directly affected by integration, though the effects could be either positive or negative, as discussed in Section 3.1. We hypothesize that citizens proximate to refugee camps with close refugee contacts will be more supportive of integration, while those exposed to potentially negative effects of integration without close contact with refugees will be less supportive.

H4a: Citizens who have close contact with refugees are more likely to support refugee integration policies.

H4b: Citizens who have direct exposure to refugees without close contact are less likely to support refugee integration policies.

3.3.3 Economic Concerns

In high-income countries, sociotropic economic concerns—concerns about the national economy—have a stronger influence on refugee attitudes than egocentric concerns about personal income or job loss (Weber et al., 2024; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). People are more welcoming to newcomers whose professional background and skills will contribute to the economy as a whole, and less welcoming to low-skilled workers, regardless of the respondent's own

economic characteristics (Adida, Lo and Platas, 2019; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016, 2023; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Valentino et al., 2019).

While egocentric concerns tend not to shape attitudes toward refugee hosting, the dynamics may shift with respect to integration. When refugees are hosted without the right to work, citizens may perceive them as less of a threat to their personal economic situation. Integration, however—especially policies that expand refugees' access to work—can heighten concerns about job competition. Empirical studies show that the presence of refugees can negatively affect employment outcomes for citizens working in low-wage, informal, or agricultural sectors (Ceritoglu et al., 2017; Verme and Schuettler, 2021; Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; Lebow, 2022; Aksu, Erzan and Kırdar, 2022; Sakamoto, Ullah and Tani, 2024). This may cause economically vulnerable workers in these sectors to oppose policies that grant work rights to refugees.

H5a: Citizens who are economically vulnerable are less likely to support refugee integration policies that expand work rights.

With respect to sociotropic economic concerns, we expect that concerns about economic losses will outweigh the potential economic benefits discussed in Section 3.1. We therefore hypothesize that those with broader concerns about the economy will be especially opposed to expanding refugee work rights, as this dimension is likely to have the greatest impact on the economy.

H5b: Citizens who express sociotropic concerns about the economy are less likely to support refugee integration policies that expand work rights.

3.3.4 Experience of Forced Displacement

Many of the largest refugee-hosting countries are low and middle-income countries that have themselves experienced conflict and forced displacement. Several studies suggest that shared experiences of displacement can foster empathy and more favorable views toward refugees (Barron et al., 2023; Hartman and Morse, 2020; Hartman, Morse and Weber, 2021).* We therefore hypothesize that individuals with a personal history of displacement will be more motivated by humanitarian concerns and thus more supportive of refugee integration.

H6: Citizens who have experienced forced displacement are more likely to support refugee integration.

4 Research Design

4.1 Survey Sample

We conducted a phone survey in Kenya in September and October 2023. A total of 3,326 people completed the survey, including a nationally representative sample of 2,432 respon-

*Though see Ghosn, Braithwaite and Chu (2019) and Sambanis, Simonson and Yaylacı (2023).

dents and an oversample from the sub-counties surrounding Dadaab and Kakuma camps (441 in Garissa and 453 in Turkana).* To improve representativeness, we constructed post-stratification weights using entropy balancing, matching our sample to the 2023 Afrobarometer survey (Hainmueller, 2012).* In the Appendix, we show that the weighted sample is representative on age, gender, province, income, and education, and that treatment arms are balanced. We use weights in the main analysis and replicate key results with unweighted data in the Appendix.

4.2 Study Design

Our study includes observational and experimental components. We first use observational data to assess baseline levels of support for refugee integration and to identify the profiles of Kenyan citizens most supportive or opposed. We then use two survey experiments to examine how support varies across policy dimensions and refugee nationality. To better understand the underlying mechanisms, we include qualitative open-ended questions. The survey was developed in consultation with local stakeholders, including UNHCR, NGOs, legal experts, and refugee-led organizations. See the Appendix for more details on the survey design and implementation, research ethics, robustness checks, and a summary of hypotheses.

4.2.1 Observational Data

Our primary outcome variable in the observational data is *Integration Support*, coded as 1 if a respondent favors granting refugees the right to work and move—either in settlements or throughout the country—and 0 if they prefer repatriation, resettlement, or continued encampment. This is based on a general hypothetical question and does not refer specifically to Kenya's 2021 Refugee Act.

Key independent variables align with our main hypotheses. *Ethnic Kinship* is coded as 1 if the respondent identifies as Kenyan Somali. *Proximity* is a categorical variable indicating whether the respondent lives in Turkana, Garissa, or another county. *Close Contact* is coded as 1 if the respondent has a refugee who is "close to [the respondent], like a family member, partner, friend, or neighbor". For egocentric economic concerns, we include several measures: *Economic Vulnerability* (coded 1 if the respondent skipped meals "many times" or "all the time" in the past month), *Unemployed* (1 if actively looking for work), and *Agriculture* (1 if working in an agricultural occupation).* *Sociotropic Economic Concerns* is coded 1 if the respondent said the national economy had "worsened a lot" in the past year. *Forced Displacement* is coded 1 if the respondent or a close family member had ever fled their home due to violence or political persecution. We include demographic controls for *age*, *gender*, *education*, *religion*, and *marital status*.

We begin by reporting descriptive statistics for support for integration. We then run logistic

*For most analyses, we use the nationally representative sample. For the analysis on proximity and contact, we include the oversample.

*We preferred Afrobarometer weights because they allow us to weight respondents based on education. See the Appendix for a discussion of alternative weighting strategies.

*We measured this using keywords given when participants are asked about their occupation, including "farm," "horticulturist," "herdsman," "livestock," and "pastoralist."

regressions of *Integration Support* on our independent variables to analyze subgroup differences. We also measure support for refugee hosting more broadly to understand whether factors driving support for integration and hosting differ. See a full discussion of this analysis in the Appendix.

4.2.2 Survey Experiments

Our first experiment investigates support for different dimensions of Kenya's refugee integration policy. After screening out participants who were already aware of the 2021 Refugee Act,[*] we randomly assigned participants to a control group or to one of three treatment groups. Each treatment group received a brief, two-sentence summary of one dimension of the 2021 Refugee Act: improved ability to work (work treatment), freedom of movement (movement treatment), or shared services with host communities (services treatment). We conducted a manipulation check to ensure that participants understood the policy information, and filtered out those who did not understand. We then asked respondents to indicate their level of support on a five-point scale, which we standardized.

The second experiment explores whether support for refugee integration varies depending on refugee nationality. Respondents were randomly assigned to either a control group (asked about "refugees" generally) or to a treatment group referencing "refugees from Somalia" or "refugees from South Sudan." To proxy for support for integration, we asked participants to imagine that the government was encouraging refugees moving to different areas of the country, and then asked whether they would support the refugee group moving into the county they lived in. Respondents were asked for their level of support on a 5-point scale, which we standardized. We also asked whether respondents believed that the refugee group had improved (1), had no impact (0), or worsened (-1) Kenya's economy, culture, or security.[*]

We report the difference-in-means of support for each integration policy dimension and the average treatment effect (ATE) of the two nationalities on support for refugee integration. For subgroup analysis, we use two strategies. First, we split the sample by treatment arm and regress outcomes on respondent characteristics to assess who supports or opposes specific policies or groups. Second, we estimate heterogeneous treatment effects by interacting the treatment with all covariates and then simulating predicted support levels for different demographic profiles, following Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) and Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019). This approach allows us to examine when and for whom support varies across policy dimensions or refugee groups.

4.2.3 Qualitative Data

To complement the quantitative analysis, we included two open-ended questions in the survey experiments. First, we asked participants what they believed would be the impact of the specific policy dimension they were assigned. Second, in the nationality experiment, we asked

[*]Respondents who said they had heard of the policy (n = 205) were asked to summarize what they knew. We hand-coded their responses to identify true awareness and excluded 51 respondents with demonstrable prior knowledge from the experiment.

[*]These perception questions were asked at the end of the survey to minimize priming effects.

why they supported or opposed hosting the refugee group referenced in their treatment arm.* We developed a coding scheme based on a review of a random 10 percent sample of responses. We then created binary variables indicating whether a particular theme was mentioned and regressed these on respondent characteristics. We provide example quotes and details of the coding scheme in the Appendix.

5 Results

A substantial portion of the Kenyan public—43 percent—not only supports refugee integration, but prefers it to any other refugee policy option (Figure 2). When asked their policy preference, the most favored option among Kenyans was allowing refugees full rights to work and move freely. By contrast, Kenya's current encampment policy was highly unpopular, favored by only 12 percent of respondents. However, a considerable minority (37 percent) preferred the harsher policy of sending refugees to their countries of origin.*

5.1 Types of Integration

Figure 2: Support for Refugee Integration



Note: Left-hand plot shows (weighted) descriptive percentages of respondents who chose each of the options when asked their policy preference towards refugees with 95% confidence intervals. N = 2,472. Right-hand plot shows the weighted mean estimates of support for each policy dimension with 95% confidence intervals. N = 254 Work, 315 Movement, 402 Services. The dashed line represents the neutral midpoint of the support scale.

*Note that the open-ended question in the nationality experiment focuses on hosting attitudes more broadly, not specifically refugee integration.

*A brief analysis of this opposing minority is provided in the Appendix.

Figure 3: Reason for Policy Support or Opposition (Coding of Open-ended Responses)



Note: Bars showing the proportion of all open-ended responses that included the topic mentioned. N = 1,273. Black indicates negative concern and gray indicates positive benefit. See A-8.1 for more information on coding scheme.

There is broad support for all three dimensions of Kenya's new integration policy. When informed about work rights, movement rights, and shared services, majorities in all treatment groups expressed support (see Figure 2). Support was highest for work rights (73 percent) and shared services (71 percent), and slightly lower for movement rights (64 percent; Table A-6.1). The manipulation check revealed most respondents misunderstood the shared services dimension, interpreting it as allowing refugees access to government services rather than locals accessing donor-funded services.* Given the expectation that there will be public resistance to refugees accessing government services due to resource constraints, this high support level for shared services is especially noteworthy.

Why do citizens support refugee integration? Examining open-ended responses, more than 4 in 10 respondents referenced humanitarian concerns when discussing reasons to support refugee hosting (Control, Fig. 5). A common refrain was "they are human beings like us" and, if people are fleeing their country for reasons that are not their fault, they should be provided with a safe and peaceful place to stay (see Table A23 for examples). While many respondents discussed potential risks associated with integration, the frequency of humanitarian justifications suggest that concerns for refugees' well-being often outweigh fears of negative impacts for many citizens. In the following sections, we examine how these sentiments vary across the three specific dimensions of the integration policy.

Regarding work rights, respondents frequently mentioned both negative economic effects, such

*Due to the small number who correctly understood the policy, we analyzed only respondents who interpreted it as allowing refugees access to services.

as job competition, inflation, and wage decreases, and the potential for economic benefits, including new businesses, job creation, increased trade and tax revenues, and higher demand for goods. One respondent said, "Most refugees are blooming in business more than Kenyans. The interaction they bring to our country will help us upgrade by bringing new ideas and ways of managing businesses." Respondents also discussed concerns about potential conflict over employment opportunities, although some respondents argued that work rights might actually reduce insecurity by improving refugees' economic self-sufficiency.

For movement rights, security concerns were prominent, especially fears that the movement of refugees out of the camps would lead to crime, violence, and terrorism. Respondents worried refugees would move toward better-resourced areas, potentially sparking tensions with locals. For instance, one stated, "[Refugees] will go where there is reliable rainfall, where there is good transport, where there is facilities... definitely then people will want to fight over resources." Respondents were also concerned that militants would bring war from neighboring countries. Interestingly, few respondents mentioned cultural threats; instead, they highlighted cultural similarities with fellow Africans.

Finally, respondents supported shared services due to the perception that they will improve the welfare of both Kenyans and refugees. Many people reasoned that if the refugees were included in government service provision, more financing would be devoted to services in the area. Respondents were more likely to discuss humanitarian impacts in this treatment compared to work and movement rights (see Fig. 3). For example, one respondent noted, "It will show [refugees] that we can accept and help them, and that they don't need to feel discriminated." However, other citizens were concerned that shared services would lead to resource strain and conflict, and some expressed frustration that the government provides more for refugees than for "suffering" and "neglected" locals. Others were concerned that shared services would lead to more refugees entering the country or that refugees would never return to their origin country.

These findings offer mixed support for H1, which predicted greater support for integration policies providing direct benefits to hosts versus policies posing potential threats. Movement rights, associated with insecurity and fewer economic benefits, were less popular, while shared services enjoyed strong support despite resource-related concerns, emphasizing the role of humanitarian considerations.

5.2 Refugee Nationality

Figure 4: Support for Refugee Integration by Nationality



Note: Weighted mean estimates of support for integration of di! erent refugee nationalities with 95% confidence intervals. N = 810 Control, 837 South Sudanese, 838 Somali. The dashed line represents the neutral midpoint of the support scale.

Figure 5: Reason for Nationality Support or Opposition (Coding of Open-ended Responses)



Note: Bars showing the proportion of all open-ended responses that included the topic mentioned. N = 2,138, exc. NA. Black indicates negative concern and gray indicates positive benefit. See A-8.1 for more information on coding scheme.

While overall support for refugees was high, our nationality experiment showed lower support for Kenya's two largest refugee groups—Somalis and South Sudanese—compared to refugees generally (Figure 4). Support was notably lower for Somali refugees, with only 29 percent supporting the government moving refugees into their local area compared to 53 percent support for refugees in general (Table A-6.1).

Consistent with H2, the primary reason for lower support for Somali refugees that respondents cited in their open-ended responses was Somalis' perceived link to insecurity and terrorism (Figure 6). Open-ended responses explicitly connected Somali refugees to al-Shabaab and terrorist threats. For example, one respondent stated, "Tanzanians are here and we don't have a problem with them. Even Ugandans are here in Mombasa and Nairobi and we don't have any problems. But I can't support Somalis because they have bad blood. They bring al-Shabaab and so many other issues." Additional analyses of the nationality experiment—including variations in perceptions of economic impacts—are provided in Appendix.

Figure 6: Beliefs about Impact of Refugees by Nationality



Note: Weighted mean estimates of perceptions of impact of di! erent refugee groups on the economy, security, and culture of Kenya. 0 indicates no impact and -1 indicates worsened impact. The dashed line represents the neutral midpoint of the support scale.

5.3 Respondent Characteristics

Figure 7: Support for Refugee Integration by Respondent Characteristics



Note: Coe" cient estimates from weighted linear regression models with 95% confidence intervals. "Refugee Integration" is the binary observational measure of support for integration, while "Services," "Work," and "Movement" are standardized scales of support for each policy dimension in the experiment. Dashed line represents the null e! ect. Full tabular results are in Tables A8 and A18.

5.3.1 Ethnic Kinship

Ethnic kinship substantially increased the likelihood of supporting integration, raising odds by 124 percent—more than any other respondent characteristic. Somali Kenyans showed equal support across policy dimensions and were notably more supportive of both Somali and South Sudanese refugees compared to the general refugee population in the nationality experiment, although this was marginally significant in both cases potentially due to small sample sizes ($p < 0.1$; Tables A22 and A20). In open-ended responses, ethnic kin were less likely to express security concerns about refugee movement (Table A24). These findings support H3a (ethnic kinship increases overall support), but not H3b (greater preference specifically for ethnic kin's rights).*

5.3.2 Proximity and Contact

Close personal contact with refugees increased the likelihood of supporting integration by 36 percent.* Respondents with close contacts had no particular preference among integration dimensions but emphasized economic benefits from work and movement rights more frequently (Table A25). This strongly supports H4a, indicating close contacts foster integration support.

However, proximity alone—living near refugee camps without direct contact—did not reduce support (Figure 8), contrary to H4b. Respondents living in the refugee camp sub-counties

*There may be a "linked fate" mechanism explaining these findings with respect to Kenyan Somalis, as this group is also discriminated against in Kenya despite being citizens.

*In Table A11, we show that it is close contact that matters for attitudes, not having a refugee acquaintance or interaction.

were *more* likely to support refugee integration (see Figure 8) and to discuss economic benefits from hosting in the open-ends (see Tables A29 and A30). For example, one respondent in Turkana said, "We are benefiting from the refugees. We get employment from the camp. Turkana ladies work there and get money." However, after controlling for close contact and ethnic kinship, proximity had no independent effect (Table A12).*

Figure 8: Support for Refugee Hosting and Integration by Region

Note: Map of Kenya broken down by province. Overlayed with two refugee-hosting counties, Turkana (in Rift Valley province) and Garissa (in North Eastern province). Darker shades indicate higher values and triangles signify refugee camps. "Integration Support" is the weighted mean of the binary observational measure of support for integration.

5.3.3 Economic Concerns

Economic vulnerability (food insecurity, unemployment, and agricultural employment) did not significantly influence support for refugee integration or preference for any integration dimension (see Table A21 and Figure 7). Thus, we find no support for H5a (egocentric economic concerns reducing support).

Citizens expressing broad concerns about Kenya's economy also did not oppose integration more than the public. However, they slightly favored granting refugees work rights over movement and services, viewing them as economically beneficial compared to other integration dimensions ((p < 0.1); Figure 7; Table A21). The open-ended responses showed that respondents perceived refugee employment positively—contributing businesses, jobs, and taxes—and preferred economic participation over encampment. Thus, contrary to H5b, these findings provide suggestive evidence that sociotropic economic concerns increase rather

*However, we are unable to rule out that those who are more welcoming toward refugees select into this group that have more close contact.

than reduce support for refugee work rights.

5.3.4 Experience of Forced Displacement

Personal or family experiences of forced displacement had no significant impact on integration attitudes, providing no support for H6. Nevertheless, open-ended responses indicated that concerns about potential *future* displacement motivated humanitarian attitudes, reflecting empathy and solidarity with refugees. Respondents frequently acknowledged the possibility of becoming refugees themselves, reinforcing their support for integration on humanitarian grounds. For example, one respondent said, "They're humans and they're supposed to be helped. The same way it might [become] worse in Kenya and we run to their country. It's brotherhood."

6 Conclusion

This paper offers one of the first nationally representative assessments of public attitudes toward refugee integration in a major refugee-hosting country in the Global South. There are four main takeaways. First, there is significant popular support for refugee integration in Kenya, with majority support for all dimensions of a new refugee integration law, including granting refugees work rights, free movement, and shared services with host communities. This calls into question the assumption that efforts to promote self-reliance and integration of refugees in a protracted refugee situation will trigger public opposition. The unique timing of our survey—after the passage of Kenya's refugee integration law but before its implementation—assuages concerns that respondents would express positive attitudes towards integration policies only in the hypothetical context of a survey but not in the real world.

Second, high rates of support for integration seem to be driven by factors that are both similar to and different from the factors that shape support for hosting refugees in high-income countries. Cultural similarity through ethnic kinship, close contact with refugees, and humanitarian concerns increase the likelihood of support for both refugee integration and hosting across contexts. Kenyan citizens overwhelmingly expressed feelings of obligation to host refugees as they are "neighbors" and "brothers and sisters". Unlike in high-income countries, however, refugee integration is associated with positive economic benefits in Kenya, and support for integration includes those citizens who are concerned about the economy and those who consider refugees—without the right to work—as an economic burden. We also see that citizens in refugee-hosting areas are more, not less, supportive of integration, and that Kenyans factor in the potential that they themselves will be displaced when considering their attitudes toward refugees.

Third, public concern about refugee integration is driven as much by fears of insecurity as by economic considerations. There is less support for granting refugees movement rights compared to work rights and services, potentially because movement is seen as more of a security threat without clear economic benefits. Refugees being able to move and live freely among Kenyans generates fear of terrorism and increased conflict over resources. This finding echoes Emeriau's (2024) study of the effect of terror attacks on willingness to grant refugee

status, and reminds us that, despite the literature questioning the extent to which refugees pose a security threat to host communities (e.g., Zhou and Shaver, 2021), such concerns remain critical in the eyes of citizens. Governments considering implementing these policies should therefore assure their citizens of the measures in place to address potential insecurity.

Fourth, attitudes towards different refugee groups vary dramatically. This echoes findings in high-income countries that citizens prefer to host and integrate people from certain countries more than others (e.g., Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2023; Adida, Lo and Platas, 2019). While Kenyan citizens are generally supportive of refugees, this is not the case for refugees from Somalia, which they associate with insecurity and terrorism, and who have been historically subjected to securitization narratives by the Kenyan government. Finding that Kenyan citizens discriminate against Somalis contributes to the trend found across studies in Weber et al. (2024) of a widespread anti-Muslim bias, even in low- and middle-income countries.

These findings offer encouraging evidence that refugee integration is politically feasible in low- and middle-income countries, even in contexts of protracted displacement. As refugee situations prolong and return and resettlement becomes increasingly unlikely for a vast majority of refugees, the shift toward local integration has gained traction among international actors. Yet, the success of these efforts hinges not only on legal and institutional reforms, but also on public support. Our results suggest that integration may be more politically viable than often assumed, particularly when host communities perceive economic benefits, share social or cultural ties with refugees, or hold strong humanitarian commitments. This challenges the conventional wisdom that integration policies are bound to provoke domestic backlash. While our study focuses on Kenya, its findings have broader relevance for refugee-hosting countries across the Global South. Future research should explore the generalizability of these patterns and examine how sustained public support can be mobilized and maintained as integration policies are implemented over time.

References

Abdelaaty, Lamis Elmy. 2021. *Discrimination and delegation: Explaining state responses to refugees*. Oxford University Press.

Adida, Claire L, Adeline Lo and Melina R Platas. 2019. "Americans preferred Syrian refugees who are female, English-speaking, and Christian on the eve of Donald Trump's election." *PloS one* 14(10):e0222504.

Adida, Claire L, David D Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort. 2016. *Why Muslim integration fails in Christian-heritage societies*. Harvard University Press.

Afrobarometer Kenya Round 9 data. 2023. Accessed October 2024.
URL: *https://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-resource/kenya-round-9-data-2023/*

Afrobarometer Kenya Round 9 report. 2023. Accessed October 2024.
URL: *https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/KEN-*AB → R9*Summary → of → Results → 16aug22.pdf*

Aksu, Ege, Refik Erzan and Murat Güray Kırdar. 2022. "The impact of mass migration of Syrians on the Turkish labor market." *Labour Economics* 76:102183.

Alix-Garcia, Jennifer, Sarah Walker, Anne Bartlett, Harun Onder and Apurva Sanghi. 2018. "Do refugee camps help or hurt hosts? The case of Kakuma, Kenya." *Journal of Development Economics* 130:66–83.

Allen, William, Isabel Ruiz and Carlos Vargas Silva. 2022. *Policy preferences in response to large migration inflows*. World Bank.

Allen, William L, Matthew D Bird, Luisa Feline Freier, Isabel Ruiz and Carlos Vargas-Silva. 2024. Migration policy preferences and forms of trust in contexts of limited state capacity. Technical report Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).

Allport, Gordon W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Alrababa'h, Ala', Andrea Dillon, Scott Williamson, Jens Hainmueller, Dominik Hangartner and Jeremy Weinstein. 2021. "Attitudes toward migrants in a highly impacted economy: Evidence from the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan." *Comparative Political Studies* 54(1):33–76.

Amnesty International. 2014. "Kenya: Somalis Scapegoated in Counter-Terror Crackdown.". Accessed November 14, 2024.
URL: *https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2014/05/kenya-somalis-scapegoated-counter-terror-crackdown/*

Appleby, Kevin. 2024. "How Europe is Slowly Closing Its Doors to Asylum-Seekers." *Center for Migration Studies of New York* .
URL: *https://cmsny.org/how-europe-closing-doors-to-asylum-seekers/*

Bansak, Kirk, Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner. 2016. "How economic, humani-

tarian, and religious concerns shape European attitudes toward asylum seekers." *Science* 354(6309):217–222.

Bansak, Kirk, Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner. 2023. "Europeans' support for refugees of varying background is stable over time." *Nature* 620(7975):849–854.

Barron, Kai, Heike Harmgart, Steffen Huck, Sebastian O Schneider and Matthias Sutter. 2023. "Discrimination, Narratives, and Family History: An Experiment with Jordanian Host and Syrian Refugee Children." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 105(4):1008–1016.

Betts, Alexander, Maria Flinder Stierna, Naohiko Omata and Olivier Sterck. 2023. "Refugees Welcome? Inter-group Interaction and Host Community Attitude Formation." *World Development* .
URL: *https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X23001045*

Betts, Alexander, Maria Flinder Stierna, Naohiko Omata and Olivier Sterck. 2024. "The Economic Lives of Refugees." *World Development* 165:106233.
URL: *https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X24001633*

Betts, Alexander, Naohiko Omata and Olivier Sterck. 2018. "Refugee Economies in Kenya.". Accessed November 14, 2024.
URL: *https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/refugee-economies-in-kenya*

Betts, Alexander, Naohiko Omata and Olivier Sterck. 2020. "The Kalobeyei settlement: A self-reliance model for refugees?" *Journal of Refugee Studies* 33(1):189–223.

Black, Richard. 2018. *Refugees, environment and development*. Routledge.

Blair, Christopher W, Guy Grossman and Jeremy M Weinstein. 2022. "Forced displacement and asylum policy in the developing world." *International Organization* 76(2):337–378.

Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder. 2006. "Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analyses." *Political analysis* 14(1):63–82.

Campbell, Elizabeth H. 2006. "Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival, and Possibilities for Integration." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 19(3):396–413.
URL: *https://academic.oup.com/jrs/article/19/3/396/1571241*

Campbell, Elizabeth, Jeff Crisp and Esther Kiragu. 2011. "Navigating Nairobi: A review of the implementation of UNHCR's urban refugee policy in Kenya's capital city." *Geneva: UNHCR* .

Campo, Francesco, Sara Giunti, Mariapia Mendola and Giulia Tura. 2023. Political Backlash to Refugee Settlement: Cultural and Economic Drivers. Technical report IZA Discussion Papers.

Card, David, Christian Dustmann and Ian Preston. 2012. "Immigration, Wages, and Compositional Amenities." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 10(1):78–119.
URL: *https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article/10/1/78/2182014*

Ceritoglu, Evren, H Burcu Gurcihan Yunculer, Huzeyfe Torun and Semih Tumen. 2017. "The impact of Syrian refugees on natives' labor market outcomes in Turkey: evidence from a quasi-experimental design." *IZA Journal of Labor Policy* 6:1–28.

Chandler, Charles R. and Yung-mei Tsai. 2001. "Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: An Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey." *The Social Science Journal* 38(2):177–188.
URL: *https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1016/S0362-3319(01)00106-9*

Crisp, Jeff. 2004. "Local Integration and Local Settlement of Refugees: A Conceptual and Historical Analysis." UNHCR. Accessed: 2024-12-24.
URL: *https://www.unhcr.org/us/media/local-integration-and-local-settlement-refugees-conceptual-and-historical-analysis-je*! *-crisp*

Dagnelie, Olivier, Anna Maria Mayda and Jean-François Maystadt. 2023. Refugees, children's health and malaria transmission in Africa. Cepr discussion paper no. 18284 Centre for Economic Policy Research.
URL: *https://cepr.org/publications/dp18284*

De Haas, Hein, Katharina Natter and Simona Vezzoli. 2018. "Growing restrictiveness or changing selection? The nature and evolution of migration Policies." *International Migration Review* 52(2):324–367.

Del Carpio, Ximena V and Mathis C Wagner. 2015. "The impact of Syrian refugees on the Turkish labor market." *World Bank policy research working paper* (7402).

Dustmann, Christian and Ian P Preston. 2007. "Racial and economic factors in attitudes to immigration." *The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy* 7(1).

Emeriau, Mathilde. 2024. "Victim or Threat? Shipwrecks, Terrorist Attacks, and Asylum Decisions in France." *American Journal of Political Science* 68(4):1187–1204.
URL: *https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12829*

Fisk, Kerstin. 2018. "One-sided violence in refugee-hosting areas." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62(3):529–556.

Fisk, Kerstin. 2019. "Camp settlement and communal conflict in sub-Saharan Africa." *Journal of Peace Research* 56(1):58–72.

Freeman, Laura. 2019. They're All Terrorists: The Securitisation of Asylum in Kenya. In *Extremisms in Africa, Vol. 2*. Tracey McDonald Publishers pp. 92–123.

Gale, Lacey Andrews. 2006. "Sustaining relationships across borders: gendered livelihoods and mobility among Sierra Leonean refugees." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 25(2):69–80.

Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas and Nikolas F. Tan. 2017. "The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy." *Journal on Migration and Human Security* 5(1):28–56.
URL: *https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/233150241700500103*

Getmansky, Anna, Tolga Sınmazdemir and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2018. "Refugees, xenophobia,

and domestic conflict: Evidence from a survey experiment in Turkey." *Journal of Peace Research* 55(4):491–507.

Ghosn, Faten, Alex Braithwaite and Tiffany S Chu. 2019. "Violence, displacement, contact, and attitudes toward hosting refugees." *Journal of Peace Research* 56(1):118–133.

Ginn, Thomas, Reva Resstack, Helen Dempster, Emily Arnold-Fernández, Sarah Miller, Martha Guerrero Ble and Bahati Kanyamanza. 2022. "Global refugee work rights report." *Center for Global Development* .

Groeger, Andre, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta and Steven Stillman. 2024. "Immigration, labor markets and discrimination: Evidence from the Venezuelan Exodus in Perú." *World Development* 174:106437.

Hainmueller, Jens. 2012. "Entropy balancing for causal effects: A multivariate reweighting method to produce balanced samples in observational studies." *Political analysis* 20(1):25–46.

Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J Hopkins. 2014. "Public attitudes toward immigration." *Annual review of political science* 17(1):225–249.

Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J Hopkins. 2015. "The hidden American immigration consensus: A conjoint analysis of attitudes toward immigrants." *American journal of political science* 59(3):529–548.

Hainmueller, Jens and Dominik Hangartner. 2013. "Who gets a Swiss passport? A natural experiment in immigrant discrimination." *American political science review* 107(1):159–187.

Hainmueller, Jens, Jonathan Mummolo and Yiqing Xu. 2019. "How much should we trust estimates from multiplicative interaction models? Simple tools to improve empirical practice." *Political Analysis* 27(2):163–192.

Hainmueller, Jens and Michael J Hiscox. 2010. "Attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigration: Evidence from a survey experiment." *American political science review* 104(1):61–84.

Halakhe, Abdullahi Boru and Samson Omondi. 2024. "Lessons and Recommendations for Implementing Kenya's New Refugee Law.". Accessed November 15, 2024.
URL: *https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/lessons-and-recommendations-for-implementing-kenyas-new-refugee-law/*

Hangartner, Dominik, Elias Dinas, Moritz Marbach, Konstantinos Matakos and Dimitrios Xefteris. 2019. "Does exposure to the refugee crisis make natives more hostile?" *American political science review* 113(2):442–455.

Hartman, Alexandra C and Benjamin S Morse. 2020. "Violence, empathy and altruism: Evidence from the Ivorian refugee crisis in Liberia." *British Journal of Political Science* 50(2):731–755.

Hartman, Alexandra C, Benjamin S Morse and Sigrid Weber. 2021. "Violence, displacement,

and support for internally displaced persons: Evidence from Syria." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 65(10):1791–1819.

Hirsch, Alan. 2024. "Overcoming the North-South Divide in Global Migration Governance." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* .
URL: *https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/11/international-migration-policy-global-north-south?lang=en*

Holland, Alisha, Margaret E Peters and Yang-Yang Zhou. 2024. "Left out: How political ideology affects support for migrants in Colombia." *The Journal of Politics* 86(4):000–000.

Hovil, Lucy. 2014. Local Integration. In *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona. Oxford University Press pp. 488–498.
URL: *https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28193/chapter/213138213*

Hovil, Lucy and Nicholas Maple. 2022. "Local Integration: A Durable Solution in Need of Restoration?" *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 41(2):238–266.
URL: *https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article/41/2/238/6564683*

Jacobsen, Karen. 2001. "The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration of Refugees in Developing Countries." UNHCR.
URL: *https://www.unhcr.org/media/forgotten-solution-local-integration-refugees-developing-countries-karen-jacobsen*

Jaji, Rose. 2013. "Somali Asylum Seekers and Refoulement at the Kenya-Somalia Border." *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 28(3):355–368. Accessed November 14, 2024.
URL: *https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/08865655.2013.862758*

Jaji, Rose. 2022. "Historical Complexities and Transformations of Refugee Policies in Kenya and Tanzania." *Africa Today* 69(1-2):88–109. Accessed November 14, 2024.
URL: *https://muse.jhu.edu/article/864870*

Jeannet, Anne-Marie, Tobias Heidland and Martin Ruhs. 2021. "What asylum and refugee policies do Europeans want? Evidence from a cross-national conjoint experiment." *European Union Politics* 22(3):353–376.

Lazarev, Egor and Kunaal Sharma. 2017. "Brother or burden: An experiment on reducing prejudice toward Syrian refugees in Turkey." *Political Science Research and Methods* 5(2):201–219.

Lebow, Jeremy. 2022. "The labor market effects of Venezuelan migration to Colombia: reconciling conflicting results." *IZA Journal of Development and Migration* 13(1).

Leghtas, Izza and David Kitenge. 2022. "What Does Kenya's New Refugee Act Mean for Economic Inclusion?". Accessed November 15, 2024.
URL: *https://www.refugeesinternational.org/what-does-kenyas-new-refugee-act-mean-for-economic-inclusion/*

Lindley, Anna. 2011. "Between a Protracted and a Crisis Situation: Policy Responses to

Somali Refugees in Kenya." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 30(4):14–49.
URL: *https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article/30/4/14/1527765*

Margalit, Yotam and Omer Solodoch. 2022. "Against the flow: Differentiating between public opposition to the immigration stock and flow." *British Journal of Political Science* 52(3):1055–1075.

Masterson, Daniel and Vasil Yasenov. 2019. "Does halting refugee resettlement reduce crime? Evidence from the United States refugee ban.".

Maystadt, Jean-François and Gilles Duranton. 2019. "The development push of refugees: Evidence from Tanzania." *Journal of Economic Geography* 19(2):299–334.

Miliband, David. 2019. "A Battle Plan for the World Bank." *Foreign A! airs* .
URL: *https://www.foreigna! airs.com/articles/2019-02-19/battle-plan-world-bank*

Miller, Sarah and Jimmy Graham. 2021. "From Displacement to Development: How Kenya Can Create Shared Growth by Facilitating Economic Inclusion for Refugees.". Accessed: 2024-12-11.
URL: *https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/from-displacement-to-development-how-kenya-can-create-shared-growth-by-facilitating-economic-inclusion-for-refugees/*

Monsutti, Alessandro. 2005. *War and migration: Social networks and economic strategies of the Hazaras of Afghanistan*. Routledge.

Murunga, Godwin R. 2009. Refugees at Home? Coping with Somalia Conflict in Nairobi, Kenya. In *African Studies in Geography from Below*, ed. Michel Ben Arrous and Lazare Ki-Zerbo. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA pp. 198–232.
URL: *https://publication.codesria.org/index.php/pub/catalog/view/140/1054/3358*

Nasubo, Fred and Matai Muon. 2024. "The Shirika Plan: In Search of Durable Futures for Refugees in Kenya." *The Elephant* . Accessed November 11, 2024.
URL: *https://www.theelephant.info/analysis/2024/09/26/the-shirika-plan-in-search-of-durable-futures-for-refugees-in-kenya/*

Nyamori, Victor. 2024. "What's Unsaid: Kenya's New Integration Plan for Refugees.". Accessed November 14, 2024.
URL: *https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/podcasts/2024/03/07/whats-unsaid-kenya-new-integration-plan-for-refugees*

Oliver, Marcia L and Philip J Boyle. 2019. "In and beyond the camp: The rise of resilience in refugee governance." *Oñati Socio-Legal Series, Forthcoming* .

Omata, Naohiko. 2021. "Refugee livelihoods: a comparative analysis of Nairobi and Kakuma Camp in Kenya." *Disasters* 45(4):865–886.

Opanda, Christine. 2025. "UDA MP Rejects Ruto's Plan to Integrate Refugees Under Shirika Plan." *Kenyans.co.ke* . Accessed: April 4, 2025.
URL: *https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/110468-uda-mp-rejects-rutos-plan-integrate-refugees-under-shirika-plan*

Peisakhin, Leonid, Nik Stoop and Peter van der Windt. 2024. "Who Hosts? The Correlates of Hosting the Internally Displaced." *American Political Science Review* .
URL: *https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055424000923*

Porter, Gina, Kate Hampshire, Peter Kyei, Michael Adjaloo, George Rapoo and Kate Kilpatrick. 2008. "Linkages between livelihood opportunities and refugee–host relations: learning from the experiences of Liberian camp-based refugees in Ghana." *Journal of refugee studies* 21(2):230–252.

Rudolph, Lukas and Markus Wagner. 2022. "Europe's migration crisis: Local contact and out-group hostility." *European Journal of Political Research* 61(1):268–280.

Sakamoto, Maiko, S.M. Asik Ullah and Masakazu Tani. 2024. "Impacts of refugee influx on the local economy and environmental degradation in Bangladesh: A spatial multilevel autoregressive analysis." *World Development* 165:106233.
URL: *https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X24001992*

Salehyan, Idean and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2006. "Refugees and the spread of civil war." *International organization* 60(2):335–366.

Sambanis, Nicholas, Matthew Simonson and Şule Yaylacı. 2023. "Once We Too Were Strangers: Can a Heritage of Displacement be Leveraged to Build Support for Present-Day Refugees?" *SSRN Electronic Journal* .
URL: *https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract*id = 4509421

Sanghi, Apurva, Harun Onder and Varalakshmi Vemuru. 2016. ""Yes" in My Backyard? The Economics of Refugees and Their Social Dynamics in Kakuma, Kenya." *World Bank* .

Shahow, Abdullahi Abdille. 2021. "Dadaab: Playing Politics with the Lives of Somali Refugees in Kenya." *The Elephant* . Accessed November 11, 2024.
URL: *https://www.theelephant.info/analysis/2021/10/16/dadaab-playing-politics-with-the-lives-of-somali-refugees-in-kenya/*

Simpson, Gerry and Adrianne Lapar. 2013. "'You are all terrorists' Kenyan police abuse of refugees in Nairobi." *Human Rights Watch* . Accessed 14 November 2024.
URL: *https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/29/you-are-all-terrorists/kenyan-police-abuse-refugees-nairobi*

Sniderman, Paul M., Louk Hagendoorn and Markus Prior. 2004. "Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities." *American Political Science Review* 98(1):35–49.
URL: *https://econpapers.repec.org/article/cupapsrev/v*3a98*y*3a2004*i*3a01*p*3a35 → 49f 00.htm

Steinmayr, Andreas. 2016. "Exposure to Refugees and Voting for the Far-Right: (Unexpected) Results from Austria.".
URL: *https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/9790/exposure-to-refugees-and-voting-for-the-far-right-unexpected-results-from-austria*

Teferra, Gerawork. 2022. "Kakuma Refugee Camp: Pseudopermanence in Permanent Tran-

science." *Africa Today* 69(1-2):162–189. Accessed November 14, 2024.
URL: *https://muse.jhu.edu/article/864873*

Thomas, Kevin JA and Miracle Mara. 2024. "African Migration at a Crossroads: The Social and Theoretical Implications of Emerging International Migration Trends." *International Migration Review* p. 01979183241268306.

Thorson, Emily and Lamis Abdelaaty. 2023. "Misperceptions about refugee policy." *American Political Science Review* 117(3):1123–1129.

UNHCR. 2019. "Refugee Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion: 2019-2023 Global Strategy Concept Note.". Accessed: 2024-12-24.
URL: *https://www.unhcr.org/media/refugee-livelihoods-and-economic-inclusion-2019-2023-global-strategy-concept-note*

UNHCR. 2024*a*. "Global Report 2023 Executive Summary.". Accessed: 2024-12-12.
URL: *https://reporting.unhcr.org/global-report-2023-executive-summary*

UNHCR. 2024*b*. "Global Trends Report: Forced Displacement in 2023." *Geneva: United Nations* .

UNHCR. 2024*c*. "Kenya Country Data Overview.". Accessed November 14, 2024.
URL: *https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/ken*

Valentino, Nicholas A, Stuart N Soroka, Shanto Iyengar, Toril Aalberg, Raymond Duch, Marta Fraile, Kyu S Hahn, Kasper M Hansen, Allison Harell, Marc Helbling et al. 2019. "Economic and cultural drivers of immigrant support worldwide." *British Journal of Political Science* 49(4):1201–1226.

Venui, Foni Joyce and Buhendwa Iragi. 2023. "Refugees' Access to Work Permits." *Refugee Led Research Hub* . Accessed November 14, 2024.
URL: *https://refugeeledresearch.org/refugees-access-to-work-permits/*

Verdirame, Guglielmo and Barbara E Harrell-Bond. 2005. *Rights in exile: Janus-faced humanitarianism*. Vol. 17 Berghahn Books.

Verme, Paolo and Kirsten Schuettler. 2021. "The impact of forced displacement on host communities: A review of the empirical literature in economics." *Journal of Development Economics* 150:102606.

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker and Luc Girardin. 2015. "Integrating data on ethnicity, geography, and conflict: The ethnic power relations data set family." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7):1327–1342.

Weber, Sigrid, Nik Stoop, Peter van der Windt and Haoyu Zhai. 2024. "A Meta-Analysis of Attitudes Towards Migrants and Displaced Persons.".

World Bank and UNHCR. 2019. Understanding the Socioeconomic Conditions of Refugees in Kenya: Volume A: Kalobeyei Settlement. Results from the 2018 Kalobeyei Socioeconomic Survey. Technical report World Bank and UNHCR. Accessed November 14, 2024.
URL: *https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/982811613626800238/pdf/Understanding-*

the-Socioeconomic-Conditions-of-Refugees-in-Kenya-Volume-A-Kalobeyei-Settlement-Results-from-the-2018-Kalobeyei-Socioeconomic-Survey.pdf

World Bank and UNHCR. 2021. Understanding the Socioeconomic Conditions of Refugees in Kenya: Volume B: Kakuma Camp. Results from the 2019 Kakuma Socioeconomic Survey. Technical report World Bank and UNHCR. Accessed November 14, 2024.
URL: *https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/443431613628051180/pdf/Understanding-the-Socio-Economic-Conditions-of-Refugees-in-Kenya-Volume-B-Kakuma-Camp-Results-from-the-2019-Kakuma-Socioeconomic-Survey.pdf*

Young, Crawford. 1976. *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Zhou, Yang-Yang. 2024. "Refugee Proximity and Support for Citizenship Exclusion in Africa.". Working paper, July 30, 2024.
URL: *https://osf.io/u9t78/download/?format=pdf*

Zhou, Yang-Yang and Andrew Shaver. 2021. "Reexamining the effect of refugees on civil conflict: a global subnational analysis." *American Political Science Review* 115(4):1175–1196.

Zhou, Yang-Yang, Guy Grossman and Shuning Ge. 2023. "Inclusive refugee-hosting can improve local development and prevent public backlash." *World Development* 166:106203.

Online Appendix

Table of Contents

A-1 Protracted Refugee Situations

Figure A1: Refugee funding and camp population across regions



Note: UNHCR Budget data from UNHCR Global Focus Budget and Expenditure (accessed October 2024). Camp population data from UNHCR Data Finder and includes those in a planned/managed camp, collective centre, or reception/transit camp.

A-2 Sample

A-2.1 Representativeness and Weights

There were three potential weights that we could have used for the analysis. First, the survey company provided post-stratification weights based on age, gender, and location. Second, we constructed weights from the census using entropy balancing, based on age, gender, and location (Hainmueller, 2012). Third, we constructed weights from the 2023 Afrobarometer

using entropy balancing based on age, gender, location, and education. The Afrobarometer sample is broadly representative of the Kenyan population.*

We preferred the Afrobarometer weights because they allow us to weight respondents based on levels of education. A concern with surveys in low and middle-income countries is that the sample has, on average, a higher level of education than the population, as participants who have a phone and are able to speak the national rather than local language are likely to be more educated. Using Afrobarometer data to construct weights mitigates this issue; unlike the census, this sample includes information about the education levels of the population.

Table A1 shows the proportion of age group, gender, province, and education across the census, Afrobarometer, and the sample using the three sets of weights. We see that the raw sample is broadly representative with respect to age, gender, and province, though it is more educated than the population (based on Afrobarometer). The Afrobarometer weights mitigate for this issue. We would have winsorized weights of > 5, but the maximum weight was 4.13.

Table A2 shows the results of a t-test between the Afrobarometer data and the sample using the three sets of weights. We see there is a significant difference in the mean of education for the census and TIFA-weighted sample, but no significant difference for the Afrobarometer-weighted sample.

*The Afrobarometer weights use the Kenya Round 9 data (2023). Note that it was not possible to integrate the weights used in the Afrobarometer data into our use of the data for the weights. Information about weighting is included in the Round 9 report (Afrobarometer Kenya Round 9 report, 2023).

Table A1: Sample Representativeness

				Weighted Sample		
Variable	Census	Afrobarometer	Sample	Cens	Afro	TIFA
Age Group						
18-24	24.9	23.6	22.5	18.5	17.1	24.7
25-29	15.1	15.6	17.1	15.0	14.3	15.0
30-34	14.0	14.0	15.7	14.8	15.6	13.8
35-39	10.4	11.1	12.0	12.1	12.6	10.2
40-44	8.8	8.0	10.5	11.4	12.5	8.9
45-49	7.0	6.7	7.7	8.9	9.4	9.5
50-54	5.1	6.2	5.5	6.9	6.8	6.8
55-59	4.4	4.4	4.1	5.4	5.1	5.0
60-65	4.1	4.8	4.3	6.2	6.0	5.3
66+	6.3	5.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8
Gender						
Male	49.5	50.0	51.8	50.0	50.0	48.7
Female	50.5	50.0	48.2	50.0	50.0	51.3
Province						
Central	11.5	13.7	13.8	13.5	13.3	15.1
Coast	9.1	9.7	11.6	11.5	10.3	13.4
Eastern	14.3	15.0	10.2	8.9	10.1	9.1
Nairobi	9.2	11.0	10.4	11.2	9.8	11.1
North Eastern	5.2	3.7	3.9	3.4	6.2	4.0
Nyanza	13.2	12.3	12.9	13.4	12.2	12.3
Rift Valley	26.8	25.3	26.4	26.0	25.5	25.4
Western	10.6	9.3	10.8	12.2	12.6	9.6
Education						
None	NA	16.3	3.5	3.7	12.5	3.7
Primary	NA	35.8	21.6	23.2	39.0	21.8
Secondary	NA	25.7	34.7	35.3	31.0	35.0
Tertiary/adult	NA	22.0	39.9	37.4	17.4	39.1
NA	NA	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3

Table A2: Comparing Weighting Schemes

		Weights								
		Census			TIFA			Afro		
Variable	Afrobarometer	Mean (SD)	t-stat	p-value	Mean (SD)	t-stat	p-value	Mean (SD)	t-stat	p-value
Age	36.91(15)	36.8 (120.69	-0.28	0.78	35.52 (12.34)	-3.53	0.00	36.92 (11.85)	0.04	0.97
Gender	0.5(0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	-0.01	1.00	0.51 (0.5)	0.91	0.36	0.5 (0.5)	0.00	1.00
Province	4.71(2)	4.87 (15.44)	2.84	0.00	4.73 (2)	0.43	0.67	4.71 (2.06)	0.00	1.00
Education	2.54(1.01)	3.07 (7.48)	19.82	0.00	3.1 (0.87)	20.97	0.00	2.53 (0.92)	-0.05	0.96

A-2.2 Experiment Balance Tables

There is balance for both survey experiments across age, gender, education, and province when the sample is weighted using Afrobarometer weights. There is balance in the unweighted sample across demographics in the nationality experiment and balance for all demographics except province in the policy experiment.

Table A3: Balance Table for Policy Treatment (Unweighted)

	control	move	services	work	p-test	SMD
n	633	639	647	591		
age	35.45 (11.79)	34.57 (11.05)	34.47 (11.65)	34.85 (11.73)	0.431	0.046
gender	0.50 (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)	0.732	0.032
education					0.904	0.061
none	22 (3.5)	22 (3.5)	24 (3.7)	20 (3.4)		
primary	146 (23.1)	140 (22.0)	134 (20.8)	122 (20.7)		
secondary	229 (36.2)	220 (34.5)	215 (33.3)	206 (35.0)		
tertiary/adult	235 (37.2)	255 (40.0)	272 (42.2)	240 (40.8)		
province					0.029	0.188
Eastern	96 (15.2)	97 (15.2)	77 (11.9)	77 (13.0)		
Central	84 (13.3)	80 (12.5)	64 (9.9)	64 (10.8)		
Coast	58 (9.2)	60 (9.4)	77 (11.9)	61 (10.3)		
Nairobi	71 (11.2)	51 (8.0)	76 (11.7)	63 (10.7)		
North Eastern	33 (5.2)	27 (4.2)	16 (2.5)	21 (3.6)		
Nyanza	83 (13.1)	87 (13.6)	69 (10.7)	84 (14.2)		
Rift Valley	150 (23.7)	175 (27.4)	190 (29.4)	148 (25.0)		
Western	58 (9.2)	62 (9.7)	78 (12.1)	73 (12.4)		

Table A4: Balance Table for Policy Treatment (Weighted)

	control	move	services	work	p-test	SMD
n	620.67	608.70	614.10	556.55		
age	37.50 (12.00)	36.49 (11.37)	36.74 (12.08)	36.96 (11.92)	0.654	0.046
gender	0.50 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.873	0.029
education					0.963	0.062
none	75.7 (12.2)	72.7 (12.0)	82.6 (13.5)	68.1 (12.3)		
primary	253.3 (40.9)	241.8 (39.8)	231.5 (37.8)	208.5 (37.6)		
secondary	193.7 (31.2)	186.9 (30.8)	185.2 (30.2)	177.1 (31.9)		
tertiary/adult	97.2 (15.7)	105.6 (17.4)	113.4 (18.5)	100.5 (18.1)		
province					0.277	0.196
Eastern	89.9 (14.5)	87.6 (14.4)	71.3 (11.6)	71.5 (12.8)		
Central	71.1 (11.5)	66.4 (10.9)	54.3 (8.8)	54.8 (9.8)		
Coast	51.5 (8.3)	67.7 (11.1)	65.5 (10.7)	58.0 (10.4)		
Nairobi	73.4 (11.8)	46.6 (7.7)	68.5 (11.2)	45.6 (8.2)		
North Eastern	47.8 (7.7)	44.0 (7.2)	26.2 (4.3)	31.2 (5.6)		
Nyanza	78.2 (12.6)	76.7 (12.6)	60.5 (9.9)	77.3 (13.9)		
Rift Valley	137.1 (22.1)	148.6 (24.4)	180.6 (29.4)	145.2 (26.1)		
Western	71.7 (11.6)	71.0 (11.7)	87.1 (14.2)	73.1 (13.1)		

Table A5: Balance Table for Nationality Treatment (Unweighted)

	refugees	refugees from Somalia	refugees from South Sudan	p-test	SMD
n	816	848	846		
age	34.64 (11.44)	34.85 (11.59)	35.00 (11.64)	0.818	0.021
gender	0.46 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.488	0.035
education				0.943	0.045
none	32 (3.9)	28 (3.3)	28 (3.3)		
primary	179 (22.0)	173 (20.5)	190 (22.5)		
secondary	279 (34.3)	300 (35.6)	291 (34.4)		
tertiary/adult	324 (39.8)	342 (40.6)	336 (39.8)		
province				0.864	0.095
Eastern	117 (14.3)	115 (13.6)	115 (13.6)		
Central	90 (11.0)	92 (10.8)	110 (13.0)		
Coast	82 (10.0)	89 (10.5)	85 (10.0)		
Nairobi	75 (9.2)	88 (10.4)	98 (11.6)		
North Eastern	33 (4.0)	31 (3.7)	33 (3.9)		
Nyanza	103 (12.6)	105 (12.4)	115 (13.6)		
Rift Valley	223 (27.3)	232 (27.4)	208 (24.6)		
Western	93 (11.4)	96 (11.3)	82 (9.7)		

Table A6: Balance Table for Nationality Treatment (Weighted)

	refugees	refugees from Somalia	refugees from South Sudan	p-test	SMD
n	792.86	795.48	811.67		
age	36.67 (11.68)	36.81 (11.87)	37.27 (11.99)	0.690	0.034
gender	0.47 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.278	0.057
education				0.883	0.061
none	108.3 (13.7)	96.0 (12.1)	94.7 (11.7)		
primary	309.4 (39.1)	298.0 (37.6)	327.7 (40.4)		
secondary	238.9 (30.2)	255.0 (32.2)	248.9 (30.7)		
tertiary/adult	134.6 (17.0)	142.6 (18.0)	139.6 (17.2)		
province				0.867	0.121
Eastern	105.4 (13.3)	108.0 (13.6)	106.7 (13.1)		
Central	76.6 (9.7)	78.0 (9.8)	92.0 (11.3)		
Coast	80.1 (10.1)	79.6 (10.0)	83.0 (10.2)		
Nairobi	64.4 (8.1)	74.3 (9.3)	95.5 (11.8)		
North Eastern	58.3 (7.4)	42.9 (5.4)	47.9 (5.9)		
Nyanza	93.7 (11.8)	101.7 (12.8)	97.2 (12.0)		
Rift Valley	208.8 (26.3)	211.7 (26.6)	191.0 (23.5)		
Western	105.5 (13.3)	99.2 (12.5)	98.2 (12.1)		

A-2.3 Don't Knows

In the observational data, 58 responded "Don't know" to the set of policy options for refugees. This was approx. 2 percent of the sample, and therefore is not a large problem for the analysis. Table A7 shows that the only variable where they may be some concern is that those with lower incomes are more likely to say "Don't know" for the integration question. However, as this is not one of our main IVs, we are not concerned about this. Only 12 people said "Don't know" in the policy experiment, and 25 people in the nationality experiment. This is a small part of the sample, and we are therefore not concerned about implications on the experiment.

Table A7: Correlates of Don't Knows

	Dependent variable:
	Integration Support DK
Age	0.014
	(0.020)
Woman	0.182
	(0.422)
Single	−0.880
	(0.578)
Income	−0.514**
	(0.232)
Educ: Primary	−0.746
	(0.802)
Educ: Secondary	−1.388*
	(0.840)
Educ: Tertiary/Adult	−0.065
	(0.807)
Unemployed	0.147
	(0.460)
Agriculture	−0.046
	(0.601)
Econ. Vuln.	−0.488
	(0.554)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	−0.663
	(0.919)
Rel: Christian	−1.857***
	(0.549)
Rel: Islam	−0.112
	(0.713)
Displaced	−0.368
	(0.767)
Socio. Econ. Concern	−0.281
	(0.190)
Close Contact	−1.353*
	(0.756)
Constant	−2.623**
	(1.267)
Data	Nat rep
Observations	2,227
Log Likelihood	−127.793
Akaike Inf. Crit.	289.587
Note:	*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

A-3 Survey Administration and Ethics

We worked with the Nairobi-based survey firm TIFA Research to conduct this research. TIFA recruited participants from its database of profiled citizens, and matched Kenyan census demographics using stratified random sampling based on gender, age, and location.

We conducted an extensive in-person piloting and training period with enumerators. TIFA implemented rigorous quality control checks, including a quality control team listening to every single interview to check for enumerator miscoding and to ensure that the qualitative open-ended responses had been captured correctly. If an interview was incorrectly administered, it was removed and not counted in the total survey number. Given the CATI survey modality, we used simple treatments in the survey experiments that could be administered and understood over the phone.

For the qualitative open-ends, enumerators asked these questions in Swahili, English, or Somali, depending on the preferences of the respondent, and then typed the response into the TIFA's survey software in that language. TIFA's quality control team checked the correctness and quality of these responses before then employing translators to translate the responses into English for us to analyze.

This study was approved by our university's Institutional Review Board. We also received Kenyan ethics approval from the Amref Ethics and Scientific Review Committee (ESRC) and the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI). We confirm compliance with APSA's *Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research*. Respondents gave verbal informed consent prior to participation. All data were anonymized before sending to the PIs to ensure participant confidentiality and privacy. Participants received small phone airtime incentives for participation, which was decided by TIFA Research based on their experience of standard payments in the sector. The participant pool was representative of the Kenyan population, and was not comprised mainly of vulnerable or marginalized groups. The research benefited all groups equally.

A-4 Robustness Checks

We conduct a series of additional analyses we conducted to check the robustness of our results. We summarize these checks here and include them in the relevant sections throughout this Appendix. For the survey experiments, we slice the sample into two groups by gender to see how stable the findings are (Section A-6.4). We re-run the main observational and experimental analyses on the raw (unweighted) data (Sections A-5.2 and A-6.2).

In Sections A-5.5 and A-7.3, we check the linearity assumption for binned and continuous variables in the linear and logistic regression, as well as the linearity interaction effect assumption for the HTEs. We conduct the analysis with an alternative measure for sociotropic economic concern, asking respondents to rate their level of concern about the cost of living (Section A-5.3). We also investigate the 2 percent of the sample who responded "Don't know" to refugee integration (Section A-2.3).

These robustness checks did not lead to any meaningful changes in the results. We found some changes in economic variables when conducting observational analysis without weights. Given that the weights match the population in terms of education, we expected some change here, and have greater confidence in the representativeness of the results with weights.

A-5 Correlates of Support for Integration and Hosting

A-5.1 Regression Table

Table A8: Correlates of Support for Refugee Integration and Hosting

	Dependent variable:	
	logistic	OLS
	Integration Support	Hosting Support
	(1)	(2)
Age	−0.023***	−0.002
	(0.005)	(0.003)
Woman	0.167*	0.118*
	(0.097)	(0.071)
Single	0.199	0.241***
	(0.125)	(0.093)
Income	0.214***	0.082**
	(0.057)	(0.041)
Educ: Primary	0.176	0.366***
	(0.182)	(0.126)
Educ: Secondary	0.455**	0.453***
	(0.190)	(0.134)
Educ: Tertiary/Adult	0.763***	0.535***
	(0.214)	(0.150)
Unemployed	−0.152	−0.211***
	(0.111)	(0.080)
Agriculture	0.088	0.032
	(0.118)	(0.087)
Econ. Vuln.	0.158	0.176**
	(0.115)	(0.085)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	0.806***	0.718***
	(0.311)	(0.203)
Rel: Christian	0.386*	−0.021
	(0.215)	(0.159)
Rel: Islam	0.299	0.173
	(0.299)	(0.206)
Displaced	0.082	0.015
	(0.150)	(0.121)
Socio. Econ. Concern	−0.071	−0.065*
	(0.050)	(0.037)
Close Contact	0.311**	0.279***
	(0.121)	(0.085)
Constant	−0.013	−0.339
	(0.336)	(0.254)
Data	Nat rep	Nat rep, Control
Observations	2,200	722
R^2		0.141
Adjusted R^2		0.122
Log Likelihood	−1,260.259	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,554.519	
Residual Std. Error		0.866 (df = 705)
F Statistic		7.248*** (df = 16; 705)
Note:		*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

A-5.2 Unweighted analysis

Table A9: Correlates of Support for Refugee Integration and Hosting (Unweighted)

	Dependent variable:	
	logistic	OLS
	Integration Support	Hosting Support
	(1)	(2)
Age	−0.022***	−0.001
	(0.005)	(0.003)
Woman	0.259***	0.072
	(0.095)	(0.069)
Single	0.290**	0.229***
	(0.116)	(0.085)
Income	0.187***	0.057
	(0.054)	(0.038)
Educ: Primary	0.163	0.269
	(0.301)	(0.205)
Educ: Secondary	0.438	0.369*
	(0.298)	(0.204)
Educ: Tertiary/Adult	0.730**	0.476**
	(0.302)	(0.207)
Unemployed	−0.097	−0.123
	(0.110)	(0.078)
Agriculture	−0.069	−0.006
	(0.122)	(0.089)
Econ. Vuln.	0.036	0.136
	(0.119)	(0.088)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	0.687**	0.595***
	(0.336)	(0.214)
Rel: Christian	0.246	0.123
	(0.200)	(0.152)
Rel: Islam	0.272	0.225
	(0.286)	(0.202)
Displaced	0.128	0.069
	(0.146)	(0.110)
Socio. Econ. Concern	−0.051	−0.079**
	(0.049)	(0.036)
Close Contact	0.207*	0.198***
	(0.109)	(0.076)
Constant	0.083	−0.381
	(0.404)	(0.293)
Data	Nat rep	Nat rep, Control
Observations	2,200	722
R^2		0.097
Adjusted R^2		0.076
Log Likelihood	−1,420.416	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,874.833	
Residual Std. Error		0.863 (df = 705)
F Statistic		4.716*** (df = 16; 705)
Note:		*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

A-5.3 Alternative Measures

We include an alternative measure of sociotropic concerns based on the question, "How concerned are you about the following issues in Kenya, if at all? Cost of living" Respondents answered this question on a scale of 1 (not concerned) to 4 (very concerned), which we then

standardized. Table A10 shows similar results to the main measure of sociotropic economic concerns, which is that there is no correlation between concern about the cost of living and support for refugee integration or hosting.

Table A10: Correlates of Support for Refugee Integration and Hosting (Alt. IV: Socio. Econ. Concern)

	Dependent variable:	
	logistic	OLS
	Integration Support	Hosting Support
	(1)	(2)
Age	−0.023***	−0.002
	(0.005)	(0.003)
Woman	0.179*	0.135*
	(0.097)	(0.072)
Single	0.212*	0.264***
	(0.125)	(0.094)
Income	0.241***	0.118***
	(0.057)	(0.040)
Educ: Primary	0.179	0.430***
	(0.182)	(0.124)
Educ: Secondary	0.467**	0.526***
	(0.190)	(0.133)
Educ: Tertiary/Adult	0.760***	0.582***
	(0.214)	(0.151)
Unemployed	−0.134	−0.189**
	(0.111)	(0.080)
Agriculture	0.099	0.064
	(0.118)	(0.088)
Econ. Worse	0.152	0.175**
	(0.115)	(0.086)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	0.872***	0.711***
	(0.302)	(0.197)
Rel: Christian	0.396*	−0.031
	(0.216)	(0.161)
Rel: Islam	0.294	0.172
	(0.300)	(0.209)
Displaced	0.071	−0.039
	(0.150)	(0.119)
Cost Concern	−0.005	0.019
	(0.045)	(0.033)
Close Contact	0.309**	0.297***
	(0.121)	(0.086)
Constant	−0.052	−0.407
	(0.336)	(0.256)
Data	Nat rep	Nat rep, Control
Observations	2,201	723
R^2		0.139
Adjusted R^2		0.119
Log Likelihood	−1,262.097	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,558.194	
Residual Std. Error		0.878 (df = 706)
F Statistic		7.122*** (df = 16; 706)
Note:		*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

A-5.4 Exploring contact, proximity, and exposure

There are different ways of measuring contact, and different levels of contact that hosts can have with refugees. We included questions in our survey that allows us to understand what type of contact is the most meaningful. We test contact in terms of: close contact vs. an acquaintance vs. a person that you have seen in a public area; perception of presence of a refugee group in a citizen's area; and living in a refugee-hosting county.

What follows is the wording of the questions used in the survey. Refugee presence question: "We now want to ask you about refugees in [respondent's ward]. How many refugees are living in [respondent's ward] today?" Refugee presence on a scale from 1 (none) to 4 (very many). Somali (South Sudanese) presence is 1 if respondent perceives any Somali (South Sudanese) refugees in their ward, and 0 otherwise. Contact question: "Over the past year, how often have you interacted with a refugee in the following ways?" Close: "Someone close to you, like a family member, partner, friend, or neighbor." Acquaintance: "Someone you see often, like in school, training, work, or place of worship." Interact: "Someone you have interacted with but don't know, like in a market, restaurant, shop".

Table A11 shows that what matters most for contact is having a close contact who is a refugee. Table A12 shows that there is no interaction effect between living in a refugee-hosting county and having a close contact who is a refugee.

Table A11: Correlations Between Types of Contact and Support for Refugee Integration and Hosting

	Dependent variable:	
	logistic	OLS
	Integration Support	Hosting Support
	(1)	(2)
Contact: Interact	−0.234	0.277
	(0.374)	(0.254)
Contact: Acquiantance	0.294	0.151
	(0.229)	(0.207)
Contact: Close	0.372***	0.278***
	(0.111)	(0.077)
Refugee presence	0.032	0.008
	(0.052)	(0.035)
Somali presence	0.161	−0.050
	(0.130)	(0.095)
South Sudanese presence	0.179	−0.150
	(0.163)	(0.115)
Garissa	0.084	−0.084
	(0.190)	(0.135)
Turkana	−0.071	0.367***
	(0.127)	(0.091)
Data	Full	Full, Control
Controls	X	X
Observations	2,489	826
R^2		0.172
Adjusted R^2		0.148
Log Likelihood	−1,474.036	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,996.072	
Residual Std. Error		0.857 (df = 802)
F Statistic		7.227*** (df = 23; 802)
Note:		*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

Table A12: Correlates of Support for Refugee Integration and Hosting (inc. Refugee-hosting Counties)

	Dependent variable:			
	logistic		OLS	
	Integration Support	Integration Support	Hosting Support	Hosting Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	−0.020***	−0.020***	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Woman	0.201**	0.201**	0.131**	0.133**
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Single	0.188*	0.188*	0.143*	0.144*
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Income	0.134***	0.133***	0.085***	0.086***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Educ: Primary	0.310**	0.311**	0.355***	0.352***
	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Educ: Secondary	0.533***	0.536***	0.421***	0.419***
	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.107)	(0.108)
Educ: Tertiary/Adult	0.787***	0.788***	0.474***	0.468***
	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.118)	(0.119)
Unemployed	0.007	0.007	−0.162**	−0.164**
	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Agriculture	0.098	0.097	0.041	0.039
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Econ. Vuln.	0.132	0.133	0.077	0.078
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	1.036***	1.039***	0.772***	0.768***
	(0.249)	(0.249)	(0.162)	(0.162)
Christianity	0.363*	0.365*	−0.039	−0.039
	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Islam	0.295	0.296	−0.005	−0.008
	(0.271)	(0.271)	(0.189)	(0.189)
Displaced	−0.014	−0.013	0.031	0.031
	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Socio. Econ. Concern	−0.109**	−0.109**	−0.078***	−0.078***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Close Contact	0.362***	0.338***	0.262***	0.256***
	(0.101)	(0.124)	(0.069)	(0.087)
Garissa	0.079	0.055	−0.177	−0.157
	(0.178)	(0.194)	(0.118)	(0.134)
Turkana	−0.045	−0.062	0.261***	0.228**
	(0.120)	(0.147)	(0.086)	(0.111)
Garissa X Close Contact		0.096		−0.045
		(0.303)		(0.176)
Turkana X Close Contact		0.054		0.072
		(0.242)		(0.168)
Constant	−0.255	−0.253	−0.243	−0.242
	(0.301)	(0.301)	(0.223)	(0.223)
Data	Full	Full	Full, Control	Full, Control
Observations	2,915	2,915	974	974
R^2			0.150	0.150
Adjusted R^2			0.134	0.132
Log Likelihood	−1,703.883	−1,703.885		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,445.766	3,449.770		
Residual Std. Error			0.852 (df = 955)	0.853 (df = 953)
F Statistic			9.346*** (df = 18; 955)	8.413*** (df = 20; 953)
Note:				*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

A-5.5 Linearity Assumption

We include three variables that are either continuous or binned, rather than binary: income, sociotropic economic concern, and age. In our analysis, we assume that the relationship between these variables and support for integration is linear. To check this assumption, we create scatterplots of the data, plotting the main outcome variable (Integration Support) against the independent variables. While Fig. A2 suggests that there is a nonlinear relationship particularly between sociotropic economic concerns and support for refugee integration, the BIC analysis in Table A13 suggests not including higher-order polynomials.

Figure A2: Checking Linearity



Table A13: Assessing Model Fit for Higher-Order Terms

iv	order	BIC
Socio. Econ. Conc.	2	3012.652
Socio. Econ. Conc.	3	3014.414
Socio. Econ. Conc.	4	3022.526
Income	2	2661.181
Income	3	2668.799
Income	4	2676.877
Age	2	2956.475
Age	3	2963.935
Age	4	2970.824

A-5.6 Minority Opposition to Refugees

Table A14 shows that the minority most opposed to refugee integration are older with lower incomes and less education, and less likely to be ethnic kin or close contacts with refugees. Table A15 shows that this group is not geographically concentrated, though the province with most strongly opposed is the Rift Valley.

Table A14: Correlates of Opposition to Refugees

	Dependent variable:	
	Most Opposed to Hosting	Preference to Send Back
	(1)	(2)
Age	−0.012	0.016***
	(0.011)	(0.005)
Woman	−0.252	0.037
	(0.231)	(0.104)
Single	−0.688**	−0.179
	(0.303)	(0.131)
Income	−0.128	−0.153***
	(0.132)	(0.059)
Educ: Primary	−1.422**	−0.301
	(0.596)	(0.307)
Educ: Secondary	−1.661***	−0.706**
	(0.600)	(0.306)
Educ: Tertiary/Adult	−2.192***	−1.026***
	(0.626)	(0.314)
Unemployed	0.261	−0.025
	(0.251)	(0.122)
Agriculture	−0.008	0.088
	(0.280)	(0.129)
Econ. Vuln.	−0.450	0.029
	(0.300)	(0.129)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	−16.050	−1.216***
	(632.485)	(0.409)
Rel: Christian	0.062	−0.250
	(0.488)	(0.216)
Rel: Islam	0.034	−0.078
	(0.628)	(0.305)
Displaced	0.065	−0.045
	(0.364)	(0.162)
Socio. Econ. Concern	0.387**	−0.0004
	(0.152)	(0.055)
Close Contact	−0.455	−0.396***
	(0.282)	(0.129)
Constant	0.783	−0.480
	(0.911)	(0.424)
Data	Nat rep, Control	Nat rep
Observations	722	2,200
Log Likelihood	−287.659	−1,225.555
Akaike Inf. Crit.	609.317	2,485.109

Note: *p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

Table A15: Geographic Distribution of Most Opposed

Province	Count	Proportion
Rift Valley	183	0.26
Eastern	110	0.16
Nyanza	88	0.13
Western	83	0.12
Coast	80	0.12
Central	77	0.11
Nairobi	58	0.08
North Eastern	15	0.02

A-6 Experiments

A-6.1 Di! erence-in-Means and ATE tables

Table A16: Difference-in-Means, Policy Experiment

% Support			Diff. btwn treatments		
Services	Work	Movement	Services – Movement	Services – Work	Work – Movement
71.41	72.98	64.42	7 (3.48)**	-1.56 (3.57)	8.56 (3.57)**

Note: Support includes "Somewhat support", "Strongly support", and "Neutral".

Table A17: ATE, Nationality Experiment

Control	Refugees from Somalia		Refugees from South Sudan	
% Support	% Support	ATE	% Support	ATE
53.22	28.54	-24.68 (0.02)***	46.58	-6.64 (0.03)***

Note: Support includes "Somewhat support", "Strongly support", and "Neutral".

A-6.2 Unweighted analysis

Figure A3: Unweighted Experiment ATEs



Note: Raw mean estimates of support for each policy dimension and refugee nationality with 95% confidence intervals. Policy experiment sample excludes respondents with existing policy awareness. The dashed line represents the neutral midpoint of the support scale.

A-6.3 Manipulation Check

We include a manipulation check that filters out respondents who did not understand the policy that they were being given information about in the policy experiment. We filtered out respondents who said that they did not know or could not answer, as well as those who gave an answer that did not directly speak to the information provided to them in the prompt. This involves obvious contradictions, such as sending refugees back or keeping them in camps, as well as vagueness that suggests that the respondent did not fully understand the information (e.g., "refugees live freely in Kenya" rather than "refugees move freely in Kenya"). Respondents sometimes took this as an opportunity to begin discussing their opinions on the policy, and therefore did not relay the information they had just been told back to the enumerator. We erred on the side of being conservative in these cases, and only included responses where it was clear that they had understood the treatment given.

It should be noted that there was sometimes overlap in respondents' understanding of the services and movement treatment, with respondents mentioning "move freely" and "live among Kenyans" in both. For the services treatment, we only included respondents who clearly mentioned something related to services. We therefore excluded respondents who gave correct information about changing the camps to settlements, or said that refugees will be able to live with Kenyans, to clearly differentiate between this treatment arm and the movement

rights treatment arm. On the services treatment, respondents mostly discussed this being about refugees getting access to services, not locals, despite the prompt suggesting that both groups will benefit from donor services. With respect to the work treatment, we filtered out respondents who thought that the policy was the government giving refugees capital for their businesses, other financial aid, or jobs, rather than them seeking out these opportunities themselves.

A-6.4 Slicing the sample

For the survey experiments, we slice the sample into two gender groups to see how stable the findings are. We are limited to gender because of small sample sizes. We find that the results for both experiments are similar across genders, except women are driving reductions in support for South Sudanese refugees compared to the control condition in the nationality experiment.

Figure A4: Gender Split (Policy Experiment)



Note: Weighted mean estimates of support for each policy dimension with 95% confidence intervals. Sample excludes NA and respondents with existing policy awareness. The dashed line represents the neutral midpoint of the support scale.

Figure A5: Gender Split (Nationality Experiment)



Note: Weighted mean estimates of support for integration of di! erent refugee nationalities with 95% confidence intervals. The dashed line represents the neutral midpoint of the support scale.

A-6.5 Scripts

Nationality Experiment

"We now want to ask you about [REFUGEES/REFUGEES FROM SOMALIA/ REFUGEES FROM SOUTH SUDAN]. To what extent do you support or oppose Kenya hosting [REFUGEES/REFUGEES FROM SOMALIA/REFUGEES FROM SOUTH SUDAN]?"

"Imagine that the Kenyan government was going to enable refugees to move to different areas throughout the country. Would you support or oppose [REFUGEES/REFUGEES FROM SOMALIA/REFUGEES FROM SOUTH SUDAN] moving into [RESPONDENT'S COUNTY]?"

"Why do you [SUPPORT/OPPOSE] Kenya hosting [REFUGEES/REFUGEES FROM SOMALIA/REFUGEES FROM SOUTH SUDAN]?"

Policy Experiment

The government have announced changes to refugee policy in Kenya. Have you heard about these changes?

Please tell me what you know about these policy changes.

I am now going to give you some information about these changes. Please listen carefully as

I am going to ask you questions about this information.

[WORK] One of the proposed policy changes is to increase the ability of refugees from certain East African countries—including South Sudan, DR. Congo, and Somalia—to work. These refugees will be given increased access to work permits, financial services like M-PESA, and support to start businesses.

[MOVEMENT] One of the proposed policy changes is to allow refugees from certain East African countries—including South Sudan, DR. Congo, and Somalia—to move freely throughout Kenya. These refugees will be able to settle into new neighbourhoods and live among Kenyan communities.

[SERVICES] One of the proposed policy changes is to convert existing refugee camps into integrated settlements, where refugees from certain East African countries — including South Sudan, DR Congo, and Somalia — will live alongside local residents. Both refugees and Kenyans in these areas will be able to access services provided by donors and NGOs, such as healthcare and education."

Just to make sure you understand what I've told you about the proposed policy, can you tell me, in your own words, what the policy is?

To what extent do you support or oppose this proposed policy change?

What impact do you think this policy will have in Kenya?

A-7 HTEs

A-7.1 Regression tables for correlates

Table A18: Correlates of Support for Integration Policy Dimensions

	Dependent variable:		
	Services	Work	Movement
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Income	0.036 (0.069)	0.055 (0.085)	→ 0.186$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.082)
Econ. Vuln.	0.107 (0.155)	0.030 (0.162)	0.225 (0.149)
Unemployed	→ 0.066 (0.134)	→ 0.242 (0.161)	0.130 (0.152)
Agriculture	0.180 (0.146)	0.0005 (0.165)	0.106 (0.171)
Close Contact	0.100 (0.157)	0.111 (0.187)	0.243 (0.181)
Socio. Econ. Concern	→ 0.153$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.062)	0.147$^{\uparrow}$ (0.078)	→ 0.219$^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.069)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	0.319 (0.424)	0.642 (0.519)	0.281 (0.380)
Rel:Christianity	→ 0.187 (0.252)	0.167 (0.307)	→ 0.608$^{\uparrow}$ (0.332)
Rel: Islam	0.194 (0.368)	0.431 (0.546)	→ 0.520 (0.427)
Woman	0.239$^{\uparrow}$ (0.125)	0.290$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.135)	0.010 (0.131)
Age	→ 0.008 (0.005)	→ 0.016$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.007)	→ 0.008 (0.006)
Displaced	0.537$^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.192)	0.008 (0.266)	→ 0.018 (0.196)
Single	0.274$^{\uparrow}$ (0.141)	0.119 (0.191)	→ 0.005 (0.175)
Education	0.080 (0.067)	→ 0.100 (0.086)	0.188$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.079)
Constant	0.099 (0.333)	0.151 (0.400)	0.489 (0.410)
Data	Services (Natrep, P)	Work (Natrep, P)	Movement (Natrep, P)
Observations	348	220	279
R^2	0.116	0.116	0.148
Adjusted R^2	0.079	0.055	0.103
Residual Std. Error	1.033 (df = 333)	0.958 (df = 205)	1.010 (df = 264)
F Statistic	3.121$^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$ (df = 14; 333)	1.913$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (df = 14; 205)	3.272$^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$ (df = 14; 264)

Note: $^{\uparrow}$p< 0.1; $^{\uparrow\uparrow}$p< 0.05; $^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$p< 0.01

Table A19: Correlates of Support for Integration Policy Dimensions (inc. Refugee-Hosting Areas)

	Dependent variable:		
	Services	Work	Movement
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Income	0.033 (0.056)	0.029 (0.068)	→ 0.188$^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.062)
Econ. Vuln.	0.064 (0.127)	0.084 (0.136)	0.196 (0.122)
Unemployed	0.029 (0.109)	→ 0.156 (0.132)	0.048 (0.122)
Agriculture	0.129 (0.134)	→ 0.004 (0.155)	0.235 (0.154)
Close Contact	0.147 (0.123)	0.053 (0.151)	0.339$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.146)
Socio. Econ. Concern	→ 0.134$^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.050)	0.044 (0.065)	→ 0.143$^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.051)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	0.158 (0.339)	0.235 (0.435)	0.006 (0.290)
Rel:Christianity	→ 0.236 (0.233)	0.157 (0.304)	→ 0.695$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.320)
Rel: Islam	0.123 (0.328)	0.543 (0.478)	→ 0.431 (0.387)
Woman	0.225$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.104)	0.265$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.122)	0.053 (0.109)
Age	→ 0.005 (0.005)	→ 0.010$^{\uparrow}$ (0.006)	→ 0.011$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.005)
Displaced	0.448$^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.154)	0.190 (0.212)	0.123 (0.172)
Single	0.288$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.118)	0.157 (0.156)	→ 0.028 (0.140)
Education	0.057 (0.054)	→ 0.024 (0.067)	0.162$^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.059)
Garissa	0.134 (0.244)	→ 0.050 (0.241)	0.438$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (0.214)
Turkana	0.213 (0.159)	0.212 (0.184)	0.264 (0.172)
Constant	0.031 (0.298)	→ 0.051 (0.383)	0.578 (0.379)
Data	Services (Full, P)	Work (Full, P)	Movement (Full, P)
Observations	446	290	374
R^2	0.139	0.102	0.185
Adjusted R^2	0.107	0.049	0.149
Residual Std. Error	0.984 (df = 429)	0.957 (df = 273)	0.979 (df = 357)
F Statistic	4.340$^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$ (df = 16; 429)	1.928$^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ (df = 16; 273)	5.081$^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$ (df = 16; 357)

Note: $^{\uparrow}$p< 0.1; $^{\uparrow\uparrow}$p< 0.05; $^{\uparrow\uparrow\uparrow}$p< 0.01

Table A20: Correlates of Support for Refugee Nationalities

	Dependent variable:			
	S. Sudanese	Somali	S. Sudanese	Somali
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income	0.092**	−0.008	0.067*	0.017
	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Econ. Vuln.	0.050	0.023	0.103	0.030
	(0.091)	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.067)
Unemployed	0.032	−0.194**	0.113	−0.082
	(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.066)
Agriculture	0.062	−0.022	0.028	−0.004
	(0.090)	(0.079)	(0.088)	(0.081)
Close Contact	0.103	0.502***	0.116	0.365***
	(0.092)	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.071)
Socio. Econ. Concern	−0.048	0.051	−0.094***	0.007
	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.028)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	0.613***	0.706***	0.589***	0.980***
	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.183)	(0.186)
Rel: Christianity	0.369**	0.044	0.312**	0.096
	(0.159)	(0.134)	(0.156)	(0.134)
Rel: Islam	0.085	0.381*	0.127	0.251
	(0.221)	(0.223)	(0.207)	(0.202)
Woman	−0.224***	−0.074	−0.191***	−0.026
	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.059)
Age	−0.004	−0.004	−0.001	−0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Displaced	−0.028	−0.032	0.026	−0.076
	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.094)	(0.087)
Single	0.193**	−0.006	0.159**	−0.055
	(0.093)	(0.084)	(0.080)	(0.074)
Education	0.039	0.055	0.046	0.042
	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.030)
Garissa			−0.203	−0.264**
			(0.134)	(0.124)
Turkana			−0.154	0.082
			(0.096)	(0.082)
Constant	−0.163	−0.341*	−0.252	−0.412**
	(0.215)	(0.179)	(0.203)	(0.175)
Data	S. Sudanese (Natrep)	Somali (Natrep)	S. Sudanese (Full)	Somali (Full)
Observations	743	744	975	986
R^2	0.071	0.155	0.065	0.162
Adjusted R^2	0.053	0.138	0.050	0.148
Residual Std. Error	0.935 (df = 728)	0.789 (df = 729)	0.951 (df = 958)	0.838 (df = 969)
F Statistic	3.962*** (df = 14; 728)	9.520*** (df = 14; 729)	4.195*** (df = 16; 958)	11.682*** (df = 16; 969)

Note: *p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

A-7.2 HTE regression table and plots

Table A21: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Policy Experiment

	Dependent variable:	
	Policy Support	Policy Support
	(1)	(2)
Income	−0.186** (0.082)	−0.188*** (0.062)
Services	−0.390 (0.522)	−0.547 (0.479)
Work	−0.339 (0.586)	−0.629 (0.543)
Econ. Vuln.	0.225 (0.148)	0.196 (0.122)
Unemployed	0.130 (0.152)	0.048 (0.122)
Agriculture	0.106 (0.170)	0.235 (0.154)
Close Contact	0.243 (0.180)	0.339** (0.146)
Socio. Econ. Concern	−0.219*** (0.069)	−0.143*** (0.051)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	0.281 (0.379)	0.006 (0.289)
Rel: Christianity	−0.608* (0.331)	−0.695** (0.319)
Rel: Islam	−0.520 (0.425)	−0.431 (0.386)
Woman	0.010 (0.130)	0.053 (0.108)
Age	−0.008 (0.006)	−0.011** (0.005)
Displaced	−0.018 (0.196)	0.123 (0.171)
Single	−0.005 (0.175)	−0.028 (0.140)
Education	0.188** (0.079)	0.162*** (0.059)
Garissa		0.438** (0.213)
Turkana		0.264 (0.171)
Income X Services	0.222** (0.106)	0.221*** (0.083)
Income X Work	0.241** (0.121)	0.218** (0.093)
Services X Econ. Vuln.	−0.119 (0.212)	−0.131 (0.175)
Work X Econ. Vuln.	−0.196 (0.226)	−0.112 (0.184)
Services X Unemployed	−0.196 (0.200)	−0.019 (0.163)
Work X Unemployed	−0.371 (0.227)	−0.204 (0.182)
Services X Agriculture	0.075 (0.222)	−0.106 (0.203)
Work X Agriculture	−0.105 (0.243)	−0.239 (0.221)
Services X Close Contact	−0.143 (0.237)	−0.193 (0.190)
Work X Close Contact	−0.132 (0.267)	−0.286 (0.211)
Services X Socio. Econ. Concern	0.066 (0.092)	0.010 (0.071)
Work X Socio. Econ. Concern	0.366*** (0.107)	0.188** (0.084)
Services X Ethnic Kin	0.038 (0.561)	0.153 (0.444)
Work X Ethnic Kin	0.360 (0.664)	0.229 (0.529)
Services X Rel: Christianity	0.421 (0.412)	0.458 (0.394)
Work X Rel: Christianity	0.775* (0.462)	0.852* (0.444)
Services X Rel: Islam	0.714 (0.556)	0.554 (0.505)
Work X Rel: Islam	0.952 (0.714)	0.974 (0.621)
Services X Woman	0.229 (0.178)	0.172 (0.149)
Work X Woman	0.279 (0.193)	0.212 (0.165)
Services X Age	0.001 (0.008)	0.006 (0.007)
Work X Age	−0.008 (0.010)	0.001 (0.008)
Services X Displaced	0.555** (0.271)	0.325 (0.230)
Work X Displaced	0.026 (0.341)	0.067 (0.275)
Services X Single	0.278 (0.222)	0.315* (0.182)
Work X Single	0.123 (0.266)	0.185 (0.212)
Services X Education	−0.108 (0.103)	−0.105 (0.080)
Work X Education	−0.288** (0.120)	−0.185** (0.090)
Services X Garissa		−0.304 (0.322)
Work X Garissa		−0.488 (0.325)
Services X Turkana		−0.051 (0.233)
Work X Turkana		−0.052 (0.254)
Constant	0.489 (0.409)	0.578 (0.377)
Data	Control (Natrep, P)	Control (Full, P)
Observations	847	1,110
R^2	0.136	0.154
Adjusted R^2	0.089	0.114
Residual Std. Error	1.007 (df = 802)	0.975 (df = 1059)
F Statistic	2.868*** (df = 44; 802)	3.865*** (df = 50; 1059)
Note:		*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

Figure A6: Policy Experiment HTEs



Note: Predicted probability of policy support across di! erent treatment groups (Services, Movement, Work) at di! erent values of variables with statistically significant coe" cients in Tab. A21. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Baseline of a married man of mean age, mean income, mean education, mean food security, employed, not working in agriculture, not ethnic kin, Christian, mean sociotropic concern, not displaced, and mean contact with refugees. Dashed line represents the null e! ect.

Table A22: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Nationality Experiment

	Dependent variable:	
	Hosting Support	Hosting Support
	(1)	(2)
Income	0.079* (0.041)	0.087** (0.035)
Somali	−0.884*** (0.296)	−0.928*** (0.282)
S. Sudanese	−0.706** (0.298)	−0.768*** (0.284)
Econ. Vuln.	0.252*** (0.086)	0.143* (0.075)
Unemployed	−0.059 (0.081)	−0.053 (0.070)
Agriculture	−0.148* (0.089)	−0.103 (0.088)
Close Contact	0.369*** (0.087)	0.367*** (0.073)
Socio. Econ. Concern	−0.093** (0.038)	−0.089*** (0.031)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	0.065 (0.205)	0.160 (0.172)
Rel: Christianity	−0.138 (0.163)	−0.186 (0.164)
Rel: Islam	0.048 (0.210)	−0.103 (0.202)
Woman	0.075 (0.073)	0.109* (0.065)
Age	−0.013*** (0.004)	−0.010*** (0.003)
Single	0.224** (0.095)	0.195** (0.083)
Education	0.027 (0.041)	0.063* (0.034)
Displaced	−0.116 (0.124)	−0.124 (0.101)
Garissa		0.095 (0.127)
Turkana		0.053 (0.092)
Somali X Income	−0.086 (0.061)	−0.070 (0.050)
S. Sudanese X Income	0.013 (0.058)	−0.019 (0.049)
Somali X Econ. Vuln.	−0.229* (0.120)	−0.113 (0.105)
S. Sudanese X Econ. Vuln.	−0.202* (0.122)	−0.039 (0.107)
Somali X Unemployed	−0.134 (0.119)	−0.029 (0.101)
S. Sudanese X Unemployed	0.091 (0.115)	0.165* (0.100)
Somali X Agriculture	0.125 (0.126)	0.098 (0.124)
S. Sudanese X Agriculture	0.210* (0.124)	0.130 (0.122)
Somali X Close Contact	0.133 (0.127)	−0.002 (0.107)
S. Sudanese X Close Contact	−0.266** (0.123)	−0.252** (0.106)
Somali X Socio. Econ. Concern	0.143*** (0.052)	0.096** (0.044)
S. Sudanese X Socio. Econ. Concern	0.045 (0.053)	−0.005 (0.045)
Somali X Ethnic Kin	0.641* (0.328)	0.819*** (0.266)
S. Sudanese X Ethnic Kin	0.548* (0.297)	0.428* (0.247)
Somali X Rel: Christianity	0.182 (0.222)	0.282 (0.220)
S. Sudanese X Rel: Christianity	0.507** (0.222)	0.498** (0.222)
Somali X Rel: Islam	0.334 (0.327)	0.354 (0.299)
S. Sudanese X Rel: Islam	0.037 (0.296)	0.230 (0.284)
Somali X Woman	−0.149 (0.103)	−0.134 (0.091)
S. Sudanese X Woman	−0.300*** (0.102)	−0.300*** (0.091)
Somali X Age	0.009* (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)
S. Sudanese X Age	0.009* (0.005)	0.009** (0.004)
Somali X Single	−0.230* (0.134)	−0.250** (0.116)
S. Sudanese X Single	−0.031 (0.130)	−0.037 (0.113)
Somali X Education	0.028 (0.058)	−0.021 (0.048)
S. Sudanese X Education	0.012 (0.058)	−0.017 (0.049)
Somali X Displaced	0.084 (0.171)	0.048 (0.139)
S. Sudanese X Displaced	0.088 (0.157)	0.149 (0.136)
Somali X Garissa		−0.359* (0.186)
S. Sudanese X Garissa		−0.298* (0.181)
Somali X Turkana		0.029 (0.128)
S. Sudanese X Turkana		−0.207 (0.130)
Constant	0.543** (0.217)	0.516** (0.207)
Data	Natrep	Full
Observations	2,208	2,934
R^2	0.152	0.147
Adjusted R^2	0.135	0.132
Residual Std. Error	0.889 (df = 2163)	0.915 (df = 2883)
F Statistic	8.803*** (df = 44; 2163)	9.950*** (df = 50; 2883)
Note:		*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

Figure A7: Nationality Experiment HTEs



Note: Predicted probability of policy support across di! erent treatment groups (Control, Somali, South Sudanese) at di! erent values of variables with statistically significant coe" cients in Tab. A21. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Baseline of a married man of mean age, mean income, mean education, mean food security, employed, not working in agriculture, not ethnic kin, Christian, mean sociotropic concern, not displaced, and mean contact with refugees. Dashed line represents the null e! ect.

A-7.3 Linearity Assumption for HTEs

To understand HTEs, we use multiplicative interaction models that interact the treatment with the moderators. We make the linear interaction effect assumption (LIE), that the effect of the treatment on the outcome can only linearly change with the moderators at a constant rate (given by the regression coefficient). Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019) recommends proving the LIE when including interaction terms between the treatment and moderators. To do this, we present Linear Interaction Diagnostic plots for the policy experiment in Fig. A-7.3 and the nationality experiment in Fig. A-7.3.

The only interactions that are potentially an issue are the interactions between sociotropic economic concern with the work treatment in the policy experiment and with "refugees from Somalia" in the nationality experiment. To investigate this further, we created binning plots with 3 bins and robust standard errors (not shown here). We conduct a Wald test for each of these interactions and find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the linear interaction model and the three-bin model are statistically equivalent for age and income in both experiments. There is not enough variation in the sociotropic economic concern variable to reject the null hypothesis.

We are therefore comfortable with the assumption of a linear relationship between the three variables that are either continuous or binned (age, sociotropic economic concern, and income) and support in each of the treatment groups in both experiments.

Figure A8: Linear Interaction Diagnostic Plots (Policy Experiment)



Figure A9: Linear Interaction Diagnostic Plots (Nationality Experiment)



A-8 Open-ends

A-8.1 Coding scheme

Two research assistants hand-coded based on the coding scheme that was devised through reviewing and categorizing 10 percent of the sample's responses. We then checked all responses for errors and consistency. Respondents could state more than one type of impact in their response.

- **Security (all except terrorism):** crime, guns, drugs, wars, violence, arms, harm, hurt, conflict, general insecurity, chaos, instability, other
- **Security (terrorism):** terrorism, terrorists, Westgate attacks, Al Shabaab
- **Economy NEGATIVE:** businesses, employment, jobs, taxes, corruption, resources, cost of living, access to services, housing, dependency, healthcare, school, Kenyans should be given NGO support instead of refugees
- **Cultural NEGATIVE:** morals, cultural/tribal/ethnic differences, changes to culture, trust, politics and voting
- **Reputation/Reciprocity NEGATIVE:** relationships with other countries, enemy countries
- **Population growth:** Concern about refugee population growing, not returning home, people should stay in their country
- **Fear:** not sure whether people are coming illegally, worry that they don't know what their intentions are, whether they will be bad people
- **Economy POSITIVE:** businesses, employment, jobs, taxes, trade, work, resources, access to services, NGOs, housing, healthcare, school
- **Cultural POSITIVE:** community, togetherness, unity, similar to Kenyans, grew up and studied here, been here for a while already, friendship, new ideas/innovation
- **Reputation/Reciprocity POSITIVE:** relationships with other countries, reputation (globally or regionally), Kenya may need help in future, diplomacy
- **Humanitarian:** human beings, humanity, people need help, should have rights, deserve sanctuary, right thing to do, they are facing a hard situation, cannot go back, be good neighbors, Kenya is peaceful, they moved due to insecurity
- **Other:** no impact, any other reason not listed here
- **Don't Know:** if someone says they don't know, not audible, unclear, empty box

A-8.2 Additional analysis

We conduct additional analyses of the open-ended responses, examining factors that are outside the hypotheses that we tested in the paper. In this section, we include insights from interviews conducted during 8 months of fieldwork.

Policy Experiment

Some participants said that movement rights would *improve* refugee-related security concerns in the country. They argued that interaction between refugees and locals would "reduce racism" and "tribalism" and lead to more "community cohesion" with people "learn[ing] to treat each other normally". Relatedly, respondents rarely discussed concerns about negative effects of movement rights on culture. On the contrary, some respondents said that they did not have a problem with refugees, since many of them had already been living in the country for a long time or were born there, and therefore had adopted (or mixed well with) Kenyan culture.* Others said that they are "Africans like us" and that there should be free movement across all of East Africa.

Interestingly, respondents often cited reasons why refugees should be given asylum that are outside the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention, such as "famine", "hunger", "floods", and lack of "homes" in their countries. This suggests that Kenyans have a broader idea of the causes of flight that should allow for people to claim asylum, with economic and climate causes of flight being grounds in addition to war and persecution.*

Nationality Experiment

Respondents were more likely to discuss both economic benefits and concerns with Somali refugees related to their success in business. Somalis are perceived as wealthy business people, who often have more skills and capital than Kenyans and strong trade networks with Somalia. While some saw this as an economic boon to the country, providing Kenyans with jobs and improving the economy, others saw this as an economic threat (see Table A23 for examples).

While Somalis were the least favored group, our experiment also found that Kenyans support South Sudanese refugees less than refugees in general. The impact question suggests that this was because Kenyans do not associate South Sudanese refugees with negative impacts on security or culture, but they do with the economy. The economic concerns mentioned were in line with those discussed in the main body of the paper, including job competition and resource scarcity. While there was no significant association with South Sudanese refugees with negative security impacts generally, participants did mention specific security issues with respect to this group. Fieldwork interviews suggest that the major source of violence and insecurity with respect to South Sudanese refugees is within themselves; the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups are known to be violent towards each other within the camp and, for

*Examples: "Most of them have been born, lived and study in Kenya"; "Because they are one of us"; "They have been here before so why do we chase them away? They have been living with us peacefully. Let them live freely."

*This aligns with the more expansive refugee definition in the African Union's 1969 OAU Convention, which includes not only individuals facing persecution but also those fleeing "external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order".

this reason, are separated across different areas of Kakuma. The other gruop most likely to be the subject of violence in Turkana is LGBTQ+ refugees. This information suggests that respondents largely do not think that insecurity on the camp would necessarily lead to violence between refugees and locals. However, some mentioned that South Sudanese refugees were responsible for transporting weapons to Kakuma.

Interview respondents suggested that the Turkana people are poor and benefit from the increased demand to sell their goods on the camp. However, fieldwork interviews also suggested that a source of tension between Kakuma residents and Turkana locals is that refugees have access to more services than Kenyans, they are wealthier and paid more by international organizations than local councils pay Kenyans for the same work, and that Kenyan citizens from Nairobi or other areas are hired over Turkana people by international refugee organizations because of their lower levels of education. These tensions, however, have been somewhat alleviated by a new rule in Kenya that requires NGOs to provide a proportion of their funding and services for host community members.

A strong sentiment among those who oppose refugee hosting was concerns about discrimination in favor of refugees. Kenyans argued that the government provides more support for refugees than its own citizens. They argue that the government should focus on dealing with its failings with respect to poverty and lack of resources and jobs for Kenyans before helping foreigners.* This was particularly the case with respect to Somali refugees, who are considered to be wealthier than refugees. This was echoed in fieldwork interviews, with one journalist saying, "People wonder with the UN why they are not giving more money to Turkana county, which is dying of starvation right next to Kakuma."

Another common theme was Kenyans feeling as though the refugees were not grateful for the asylum that the country has provided them, and that they are rude to citizens despite their hospitality.*

A-8.3 Examples

Below is a selection of quotes from the open-ended questions in the policy and nationality experiments. Some quotes have been edited for comprehension.

A-8.3.1 Policy Experiment

Work Rights

- "It will lead to the creation of job opportunities."
- "It will give every person an opportunity to work."

*Examples: "They help refugees and forget Kenyans", "When we welcome refugees, you find that we give a lot to foreigners and then we forget our own people... they are the ones who are getting rich from the current government unlike us."

*Example: "I'm in a dilemma. I know [refugees] don't run out of their places due to fun, but they are arrogant sometimes. You rent them your house, they destroy it, by the time you come back, you need to reconstruct again."

- “Economic growth because if they are able to work they will be able to pay taxes.”
- “When they’re offered those business licenses, when people are getting employed, the number of people getting jobs is high, it will increase the economy and the government will earn more taxes.”
- “Increased workforce and stability, boosting the economy and unemployment.”
- “Security may be compromised but we would have built oneness and peace with the refugee countries.”
- “If the refugees are taken care of and provided with work, they will improve the economy. But if also given too much freedom, they will end up domineering the economic and employment sector.”
- “If we allow them to enter and start doing business, most of us will lose jobs because most Kenyans do their business with small money and for sure we don’t have money. But them, they will come with a lot of money like the Somali you are saying, so they will be the ones to take over here. So it’s better we work with the small that we have, we succeed but not the visitors to enter.”
- “Help in the economy because there is money and they will be able to pay taxes and there will be development like roads because they will need access.”
- “It will help refugees improve their lives and will engage them and this will reduce terrorism cases.”
- “It will make refugees live a good life as they will be able to start businesses.”
- ‘Competition in the business sector.”
- “Some Kenyans will not get work because the refugees will be prioritized.”
- “It will bring talents to Kenyans in work industry.”
- “It will help refugees for they will have something to support themselves.”
- “I don’t see any effects because it’s like helping God’s children.”
- “It will help them earn something for themselves instead of waiting for relief.”
- “Refugees will be now in a position to feed themselves so it will reduce dependency.”
- “The danger will be them coming in large numbers and get jobs while we Kenyans will lack jobs. They can get opportunities that we don’t get.”
- “It will make people complain why others are given work while we don’t have work.”
- “It will be good since if people are helped our country will be safe.”

- “There will be insecurity and also if they’re allowed to use M-PESA services they might con people.”
- “It will improve the name of Kenya and create job opportunities by employing youth.”
- “The locals will be able to gain in their businesses through trading with the refugees.”
- It will help us as Kenya and Kenya will be a good role model to others.”
- “Increased conflicts between Kenyans and refugees if they will be allowed to work while Kenyans don’t have jobs.”
- “It will bring theft cases because they are coming to look for money.”
- “They are going to take our businesses and bring fake things like gold and money.”
- “The unemployment rate in Kenya is high. If you allow them to come to Kenya who will guarantee our security. Insecurity and cost of living because many Kenyans will not have employment.”

Movement Rights

- “We already have issues with the resource management. We have seen so many people fighting over resources, water and even land. [Movement rights will mean that refugees] will go where there is reliable rainfall, where there is good transport, where there is facilities... definitely now people will want to fight over resources.”
- “Will bring a lot of changes helping Kenya to grow, like promoting peace within Kenya. They will be able to concentrate on other things like education and farming without any interruption. This will make the country grow widely in terms of education and farming.”
- “It will create a good relationship between Kenya and other countries like Sudan and Congo since they have allowed their people to live among Kenyans.”
- “It will lead to threats and cultural alienation.”
- “It will cause insecurity, rape cases, and spread of diseases.”
- “Refugees will bring their knowledge in Kenya and with interaction we will learn some things from them.”
- “Maybe some have a bad background, maybe they’re criminals coming to interfere with the security of Kenya.”
- “Maybe the refugees can come with bad intentions. There are those who can bring destruction while others will be in real search of peace. ”

- “You know there are some people from maybe Southern Sudan or Somalia or Uganda or anywhere who are good in business so it will improve economy. We will interact with people from different places. Their countries are not safe maybe they come to Kenya and be so many. Maybe we will able to share food, housing, land and other things.”
- “The refugees might bring new ideas and lead to country’s growth.”
- “It will enable them to interact with Kenyans and will lead to assimilation hence population increase.”
- “Refugees number might increase which might results to violence.”
- “Stiff competition for the scarce resource and job opportunities and there will be security issues.”
- “They might be bringing good ideas for us to be investing or upgrade ourselves. People will learn to treat others normally. Maybe people should know we’re not different to them.”
- “The economy will become very hard. There is no money to cater for extra people.”
- “They will help because most of them will come with different ideas. What they are doing in their home country, like that, they will create something in Kenya to get money which it will be helpful to people living in that neighborhood.”
- “It will increase the tax because there will be free movement of people from one place to the other and so we may interact and so many things.”
- “The problem is you can’t know whom you’re welcoming. Someone comes if in need of help but after staying with them, you see negative things. They can destroy your family, your wife, and you still go out to help them survive. You don’t know where they’re from and where they’re going. Where will you take them?”
- “People can share ideas in terms of growth of Kenya, business, economy, planning.”
- “They will be taking our jobs.”
- “They will grow the labor force and the economy and might also compromise morals and peace.”
- “Over population of refugees who will get lands and take over the country.”
- “I don’t think there will be any impact as long as there is law and they are under law, there will be no issues. a criminal will be treated as a criminal so I don’t think there will be any issues.”
- “Increased population which will overburden the economy, also can lead to improved economic status since Somalis are vibrant in business.”

- “Some enemies want wealth, cows or camels or goats. Then there are enemies like Alshabab, they don’t want wealth, they want the blood of a good person to kill.”
- “Because the war is going on in Somalia, it will bring war here to us.”
- “It will cause language barrier.”
- “It’s okay, people will understand each other through interacting with them.”
- “More social interactions, integration, cultural diversity, economic diversity.”
- “Because we do not know if refugees have good business intentions or if they will be those who have come to harm us. There are those who have come with guns and drugs, now we do not know if they have come to destroy our country. There are others who have come to have businesses and jobs for the children.”
- “Mess up with Kenyan culture since they have their own culture.”
- “It will bring unity among Kenyans and businesses will grow.”
- “Allowing them to move freely can bring about criminal acts.”
- “Refugees who came to Kenya most of them don’t know Swahili, they are speaking a language we don’t understand. So even when they plan to commit crimes you won’t know.”
- “Some can might be bad people who have ran away from their homes or are killers and this can cause insecurity.”
- “It can bring enmity between us and them because of land issues. There might be so many in one place and people might feel they want to take their lands.”
- “Will bring thievery and evil in Kenya.”
- “Someone who comes from another place finds it hard to relate with others. Refugees from Sudan are violent. Even if they play they start war that is sometimes dangerous. So, for me, I see there is danger if there will not be regulations.”
- “It might cause unemployment, land shortages for settlement.”
- “Kenyans displacement by refugees.”
- “Negative because of lack of enough space in the country.”
- “The world is bad, alshabab are everywhere, they can hide. So the refugees should live where they’re supposed to live [in the camps]. They should be strict.”

Shared Services

- “It will bring togetherness among the people since the refugees are also human.”
- “I don’t think there will be an impact because we are just helping.”
- “It is going to bring people together.”
- “It shall bring civilization and cultural interactions.”
- “The refugees will feel at home away from home. We will learn a lot from them as they also learn from us. We will get to know each other.”
- “Positive impact. It will improve people’s way of living. [Refugees] will not feel inferior. Will also promote the Kenyan economy.”
- “[Will improve Kenya] economically, socially, and culturally. Economically, when refugees come in, the areas are likely to grow as the services offered to refugees will also reach other people. Socially, there will be friendship, intermarriages, and also peace will be promoted. Culturally, we learn their culture, they learn ours and we get to know each other better.”
- “Obvious positive impact. The refugees are scattered all over and some of them, if they can’t get their daily bread, they get into different activities like stealing from others. Some of them face challenges like defilement.”
- “There will be an increased cost of services.”
- “Refugees who come to Kenya for refuge will be treated without bias and will not be profiled racially.”
- “It will cause overpopulation.”
- “I think will help so many people get health services, clean water, and infrastructure development.”
- “Through social interactions, the barrier between refugees and Kenyans will be eliminated.”
- “It is a contradictory opinion because on the one hand, it brings terrorism into our country. On the other hand, it is a blessing because we are helping people.”
- “Refugees will get an advantage of food to feed their families and a place to settle their families.”
- “If those people come, for example, the child should study and then continue, if he goes back to his country and sees something good, he will bring it to us in Kenya.”
- “It will result in an increase in population, better health care, and improvement in education.”

- "It will have an impact because, for example, a Sudanese person building a market or a factory will help Kenya with employment."
- "It's going to create a sense of peace. It will show them we can accept them, that we can help them. They don't need to feel discriminated."
- "There will be overpopulation. There will be unemployment. It will cost the government to allocate money because of the huge population. We can't know if the refugees are beneficial because there could be criminals among them who might start their gangs and this can lead to insecurity."
- "It will bring about deforestation."
- "It will lead to diseases like cholera outbreak."
- "No impact. It will help people."
- "More refugees will come to Kenya."
- "Increased number of refugees which can lead to bad character development. Also depends on the available money to cater for their needs."
- "I don't really know but if it is us funding them it might be a burden but if it an external funding such as NGOs it is ok."
- "Kenyans will start complaining about the refugees as they will be given things that belong to Kenyans."
- "Kenyans will be neglected."
- "They should help Kenyans that are suffering."
- "It will make others run from their countries if they hear refugees are hosted well in Kenya."
- "It will have a very bad effect in Kenya. Like right now there is a problem with the cost of living. It will be a very big burden to Kenya."
- "There will be discrimination and the refugees will be treated better. Our benefits will be given to them."

A-8.3.2 Nationality Experiment

Humanitarian Motivations

- "We're human and it's not good to see your fellow [human] suffer or bleed. You have to care about the other's life like you care about your own."
- "They are poor, they have been tortured, they lack food in their country, that's why

they come here, then they should be free to look for food."

- "Because they don't run away from their countries because of pleasure but for security purposes hence we should accommodate them."
- "[I support] because of humanity. What's happening in Khartoum or Juba... life [there] is not good. We're all humans, children need to go to school."

Future Displacement

- "They're humans and they're supposed to be helped. The same way it might [become] worse in Kenya and we run to their country. It's brotherhood."
- "Let's take [a situation where]... my country poses [a] danger to my life and I ran to another country. I will need to be treated well, for instance in Somalia."
- "Do to your neighbor what you will also want to be done to you."

Theme	Control	South Sudanese	Somali
Security, Terrorism	"Some are brought because there is no food in their countries but there are some who are criminals and have come to destroy our country." "Because they are running away from wars and they might carry the same into our country." "It is because you hear that refugees have brought guns into Kenya, they have stolen cattle, disaster is happening." "Those refugees are coming to Kenya and they are planning to disturb the people of Kenya." "They need proper screening to avoid hosting criminals." "Children in our country may adopt bad behaviors from them."	"They are spreading brutality in Kakuma." "Most of Pokot bandits get their weapons from Sudan." "Because Kenyans spoke for them to get freedom so they should go back to build their country. They bring a lot of crime and hard drugs."	"Somalis I can't support because they have a bad blood. Most of them are alshabab. Somalis are not good. Tanzanians are here and we don't have a problem, even Ugandans are here in Mombasa and Nairobi but they don't have a problem... but Somalis, they have alshabab and so many things." "They are the ones disturbing people here in Kenya. Even now they're bringing problems in Garissa, planting bombs. So, you can't trust them... even their kids you can't trust. They're trained from childhood." "Because if you look at people who attacked the university where my sister was a student, most of them clearly looked like Somalis, so we don't want them in our country." "If you look at places like Lamu, we are always shown in the news that they have killed people. You see, people like them we save and they come to kill us. Yes, there are those who need help but there are others who do not come because of the help, they have come to bring us more harm than good."

Theme	Control	South Sudanese	Somali
Economy (Positive)	"Because refugees are hardworking it will improve the economy of the country." "Most of the refugees are blooming in business more than Kenyans. The interaction they bring to our country will help us upgrade by bringing new ideas and different ways of managing business. You'll find most refugees are very successful more than Kenyans. It brings us together."	(Quotes below are from respondents from Turkana, majority South Sudanese refugees. Some are in control group, but will associate refugees with South Sudanese.) "We are benefiting from the refugees. We get employment from the camp. Turkana ladies work there and get money." "Because the hosting communities will also benefit from the support given to refugees." "The NGOs involved create job opportunities to Kenyans." "Wood and charcoal business is flourishing due to refugees."	"The Somali people have money and thus make the Kenyan economy to rise." "The Somalis in the country help create jobs and pay us to help our children." "There are a number of Kenyans working in the camps and also some Kenyans go to get food from these camps." (Control, Garissa)
Economy (Negative)	"If we cannot feed ourselves what will we feed them? We are suffering and we do not have surplus." "They bring stiff competition in the job market. Results in high cost of living." "They will lead to unemployment and overpopulation."	"Kenyan government will be focusing on them more than us for things like water supply and food." "They act like they belong here. They take jobs that are made for us." "In Southern Sudan there is now [no] war. They are lazy, let them go back to their country." "The don't help Kenya in any way in generating revenue i.e., paying taxes. There are other countries like Ethiopia, why don't they go there."	"Somalis have taken over most business opportunities." "Somalis are occupying a lot of space hence making Kenya lose work opportunities." "They are coming to destroy our business like they're so many in Eastleigh and no Kenyan can do business there." "It's like you want to welcome visitors in your home but you already have like 8 children to take care of... You'll have more problems, you have to work hard too to actually be able to fulfill all of this. That is the same feeling we'll have in our country. In as much as we want to promote [refugees], we have a big problem already and our economy cannot allow."

A-8.4 Regression tables

Table A24: Mentions security concerns in open-ended question about policy impact

	Dependent variable:		
	Services	Work	Movement
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Income	0.152 (0.158)	0.417* (0.238)	−0.065 (0.163)
Econ. Vuln.	−0.044 (0.365)	0.084 (0.461)	−0.316 (0.311)
Unemployed	−0.140 (0.309)	0.794* (0.462)	−0.319 (0.321)
Agriculture	0.424 (0.317)	1.624*** (0.456)	0.745** (0.354)
Close Contact	−0.631 (0.386)	0.887* (0.486)	0.862** (0.346)
Socio. Econ. Concern	0.242 (0.151)	0.035 (0.216)	0.603*** (0.182)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	−2.096 (1.543)	0.478 (1.829)	−1.854** (0.872)
Rel: Christianity	16.188 (853.459)	−0.826 (0.852)	0.006 (0.775)
Rel: Islam	14.797 (853.460)	−1.975 (1.900)	0.333 (0.933)
Woman	−0.403 (0.279)	−0.096 (0.390)	−0.114 (0.269)
Age	−0.0001 (0.012)	0.003 (0.020)	−0.010 (0.014)
Displaced	−1.650** (0.651)	0.135 (0.619)	0.197 (0.401)
Single	−0.021 (0.320)	−1.010 (0.690)	0.019 (0.348)
Education	−0.229 (0.153)	−0.205 (0.236)	−0.112 (0.155)
Garissa	0.918 (0.679)	−1.207 (1.224)	−0.138 (0.601)
Turkana	0.695* (0.387)	0.146 (0.607)	−0.326 (0.421)
Constant	−17.153 (853.459)	−1.860* (1.122)	−0.815 (0.919)
Data	Services, Full (P)	Work, Full (P)	Movement, Full (P)
Observations	448	293	379
Log Likelihood	−185.621	−101.652	−182.947
Akaike Inf. Crit.	405.242	237.304	399.893
Note:			*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

Table A25: Mentions positive economic effects in open-ended question about policy impact

	Dependent variable:		
	Services	Work	Movement
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Income	0.097 (0.205)	−0.128 (0.233)	−0.003 (0.277)
Econ. Vuln.	−0.182 (0.517)	0.230 (0.439)	0.162 (0.540)
Unemployed	0.847** (0.418)	−0.215 (0.441)	0.223 (0.552)
Agriculture	0.702 (0.477)	−0.027 (0.595)	0.899 (0.649)
Close Contact	0.357 (0.429)	0.961** (0.438)	1.208** (0.548)
Socio. Econ. Concern	−0.118 (0.179)	0.230 (0.243)	−0.019 (0.202)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	−0.985 (1.177)	1.803 (1.484)	0.612 (1.329)
Rel: Christianity	−0.012 (0.885)	−0.771 (0.793)	−1.389 (1.061)
Rel: Islam	0.118 (1.168)	−2.352 (1.608)	−0.894 (1.452)
Woman	−0.072 (0.395)	−0.158 (0.414)	−0.175 (0.491)
Age	0.052*** (0.019)	−0.041* (0.023)	0.017 (0.023)
Displaced	0.107 (0.549)	0.661 (0.582)	−0.380 (0.815)
Single	0.654 (0.413)	−0.190 (0.487)	−0.390 (0.653)
Education	0.622*** (0.223)	0.034 (0.222)	0.292 (0.268)
Garissa	0.769 (0.863)	−0.278 (0.817)	−0.041 (0.954)
Turkana	0.021 (0.582)	0.300 (0.527)	0.564 (0.682)
Constant	−4.773*** (1.157)	−0.151 (1.137)	−2.681** (1.366)
Data	Services, Full (P)	Work, Full (P)	Movement, Full (P)
Observations	448	293	379
Log Likelihood	−110.487	−86.000	−64.971
Akaike Inf. Crit.	254.973	206.000	163.943
Note:			*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

Table A26: Mentions negative economic effects in open-ended question about policy impact

	Dependent variable:		
	Services	Work	Movement
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Income	−0.141 (0.223)	0.044 (0.226)	0.039 (0.261)
Econ. Vuln.	0.132 (0.500)	0.328 (0.455)	−0.169 (0.545)
Unemployed	−0.038 (0.460)	−0.648 (0.491)	0.220 (0.510)
Agriculture	0.611 (0.480)	0.787* (0.426)	−1.168 (0.753)
Close Contact	0.661 (0.465)	−0.005 (0.490)	0.255 (0.560)
Socio. Econ. Concern	0.375 (0.268)	−0.111 (0.209)	−0.282 (0.223)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	−15.297 (879.745)	−18.107 (957.057)	−0.927 (1.588)
Rel: Christianity	−0.344 (0.720)	17.240 (1,943.932)	1.395 (1.643)
Rel: Islam	−0.886 (1.282)	18.874 (1,943.933)	0.652 (1.932)
Woman	−0.352 (0.423)	0.047 (0.378)	−0.681 (0.458)
Age	0.0005 (0.019)	0.005 (0.019)	−0.024 (0.025)
Displaced	−0.112 (0.573)	−0.254 (0.739)	0.291 (0.633)
Single	−0.616 (0.523)	−0.106 (0.532)	0.111 (0.554)
Education	0.352 (0.229)	0.423* (0.233)	−0.061 (0.261)
Garissa	−0.166 (1.104)	−1.033 (1.133)	−1.179 (1.246)
Turkana	−0.705 (0.670)	−1.454* (0.814)	−1.386 (0.847)
Constant	−1.940* (1.066)	−18.740 (1,943.933)	−2.437 (1.867)
Data	Services, Full (P)	Work, Full (P)	Movement, Full (P)
Observations	448	293	379
Log Likelihood	−101.752	−96.073	−75.070
Akaike Inf. Crit.	237.504	226.146	184.141
Note:			*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

Table A27: Mentions humanitarian concerns in open-ended question about reasons to support/oppose refugee hosting

	Dependent variable:		
	Control	South Sudanese	Somali
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Income	−0.032 (0.080)	0.086 (0.084)	0.073 (0.103)
Econ. Vuln.	−0.124 (0.177)	0.126 (0.181)	−0.263 (0.219)
Unemployed	−0.125 (0.164)	0.241 (0.170)	0.524*** (0.199)
Agriculture	−0.335 (0.208)	0.172 (0.197)	0.251 (0.249)
Close Contact	0.220 (0.167)	0.110 (0.177)	0.784*** (0.205)
Socio. Econ. Concern	0.128* (0.074)	0.005 (0.076)	0.200** (0.093)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	0.121 (0.397)	−0.129 (0.413)	1.001* (0.550)
Rel: Christianity	−0.041 (0.377)	−0.472 (0.340)	0.334 (0.460)
Rel: Islam	0.051 (0.464)	−0.252 (0.456)	0.687 (0.637)
Woman	−0.139 (0.151)	−0.567*** (0.154)	−0.276 (0.185)
Age	0.019*** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	−0.007 (0.009)
Displaced	0.151 (0.230)	0.199 (0.211)	0.018 (0.269)
Single	0.164 (0.191)	−0.195 (0.187)	−0.018 (0.229)
Education	0.329*** (0.081)	0.271*** (0.083)	−0.020 (0.094)
Garissa	−0.114 (0.295)	−0.033 (0.304)	−0.976*** (0.378)
Turkana	−0.068 (0.210)	−0.231 (0.224)	−0.685** (0.282)
Constant	−1.030** (0.476)	−0.608 (0.452)	−1.728*** (0.578)
Data	Control, Full	South Sudanese, Full	Somali, Full
Observations	982	983	994
Log Likelihood	−556.299	−534.396	−388.761
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,146.597	1,102.793	811.522

Note: *p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

Table A28: Mentions security concerns in open-ended question about reasons to support/oppose refugee hosting

	Dependent variable:		
	Control	South Sudanese	Somali
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Income	0.036 (0.126)	−0.016 (0.112)	−0.014 (0.089)
Econ. Vuln.	0.168 (0.248)	−0.293 (0.253)	−0.153 (0.177)
Unemployed	0.252 (0.242)	−0.245 (0.240)	0.032 (0.174)
Agriculture	0.170 (0.274)	0.228 (0.252)	0.014 (0.201)
Close Contact	−0.650** (0.293)	−0.153 (0.250)	−0.381** (0.192)
Socio. Econ. Concern	0.388** (0.151)	0.032 (0.105)	0.090 (0.083)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	−1.728** (0.695)	−0.931 (0.593)	−2.163*** (0.622)
Rel: Christianity	0.139 (0.516)	−0.579 (0.423)	−0.108 (0.324)
Rel: Islam	0.301 (0.617)	−0.132 (0.567)	−0.920* (0.521)
Woman	−0.562** (0.232)	0.523** (0.204)	−0.047 (0.153)
Age	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	0.018** (0.007)
Displaced	0.127 (0.338)	−0.155 (0.295)	−0.030 (0.227)
Single	−0.009 (0.304)	−0.302 (0.258)	0.113 (0.191)
Education	−0.241* (0.125)	0.133 (0.112)	0.255*** (0.084)
Garissa	0.277 (0.493)	−0.047 (0.453)	0.514 (0.392)
Turkana	0.258 (0.302)	0.387 (0.283)	−0.118 (0.205)
Constant	−2.501*** (0.689)	−1.568*** (0.584)	−0.648 (0.439)
Data	Control, Full	South Sudanese, Full	Somali, Full
Observations	982	983	994
Log Likelihood	−312.600	−357.837	−517.779
Akaike Inf. Crit.	659.200	749.675	1,069.559

Note: *p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

Table A29: Mentions negative economic impacts in open-ended question about reasons to support/oppose refugee hosting

	Dependent variable:		
	Control	South Sudanese	Somali
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Income	0.136 (0.153)	0.044 (0.156)	0.352* (0.184)
Econ. Vuln.	0.387 (0.306)	0.148 (0.318)	−0.336 (0.385)
Unemployed	−0.401 (0.321)	0.562** (0.285)	0.074 (0.372)
Agriculture	−0.037 (0.323)	−0.222 (0.373)	0.730** (0.365)
Close Contact	0.251 (0.299)	−0.376 (0.374)	0.328 (0.360)
Socio. Econ. Concern	0.232 (0.167)	0.136 (0.163)	−0.193 (0.138)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	−2.341** (1.056)	−1.890** (0.783)	1.717 (1.812)
Rel: Christianity	0.575 (0.729)	0.833 (0.831)	−1.394*** (0.458)
Rel: Islam	0.698 (0.838)	1.832** (0.910)	−2.654 (1.768)
Woman	−0.468* (0.278)	0.129 (0.273)	0.169 (0.316)
Age	0.001 (0.013)	−0.008 (0.014)	0.004 (0.015)
Displaced	−0.999* (0.560)	−0.944* (0.516)	−0.141 (0.489)
Single	−0.376 (0.378)	0.199 (0.321)	0.077 (0.393)
Education	−0.045 (0.149)	−0.031 (0.156)	−0.265 (0.168)
Garissa	−0.393 (0.617)	−1.052 (0.696)	−1.518* (0.777)
Turkana	−0.900** (0.441)	−1.149** (0.542)	0.033 (0.452)
Constant	−2.522*** (0.908)	−3.061*** (0.983)	−1.949*** (0.736)
Data	Control, Full	South Sudanese, Full	Somali, Full
Observations	982	983	994
Log Likelihood	−222.779	−205.106	−174.842
Akaike Inf. Crit.	479.557	444.212	383.683

Note: *p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

Table A30: Mentions positive economic impacts in open-ended question about reasons to support/oppose refugee hosting

	Dependent variable:		
	Control	South Sudanese	Somali
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Income	0.080 (0.116)	0.018 (0.137)	0.041 (0.158)
Econ. Vuln.	0.106 (0.254)	0.517* (0.275)	0.546* (0.303)
Unemployed	−0.079 (0.238)	0.351 (0.268)	−0.112 (0.314)
Agriculture	0.388 (0.313)	0.398 (0.321)	0.554 (0.414)
Close Contact	0.329 (0.231)	0.048 (0.292)	0.113 (0.323)
Socio. Econ. Concern	0.078 (0.106)	−0.233** (0.112)	−0.050 (0.133)
Ethnic Kin (Somali)	1.711** (0.678)	0.773 (0.864)	−0.641 (0.708)
Rel: Christianity	0.299 (0.688)	0.177 (0.594)	1.697 (1.576)
Rel: Islam	−0.375 (0.882)	−0.785 (0.973)	2.854* (1.652)
Woman	−0.156 (0.225)	−0.598** (0.262)	0.445 (0.289)
Age	−0.026** (0.012)	−0.010 (0.012)	−0.014 (0.015)
Displaced	−0.075 (0.327)	0.401 (0.321)	−0.024 (0.410)
Single	−0.162 (0.279)	0.099 (0.297)	−0.308 (0.361)
Education	0.084 (0.116)	−0.115 (0.131)	0.211 (0.145)
Garissa	−0.569 (0.442)	0.536 (0.464)	0.409 (0.579)
Turkana	1.180*** (0.263)	0.284 (0.341)	1.236*** (0.345)
Constant	−1.702** (0.810)	−2.477*** (0.776)	−4.599*** (1.674)
Data	Control, Full	South Sudanese, Full	Somali, Full
Observations	982	983	994
Log Likelihood	−305.685	−241.571	−197.094
Akaike Inf. Crit.	645.370	517.142	428.189
Note:			*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01

A-8.5 Fieldwork

We conducted interviews with stakeholders and humanitarian professionals during one month of fieldwork in Nairobi and Turkana in June-July 2022 and seven months of fieldwork in Nairobi from September 2023 - March 2024. Below is a list of relevant quotes from these interviews, loosely grouped by security, economics, and comments about the Refugee Act.

Insecurity:

- Local Sudanese researcher and former refugee: "A cause of insecurity on the camp is the sharing of resources. There is a lack of language sharing to be able to work out how to share these resources. But they have been good at finding ways to deal with these tensions together."
- Somali refugee-led organization leader: "We [Somalis] don't face any problems with the Kenyans. The Kenyans are nice, welcoming people. The only time when it's a problem is when people don't have enough money and have to go and live in the slums. There, they will face harassment. People will think that they're Al Shabaab. Another issue is we constantly have to give money to the police. The police will try to report us for running businesses without the right documentation, and we will have to pay them off. Also, Kenyans think that Somalis are very rich. They think that because there are some people who have big houses. But they forget that there are some Somalis that don't have much."

- Somali UN employee: “The South Sudanese are aggressive people. There’s conflict. They bring their political dynamics into the camp. There are a lot of generals living in the camp, powerful SPLA and SPLM military commanders. Young people are fighting. A lot of military leaders in the camp, especially the Nuer. There’s also conflict over resources—water, firewood—among refugees and with the host community. There’s also a lot of tension with the hosts in Kakuma because refugees get more support. This is very different to Dadaab. Somalis have very strong social networks, strong connections between the people. I would be able to ask for a lot of support if I were to just meet another Somali on the street. Also, you can’t tell the difference between a Somali and a Kenyan-Somali. This means that a Somali-Kenyan could go to the camp if they wanted to access the services or to hope to get resettlement. And vice versa. Refugees that have money, they can make it up that they are Kenyan-Somali. They can access documentation through corruption and friends in Nairobi. Somalis have flourishing businesses in Eastleigh and opportunities. They could get the papers to say that you’re not a refugee anymore and then make a million overnight. There’s a ”give and share” mentality—which means that Kenyan Somalis support the refugees.

- Somali NGO worker: “The refugees from Uganda are mostly LGBTQ. The Burundis are ok with this but the South Sudanese are really not. Block 13 [where LGBTQ refugees live] was attacked by the Dinkas. Their children are not going to school because they get discriminated againts. Someone was killed in block 13, in the news. They are now sleeping outside because inside they can be burned. There was a case of someone burning down the house of an LGBTQ refugee in block 13.”

- Kenyan NGO worker: “There is a lot of hatred between the Dinka and the Nuer. When they look at each other, they think of destruction. The UN tried to set them apart and place them in different parts of Kakuma. However, they’re all in the same camp so could go and find each other. NGOs try to bring the two groups together for things like peacemaking, sports etc. But any small little thing that happens between a Dinka and Nuer during this, could blow up into a big fight. Of course there are fighters living in the camp. Being in the SPLA is voluntary—you can just pick up a gun and join. This means that there are lots of child soldiers. In Nuba, everyone is SPLA. But when people come to Kakuma, they’re disarmed. Also note that their fighting at home isn’t to cause harm so much as to protect themselves. So it’s not a big security issue. But I lived in Dadaab and there it was different, this was very scary. Al Shabaab was coming in through the refugees. It was scary living there, lots of security issues. In Kakuma, the interactions with the host community are not good. They have lots of guns for cattle. But they interact well on economic grounds. Often the Turkana that rape women when they are leaving the grounds for firewood.

- Kenyan NGO worker: “I get updates on security on the camp so that I tell the drivers and workers where they can go. I can tell you that with the Dinka and Nuer, there’s group fighting. Football is a cause of violence between the two. Any small things that brings competition/division to the Dinka and Nuer and it will set them off. We had to stop the football. Another time, two boys were fighting over a girl in school, then the families got involved because they were Dinka and Nuer. It blew up, there were

deaths."

- Kenyan NGO worker: "There are people from the military living in the camp. I know this because I used to be a headteacher with an NGO. I taught a student, we got on well. Then, on his graduation day, he came out fully kitted in military gear. I had no idea. Then he told me that he was in the military. He said that there are these people in the camp but you would never know about them. These people can bring firearms with them over the border because the border controls are weak. Because of this, there are spies coming from other countries to the camp (like from Egypt). They are coming to see if any rebel group is forming here, and military people that are living in the camp and re-grouping. These countries don't want these rebel groups to exist because they want stability in the region. When South Sudan is fighting, it's bad for business in the region."

- Kenyan NGO worker: "When there is a lack of food, there is an increase in crime, but it's not violent. People take stuff, there's theft, but they don't fight. Turkana will rob the refugees—they suffer from hunger more than the refugees do because they don't get any rations. People here make the most with what they have and they aren't very violent towards each other."

- Turkana NGO worker: "The main source of insecurity in the camp is the fighting that people bring with them from their homes. The Dinka and Nuer from South Sudan. They have to live in separate parts of the camp. There used to be conflict with the Turkana people but now it's not so bad. Used to be that they would be upset that they don't get the same services as the refugees. But now there's a rule so that the locals do get something - but I can't remember what it is. Means that there's less violence. The other types of fighting are small fights about things like children arguing or beating each other up. But this is worse if it's between a Dinka and Nuer. They don't fight in the same way but the bitterness is still there. Another source of insecurity on the Dadaab side and why Dadaab is less secure - they don't have a reception center on the border with Garissa. And there are Kenyan Somalis there, meaning that terrorists can cross the border. That would never happen in Kakuma - the Turkana people would not allow them to pass through the border.

- Refugee-led organization worker: "UNHCR has the positive narrative of integration. But I anticipate that there will be hostility. The Turkana are violent. So are the South Sudanese. They do not negotiate to solve problems, they believe in revenge. I worry that the host communities will try to do what they can to overpower the refugees - I suspect the Turkana would do that. this would be a problem after the integration with refugees being sent to different counties. Likely to be inter-communal conflict. "A big fish swallowing a small one". It's like the Masai people. Masai people are hostile when they are in the majority. Kikuyu can't keep cattle when they are in Masai-majority areas."

- Local journalist: "People make a lot of jokes towards people that are wearing the burqa—in jest, they say that they must be members of Al-Shabaab. But it's a joke,

not like just after Westgate. Also those in Turkana will probably have an opinion on the refugees there. So these issues are much more local. Both Ruto and Odinga have Somalis in their govt and they want to get the Somali vote, so they're not going to do anything crazy to go against the Somalis. The ethnic Somalis here are very important for Somali refugees' integration. They have allowed them to prosper and fostered economic ties."

Economics:

- UN employee: "The government does like Somali refugees because they bring in so much business. Somalis are a big reason for Kenya's economic growth."
- Local Sudanese researcher and former refugee: "The Somalis and the Ethiopians are much more entrepreneurial. This means that they are often the ones that are coming up with ways to solve problems, like how to share water resources. The Sudanese are pastoralists. They're much more lazy and more likely to be consumers."
- Kenyan journalist: "People wonder with the UN why they are not giving more money to Turkana county, which is dying of starvation right next to Kakuma. The UN are the ones that are known for driving the fancy cars, having a lot of money. The Turkana are not able to get jobs working on the camp. Instead, UN people come from Nairobi, other parts of Kenya, or internationally. This is because Turkana people are not well educated, as the area is very underdeveloped. The 2010 Constitution had devolution to give more power to the counties, with extra money going towards places that are disadvantaged. Turkana should have been developed as a result. However, it remains very poor. We're not sure where a lot of this money has gone."
- Local Sudanese researcher and former refugee: "Dadaab is pictured as much more insecure than Kakuma. I think this is not because it is actually not safe but because the tensions between Kenya and Somalia are worse, and securitization gets more severe when there are problems. The government say it's Al Shabaab. But I think that Kakuma, not Dadaab, is less safe."
- Local Sudanese researcher and former refugee: "Turkana people are not well-educated and they don't get given the UNHCR jobs. So there's a lot more of a separation between them and the refugees. This is unlike in Dadaab where is a lot more affinity—can't tell the difference between Somali-Somali and Kenya-Somali. This was an artificial border that was drawn. The Somali refugees in Dadaab share resources with the host community in ways that they don't in Kakuma. Turkana people are poor—they will try to sell stuff to refugees in Kakuma."
- NGO worker: "There are a lot of people saying that there is tension between the Turkana and the refugees. But I find that this is not the case—there's actually a symbiotic relationship. They trade with them. I have a colleague who is also a pastor, and he said that the refugees go to the Turkana church and vice versa. However, there is a problem with the wages that they pay. Rather than the refugees being paid less (which is what some have said), they might actually be paid more. International

organizations pay the refugees 6,000 KSh to be hygiene officials but the Turkana county pay the community health workers (which essentially do the same job) only 4,000 KSh. This is tough because people should be paid the same for the same job. The people from Turkana that are living close to the refugee camp don't want to do anything for themselves."

- Turkana NGO worker: "Zone 1 is where Somali market is - all the businesses. Somalis are entrepreneurs, but South Sudanese are lazy. Somalis are actually contributing to corruption in Nairobi. They have learned to pay off the policeman, so those urban refugees are a cause of corruption. They even pay for resettlement. It was a big thing before - not so bad now."

- NGO worker: "You see that different refugees have different economic status. Somali businesses and remittances means that they are richer. Other tribes struggle with their basic needs."

- Refugee-led organization worker: "People here have created their own way of living. UNHCR says that you have to live a life of dependence, but people don't want that. They don't need aid. The Burundians are great farmers. Those from Darfur know how to grow things in arid zones like Kakuma. Congolese are good at fishing. When the Congolese came here, they explored. They saw that the Turkana had fish, so they went out and got some. When they came back to the camp, people thought that they were witches, they just didn't know where they could have got these fish. But they weren't witches. They're just good at getting fish and refugees from other countries didn't know how."

The Refugee Act:

- Kenyan journalist: "Most people won't have heard of the Refugee Act 2021. Refugees are not seen to be a big problem in Kenya. However, they are a problem at the local level—someone who is running for the governor said some derogatory comment about Somalis—that the Somalis have started to influence things at the city council. People don't like this.

- Somali refugee-led organization leader: "I hope that the Refugee Act will make things better with the work permits. But most people don't know about it. We [Somalis] probably wouldn't apply for the work permits now anyway."

- UN employee: "The Refugee Act is a long-awaited law and very welcomed. Since '91, there have been no durable solutions. People that were born in the camp are now having their own children. No access to higher education, cannot work. But these people, all they know is Kenya. They have never been to the country that is their nationality and they can relate more to Kenyan culture than to their other culture. People want to be able to do more with their lives. They're currently identifying the counties that refugees would be able to go to—named Eldoret as one potential. Currently working out how they would access the services. RCK is very happy that this law will be passed. But then there are different views on this. There's not yet consensus. Especially in

Dadaab—they think that there are security issues that make them not want to issue the movement permits. Some counties don't like that refugees will have the movement and work permit because there are not enough jobs for Kenyans."

A-9 Support for Refugee Hosting

This survey has focused on citizens' attitudes towards refugee integration. An additional question is whether the drivers of support for refugee integration differ to the drivers of support for refugee hosting. To answer this, we measure *Hosting Support* in the survey, where we ask respondents how much they support Kenya hosting refugees on a 5-point scale, which we then standardize. This question is employed in our survey experiment on refugee nationality. In our analysis of nationwide determinants of refugee support, therefore, we only include the results from the control group.

Similar to refugee integration, we find that there is broad support for refugee hosting among Kenyans, with 65 percent of respondents in favor (see Fig. A10). Similar to the findings on integration, Table A8 shows that ethnic kin and those with a close refugee contact are more supportive of refugee hosting, suggesting that these groups support welcoming policies toward refugees generally. We also find that, descriptively, people living in refugee-hosting counties are more supportive than the rest of the population toward hosting, similar to integration.

Economic factors diverge, however. Recall that neither sociotropic nor egocentric concerns were associated with more or less support for refugee integration. However, those who are economically vulnerable are surprisingly *more* likely to support refugee hosting than the rest of the population and those with sociotropic concerns about the economy are *less* likely to support hosting (at $p < 0.1$ level). This suggests that there is empathy mechanism at play among those who are most economically vulnerable, and that those who are concerned about Kenya's economy are more worried about negative economic effects of refugees living in camps without the right to work than them working and contributing to the economy.

Examining open-ended responses for why respondents supported or opposed refugee hosting in Kenya, more than 4 in 10 respondents referenced humanitarian concerns (Control, Fig. 5). This was four times more common than the second-most mentioned response type. A common refrain was "they are human beings like us" and, if people are fleeing their country for reasons that are not their fault, they should be provided with a safe and peaceful place to stay (see Table A23 for examples). This mirrors other studies showing humanitarian concerns and empathy playing a significant role in citizens' support for hosting forcibly displaced people (Peisakhin, Stoop and van der Windt, 2024; Alrababa'h et al., 2021). The nature of the integration open-ended question—which asked respondents what they thought the impact of the integration policy would be, rather than why they supported or opposed it—did not solicit humanitarian responses in the same way, but we suspect that similar humanitarian motivations play matter here, too.

Unlike other studies (e.g., Thorson and Abdelaaty, 2023), we do not find that being given information about the integration policy has an effect on participants' support for refugee hosting (see Figure A11). Public support for hosting refugees, then, seems robust to changes in government policies that grant additional rights and freedoms to refugees.

Figure A10: Support for Refugee Hosting



Note: Weighted descriptive percentages of support for refugee hosting in Kenya.

Figure A11: Effect of Policy Information on Support for Refugee Hosting



Note: Weighted mean estimates of support for refugee hosting in Kenya among the control and treatment groups in the policy experiment with 95% confidence intervals. Sample excludes NA and respondents with existing policy awareness. The dashed line represents the neutral midpoint of the support scale.

A-10 Summary of Hypotheses

Table A31 provides a summary of our hypotheses and whether our results indicate support for them.

Table A31: Support for Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Support
H1: Citizens are more likely to support refugee integration policies that provide direct benefits to hosts (e.g., shared services) than dimensions that could pose a potential threat (e.g., work rights or freedom of movement).	Mixed
H2: Citizens will be less likely to support integrating a refugee group that is perceived as having a negative impact on the country.	Strong
H3a: Citizens who are ethnic kin with a refugee group are more likely to support refugee integration, particularly for their refugee kin.	Mixed
H3b: Citizens who are ethnic kin with a refugee group are more likely to support movement and work rights for refugees than citizens who are not ethnic kin with a refugee group.	Null
H4a: Citizens who have close contact with refugees are more likely to support refugee integration policies.	Strong
H4b: Citizens who have direct exposure to refugees without close contact are less likely to support refugee integration policies.	Null
H5a: Citizens who are economically vulnerable are less likely to support refugee integration policies that expand work rights	Null
H5b: Citizens who express sociotropic concerns about the economy are less likely to support refugee integration policies that expand work rights.	Null
H6: Citizens who have experienced forced displacement are more likely to support refugee integration.	Null

A-11 Changes to the Pre-Analysis Plan

In our pre-analysis plan, we said that we would analyze the factors driving support for both integration and hosting in this study. We decided to streamline the paper to focus on integration and move the analysis of support for refugee hosting to the Appendix. We changed the wording and order of the hypotheses accordingly.

We initially proposed using a measure of support for moving refugees into a citizen's local area as part of our index for support for refugee *hosting*. However, after conducting more interviews and consultations with local stakeholders and re-assessing the Kenyan context, we considered that this measure is a better proxy for support for refugee *integration*, since Kenya's current hosting policy is to keep refugees in camps, not among local communities, and moving and settling into respondents' counties is one of the dimensions of the country's new integration policy. We conducted a robustness check to ensure that including this measure as a proxy for hosting support instead of integration support does not significantly change our main results (not included here).