This book examines the welfare of Syrian refugees in Jordan and quantifies the fiscal implications of their economic participation. Its central aim is to shift the international discourse on refugee “burden sharing” from abstract principles to concrete numbers by demonstrating the existence of a “triple win”: increased financial autonomy of refugees; less aid needed to support refugees; and more aid available for the development of the host economy.
As of 2023, approximately 660,000 Syrian refugees were registered with UNHCR in Jordan, although the 2015 census indicates a much larger Syrian population of around 1.27 million. The overwhelming majority (80 percent) live in host communities rather than refugee camps, concentrated primarily in Amman, Irbid, Mafraq, and Zarqa. The population is extremely young, with a median age of 13 in camps and 15 in host communities (compared to 26 for Jordanian nationals). Like the Jordanian population, the refugee population has a notable deficit of men in the 25–35 age group, possibly reflecting higher mortality due to conflict and migration choices.
The analysis is based on the 2021 Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF), the fifth round of a UNHCR–World Bank survey of Syrian refugees in Jordan. For the first time, the VAF incorporated a full consumption module mirroring Jordan’s national Household Income and Expenditure Survey, enabling direct monetary poverty estimation. VAF data were merged with the Refugee Assistance Information System (RAIS) to assess the poverty impact of cash transfers. Refugee labor market outcomes were benchmarked against the 2019 Jordan Labor Force Survey (LFS), which covers both Jordanian nationals and other foreign workers.
The book applies several analytical methods. Monetary poverty is estimated using a cost-of-basic-needs approach, while multidimensional poverty is measured using the World Bank’s Multidimensional Poverty Measure, which adds education and access to basic infrastructure to the monetary dimension. A Freedom Index, constructed from the 2022 Quality of Life Survey, captures non-monetary welfare across dimensions (life satisfaction, optimism for self and children, not being discriminated against, mental health, freedom to make life decisions, and sense of security), and is used to help explain why refugees choose to live outside camps despite facing higher monetary poverty there. Regression models are used to identify determinants of camp location choice, school enrollment, and labor market participation. Finally, fiscal incidence is estimated using the Commitment to Equity (CEQ) methodology, which maps refugees into income deciles to compare their contributions to public revenues against their use of public services. Scenario-based modeling—contrasting no-income, current-participation, and full-participation outcomes—quantifies the savings to the international donor community from refugee economic activity, with the full-participation scenario constructed using nearest-neighbor matching to project counterfactual earnings by pairing Syrian refugees with comparable Jordanian or immigrant workers.
Main empirical findings:
- Monetary poverty among Syrian refugees is pervasive at 58 percent overall, and is paradoxically higher outside camps (62 percent) than inside (45 percent). The higher poverty rate in host communities reflects the cost of rent and utilities—expenses that camp residents do not incur—as well as lower levels of humanitarian assistance relative to those provided in camps. The poverty gap (the average distance from the poverty line) is also larger for out-of-camp refugees (19 percent) than for camp residents (9 percent).
- Multidimensional poverty, which captures education and access to basic infrastructure alongside consumption, affects 67 percent of refugees outside camps and 57 percent inside camps. The broader measure reveals that even refugees who are not monetarily poor face significant deprivation in access to education and services. Camp residents benefit from the provision of public utilities and services that host-community refugees must procure independently.
- Despite facing higher poverty, more than 80 percent of Syrian refugees choose to live in host communities, suggesting a preference for autonomy and economic agency. Although time of arrival, as well as government policy toward refugees, plays a role in whether Syrians live in or outside of the camps, evidence suggests that refugee households make this decision themselves, which leads to self-selection in regard to certain characteristics. Regression results confirm that the probability of living outside a camp is positively associated with the age of the household head, having a chronic illness (likely reflecting proximity to health services), and employment in sectors such as construction and manufacturing. Larger households with higher dependency ratios are more likely to remain in camps.
- A Freedom Index constructed from the 2022 Quality of Life Survey shows that refugees living outside camps score better overall on non-monetary dimensions of welfare, particularly on perceived freedom from discrimination and ability to make life decisions. Among camp residents, 56 percent experience an absence of freedom as defined by the index, compared to 53 percent of those outside camps. Camp residents are more optimistic about the future, but refugees living outside camps report higher rates of mental health difficulties.
- School enrollment among Syrian refugee children (ages 6–17) increased from 78 percent in 2015–16 to 85 percent in 2021, with higher rates in camps (91 percent) than in host communities (83 percent). Regression results identify the household head’s level of education as the strongest positive predictor of enrollment (+10.7 to +18.8 percentage points depending on attainment level), while having a male household head (−5.8 percentage points), being a male child (−3.1 percentage points), and living in rural areas outside camps (−3.5 percentage points) are associated with lower enrollment rates. Consumption levels, receipt of assistance, and duration of stay in Jordan were not statistically significant determinants.
- Humanitarian cash assistance reduces monetary poverty among Syrian refugees by 20 percentage points, from 78 percent before assistance to 58 percent after. In camps, cash and in-kind assistance reduces the pre-transfer poverty rate from 91 percent to 45 percent; in host communities, cash assistance reduces the pre-transfer poverty rate from 75 percent to 62 percent. The report estimates that $899 million annually would be required to close the poverty gap entirely; at current targeting efficiency levels, the shortfall is approximately $244 million per year.
- Current targeting of cash assistance shows meaningful inefficiencies, with an estimated $120 million in annual leakage to non-poor households and a 63 percent targeting efficiency rate. Within camps, the most destitute households sometimes receive less assistance than those above the poverty line. An updated 2021 Proxy Means Test model—using 20 variables covering more diverse aspects that correlate with refugee welfare—reduces inclusion errors from 22 percent to 13 percent and correctly classifies 80 percent of households, compared to 77 percent under the 2014 model. However, exclusion errors rise from 3 percent under the 2014 model to 13 percent under the 2021 model, meaning more poor households are incorrectly screened out.
- Only 24 percent of working-age Syrian refugees are employed, compared to 30 percent of Jordanians and 68 percent of other foreign nationals, and the employment rate among Syrian women is just 3 percent. Gender is the strongest predictor of labor market inactivity among Syrians in Jordan: Syrian women are 44 percentage points less likely to be active in the labor market than men and 39 percentage points less likely to be employed. Among Syrians aged 15–29, 58 percent are not in employment, education, or training (NEET), well above the 38 percent rate for Jordanians and 23 percent for other foreigners.
- Even after controlling for personal characteristics, employed Syrians are 17.2 percentage points more likely than Jordanians to earn low wages. Only 6.3 percent of refugees outside camps and 12.4 percent of refugees inside camps hold an active work permit. High permit costs are cited by 85 percent of camp residents as the primary reason for non-renewal, whereas for out-of-camp refugees the main reasons were cost (43 percent), sector restrictions (18 percent), and unemployment (14 percent). Sector restrictions confine refugees largely to construction (25 percent of employed Syrians), manufacturing (18 percent), and wholesale/retail (16 percent). Most Syrians in Jordan are employed informally: 92 percent of employed Syrians lack a written open-ended contract and only 1 percent contribute to social security.
- Refugee economic participation already reduces the annual cost of hosting by approximately $860 million compared to a counterfactual in which refugees earn no income, with the bulk of savings ($821 million) coming from reduced subsistence assistance needs. Under a full-participation scenario—modeled by matching refugees with comparable workers to project their earnings if labor market restrictions were removed—annual savings could increase by a further $400 million, reducing total per-refugee hosting costs from $1,148 to $543 per year.
The report concludes that the cost of hosting Syrian refugees in Jordan is not fixed but is a direct function of policy choices regarding economic participation. Cash assistance, while vital—reducing monetary poverty by 20 percentage points—is insufficient to eliminate poverty on its own, and funding shortfalls and declining donor engagement make increased reliance on humanitarian transfers an unlikely path forward. Syrian refugees face persistent earnings gaps and high informality that cannot be fully explained by their demographic characteristics, pointing instead to regulatory constraints—sector restrictions, costly work permits, and unequal treatment—as the binding barriers. Refugees themselves are already signaling a preference for economic agency: the majority voluntarily accept higher monetary poverty in host communities in exchange for freedom of movement and employment opportunities. The largest gains for refugee welfare lie outside the humanitarian system and economic participation already generates approximately $860 million in annual savings relative to a no-income baseline—savings that could increase by a further $400 million if labor market restrictions were removed. These figures provide an empirical basis for a renewed bargain between Jordan and the international community: one in which Jordan’s contribution to a global public good is formally recognized, donor savings from refugee self-reliance are redirected toward host-community development, and policy reforms are supported by stronger evidence, greater transparency, and sustained high-level dialogue.