

Examining the Link between Aid and Support for Refugees: U.S. Aid Cuts and Kakuma Camp, Kenya

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The largest aid contraction on record



- In 2025, aid from OECD donors fell **23%** — the fastest annual drop on record, led by U.S. cuts to USAID (OECD, 2026)
- USAID shut down; **~92%** of grants terminated (NPR, 2025)
- Estimated **1.2–2.6 million** excess deaths (Kenny and Sandefur, 2025)

The world's 42.5 million refugees are exposed in two ways

1 **Directly:** cuts reduce food, healthcare, schooling, and work

- In 2024, US funded 40% UNHCR income; fell 73% in 2025; (UNHCR, 2025_{a,b})
- WFP funding fell **34%**, affecting 16.7M people (World Food Programme, 2025)

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2 **Politically:** cuts may reduce host countries' willingness to continue hosting

- 71% of refugees live in LIMCs that often rely on donor financing
- Locals can benefit from hosting, e.g., infrastructure, jobs, and services (Alix-Garcia et al., 2018; Zhou et al., 2025; MacDonald and Lichtenheld, 2026)
- If funding is cut, will support for hosting erode, encouraging return or onward movement?

Theory: two literatures, pulling in opposite directions

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Toward backlash

Egocentric: households lose income, jobs, customers, services, or security

Sociotropic: broader concerns about fiscal, cultural, and security costs (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014)

Against backlash

Continued benefits: cuts reduce the aid economy but net benefits often remain

Humanitarian: refugees severely harmed by aid cuts, more so than hosts (asymmetric) (Weber et al., 2024; Hartman and Morse, 2020)

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
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Exposure raises *both* the costs hosts bear *and* their proximity to refugee suffering
⇒ **the net effect is not obvious**


Testing this theory in Kenya

- **Large refugee host:** ~800,000 refugees, mostly from South Sudan and Somalia
- **Concentrated in two camps:** Kakuma and Dadaab
- **Locals benefit:** economic development (International Finance Corporation, 2018; Alix-Garcia et al., 2018); agreement to share aid with hosts
- **Higher support where exposed:** camp areas → strongest support (MacDonald and Lichtenheld, 2026)
- **Vulnerable to cuts:** major pre-cut U.S. aid recipient (U.S. Department of State, 2025)



Source: UNHCR, April 2025. By camp/urban location and country of origin.

Aid cuts in Kenya



- 1. Gradual WFP cuts:** rations decreased from 80% to 45% of minimum daily needs
- 2. U.S. aid announcement:** rations fall to 40%; NGOs cut staff and services
- 3. Severe, sudden cuts & partial recovery:** cash suspended, rations 28%, tiered “Differentiated Assistance” (and misclassification), delayed distribution, protests (Aug) → reduced insecurity (Sept) → rations and cash partially restored for Cats 1–3 (Oct)

Note: WFP and UNHCR reporting, 2023–2025 (WFP 2025a,b; UNHCR 2025a). Ration % of 2,100 kcal minimum basket; cuts apply across Dadaab and Kakuma/Kalobeyei jointly.


Research design

Q: Does exposure to aid cuts reduce citizens' support for refugee hosting?

Three original data sources:

- 1 Two nationwide phone surveys** bracketing the cuts (2023, $N \approx 3,300$; 2026, $N \approx 2,300$), with oversamples near Kakuma (Turkana county)
- 2 Three-wave, face-to-face panel** of 300 residents next to Kakuma (May, July, Sep/Oct 2025); 205 in panel
→ Includes a **pre-registered vignette experiment** (Wave 3)
- 3 52 in-depth interviews** with refugee leaders, alongside each wave

Survey timeline



Aid cuts: harm to refugees

- **Acute hunger** — some eating *“once per day”*
- Land **too arid to farm**, need movement/work permits to earn elsewhere
- **Medication shortages**: *“Now we have no drugs in the hospital . . . Malaria is the biggest killer”*
- **Skipping meals, debt, selling assets** — mother sold *“the roof of the house to feed her children”*
- **Rising theft and violence**: *“people have been cut with panga [knife] just because of a smart phone”*
- Girls exposed to **sexual exploitation** and unwanted pregnancy
- Some **returned to South Sudan despite conflict**: *“better to die in your country with a bullet than hunger”*



Kakuma protests (July 30, 2025). Source: Gabriella Kennedy

Aid cuts: harm to hosts

	Benefit from the camp economy	Change across the panel (W1 → W2 → W3)
Services	Health and schools: <i>"Since the refugees came ... Schools and hospitals were built"</i> (Woman, 21)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Camp healthcare 42 → 30 → 27% • Camp education 20 → 20 → 17%
Jobs	NGOs <i>"creating job opportunities"</i> (Man, 27); Work for refugees, <i>"fetch water, wash the dishes, do the laundry"</i> (Woman, 48);	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NGO jobs 20 → 17 → 14% • Refugee-household jobs 13 → 12 → 14%
Business & income	Selling to refugees: <i>"[We] take firewood ... sell it to the refugees ... then go feed [our] kids"</i> (Woman, 23)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Businesses serving refugees 13 → 17 → 13%
Security	Historically cordial host-refugee relations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feels unsafe at night 58 → 69 → 72% • Crime victim 53 → 52 → 43%

Note: Kakuma panel, W1-W3 2025; N = 205 households. Cells = share reporting each item by wave.

▶ Host outcomes

Four findings

1 No nationwide backlash

→ Support moderately increased

2 Backlash concentrated in refugee-hosting regions

- Most-exposed areas no longer more supportive than the rest of the country
- Panel and experiment both show aid cuts reduce support for local hosting in Kakuma

3 Backlash driven by household losses and insecurity


- Households that lost jobs/services became less supportive; unaffected neighbors did not
- Most who want to close the camp cite security

4 Humanitarian concerns dampen backlash for some

- High concern for refugee need and suffering — locals and nationwide
- Origin-country conflict larger factor for support than aid
- Support stable among high-empathy locals despite cuts

No nationwide backlash — modest increases in support

Hosting Support Index by region, pre/post-cuts




Note: Weighted mean *Hosting Support Index* (ICW composite: nationwide hosting, local hosting, opposing return) by province. 0 = neutral, higher = pro-refugee. $N = 949$ (2023), 2,034 (2026). Turkana oversample shown separately. Triangles: Kakuma and Dadaab camps.

Support for hosting fell in camp regions (nationwide DiD)

Change in Hosting Support Index by region

Change (2026 – 2023)



Change in hosting index
(SD units, 2026 - 2023)


-0.2 0.0 0.2

	Hosting Index
Post-cuts	0.100** (0.040)
Turkana	0.219*** (0.080)
Post-cuts × Turkana	-0.238** (0.096)
Controls	Yes
N (Turkana, 2026)	349
Observations	3,263
R ²	0.036

Note: Pooled difference-in-differences, 2023–2026. HC-robust SEs; controls for age, gender, education.


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Support for hosting fell during the cuts (panel)



Note: Mean support for hosting locally and camp closure (1–5; higher = more pro-closure), 95% CIs, by wave. Support hosting locally: “Refugees continuing to live in your district.” Support camp closure: “The Kenyan government closing Kakuma camp and moving the refugees in Kakuma back to their countries.” Balanced Kakuma panel, W1–W3 2025; N = 205. Trend confirmed with repeated cross-section ($N \geq 300/\text{wave}$). Stars: event-study tests, SEs clustered on respondent.

Aid cuts lower support (experiment)




- Rate **6 of 24** hypothetical refugee profiles; support hosting in Kenya 1–5
- **Four attributes vary:** aid (100/40/0%), services, local jobs, origin peace
- **Manipulation check** on aid level
- AMCEs isolate the effect of changing each variable alone

[Details](#)

Note: AMCEs on hosting support (1–5); respondent FE, SEs clustered on respondent. Dashed line = reference-level mean. Kakuma W3 Full (Sep/Oct 2025); N = 301 respondents, 1,885 profiles.

Support drops under a hypothetical full cut scenario

Hosting support under hypothetical full aid cut





“Currently, Kenya receives financial support from international donors to host refugees. Imagine a situation where donors completely cut off/end their financial support for refugees in Kenya. This would mean that they no longer provide any of the aid that is used for services for refugees, such as healthcare and education.

In this hypothetical situation, to what extent would you support Kenya continuing to host refugees?”

Note: Mean support for hosting nationwide under a hypothetical full aid cut (1–5), 95% CIs. Kakuma area, W1 vs W2 2025; N = 202 (W1), 201 (W2). SEs clustered on respondent.

Personal exposure drives backlash (panel DiD)

Camp-closure support by exposure




Three ways to measure exposure:

- **ITT (baseline):** aid recipient or NGO/aid employee at W1
 - fixed pre-shock trait
 - But note selection into group; quasi-causal
- **Switching DiD:** within-respondent, by domain of loss
- **Cohort DiD:** freshly lost access by W3 vs. never-exposed neighbors
 - W1→W2 as a placebo pre-trend

▶ Measuring exposure

Note: Left (ITT): mean camp-closure support by baseline exposure (W1 aid recipient or NGO/aid employee) vs unexposed, 95% CIs; n = 127 exposed, 78 unexposed. Right (switching DiD): within-respondent effect of losing camp access, by domain and pooled (SD units). Balanced W1–W3 Kakuma panel; respondent (and wave) FE; SEs clustered on respondent. N = 205 (615 respondent-waves).

Why hosts oppose closure: the camp economy (open-ends)



“Why do you **oppose** closing the camps?”


- *“There is a good economic relationship between the refugees and the community. Without them, some sectors will collapse.”*
- *“This camp helps a lot of people, like those who sell charcoal and firewood, and others benefit from casual jobs. If closed, crime rates will rise tremendously.”*
- *“If the refugees go, a lot of jobs will be lost, humanitarian aid will be cut, and development will stop.”*
- *“Refugees have brought more good than harm. Organizations supporting refugees also support locals by building hospitals, and they are a source of employment.”*

Note: Share of respondents giving each coded reason for opposing closure. Kakuma panel, W3 2025; n = 163.

Why some now support it: insecurity (open-ends)

Why support closing the camp?

Kakuma panel, W3 (n = 124)




“Why do you **support** closing the camps?”

- *“Since they came there’s been a lot of issues. . . there’s no peace, you cannot walk in the neighborhood at night and there are gangs and thugs.”*
- *“When conflicts arise between the refugees themselves this affects the businesses of the host — they sometimes burn down the food stores during distribution.”*
- *“Because they kill Kenyans that work in the camps and disrupt peace. The teachers who teach in the refugee camps from host are always under attacks from refugee community.”*

Note: Share of respondents giving each coded reason for supporting closure. Kakuma panel, W3 2025; n = 124.


Caveat: Hosts don't lose support for hosting nationwide (panel)

Support for local vs. nationwide hosting measures in Kakuma



Note: Mean support (1–5) on local and nationwide hosting items, 95% CIs, by wave. Balanced Kakuma panel, W1–W3 2025; N = 205.


Hosts feel strong empathy for refugees' suffering (panel)




- **67.8%** are “worried that the refugees do not have enough food to eat because of the cuts to cash assistance and food rations” (Sept/Oct)
- **64.9%** are “very concerned about the refugees and their suffering” (Sept/Oct)

Refugee protection needs outweigh aid in driving support (experiment)

Restoring peace vs. cutting aid




Aid effect by baseline empathy



Note: Left: AMCEs on percent supporting hosting (support ≥ 4 of 5), for aid level and origin context. Right: predicted hosting support (1-5) by aid level, split at median baseline empathy (138 below, 163 at or above). Respondent FE, SEs clustered on respondent. Vignette experiment, Kakuma W3; N = 205 respondents, 1,316 profiles.

Humanitarian concern may sustain nationwide support (open-ends)



“Why do you **support** Kenya hosting refugees?”

- *“We’re human and it’s not good to see your fellow suffer or bleed. You have to care about the other’s life like you care about your own.”*
- *“They don’t run away from their countries because of pleasure but for security; hence we should accommodate them.”*
- *“They’re humans and they’re supposed to be helped. The same way it might [become] worse in Kenya and we run to their country. It’s brotherhood.”*
- *“Do to your neighbor what you will also want to be done to you.”*

Note: Share of respondents giving each coded reason for supporting hosting. Nationally representative survey, 2023, control arm; N = 697 (788 mentions).

Takeaways

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 - **Humanitarian concern** reduces impact for some — empathy is high locally and nationally, and high-empathy hosts support despite cuts
- ⇒ Support for hosting rests on **material benefits** and **low insecurity**; if cuts persist, **local support may decline further**

Potential implications

Does local backlash matter?

Turkana are
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Tensions between locals and refugees can lead to **camp closures and coerced return**

(MacDonald, 2026)

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Tensions between locals and refugees can lead to **camp closures and coerced return**

(MacDonald, 2026)

Camp closure in coastal Kenya (1990s)

1992

"Most refugees lived in a series of a dozen camps located along Kenya's coast near Mombassa and along the arid, desolate 450-mile Kenya-Somalia border."

1993

"Tensions between the refugees and the local population along the coast, however, **flared into violent clashes that left one Somali dead and 14 wounded** in August."

1994

"In May, some 2,000 persons were uprooted and at least eight died in violence near coastal Kenya. . . . **In an effort to . . . ease tensions between the refugees and local inhabitants**, Kenyan government officials threatened to close a coastal camp. . ."

1995

"UNHCR closed two refugee camps in April, including the largest coastal camp, Utange. . . . The camp was the site of past disturbances and **arson, linked to tensions between the refugees and local Kenyans**, and to refugees' discontent toward UNHCR."

1998

"During 1998, Kenyan officials closed the last refugee camp located on Kenya's coast, near the port city of Mombassa."

Source: Global Refugee Return dataset (MacDonald, 2026).

Questions and comments welcome

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Real-time reports by wave: www.maemacdona1d.com

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Shirika Plan

Awareness of the Shirika Plan nationwide: **1.5%** (2023) → **11.5%** (2026); 9 in 10 have not heard of it

Nationwide: support by awareness

Outcome	Year	Aware – Unaware	<i>p</i>
National	2023	+0.44	0.028
National	2026	+0.24	0.060
Local	2023	+0.80	0.010
Local	2026	−0.22	0.110

National hosting positive in both years. Local hosting positive in 2023, slightly negative but not significant in 2026 (and the local item differs across years).

Kakuma: support by awareness

66.7% of W3 respondents had heard of the Shirika Plan.


Outcome	Aware – Unaware	<i>p</i>
National hosting	+0.51	0.055
Local hosting	+0.37	0.183
Close camp	−0.47	0.095

In the hosting area, aware respondents are *more* pro-hosting and *less* likely to favour closing the camp.

Takeaway: too rare nationally to move the aggregate, and where present it raises support.
Shirika awareness does not explain the decline.

Appendix: Kakuma sample

Survey respondents and the camp economy, by baseline exposure



Note: Face-to-face panel respondents in the Kakuma/Kalobeyei host area (Turkana). Points shaded by baseline (W1) structural exposure — household was an aid recipient or NGO/aid employee — against camp polygons, hospitals/clinics, and schools. Full sample.

Appendix: formal framework

Each host i 's support for hosting, H_i , sums how much the self, the community, and the refugees gain or lose from hosting, weighted by how much i values each:

$$H_i = \underbrace{\alpha_i \theta_i}_{\text{self}} + \underbrace{\beta_i E_i [\sigma A - C(A)]}_{\text{community}} + \underbrace{\gamma_i [E_i S(A) + \frac{1}{2} S(A)]}_{\text{refugees}}$$

- $\theta_i \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$: whether i 's household holds an aid-related benefit or bears a cost; a cut enters as $\Delta \theta_i = -1$. α_i weights own welfare.
- E_i : structural exposure to the aid economy (highest near camps). $\sigma A - C(A)$ is the community payoff, with $C(A) = \bar{c} - A$. The community still gains while $A > A^* = \bar{c}/(\sigma + 1)$.
- $S(A) = \bar{s} - A$: refugee suffering, rising as aid falls. γ_i weights refugee welfare (> 0 empathy, < 0 hostility).

E_i enters the community and refugee channels with *opposite* signs: a cut shrinks community benefits (down) while raising refugee suffering (up). The net direction depends on whether $\beta_i(\sigma + 1)$ or γ_i is larger, on personal exposure θ_i , and on whether $A > A^*$.

Appendix: hypotheses

H1 — community exposure (E_i)

Under aid cuts, high-exposure populations move toward less pro-hosting attitudes than low-exposure ones (more personal losses; community costs amplify with exposure) — unless empathy in the exposed population is strong enough to outweigh both.

H2 — personal exposure (θ_i)

Within an exposed community, hosts who personally lose an aid-related benefit or absorb a new cost show a steeper decline in support than otherwise-similar neighbors (by the self-channel weight α_i).

H3 — continued benefits (A vs. A^*)

The community channel stays a net source of support while the community still captures net benefits ($A > A^*$); cuts shrink it but do not reverse it. Opposition emerges only once cuts push A below A^* .

H4 — empathy (γ_i)

Holding exposure and personal stake fixed, aid cuts move pro-empathy hosts ($\gamma_i > 0$) toward more pro-hosting attitudes and hostility-leaning hosts ($\gamma_i < 0$) toward less.

Appendix: the cuts' effects on refugees in detail


- **Food.** WFP cut the general food basket from 80% to 40% of minimum daily needs (2023–Feb 2025). In June 2025, *bamba chakula* cash transfers (\$3.09–3.98/refugee/month) were fully suspended.
- **Differentiated Assistance (Aug 2025).** Four vulnerability tiers; Cat 1–2 received 40%/20% of the minimum food basket, Cat 3–4 (nearly half of registered refugees) received nothing. Leaders reported many vulnerable refugees misclassified as self-sufficient.
- **Health and education.** NGO budget cuts (UNHCR, IRC, LWF) reduced staffing and services; medication shortages widespread; children dropping out of school due to hunger.
- **Coping.** Meal-skipping, debt, asset sales, transactional sex for basic supplies, rising theft and violence; some return to South Sudan despite active conflict.
- **Partial recovery (Sep–Nov 2025).** Cash resumed and rations rose for Categories 1–3 (Cat 1 to 55%, Cat 2 to 35%, Cat 3 to 20%); Category 4 remained without assistance, and staffing did not return to prior levels.

Based on 52 interviews with 17–18 refugee leaders across the three waves.

◀ Back

Appendix: host livelihood outcomes across the panel

Host livelihood outcomes across the panel



- Camp healthcare access: 42% → 30% → 27% (largest sustained loss)
- NGO and refugee-household employment fell as budgets and cash contracted
- Feeling unsafe at night rose 58% → 69% → 72%; crime victimization 53% → 52% → 43%
- Most W1→W2 household losses persisted through W3

Note: Share of Kakuma panel households reporting each outcome, by wave (W1 May, W2 Jul, W3 Sep/Oct 2025). N = 205.


Appendix: three ways to measure exposure

Each strategy defines a household's exposure to the cuts differently, trading off identification against statistical power. All point the same way: the personally exposed become **more** supportive of closing the camp.

- **ITT — baseline structural exposure.** Treatment is a fixed Wave 1 trait (aid recipient or NGO/aid employee). Measured before the severe cuts, so it cannot be driven by later attitudes. Most credible; effect is intent-to-treat (attenuated). [▶ Details](#)
- **Cohort DiD — realized economic loss.** Households that first lost either employment or services between W2 and W3 vs. never-exposed neighbors, with W1→W2 as a placebo. [▶ Details](#)
- **Switching DiD — within-person loss events.** Pools all loss events across waves and domains, using respondent and wave fixed effects. Highest power. [▶ Details](#)

[▶ Regression table](#)[◀ Back](#)

Appendix: ITT — baseline structural exposure



Interacts a fixed Wave 1 exposure indicator — household was an aid recipient or NGO/aid employee — with wave dummies, on the balanced W1–W3 panel with respondent fixed effects.

- Treatment is set *before* the severe cuts, so it cannot be a product of how a household feels about refugees
- Estimates an **intent-to-treat** effect of structural exposure — conservative, since not all exposed households actually lost out
- 127 exposed vs. 78 unexposed; both wave interactions $\approx +0.71$ ($p < 0.05$)

Note: Outcome: support for closing the camp (higher = more support). Balanced W1–W3 Kakuma panel; respondent FE; SEs clustered on respondent. $n = 127$ exposed, 78 unexposed.


Appendix: baseline imbalance — ITT treatment

Variable	Baseline exposed (Mean, SD)	Unexposed (Mean, SD)	Difference	p-value
Age (years)	31.10 (9.72)	28.65 (7.92)	+2.45*	0.051
Female	0.47 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	-0.04	0.577
Hosting support — national (1–5)	3.40 (1.71)	2.67 (1.78)	+0.73***	0.004
Hosting support — local (1–5)	3.46 (1.70)	2.54 (1.73)	+0.93***	0.000
Support for camp closure (1–5)	2.25 (1.64)	3.21 (1.88)	-0.95***	0.000

Note: Baseline characteristics (Wave 1, before severe cuts) by whether household was an aid recipient or NGO/aid employee at baseline. Difference is treated minus control. Significance: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (Welch's t -test). $N = 85$ baseline exposed, 74 unexposed. Large imbalances on pre-shock attitudes (hosting support) indicate selection: households in aid work were substantially more pro-refugee even before the cuts. ITT estimates reflect both the causal effect of exposure and this baseline selection.

Appendix: cohort DiD — freshly realized loss

Camp-closure support: cohort DiD and switching DiD




Compares households that *first* lost camp access (education, healthcare, refugee or NGO employment) between W2 and W3 against neighbors who never lost access across the panel.

- **Placebo:** the W1→W2 interaction should be near zero under parallel pre-trends (confirmed)
- 51 freshly exposed vs. 75 never exposed; W3 effect +0.84 ($p < 0.05$)
- Treatment is a realized loss, so a treatment-on-treated estimate

Note: Panel B (left): cohort means, households first losing access W2–W3 ($n = 51$) vs never lost ($n = 75$). Panel C (right): switching DiD by domain. Balanced W1–W3 Kakuma panel; respondent FE; SEs clustered on respondent.

Appendix: switching DiD — within-person loss events



Pools every loss event across waves and domains, regressing camp-closure support on a contemporaneous post-loss indicator with respondent and wave fixed effects.

- Identifies off **within-respondent** change as a household loses access
- Estimated separately by domain (education, healthcare, refugee/NGO employment) and pooled (“any domain”)
- **Highest power** (N = 205, all 615 respondent-waves)
- Any-domain effect +0.61 ($p < 0.05$); consistent in sign across domains

Note: Standardized effect (outcome SD units). Outcome: support for closing the camp. Balanced W1–W3 Kakuma panel; respondent and wave FE; SEs clustered on respondent. N = 205 (615 respondent-waves).

Appendix: exposure and camp-closure support — all three designs I

	Camp closure
<i>Panel A: Intent-to-treat – baseline (W1) aid recipient or NGO/aid employee × wave</i>	
Wave 2	-0.179 (0.251)
Wave 3	-0.141 (0.265)
Baseline exposed × Wave 2	0.711** (0.311)
Baseline exposed × Wave 3	0.712** (0.336)
Respondent-wave obs.	612
Respondents	204
<i>Panel B: Within-Kakuma DiD – newly lost W2→W3 vs never lost (eq. ??)</i>	
Wave 2	-0.173 (0.248)
Wave 3	-0.200 (0.280)
Newly lost W2→W3 × Wave 2 (placebo)	0.493 (0.389)
Newly lost W2→W3 × Wave 3	0.840** (0.398)
Respondent-wave obs.	375
Respondents	125
<i>Panel C: Switching DiD on camp closure, by loss domain (N = 205)</i>	
Any domain	0.606** (0.240)
Education	0.311 (0.342)
Healthcare	0.790*** (0.272)
Refugee employment	0.970** (0.440)
NGO employment	0.629** (0.262)
Respondent-wave obs.	612
Respondents	204

Note: Outcome: support for closing the camp (higher = more support / more hostile). Balanced W1–W3 Kakuma panel; respondent FE; SEs clustered on respondent. Panel A: baseline-exposure ITT (n = 127, 78). Panel B: cohort DiD with W1→W2 placebo (n = 51 vs 75). Panel C: switching DiD by loss domain. N = 205.

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